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V. THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
This study explores corporate governance (CG) structures and practices in Jamaica to fill 
theoretical, practical and public policy gaps. The study is organized into four parts and nine 
chapters.  Part one is an introduction to the thesis and the contextual setting. Part two explores the 
theoretical and methodological framework via an in-depth review of the social science literature on 
CG and sets out the research strategy and methodology. Part three analyses and discusses the 
findings from the fieldwork, and part four examines gaps, proposes recommendations for reform, 
discusses conclusions, limitations of the study, and suggestions for future research.   
The study assumes a two-fold hypothesis of a CG problem and public policy problem. The 
CG problem is characterised by a dearth of empirical literature, a lack of CG awareness, and 
inadequate and poor CG practices among public bodies.  The public policy problem is defined by a 
weak regulatory framework, systemic weaknesses in the financial sector, and pervasive corporate 
and political corruption. In seeking solution to the problems under review, the study adapts the 
interviewer’s administered survey method supported by three in-depth case studies and two focus 
groups. The views of about 100 respondents were sought and an additional unspecified number of 
informal informants. This multi-technique approach ensured that the weaknesses of a given 
technique were compensated for by the counterbalancing strengths of other techniques.  The key 
themes of focus were regulation, corruption, ownership and control, stakeholder relations, 
perceptions and role of institutional investors, board characteristics and processes and the board’s 
role in strategic decision-making and corporate disclosures.   
The findings revealed that while Jamaica has implemented several laws and regulations, 
there are still gaps in coverage, content and effectiveness of implementation. Corruption is still 
rampant in spite of evidence of a reduction since 2006 (TI 2008 Report). Ownership and control of 
Jamaican firms are highly concentrated and mainly by oligarchic groups giving way to such 
problems as an under-developed new issues market, a high degree of insider boards, inadequate 
minority protection, poor information disclosure, and incentives are aligned to dominant 
shareholders. There is a lack of representation and voice of employee and trade union 
representatives in the Jamaican boardrooms and institutional investors (II), while controlling 
approximately 75% of listed companies, are not interested in promoting CG reform over and above 
the extent to which such efforts would redound to their self-interest.  IIs play influential roles in 
financing Jamaican politics and control large distribution channels, and determine who gets large 
private sector contracts. While much is being done internationally to achieve gender balance in the 
boardroom, the mean number of females on Jamaican corporate boards is 1.8 (or 19.8%) with an 
average board size of 9.1 Directors. Cross-tabulation analyses were conducted and tests for 
relationships between and within groups of key variables (board size, Chair/CEO duality, NEDs 
vs. EDs, number of female Directors with listed and unlisted firms and dominant ownership 
dispersed vs. closely held)  and nothing of significance was found.   
The study has concluded that reform is needed in several areas. These include increase of 
coverage and content of legislation and enforcement mechanisms to improve CG and fight 
corruption; reform of corporate boards - director selection and appointments, board’s role and 
conduct of Directors, training and board performance evaluation.  Future research is directed at 
more emphasis on CG in developing countries, SMEs, public bodies and non-profit organizations, 
the role and contribution of employees and trade unions, the board’s role in influencing strategy, 
and the role of risk management. The study seeks to contribute to the growing body of 
international literature on emerging CG and targets primarily academics, practitioners and 
policymakers.   
[10] 
 
VI. DECLARATION 
  
No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application 
for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.  
 
 
VII. COPYRIGHT STATEMENT 
 
 
i.  The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns 
any copyright in it (the “Copyright”) and s/he has given The University of Manchester 
the right to use such Copyright for any administrative, promotional, educational and/or 
teaching purposes.  
 
ii.  Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts, may be made only in accordance with 
the regulations of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester. Details of these 
regulations may be obtained from the Librarian. This page must form part of any such 
copies made.  
 
iii.  The ownership of any patents, designs, trademarks and any and all other intellectual 
property rights except for the Copyright (the “Intellectual Property Rights”) and any 
reproductions of copyright works, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), 
which may be described in this thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be 
owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property Rights and Reproductions cannot and 
must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) 
of the relevant Intellectual Property Rights and/or Reproductions.  
 
iv.  Further information on the conditions under which disclosure, publication and 
exploitation of this thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property Rights and/or 
Reproductions described in it may take place is available from the Head of School of 
(Manchester Business School) (or the Vice-President).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[11] 
 
VIII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
This work has been the most demanding personal project that this author has ever 
undertaken in terms of time and financial outlays. It could not have been accomplished without 
the constructive engagement of professional and academic colleagues, corporate executives 
and Directors, public officials, close friends and relatives.  The author owes a debt of gratitude 
to these persons but it is not possible to recognise each by name herein. Thanks to the Hon. 
Douglas Orane, Chairman and CEO, and Mr. Donald Wehby, Group Chief Operating Officer, 
and the entire team at GraceKennedy Limited, for providing me the equivalent of the first 
semester tuition fee and subsequently a substantial sum towards the publishing of my book, 
Effective Corporate Governance, from which the proceeds of sales were used to finance the 
remainder of my doctoral studies. Many thanks to the Chief Executive Officer of Jamaica 
National Building Society (Mr. Earl Jarrett), Capital & Credit Financial Group (Mr. Ryland 
Campbell), and Victoria Mutual Building Society (former CEO, Mr. Karl Wright), who have 
also supported the fieldwork of this study in words and deeds.  
 
To my supervisor, Professor Jeffrey Henderson who even after departing MBS for the 
University of Bristol, where he is the Leverhulme Research Professor of International 
Development, gave his unwavering commitment to see me through to the end of this project. I 
want to thank him for the confidence he has bestowed in me, his relaxed disposition and easy 
persona that cultivates such ease and openness with his students; yet provided frank and 
constructive critique whether for restructuring or rewriting works that sometimes I thought 
were already so excellently researched and written.  Also, I want to thank Dr. Saleema Kauser 
at the Manchester Business School who supported Professor Henderson with the 
administrative formality given his transfer to Bristol.  
 
Thanks to the 75 organisations and approximately 100 members of Boards of Directors 
and Executives who impacted this study in their roles as formal and informal informants.  To 
my friends and members of my family, I thank you for constantly prodding me to take this 
work to completion.  I have gained immense inspiration just to know that there were people 
who cared. Very special acknowledgement to the contribution of my colleagues and good 
friends, Merle Donaldson-Phillips, Janelle Muschette-Leiba and Melody Samuels who have 
been consistent in their tangible assistance and moral persuasion.  
 
I found the staff in the Post Graduate Degrees Programme Office at the Manchester 
Business School to be exceptional in their support to their students.  I have benefitted from 
their unreserved and unselfish enthusiasm toward assisting their students, at times beyond their 
call of duty. I want to thank especially Mrs. Lynne Barlow-Cheetham, 
Senior Programme Administrator, and Mrs. Anusarin Lowe, Programme Administrator, for  
their support over the years.   
 
Thank you all.   
 
 
[12] 
 
 
IX. PREFACE 
 
 
There was no serious challenge in obtaining research materials, equipment and doing 
the fieldwork and write-up.  The respondents at all stages of this study were extremely 
cooperative.  My public visibility in the research environment may have aided in accessing and 
obtaining available data. This may be partially due to several factors. First, the fact that on 
return to Jamaica to do fieldwork in 2002, I quickly established myself in the field of corporate 
governance (CG) and have served in one or more capacities at key centres or repositories of 
CG information such as the Jamaica Stock Exchange (as Judge on the JSE CG Best Practice 
Awards Committee), and the Private Sector Organisation of Jamaica (PSOJ) as a member of 
its corporate governance committee.  Second, I found that most of the company respondents 
were aware of my research long before I approached them for information. This was due to my 
writing a weekly column in the Financial Gleaner on CG. I did this immediately on return 
home in September 2002 and the column lasted for nearly three years.  
Third, in April 2005, I published my first book, Effective Corporate Governance: An 
Emerging Market (Caribbean) Perspective on Governing Corporations in a Disparate World 
(Jamaica and the United States) and established a successful business. This book was the first 
of its kind to have been published by an author from a developing country. Fourth, I obtained 
some notoriety from my countrymen for pioneering the training and devlopment of Boards of 
Directors of Public Sector Entities in Jamaica and the Caribbean in the areas of Effective 
Corporate Governance and Public Accountability. At the time of writing, I would have trained 
just over 4000 Directors, Senior Execuitves and Government Ministers throughout the 
Caribbean, South America, South Africa and Mauritius.  I have also won the contract to 
“Clarify the governance framework for Public Bodies in Jamaica”—the first attempt by a 
Caribbean government to develop a corporate goveranance code for State-owned Enterprises. 
Finally, I was already in the public’s purview prior to enrolment at MBS while serving as a 
Spokesman on Emerging Technologies for the then Opposition Jamaica Labour Party (which 
now forms the Government).   
In spite of the preceding, due to elapsed time between collecting data and completion 
of write up, I had to allow myself an extended vacation in the summer of 2008 and the first 
nine months of 2009 to finalize and fine-tune this thesis to facilitate completion. This included 
going back to several of the companies I interviewed earlier to obtain more current and up-to-
date information, as well as to re-write my literature review which by then was partially dated.  
All in all, I had little regrets as the experiences gained in business and the extended 
time spent on this thesis helped me to hone my academic skills, theoretical knowledge, and 
practice experiences. When all these factors are combined, I think they have made me more 
intellectually equipped to contribute to the growing body of CG literature and to raise the 
standards of CG throughout the Caribbean, in the private and public sectors.  
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CaPRI  - Caribbean Policy Research Institute  
CCMB  - Capital & Credit Merchant Bank 
CEO  - Chief Executive Officer 
CII  - Council of Institutional Investors 
CGP  - Corporate Governance Problem  
CSR  - Corporate Social Responsibility   
ED  - Executive Director 
FIA  - Financial Institutions Act 
FINSAC - Financial Sector Adjustment Company 
FSC  - Financial Services Commission 
GCGF  - Global Corporate Governance Council 
GOJ  - Government of Jamaica  
IAQS  - Interviewer’s Administered Questionnaire Survey  
IAS  - International Accounting Standards 
IASC  - International Accounting Standards Council 
ICAJ  - Institute of Chartered Accountants of Jamaica 
IMF  - International Monetary Fund 
INTEC - Information Technology Fund 
IFC  - International Finance Cooperation 
IOSCO - International Organization of Securities Commission 
ISGC  - Inclusive Social Governance Council 
JCC  - Jamaica Chamber Of Commerce
  
JDIC   - Jamaica Depositary Insurance Corporation  
JMMB  - Jamaica Money Market Brokers Limited 
JSE  - Jamaica Stock Exchange 
MFPS  - Ministry of Finance and the Public Service  
MOU  - Memorandum of Understanding 
NAS  -  Non-Anglo-Saxon   
NED  - Non-Executive Director 
NIBJ  - National Investment Bank of Jamaica 
NYCF  - New York City Funds 
OECD - Organisation for Economic Cooperation and  
Development 
PSOJ  - Private Sector Organisation of Jamaica 
SEC  - Securities and Exchange Commission 
SOE  - State-owned Enterprise 
SWIB  - State of Wisconsin Investment Board 
TIAA-CREF   - Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association, College  
Retirement Equities Fund  
UKSA  - United Kingdom Stockholders Association 
WTO  - World Trade Organization 
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CHAPTER 1.0 THE IMPORTANCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (CG) AND 
THE PROBLEM STATEMENT   
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to examine corporate governance structures1 and practices2 
in Jamaica with the aim of prescribing recommendations for public policy reform.  The study 
is exploratory in nature given that no previous work has ever been undertaken in Jamaica on 
the subject of CG and, therefore, necessitates an understanding, albeit in a structured and 
measured manner, of as many key CG issues as possible.  The study also assumes that there 
exists several weaknesses in Jamaican CG, which are embedded in and can be addressed by a 
set of key CG elements.  These elements form the key issues under review and include: 
regulation, corruption, ownership and control; stakeholder relations (representation), 
perception and role of institutional investors, board characteristics and processes, the board’s 
role in strategic decision making and corporate disclosure.  In framing the problems for which 
solutions are sought, some of these key elements are discussed later under the Problem 
Statement of this chapter.  In the next section, the key issues of this study are outlined and 
their importance justified, followed by principal findings and some potential beneficial 
implications of the study.   
Regulation is the act of controlling and restricting human or societal behaviour by 
means of rules or restrictions and they may take many forms from legal restrictions 
promulgated by governments to self-regulation (voluntary codes) by individual firms (Bert-
Jaap et al, 2006).  Regulation also takes on such terms as Codes and Practices and these are 
discussed later in this section.   
In the last ten years, Jamaica has implemented a swathe of regulations, mainly in 
response to failures in the financial system, breaches in public procurement and the use of 
public good for private gain by public employees.  A closer examination of these regulations is 
perused in this study to determine, among others things, their effectiveness in modifying 
corporate behaviour towards greater compliance, effectiveness of implementation and 
enforcement and gaps in content that may exist. This examination would yield, it is hoped, a 
scientific basis for prescribing measures to strengthen the regulatory framework of Jamaica 
and to achieve a greater level of compliance.   
                                               
1Corporate governance structures in this study refer to laws, regulations and regulatory institutions and their role 
in CG development.  See Appendices 6.     
2
 Corporate governance practices in this study concern the board structural characteristics and its processes. See 
also Appendix 12 (item 1.7.17).  
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A strong regulatory framework provides for soundness and integrity of the financial 
system which could redound to better corporate governance and ultimately greater business 
confidence in the economy by would-be investors. Higher business confidence means greater 
likelihood of achieving a prosperous economy with an abundance of opportunities for the 
Jamaican people.  
Indeed, for the last two decades, the practice of CG is dominated by “politically” 
negotiated codes (personal experience). Typically, regulation are the “hard” laws which carry 
with them punitive measures for non-compliance and the “soft” laws or codes, which in most 
cases, have no punishable element in response to non-compliance. However, while regulation 
are non-negotiable and are established by independent governmental or quasi-governmental 
organisations, codes (self-regulations) are usually negotiated by a homogenous group of 
organisations (in similar industry) or between countries with common interests; for example, 
the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and the London Stock Exchange Rules adopted 
from the Cadbury Report by the LSE in 1999.    
Regulations are a broader concept in which Corporate Governance Structures are 
placed in this thesis.  These CG structures of concern are those institutions, reputational 
agents3, rules and voluntary Best Practices of CG, as defined by Oman (2001). These 
structures comprise formal and informal rules, including generally accepted practices, 
legislation, government regulatory bodies, stock-exchange listing rules, financial accounting 
standards, public disclosure, professional associations, business associations and chambers of 
commerce and watchdog groups. See Appendix 6.   
On the other hand, in this thesis, the Corporate Governance Practices to be explored 
include: ownership and control or their separation in Jamaica companies, board characteristics 
and processes [Chairman/CEO duality or separation, board size, number of Non-Executives 
versus Executive directors on boards, number, type and size of board committees, tenure of 
Directors, gender equality issues (female representation), board performance evaluation and 
the nature], and the quality and content of corporate disclosure.  CG Practices are activities 
that are actually implemented by employees and Directors as well as public sector officials. 
These ‘practices’ very often contradicts the written rules and codes as individuals sometimes 
do what they please to satisfy their own self-interests.  It is one thing to implement strict rules 
but it is another issue when company Directors, employees and public officials do what they 
                                               
3
 Reputational agents refer to private sector agents, self-regulating bodies, the media, investment and corporate 
governance analysts, and civic society that reduce information asymmetry, improve monitoring of the firms, and 
shed light on opportunistic behavior (OECD/World Bank, 1999, June, Paris MOU).  
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please.  These practices along with the identifiable CG structures will form the key issues of 
focus in this thesis. See section 3.7 for more on CG Practices.   
Corruption: In this thesis, the perception and incidents of corruption are explored with 
a view of framing recommendations for policy consideration to minimize its prevalence in 
Jamaica. By this, it is hoped that business confidence will be improved and sustained and 
economic losses to government and the private sector reduced.  
 While corruption is treated in various ways from one culture to another, here, the focus 
is on political (mainly) and corporate corruption. On the one hand, political corruption is 
defined as use of legislated power by government officials for illegitimate private gain 
(Transparency International Annual Reports 1999-2007; CaPRI, 2007).  The misuse of 
government power for other purposes, such as repression of political opponents and general 
police brutality, is not considered political corruption.  In sum, the World Bank defines 
political corruption as the misuse of public office for private gain. Forty-five per cent (45%) of 
Jamaican people define corruption as the misuse of public office for private gain. On the other 
hand, corporate (private sector) corruption is defined as the abuse of power by corporate 
managers against shareholders or consumers (CaPRI, 2007:13). 
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (TICPI) which measures 
corruption among public officials and politicians within countries worldwide rates Jamaica at 
3.6 out of 10 (ranking 64th).  A score of ten on the TICPI connotes an almost corruption free 
status. Neighbouring Caribbean islands Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago and Cuba had scores 
of 6.9 and 3.8, respectively, the latter two having received equal rating.   According to the 
World Bank (1997), “corruption frustrates the formation of social capital and violates public 
trust [and confidence] and corrodes social capital.” The World Bank further states that 
“[u]nchecked, the creeping accumulation of seemingly minor infractions can slowly erode 
political legitimacy.’’ (Ibid, 102–104).  In other words, the legitimacy of a government (and 
ultimately the state) is undermined.  
According to Nice (1986), “When public funds are squandered in unproductive ways or 
public Officials abuse the authority with which they have been entrusted, citizens will 
naturally be reluctant to permit expansion in government operations. This situation will be 
particularly important to people looking to government for assistance (p. 278).  In fact, there is 
heavy reliance on government by citizens for various forms of services and as such, social 
security dependence is of growing proportion.   
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 Ownership and Control: This study investigates the nature of existing corporate 
ownership in Jamaica and how, if at all, it influences important CG drivers such as board 
composition and leadership responses to emerging CG practices. High ownership 
concentration is assumed to characterise Jamaican firms and is associated with several 
governance problems such as the compliance with regulation, adoption of corporate 
governance recommendations, exclusion of employee and trade union representation, and the 
reliance on bank loans and family finance rather than public finance through the local capital 
markets, to name just a few.  
 Stakeholder Relations (Representation): Given the growing importance of stakeholder 
relations and representation in the international CG debate (Donaldson and Preston 1995; 
Sternberg 1997; Tirole 2001), and based on claims of stakeholder underrepresentation and 
voice among Jamaican corporate boards (pre-study personal knowledge), this study explores a 
wide range of stakeholder issues to better understand how employees, trade unions and others, 
contribute in firm-stakeholder interrelationships and organisational outcomes. This study 
assumes that a cordial and mutually beneficial stakeholder-firm relationship could foster long-
term corporate value and strengthening firm external networks, corporate reputation and good 
corporate citizenship.  
 Perception and Role of IIs: The study of IIs in this thesis seeks an understanding of 
their importance and how their role can aid CG development.  IIs hold voting rights, enter into 
dialogue with the management, stage proxy contests and voice concerns, ensure that board 
members have adequate experience and are truly independent, are usually privy to a wealth of 
information on their investee companies and this allows for early detection of risks, can 
boycott, display or withhold needed loyalty, and vote on key issues.  According to Theurillat et 
al (2007), IIs can possess much clout as it relates to the operational and informational 
efficiency of the financial markets which engenders liquidity and transparency as well as 
guaranteeing good quality public information. With these myriad of possible levels of 
participation, the Jamaican IIs could indeed play a crucial role in improving the state of CG in 
Jamaica.  
 Board Characteristics and Processes: Given the exploratory nature of this study, it 
seeks to examine issues that have not previously been studied empirically in Jamaica in an 
effort to establish body of information on which further studies can be built. Some of the 
issues of critical importance are board size, Chairman/CEO duality of separation, non-
executive versus Executive Directors, board committees and their composition, director tenure, 
gender and inequality issues, board performance evaluation, director training,  frequency of 
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board meetings, timing of distribution of board papers; and proxy forms. The latter are not 
included in the key elements of focus of the thesis, albeit important.   
 Board’s Role in Firm Strategic Decision-making:  Board’s role in decision making is a 
critical value-added contribution. However, because Directors are not often trained and 
properly prepared for their task, they come to the boardroom uncertain of their role and tend 
instead to become too involved in the day-to-day activity of the firm (personal experience).   In 
this study, the role and extent of involvement of the Board and Senior Management, jointly 
and separately, are explored with the hope that the findings will yield beneficial answers to 
effect appropriate improvement in boardroom dynamics and effectiveness.  
 In the past two decades, there has been increasing scrutiny of Boards of Directors, 
increased vigilance by shareholders and a raging public scepticism in light of questionable 
events of corporate failures.  Codes and guidelines have been issued by investor groups calling 
on boards to become more involved in firms’ strategic decision-making processes.  Whilst 
there is evidence that boards are becoming more involved (Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2008), 
the overwhelming impression, mainly from the business press, is one of boards’ passivity and 
reluctance to introduce contestability into the boardroom (Stiles, 2001). In Jamaica, the 
passivity can be described as extreme and unbeneficial to shareholders themselves and by 
extension the investment community (personal experience). Though research on board 
involvement in strategic decision making have increased since the start of this decade, there 
remains a dearth of academic studies featuring the perceptions of Directors themselves as to 
their roles and influence in the core decision-making process of the organisation.  This study 
also seeks to add new knowledge to existing literature on board’s role in strategic decision-
making.   
Corporate Disclosure is critical in any CG debate and hence no less in the Jamaican 
context. There are many claims of weak disclosure regimes and inadequate coverage of 
published CG information (Jamaica Stock Exchange 2008 Report).  In response, this study 
seeks to determine the nature, role, coverage, appropriateness of existing disclosure regimes 
and downsides, if any, with the intent of proposing others and strengthening existing regimes.  
See Appendix 3C for the detailed questions under the respective broad themes.   
 Furthermore, some companies did not comply with the Jamaica Stock Exchange (JSE) 
timely financial reporting guidelines and many other regulatory requirements within the 
financial sector.  Consequently, these companies were often de-listed from the JSE resulting in 
the freezing of shareholders’ investments as no stocks are traded during suspension. With 
weak, inadequate or the total lack of regulation, including those relating to shareholders’ 
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protection, there was little or no compensation to these shareholders.  Shareholders suffered 
the loss of opportunity cost of their investment, as well as, the total lack of access to their 
hard-earned assets as many of these companies were delisted on a temporary basis or over a 
protracted period.  Findings of this study could assist in better understanding the underlying 
causes and propose solutions for an improved information disclosure regime for Jamaica. 
Hence, this issue should be of interest to the entire investment community and those interested 
in the theoretical aspects of corporate information disclosure.  
Principal Findings: Some principal findings of this study revealed that while Jamaica 
has implemented several regulations and informal voluntary CG codes, there are still several 
regulatory gaps in coverage, content and effectiveness of implementation. Corruption is still 
rampant in spite of evidence of a reduction in 2008 compared to 2006 (TI 2008 Report). 
Ownership and control of Jamaican firms are highly concentrated giving way to such problems 
as an under-developed new issues market, a high degree of insider boards, inadequate minority 
protection, poor information disclosure, and incentives being aligned to dominant 
shareholders.  Cross tabulations were conducted on selected categories of data (sectoral and 
industry groups) such as between listed and unlisted companies and between  highly dispersed 
and closely held dominantly owned firms using variables such as board size, Chairman/CEO 
duality of separation, number of NEDs and Executive Directors, and presence of female 
Directors. In all the tests conducted, no statistical significance was observed, i.e., there no 
relationship to be found between an industry or sectoral group and the level of existence or 
prevalence of a particular variable. There is a lack of representation and voice of employee and 
trade union representatives in the Jamaican boardrooms and institutional investors (II), while 
controlling approximately 75% of listed companies, are not interested in promoting CG reform 
over and above the extent to which such efforts would redound to their self-interest.  
Notwithstanding this, IIs play influential roles in financing Jamaican politics and they control 
large distribution channels, and determine who gets large private sector contracts. 
Several areas have been identified for reform. These include the need for regulatory 
strengthening in coverage and strategies for the effectiveness of enforcing legislations, 
implementation of anti-corruption measures, widening coverage and content of information 
disclosure, reform of corporate boards, director selection, and training, remuneration and 
performance evaluation issues.  
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The study seeks to contribute to the growing body of international literature on 
emerging markets corporate governance and targets primarily academics, practitioners and 
policymakers.   
The remainder of this chapter includes seven sections. Section 1.2 outlines the subject 
matter contextual background and provides a background overview on recent developments 
and causes for concern in the local and international CG agenda.  Section 1.3 articulates the 
importance of corporate governance and why. Section 1.4 outlines the problem statement and 
motivation of study which is two-fold: 1.) corporate governance problem, and 2.) public policy 
problem.  Section 1.5 highlights the research challenges and triumphs while section 1.6 
presents a selection of beneficial implications of this study. Section 1.7 presents the 
organisation of the different chapters of this thesis and section 1.8 summarises the issues of 
this chapter.    
 
1.2  SUBJECT CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND   
In the two last decades, increased worldwide public attention as a result of high-profile 
corporate scandals and collapses such as Polly Peck, Bank of Credit and Commerce, Shell, 
Eurotunnel, and Maxwell/Mirror Group, in the United Kingdom, and Enron, WorldCom, Tyco 
and Aldelphia, in the United States of America, have forced governments, regulators and 
boards of companies to carefully reconsider fundamental issues of CG as essential for public 
economic interest.  It was also reported in the ‘Commonwealth Association for Corporate 
Governance Guidelines (CACG)’, (August 1999:1,) that “volatility and instability experienced 
in emerging markets in recent times have drawn attention to the implications of corrupt 
practices and bad administration in national financial systems and on public expenditure.”  
In addition, increased privatization, financial market liberalisation, and high-profile 
corruption have led major international development and donor institutions such as the World 
Bank, OECD and the IMF to reconsider their approach to global governance.  For example, 
the World Bank’s increased focus on corporate behaviour, management, and policies has seen 
it paying particular attention to the governance of the banking sector, due to the sector’s 
enormous influence on developing economies, especially where stock markets are 
underdeveloped, (Monks and Minow, 2008:395). According to the Corporate Governance 
Policy (World Bank), the resulting international debate on CG has shown that underlying 
principles of fairness, transparency, accountability and responsibility reflect minimum 
standards necessary to provide legitimacy to the corporate sector. It is hoped that the principles 
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could reduce financial crisis vulnerability and broaden and deepen access to development 
capital.   
Jamaica, the focus of the thesis, has suffered from similar problems. In Jamaica, the 
‘Sunday Observer’ (October 17, 1999: pg. 1,4-7) in its front page article entitled, ‘Busting the 
Piggy Bank,’ reported fat pay packets and disparities in public sector salaries. This report 
brought to public attention the fact that many public sector bosses were in breach of 
established pay guidelines and were paying themselves excessive salaries of millions of dollars 
at tax-payers’ expense. After a full-scale investigation requested by the public and endorsed by 
the Government into the operations of more than 80% of the just under 200 public entities, 
then Prime Minister P. J Patterson reporting to Parliament on April 12, 1999 conceded that, 
“the Finance Ministry had lost control of the salaries in some of these state-owned 
companies.” (Sunday Observer, 1999:1) 
During the 1990s while prominent world financial markets (South East Asia, Russia 
and Argentina) collapsed resulting in significant losses in assets, closures of many financial 
institutions, loss of jobs and the plunging of many once booming economies into depression, 
Jamaica also experienced significant financial instability.  Between 1993 and 1999 in Jamaica, 
several leading banks and other financial institutions collapsed or were bailed-out or taken 
over by others. Four of the country’s largest and oldest insurance companies and at least 
fifteen merchant and investment banks and other financial institutions, which accounted for 
approximately 30% of depositors’ value in all financial institutions, experienced closures 
(Bonnick, G., 1999.)  
The Jamaican public has received no defensible explanation about these crises which 
occurred and directly affected both public and private companies. However, what remains 
evident is that the failures were partially due to poor administration and outright neglect of the 
duties of responsibility, care and loyalty to shareholders on the part of board Chairmen, 
Directors, CEOs and management (Hilton, 1999).  
The Directors of boards are persons with whom the responsibility of governance is 
entrusted and therefore should be held accountable.  Good CG is achieved when Directors and 
management agree on a set of principles and practices which seek to ensure accountability to 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Apart from each corporation’s mission and values, the 
board and management must ensure that the laws governing good business conduct within 
their jurisdictions are upheld.  In addition, the board’s relationship with its internal and 
external stakeholders (customers, management, employees, shareholders, bankers, investors, 
suppliers, the community, media and others), ought to be ethically sound. To ensure that these 
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responsibilities are upheld by Directors, many countries have codified standards of conduct of 
boards especially for stock exchange-listed companies. According to Tricker (1994): 
  
Whilst managerial processes have been widely explored, relatively little 
attention has been paid to the processes by which companies are governed.  
If management is about effectively and efficiently running businesses, 
governance is about seeing that this goal is properly achieved. All 
companies need governing as well as managing (Tricker R. I., 1994). 
 
Critical to the assertions of Tricker, the governors (Directors) themselves need to be 
governed and so it is important that companies are not only managed by the managers but that 
there are structures and procedures to ensure checks and balances at all levels. The problem of 
poorly administered corporations has significant implications for stakeholders, and for the 
performance of the economy as a whole.  For example, when the financial system collapses, a 
“ripple effect” is triggered causing widespread failures of “satellite” businesses.  During the 
1993-1999 melt-down of Jamaica’s financial system, scores of businesses, many totally 
unrelated to the financial sector, failed resulting in the loss of thousands of jobs, loss of foreign 
exchange earning potential, loss of national ownership of key institutions (as many were 
bought by foreigners) and loss of confidence in the political economy.  
Unlike the more than sixty countries and major international institutions which have 
established national and international corporate governance codes 
(www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php) to date, there is no national code for any Caribbean 
economy. In addition, efforts by the Private Sector Organisation of Jamaica (PSOJ) and the 
Caribbean Regional Taskforce on Corporate Governance (CRTCCG) have been criticised for 
being inadequate and inappropriate for the Jamaican and Caribbean realities, respectively. See 
chapter two, section 2.4.1.    
 
1.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND WHY NOW 
  
The process of continuous change has allowed developed countries such as Jamaica to 
establish a complex mosaic of laws, regulations, institutions, and implementation capacity in 
the public and private sectors.  These systems of laws and institutions are by no means 
intended to shackle businesses but rather to allow them to function more effectively by 
attracting the best human capital and financial resources on affordable terms. 
The economic crises of 1997 in East Asia, followed by those of Argentina and Brazil, 
and other regions, similar to the Jamaican crisis mentioned earlier, have demonstrated how 
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macro economic difficulties can be exacerbated by systematic failure of CG.  In the Jamaican 
context, this failure stems from weak legal and regulatory systems, inconsistent accounting 
and auditing standards, poor banking practices, weak and unregulated capital markets, 
ineffective oversight by corporate Boards of Directors, and little regard for the rights of 
minority shareholders (Hilton 1999). 
The case for the importance and study of CG in this thesis: corporate governance is 
important at this time and particularly for emerging economies like Jamaica for several 
reasons. First, the principal-agency problem is at the centre of what makes CG important.  This 
problem grows out of the separation of ownership and control and of corporate outsiders and 
insiders (Berle and Means, 1932).  In the absence of the protection and checks-and-balances 
that good CG provides, asymmetry of information and difficulties of monitoring mean that 
capital providers who lack control over the corporation will find it risky and costly to protect 
themselves from the opportunistic behaviour of managers or controlling shareholders.  
 Consequently, without meaningful protection for external capital providers, those who 
control the corporation can use their position to misappropriate economic benefits, often at the 
expense of long-term performance and value of the enterprise.  Where poor CG is the norm, 
the problem extends beyond underperformance in the corporate sector to greater vulnerability 
of the financial system, since it is difficult for local capital providers (banks and institutional 
investors) to avoid governance risks (World Bank/OECD 1999)4. 
Second, is that it is becoming increasingly clear that a healthy and competitive 
corporate sector is fundamental for sustained and shared growth - sustained in that it can 
withstand economic shocks, shared in that it delivers benefits to all of society.  According to 
Vision 2030, Jamaica:  
Good governance frameworks seek to be responsible for allowing 
rights and enforcing responsibilities for management at the appropriate 
levels; local, national, regional and global. Such governance 
frameworks enable the participation of all stakeholders in decision-
making related to development and include mechanisms for ensuring 
transparency and accountability (PIOJ 2009). 
 
Third, is that whether or not firms had previously seen it necessary to internationalize 
in search of larger markets, competitive pressures brought about by globalisation have now 
made it extremely necessary to tap both domestic and international markets in quantities and 
ways that would have been inconceivable even a decade ago.  To effectively compete and 
                                               
4
 Corporate Governance: Framework for Implementation, World Bank/OECD 1999 
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attract international and domestic capital, the reputation of firms is becoming more and more 
important.  Oman (2001) argues that increasingly, firms, individual investors, funds, banks and 
other financial institutions are basing their decisions not only on a company’s outlook, but also 
on its reputation and its governance.  It is the growing need to attract and access financial 
resources, domestic and foreign, and to harness the power of the private sector for economic 
and social progress that has brought CG into prominence the world over.  
Fourth, sound CG is important not only to attract long term “potent capital” but more 
so, to broaden and deepen local capital markets by attracting local investors, both individual 
and institutional.  Unlike international investors who can diversify their risks, Jamaican 
investors are often captive to the system and face greater risks, particularly in an environment 
that is opaque and does not protect the rights of minority shareholders (Kerr V, 2005:182-192).  
As a group, domestic investors constitute a large potential pool of stable long-term resources 
that is critical to development.  If local capital markets are to grow, CG standards will need to 
improve to give investors the protection required to encourage them to provide capital.  
Fifth, while Jamaica is not stacking up too badly with many of the regulatory 
frameworks in place, this is not the norm for the rest of the Caribbean, which features 
significant divergence in the maturity of supporting institutions, laws and regulations and 
human resources. The challenge for the Caribbean as a whole will be for the region to adopt 
systems of CG suitable to member countries’ own corporate structures and implementation 
capacities, in the public and private sectors, to create a culture of enforcement and compliance.  
These small island states will need to do so in a manner that is credible and well understood 
both locally and across borders.   
Sixth, CG has only recently emerged as a discipline in academia, although it has been a 
strand of political economy for centuries. While the importance of CG is now widely 
recognised, the terminology and analytical tools are still emerging.  The voluminous literature 
now developed has largely ignored the developing world and significantly favours the 
developed and advanced industrialised economies.  Therefore, this study comes at a critical 
time as it seeks to highlight the realities of CG in an emerging market such as Jamaica, in an 
effort to influence reform as well as to support the transition of CG into a profession and serve 
the best interests of academia, practitioners and policymakers in the private and public sectors.  
Seventh, although CG may not prevent corruption, effective CG should make it more 
difficult for corrupt practices to develop and take root, and more likely that corrupt practices 
will be discovered early and eliminated. Effective corporate governance is a check on the 
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power of the relatively few individuals within the corporation who control large amounts of 
other people’s money (Oman 2001).  
Eight, by no means exhaustive, is the role of the World Bank in improving CG in 
developing countries, many with similar challenges to those faced by Jamaica and for which 
this thesis seeks solutions.   In the late 1990s in Russia, a substantial share of profits of oil 
companies was siphoned off by their controlling shareholders, leaving the companies in debt 
to creditors, employees and the state.  In the Czech Republic, thousands of small shareholders 
lost their investments as “tunneling” schemes by insiders, stripped privatized companies of 
their assets (www.worldbank.org/html/fbd/privatesector/cgi/worldbank/OECD/1999:2).  
At the World Bank’s annual meeting of October 1998, the Bank announced an initial 
raft of measures to improve governance worldwide, including expert and technical assistance, 
knowledge sharing and loans tied to CG reform.  Very soon after, the Bank established an 
Internet site offering a catalogue of governance codes, research materials and links to CG 
resources. In Britain, the then Chancellor Gordon Brown, speaking at the above mentioned 
meeting, called for the Bank to endorse the OECD Principles and for the Bank’s individual 
country reports to list how each market was implementing these principles. Brown was 
relentless in his plea and made further calls at the Commonwealth Summit and the meeting of 
G7 Finance Ministers for international principles and codes of Best Practices on CG and 
accounting as part of efforts to stabilise the global economy (Monks and Minow, 2008:395-
396).  
The seriousness and importance given to CG was further highlighted when the World 
Bank’s President, James Wolfensohn, endorsed governance reform in “The Economist” of late 
1998, in that publication’s forecast for the coming year.  He asserted that: 
 “Strong corporate governance produces good social progress and good 
corporate governance can make a difference by broadening ownership 
and reducing concentration of power within societies.  It bolsters capital 
markets and stimulates innovation. It fosters longer-term foreign direct 
investment, reduces volatility, and deters capital flight.”   
 
Wolfensohn demanded tough rules of transparency and disclosure and stated that in 
Southeast Asia the Bank would lay down strict requirements for financial and corporate 
restructuring in return for financial assistance.  The World Bank’s crisis loans to Korea (US$2 
billion), Indonesia (US$1 billion), Thailand (US$400 million) and Malaysia (US$300 million) 
were linked partly to CG reforms being made by those countries.  These reforms were 
underpinned by studies conducted by the Bank’s Chief Economist who found that countries 
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that pursue privatizations without putting good CG structures in place experience worse 
economic growth. These results support frequently voiced criticisms of the IMF for promoting 
free market policies without securing meaningful securities law, regulation, disclosure 
practices, etc. Furthermore, CG has been adopted as one of the 12 core best-practice standards 
by the international financial community.   
In summary, corporate governance promotes greater transparency, accountability, and 
conformity to laws and regulations. As a result, wealth is maximised and long-term prosperity 
for the company, its owners and stakeholders is assured. Moreover, this preserves company 
integrity and reputation, as it minimises abuse of power, employment discrimination, 
mistreatment of shareholders, and poor accounting practices. Above all, CG can act as a shield 
against widespread financial crises. 
Nonetheless, corporate governance is not just about a commitment to such ideals. More 
importantly, it emphasises the significance of ethics in business. For instance, a commitment 
to transparency results in better compliance to laws and regulations.  Accordingly, this lessens 
the likelihood of fraudulent business dealings and allows corporations to attract more 
investments because of the increased confidence of local and international investors.    
Having justified the importance of corporate governance and its relevance for study in 
this thesis, the problem statement and motivation of this study are outlined in the next section. 
 
1.4  THE PROBLEM STATEMENT AND MOTIVATION OF STUDY  
1.4.1 The Motivation for this Study  
   
The motivation for this research is two-fold in nature.  First, it is closely intertwined 
with the author’s personal and professional ambition. The author having worked for nearly two 
decades in the private and public sectors of Jamaica, has developed a genuine appreciation for 
and wanting to contribute in a meaningful way to stemming the growing incidents of 
corruption in both the private and public sectors. He also has an interest in and passion for 
improving the state of regulatory maturity which is at varying stages, and for this reason, is 
often breached by the very enforcers and vanguards and of the laws and government policies. 
Furthermore, there are weaknesses and lack of adequate oversight which give rise to other 
issues such as inefficiencies, ineffectiveness and bureaucratic red-tape in the delivery of public 
services and in many aspects of the private sector.  
The author of this thesis in addition to wanting to make a personal and national 
contribution in helping to improve corporate and political governance, wants to do this 
consistent with his own professional aspirations, which is to further develop his management 
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consulting experience, public policy analytical skills and to contribute to the growing 
international body of scholarly work in the area of corporate governance through publications 
and policy dialogue. This research and its  findings, albeit exploratory, is unique in the sense 
that it is the first of the kind for the Caribbean and could serve as a springboard on which to 
build further empirically rigorous and sound studies in furthering both public policy and 
general academic interests in CG within and beyond the Caribbean. 
By the completion of this thesis, it is expected that the candidate will have honed his 
research and technical reporting writing skills, sharpen his analytical thinking, refined his 
research fieldwork techniques and be able to weave through voluminous literature and be able 
to get to essential issues expeditiously and effectively. All these experiences and new 
knowledge and skills can only serve to enhance his overall professional competencies in his 
chosen field and make a more rounded academic and practitioner.   
The second motivational factor for this study has its genesis in two fundamental 
challenges with relevance to corporate governance and public policy. First, is the Corporate 
Governance Problem (CGP). Second, is the Public Policy Problem (PPP).  Like any social 
problem, corporate governance arises from institutional, historical and political contexts. In 
expounding the research problem of this thesis, one cannot be but to make the logical 
connection and associations to these institutional, historical and political contexts.   
The CGP is three fold in nature. First, is  the lack of empirically sound data on any 
previous work on CG in emerging markets generally and in Jamaica, both prior to my 
commencement of doctoral studies in 2001 and subsequent to my publishing the book, 
Effective Corporate Governance: An Emerging Market (Caribbean) Perspective in Governing 
Corporations in a Disparate World in 2005. Second, is the lack of awareness and 
understanding of the importance of corporate governance to the Jamaican economy as evident 
by the absence of a National Corporate Governance Code.  Third, are inadequate corporate 
governance structures and practices in the private and public institutional arrangement of 
Jamaica.   
The second challenge is the Public Policy Problem.  Like the CGP, there are three 
underlying issues.  First, is a prevailing weak and relatively underdeveloped regulatory 
framework in both the private and public sectors, which has been proven to give way to 
collapses in the financial system and cases of public sector inefficiencies, fraud and corruption. 
Therefore, the need for public policy reform to improve CG, avoid corporate crises and 
minimise corruption in the public and private sectors is a matter of national importance (MFPS 
Paper No. 56, September 2002). Second, are systemic weaknesses in the local financial sector 
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which have resulted in a collapse of the financial sector during the 1990s. The third challenge 
is related to perennial incidents of real cases of corporate and political corruption, particularly 
in the public sector. Having identified the context of the CG problem in the preceding, this is 
therefore discussed in greater detail in the ensuing section.  
Notwithstanding the above, the CGPs overlap the public policy problems and vice 
versa. On the one hand, the lack in CG awareness, dearth of empirical literature, and 
inadequacies and poor state of CG in public bodies, all implicate public policy. On the other 
hand, weak regulatory structure, systemic weaknesses in the financial sector and the 
perceptions and incidents of corruption in Jamaica, all have serious implications for the private 
corporatised sector in as much as they have critical implications for Government and the 
public service as a whole. Therefore, the issues of CG are inextricably linked with those of 
public policy and vice versa.  See Figure 1.0 for a diagrammatic illustration of the problem 
statement.  
 
1.4.2 The Corporate Governance Problem in Jamaica  
 A dearth of empirical literature: There is a dearth of empirical data on CG in 
emerging markets generally and there has never been a study on any aspect of CG in Jamaica. 
Additionally, the lack of understanding of existing CG structures, corporate board practices- 
board composition and characteristics, the nature and role of corporate disclosure and the role 
of the board in strategic decision-making, among other factors, put Jamaica at a serious 
disadvantage at this time. Furthermore, the absence of formal studies on CG would further 
constrain any future attempt by Government or the private sector towards the development of a 
national CG framework, as there would be little or no background information, and more 
importantly, no empirically reliable data from which to draw.   
 It is essential that this theoretical gap be bridged. Hence, this thesis seeks to enrich CG 
scholarship for the benefit of practitioners (corporate profit-oriented leaders who want to 
improve board effectiveness and company performance), politicians and public policy experts  
(who want to improve accountability and transparency in Government and efficiency and 
effectiveness of public governance), the academic community of scholars, students and 
researchers (who want new insights into CG from a developing country’s perspective), 
journalists, the media, watchdog groups and independent scholars and consultants.    
A perceived lack of corporate governance awareness: Although there are no empirical 
studies on the level and nature of CG awareness among Jamaican professionals, it is this 
[31] 
 
Researcher’s studied opinion and experience that at best, such knowledge would be at the very 
minimum. Like most other initiatives designed to benefit a broad spectrum of persons, to 
achieve buy-in, one seeks to encourage participatory governance, that is, to get the 
stakeholders on board in contributing to the decision making process. A necessary precursor to 
encouraging awareness building is the dissemination of Best Practices information and a 
concerted effort to convince the Government of both the merits of good CG and the urgent 
need for reform.   
Inadequate CG structures and practices: The third plank of the CGP relates to 
inadequacies in laws, regulations institutional arrangements, standards of business practices, 
and failure to keep abreast with emerging trends in Best Practice adoption and implementation.  
In addressing these issues, several factors have been identified, which all have academic, 
public policy, and practical relevance to this study. These include: selection of Directors; 
director orientation, training and continued development, performance evaluation and 
accountability, board composition and committees and role of the board and key fiduciaries.     
Historically, public boards are not as meticulously selected and oriented as private 
boards. The statutes governing some public companies prescribe the different stakeholder 
groups that should constitute the particular board.  The ‘responsible’ Minister normally 
chooses his Directors from among a specified few or the person or persons submitted to him 
from each stakeholder group. Also, there are no written guidelines that set out the 
qualifications of a Director of a state-owned enterprise.  This problem is exacerbated by the 
non-existence of a formal programme of orientation for ‘first-time’ Directors. Prior to 2002, 
there was no known programme of director orientation in Jamaica. However, in recent years, 
some companies have been offering such a programme which often involves providing 
Directors with the company’s operational manual and director’s guide book and familiarizing 
new directors with management and the business of the organisation. This practice of properly 
orientating new board members is far from being a common practice in the Jamaican public 
sector.  
Board Evaluation: There is hardly any fully established system of evaluating and 
rewarding performance at the level of corporate boards in the public sector of Jamaica.  It has 
been reported that only one stock market listed company is known to have experimented with 
the practice of evaluating its Board of Directors, albeit through peer review.  In other words, 
performance evaluation of corporate boards is not a common practice in Jamaica, in the public 
and private sectors.  
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Board composition (diversity) is both limited and protected by some statutes. The 
statutes of State-owned Enterprises stipulate the different stakeholder groups and, to an extent, 
protect the integrity of board composition from the “Responsible Minister” who might 
otherwise be quick to appoint his political cronies.   
Critical to the global debates on CG are the issues of director selection and orientation, 
performance accountability (evaluation) and board composition. These three issues have been 
determined from the doctoral research proposal stage to be of critical relevance in this study, 
given the importance of the effectiveness of State-owned Enterprises to the national economy. 
These themes have been studied in each research approach employed in this study, 
specifically, Interviewer’s Administered Questionnaire Surveys (IAQS) and Focus Group.  
 
 
   
1.4.3. The Public Policy Problem in Jamaica  
For the purposes of this analysis, the PPP has been earlier defined in the context of three 
issues: 1.) underdeveloped regulatory framework, 2.) systemic weaknesses in the financial 
regulatory structures, and 3.) the perception and incidences of corruption.  
Underdeveloped Regulatory Framework:  Firstly, Jamaica’s regulatory framework for 
both public and private sectors is a work in-progress. There is wide disparity in the different 
stages of development which spans many decades. Like other developing countries, Jamaica 
has not yet fully developed the legal and regulatory systems, enforcement capacities and the 
private sector institutions required to support effective CG.  Also, attempts at reforming CG 
have tended to be reactive, rather than proactive, and usually focus on the surface issues. 
Figure 1.0:   
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  Additionally, in spite of corporate collapses that have shaken the stock markets and big 
businesses in Asia (1997 East Asian Financial Sector Crisis), Russia, Argentina and Jamaica, 
the demise of Enron, Worldcom, Tyco and countless others, there has been no public 
proclamation or practical gesture by the Jamaican Government vis-à-vis enforced governance 
(regulations) versus volunteered governance (self-regulation). Furthermore, Jamaica has not 
kept pace with other common law jurisdictions (in the area of corporate governance 
development—emphasis added) but has tended to follow the UK model which did not codify 
the legal duties and responsibilities of Directors, nor regard the position as requiring any 
special training or skill (Bovell, C., 1999).   
 Systemic Weaknesses in the Financial Sector: Secondly, systemic weaknesses 
inherent in Jamaica’s financial regulatory sector had given way to a financial sector meltdown 
between the mid and late 1990s, which resulted in the demise of more than 150 companies, 
including 15 banks (5 commercial banks accounting for about sixty per cent (60%) of deposits 
in the population of nine commercial banks), 21 insurance companies (including all major life 
insurance companies with five accounting for over ninety per cent (90%) of premium income 
in business), one third of all merchant banks, 34 securities firms and several building societies, 
which were found insolvent and eventually had to cease operations (Bonnick 1999).   
Table 1.0: Selected Failed Institutions (1990s Financial Sector Meltdown) 
 
Company Name 
 
Date of Intervention 
Extent of Support 
(US$ billions) 
1) National Commercial Bank February 1, 1997 $0.22 
2) Crown Eagle Life Insurance Company November 1, 1997 $0.17 
3) Mutual Life Assurance Society December 16, 1997 $0.097 
 
4) Loans Bank 
February/March, 1998 $0.091 
 
5) Citizens Bank September 30, 1997 $0.03 
6) Eagle Merchant Bank November 1, 1997 $0.03 
7) Life Of Jamaica July 18, 1997 $0.02 
8) Island Life Insurance Company July 8, 1997 $0.003 
 
9) Dyoll Life Insurance Company July 3, 1997 $0.003 
 
10) Caldon Finance Merchant Bank March 22, 1998 $0.0014 
11) Fidelity Finance Merchant Bank March 25,1998 $0.0014 
 
12) Bill Craig Finance & Merchant Bank January 1, 1998. $0.0001 
 
Source: FINSAC website: www.finsac.com; Business Recovery Services Ltd (In-house data) 
 
The meltdown of the financial sector presents a CGP on the one hand and a public policy 
problem on the other hand.  It presents a public policy problem in that the failure of a 
significant number of businesses triggered a “ripple effect” resulting in the loss of thousands 
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of jobs, loss of national ownership and a general erosion of business confidence throughout the 
entire Jamaican economy.  
Table 1.0 provides an impartial list of affected financial institutions during the melt-
down which were bailed-out by the Financial Sector Adjustment Company (FINSAC), 
liquidated or bought by mainly foreign interests for less than their market value.  Table 1.0 
also lists some of the leading financial institutions, the date of FINSAC intervention and 
indicative cost to the Jamaican government (public) of the extent of FINSAC intervention.  
Among these institutions (Table 1.0), thousands of employees lost their jobs as a result of their 
collapsed or restricted operations. See Appendix 1 for a complete list of failed institutions.   
 Several of the financial institutions were taken over by the FINSAC and subsequently 
sold to foreign interests. Examples are Jamaica Citizens Bank, which was sold to the 
Trinidadian owned RBTT and Mutual Life, sold to the Trinidadian owned Guardian Life.  In 
spite of the enormity of the above crisis and its implications on the financial sector, the labour 
market, economic growth and significant social deterioration in the economy, neither the 
Government of Jamaica nor the private sector have sought to conduct a comprehensive study 
into the reasons for the crisis. However, one exception was that of sectoral studies5 conducted 
by consultants and commissioned by the said Government. This financial crisis has been 
estimated to have cost the Jamaican tax payers in excess of US$4.0 billion.   
Public and Private Sector Corruption: The third case for the Public Policy Problem 
explored under this study relates to the perception and incidence of corruption in the private 
and public sectors of Jamaica.  Exacerbating the financial crisis of the 1990s, on April 27, 
1999 in the midst of the Government reeling from three days of riots over its aborted plans to 
increase taxes on petrol, then Opposition Spokesman on Finance, Mr. Audley Shaw, M.P., 
(Minister of Finance and The Public Service since September 2007), delivered yet another 
body blow.  Mr. Shaw in his presentation to Parliament claimed: 
“…that [Dr. Garvin Chen], the President of the National Investment Bank 
of Jamaica (NIBJ), was earning a salary of over J$7.0 million a year, had a 
mortgage from the institution of J$17.0 million and received very generous 
allowances. Other officials at the NIBJ had similar hefty packages. The 
NIBJ was not the only public sector entity where such payments were being 
thrown around.  Indeed, it was common practice.” (Sunday Observer, pg.1, 
October 17, 1999.  
This exposure of public sector excesses came in the aftermath of gas riots, the 
meltdown of the financial sector, the collapse of businesses and the Government’s call for belt-
                                               
5
 FINSAC commissioned several sectoral studies with a view to better understanding aspects of the financial 
sector failures and its impact on the different sectors—banking, agriculture, manufacturing etc.  
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tightening. Shaw’s (1999) assertion embarrassed the Government and gained currency with the 
public, forcing then Prime Minister Patterson to call together public sector bosses to insist that 
they follow established pay guidelines and to order a full scale investigation into the salaries of 
about 1000 bosses in approximately two hundred state-owned entities.    
The Cabinet’s summarised version of an 81-page report commissioned by the 
Government and conducted by PriceWaterhouseCoopers was tabled in Parliament six months 
after Mr. Shaw’s revelations of April 27, 1999. It revealed that many other bosses of state 
owned entities were in breach of salary guidelines and were paying themselves excessively, 
millions of dollars of tax-payers money. Prime Minister Patterson in an address to Parliament 
on October 12, 1999, conceded that the Finance Ministry had lost control over the operation of 
many of these entities.  
The report prepared by the Cabinet Office not only confirmed hefty pay packages in 
some agencies but have revealed glaring disparities between bosses and their deputies and 
more broadly across state-owned enterprises performing essentially the same functions.  
Table 1.1 illustrates salary disparities among public sector bosses and their 
subordinates.  Unlike in the United States where the salaries and perks of corporate executives 
of listed corporations and financial regulatory Public Bodies are required to be disclosed under 
the Securities and Exchange Commission laws, in Jamaica there is no such law and the 
practice in the public and private sectors is for the disclosure of just basic salaries, which may 
or may not include travelling and sometimes contractual gratuity as a substitute for pension. 
Therefore, while this table is void of perks and bonuses which is almost non-existent in the 
public sector, it provides an illustrative view of the disparities in salaries among public sector 
executives and a true reflection of the trend throughout the public sector.  
 Salaries (excesses) have come into questioning as indicated earlier among Jamaican 
public sector bosses and have triggered intensive debates over the state of internal controls in 
the public sector (Sunday Observer, October 17, 1999, Busting the Piggy Bank, pg. 1, 4-7). In 
the international context, several cases of salary excesses have made global news headlines 
and have resulted in many CEOs being fired, organisations coming under negative criticisms 
and even tarnishing of reputation.  See Financial Times of May 9, 2002, pg. 22.  According to 
Jacob Barney:   
The first decade of the Twentieth Century began with a rash of large-scale 
corporate scandals touching every corner of the globe, and it draws to a 
close in the midst of a worldwide recession which, somewhat ironically, 
has brought to light gargantuan executive compensation packages, 
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resulting in widespread public outcry. Given the global nature of these 
two sets of corporate crises, it stood to reason that there would emerge a 
universal movement to revise the laws and practices controlling executive 
compensation. However, the mere fact that such a movement has emerged 
does not mean that the response to this movement will be uniform 
(http://works.bepress.com/jacob_barney/1/). 
 
Table:  1.1:  An Illustrative List of Salary Disparities among Public Sector Executives 
 
Name of 
Organisation 
Salary Paid 
to Exec.  
Head (mill 
J$) 
(A) 
Salary 
Paid to 
Senior VP 
(mill J$) 
(B) 
Extent of 
*Disparity  
(%) 
between A 
& B 
Salary Paid 
to Manager 
(mill J$)  
 
(C) 
Extent of 
Disp. Bet.  
A & C 
(%) 
Salary  
Paid to other 
Members 
(mill J$) 
BOJ  7.3 5.25 39.0 4.0 82.5  N/A 
NDBJ 7.03 2.50 180.0 1.9 270.0 1.3 
 
NIBJ 
 
7.4 
 
4.45 
 
166.0 
 
3.0-3.8 
94.7-
146.0 
 
1.9 
Heart 
Trust/NTA 
 
5.3 
 
3.3 
 
60.6 
 
2.99 
 
77.25  
 
_ 
SCJ 4.30 6.0** -39.5 2.0 and  
under 
200.0  
_ 
UDC 0.53*** 2.57  4.7-3.2  _ 
Petrojam 6.0 4.8 25.0 3.5-4.0  33.3-71.4 3.2  
PAJ  6.0 3.48 49.5  3.48  _ 
Source:  Extrapolated from information of the Sunday Observer, October 17, 1999, pg. 1, 4-7) 
 
Keys:  BOJ–Bank of Jamaica; NDBJ-National Development Bank of Jamaica; NIBJ-National Investment Bank of 
Jamaica; SCJ-Sugar Corporation of Jamaica; UDC- Urban Development Bank of Jamaica; PAJ-Port Authority of 
Jamaica  
* Disparity is the difference in percentage pay that a CEO gets over and above his subordinates  
** The general manager crop production makes more than the President of the SCJ. This is rather difficult to 
understand.   
*** The Executive Chairman accepts only a travelling allowance as his Company Gentech Ltd. was already 
making billions of dollars in contracts from the Government.  
Note briefly:  US$1=J$60.0 at the approximate time of occurrence of breaches.  
 
Therefore, Table 1.1 is also important in that it illustrates practical realities of salary 
disparities in the Jamaican public sector consistent with the issue as a major concern among 
both private and public sector companies internationally. In Table 1.1, the issue of salary 
disparity is treated as partial support to the existence and/or perception of corruption in the 
public sector of Jamaica. Also see Paul M. Guest (2009)6.  
In underscoring the problem of corruption in Jamaica, two of Jamaica’s most important 
citizens in the likes of The Most Honourable Portia Lucretia Simpson-Miller, then Prime 
Minister of Jamaica, and the Contractor General of Jamaica, Mr. Greg Christie, have echoed 
sentiments to tackle the scourge of corruption.  In her inaugural speech, The Most Honourable 
                                               
6
 Board structure and executive pay: evidence from the UK. Cambridge Journal of Economics Advance Access 
published online on July 14, 2009 (http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/bep031v1).  
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Portia Lucretia Simpson-Miller declared: “I want to pledge to the Jamaican People to work 
tirelessly to eradicate corruption”.  This pronouncement by Prime Minister Simpson-Miller 
was the second of many goals she outlined to “facilitate change” in Jamaica (Jamaica 
Information Service, 2003).   For his part, Mr. Christie has described corruption as a scourge 
that is strangling Jamaica to death and used the recent (2010, March 11) conviction of Sierra 
Leone's former health and environment, Sheiku Tejan Koroma, to urge journalists to focus on 
breaches of trust in relation to the Government's contract procurement process.  In pointing the 
media to the conviction of Sheiku Tejan Koroma, Christie said it should encourage the press to 
"focus upon, and give deep thought to, similar issues with which we are currently faced here in 
Jamaica, particularly as they relate to matters which have to do with public procurement and 
government contracting and the abuse of office on the part of those in whom the Jamaican 
taxpayer has reposed his/her confidence" (Jamaica Observer, Friday March 12, 2010)7.   
The Jamaican situation is exacerbated by the fact that laws governing political 
corruption—the Jamaican Constitution, The Representative of the People’s Act of 1944, The 
Corruption Prevention Act of 2003—are either weak in various aspects or not enforced in 
others.  However, recent amendments to the Corruption Prevention Act signify possible 
improvement to corruption laws.  While these legislative developments are taking place, 
critical entities such as the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (CPC), have been 
encountering challenges in executing their duties. This is confirmed by the many complaints 
by civil society on various electronic media which would suggest that political victimization 
and a non-responsive citizenry are just some of the challenges besetting the CPC (Waller et al, 
2007). 
The problems of CG are further elaborated in chapter 2 which details the Jamaican 
contextual realities, including challenges to CG.  Indeed, the challenges detailed in Chapter 2 
further reinforce why CG is important and expand both the CG and public policy problems 
earlier exposed.  These problems and challenges therefore form a basis for the structure and 
content of the literature review of Chapter three which seeks to provide theoretical, empirical 
and practical debates around the critical key research questions, focusing on opposing, 
                                               
7Jamaica Observer (2010).  Corruption strangling Jamaica: Contractor General says conviction of Sierra Leone 
minister, holds lessons for Jamaica, March 12, page 1.  
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concurring and contradicting perspectives. In the next section of this chapter, the research 
challenges and triumphs are discussed.  
 
1.5 THE RESEARCH CHALLENGES AND TRIUMPHS  
This section features critical factors which challenged the research agenda to the extent 
of making it difficult and/or interesting. These factors include the availability of data, selection 
of country, Anglo-Saxon dominance of the CG literature, empirical gaps, and resource 
constraints.  These are discussed in the following segments.  
 
1.5.1 Availability of Data and Access to Respondents  
  
The limited availability of meaningful data makes a study on corporate governance 
practices and structures in Jamaica a challenging endeavour. Boards of Directors are not easily 
accessible, always busy, and often conduct their business behind closed boardroom doors 
(Maassen 2000). While stringent disclosure regulations provide detailed information on board 
practices in annual reports and proxy statements of listed companies in the UK and many 
continental European countries, the extent of the disclosure regulations in Jamaica is very 
limited and there is hardly any disclosure on CG practices.   
In this study, it has been found that most databases (or available data) concentrated on 
financial information and were only available in the Annual Reports of Companies (in hard 
copy and on web sites) listed on the Jamaica Stock Market and/or non-listed financial 
institutions.  However, with strategies such as establishing the right contacts within the 
companies studied, and the ability to network by attending various corporate activities of the 
targeted firms, these have contributed to this thesis, benefiting from much archival and 
unpublished data.   
The prominence given to CG over the last decade has stimulated the interest of many 
academicians, institutions, independent researchers and countries, to the extent that there is 
already the publication of one scholarly journal (Corporate Governance: An International 
Review), several academic books and many research programmes sponsored by the OECD, 
World Bank and the Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance, dedicated to 
promoting and disseminating scholarly work in CG. In addition, McKinsey Consulting Group, 
executive search firms such as Spencer Stuart, Korn Ferry International, and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers have produced research which has been used in this proposal.  In 
addition, the Bank of Jamaica, the Financial Services Commission, Jamaica Stock Exchange, 
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case companies (GraceKennedy Limited, Capital & Credit Merchant Bank and Jamaica 
National Building Society), have made public, their CG activities (though largely voluntarily) 
which have been heavily utilised in this study. 
 At the time of preparing this research proposal (2002 August), many corporate 
misdeeds were making headlines all over the world, particularly in the USA.  After 5 years 
(and at the time of finalising this thesis), there have been many responses vis-à-vis reforms to 
the turbulences that have shook the CG landscape only a decade ago.  In Jamaica, there are 
increasing calls for reform, greater level of disclosure and more stringent requirements for 
auditors, from both private and public sector leaders. In this regard, a significant amount of 
information has been generated and has become available during 2006-2009.   
  
1.5.2   Selection of Country 
There are many other reasons for having chosen Jamaica for doctoral research in 
corporate governance. First, doctoral studies are meant to contribute to and advance 
knowledge in the chosen field of study. Given that no previous in-depth academic study on CG 
had ever been undertaken in Jamaica, this presented an opportunity to break new ground and 
become the first researcher to have completed a doctorate in CG based on the Caribbean 
context.    
Second, the chosen research environment should exhibit a need and tolerance for the 
research and the convenience of the researcher.  There was a need to strive in an environment 
of comfort and one with sufficient maneuvering ability—work, study and play without 
worrying about surviving (paying school fees and enjoying a quality life).  In this regard, being 
self-funded was indeed a major factor as it was recognized that it would be advantageous to do 
fieldwork in an environment where the researcher earns while he learns.   
Third, there should be some existing problem to provide motivation to the researcher 
and stimulate his intellectual curiosity.  He should have more than a cursory desire for the 
project.  The researcher had carefully and strategically decided that he wanted a “rare” degree 
in an area in which he would be the sole person, or at least, one among, not more than a few 
graduates.   
Fourth, this author recognised that CG was an emerging field for academic studies and 
board services consulting and would require highly trained professionals. Fifth and the most 
important to the field of CG development, was the fact that it was realised from an early scan 
of the global CG literature, that most were Anglo-Saxon in origin, and hence the motivation to 
generate an urgently needed Caribbean body of CG literature was most imperative.    
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 Notwithstanding the above stated reasons, Jamaica provided a fertile ground for CG 
research by the very nature of its own corporate failures that occurred during the 1990s—the 
era of “Fat Cats” and the Financial Sector Meltdown of 1993-1999. Also, during this period of 
thesis development, Jamaica had began to recover from the financial melt-down and much 
activity was taking place in the public and private sectors in terms of new regulatory 
developments.  For example, the passage of the Public Bodies Management and 
Accountability Act, 2001; the Access to Information Act, 2002, Corruption Prevention of Act 
2003, and the revised Companies Act of Jamaica, 2004.   
 
1.5.3  Anglo-Saxon Dominance and Empirical Gaps in Corporate Governance  
  Research 
 
This challenge relates to the bulk of Anglo-Saxon views that have dominated the CG 
literature.  The existing body of knowledge is dominated by research on the structures and 
practices of corporate boards in the USA and UK, which most often apply shareholder 
perspective to CG.  More so, these studies are mainly focused on quantitative research 
methods rather than exploring the realities of organisational contexts through one-on-one 
dialogue with organisational actors—Boards of Directors, CEOs, Corporate Secretaries, and 
other employees.  
 
1.6  BENEFICIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY   
 This thesis seeks answers to CG challenges in the public and private sectors of Jamaica 
and for this reason, focuses on an appropriate research strategy and methodology to ensure that 
its aims are realised.  It focuses on advancing academic (theoretical) understanding, practical 
improvement in the effectiveness of public and private sector boards and public policy 
(corporate and political governance issues) reforms.  More specifically, the potential beneficial 
implications of this study are highlighted in at least five ways as presented in the ensuring 
analysis.  
 First, this research is an attempt to provide the first and potentially beneficial source of 
an empirically sound body of CG literature to be accessible to by private and public sector 
planners, academicians, independent scholars and practitioners on Jamaica and the Caribbean. 
Second, the researcher’s presence in and interaction with (participant observer) research 
subjects and the wider business community during the fieldwork, has positively influenced the 
current stage of CG development in Jamaica. This was a stated potential beneficial implication 
in the formal Research Proposal of this study. This sensitisation was achieved through the 
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publication of numerous articles in the Financial Gleaner and participation in numerous 
conferences, seminars and academic colloquiums and extensive appearances and features in 
the local media regarding the author’s role in CG development in Jamaica. Third, the research 
strategy and findings will have potential for the transfer to and replication (generality) in other 
Caribbean and emerging markets.  
Fourth, it will influence international CG agenda by disseminating findings through 
books, book chapters, conferences, seminars and publications in recognised academic journals. 
Fifth, the emergent theory-testing and development aspects will improve the dearth of 
academic literature available on CG realities in emerging markets.  Also, the results will most 
certainly add to the wider volume of academic literature on corporate governance, and provide 
unique experiences from a developing country’s perspective.  
 
1.7   ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
 
 This thesis is organised into four parts. Each part discusses different but  
complementing issues and weaves logical connection from one stage to  the next.  Part one  
consists of chapters 1 and 2.  It provides an introduction to the thesis by identifying the key  
issues under study, justifies the importance of CG and why it deserves this particular attention  
at this time and articulates the problem and motivation for the research. Chapter two discusses  
the contextual setting of Jamaica. The specific topics for consideration are identified and  
explored under respective chapters.   
Part two discusses the research theoretical and methodological framework and  
include chapters 3 and 4.  Part three focuses on the findings of the research and presents  
analyses and discussions in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  Part four constitutes chapters 8 and 9 and  
presents analyses and discussions on  theoretical, empirical and regulatory (public policy)  
gaps, proffers recommendations, policy reform and conclusions, suggestions for future  
research, and limitations of the study.   
  Chapter 2 discusses the Jamaican political, economic and socio-cultural dynamics, 
the governance framework (private and public sector), factors that challenge the CG 
agenda and local and global trends in CG. It ends with a summary and conclusions.  
 Chapter 3 explores nine broad themes after the introduction:  1.) brief history of CG 
development; 2.) corporate governance and its democratic principles, 3.) relevant theories of 
CG, 4.) regulation, 5.) perceptions and incidence of corruption, 6.) ownership and control 
patterns, stakeholder relations, perception and role of institutional investors, 7.) board 
characteristics and processes (board size, Chairman/CEO duality or separation, Non-Executive 
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Directors (NEDs) versus Executive Directors, board committee and composition, tenure of 
Directors, gender and inequality issues, board performance evaluation, and timing distribution 
of board papers and proxy forms) 8.) board’s role in strategic decision-making and 9.) the 
nature of corporate disclosure.  
 Chapter 4 details the research objectives, research questions (key elements under 
study) and the research strategy and methodologies employed.  It explores the aims and target 
users of the study, the focus of the study, epistemological issues, research design and data 
collection techniques, the research population, samples and response rate, data analysis and 
coding issues, the fieldwork overview and aims and target users of the research.  Like the 
chapters before, it ends with a summary and conclusion. Chapter 4 essentially integrates the 
methodological approaches.  
 Chapter 5 analyses the role of regulation and political and corporate corruption.  This 
chapter is indicative of the significance of regulation and corruption in CG and the response to 
the research problems of chapter 1 and research questions of chapter 4 while relating to the 
literature review on regulation and corruption of chapter 3. 
 Chapter 6 is the second of the result chapters and analyses ownership and control 
patterns, the role and nature of stakeholder relations (representation) and perception, and the 
role of institutional investors.  These areas are in response to research problems under review 
and key elements (See Appendix 3A, 3B and 3C).   
 Chapter 7 analyses findings on board characteristics and processes, board’s role in 
strategic decision-making and corporate disclosure. It integrates results obtained across 
methodological approaches similarly to those in chapters 5 and 6.  These areas are consistent 
with the research problems under review, key elements, and research questions.   
 Chapter 8 outlines theoretical, empirical and public policy gaps and suggest 
recommendations for the way forward for public policy reform in Jamaica. It benefitted from 
suggestions made by participants of policy discussion groups held.  
  Chapter 9 is the concluding stage of the thesis. It synthesises research findings and  
 presents conclusions in response to problem statements and research questions, addresses  
limitations of this study and proposes areas for future research.   
 
1.8  CHAPTER SUMMARY  
This chapter outlines the nature and focus of the study and includes seven sections 
along with this summary and conclusion.   The chapter introduces and rationalises key areas 
under review and establishes the framework for further development of each problem 
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identified.  Section 1.0 provides an introduction which defines the issues under study and 
section 1.2 presents an overview of recent developments in the local and international CG 
arena. Section 1.3 articulates why corporate governance is relevant at this time and why should 
be the study of interest to the reader.  Section 1.4 sets out and articulates the problem statement 
and motivation for the study. It specifically identifies a lack of CG awareness in the wider 
Jamaican context, a dearth of empirical literature, poor state of institutional governance, 
disparity in the stages of regulatory development, systemic weaknesses in the financial 
regularity sector and the prevalence of corporate and political corruption as the main problems.  
Sections 1.5 highlights the research challenges while section 6 outlines the triumphs and 
beneficial implications of the study. Section 1.7 outlines the organisation of the thesis and 
identifies the broad themes of each chapter. It makes logical connections as it progresses to the 
concluding section.  
The motivation for this research is two-fold in nature.  First, it is closely intertwined 
with the candidate’s personal and professional ambition. The second motivational factor for 
this study has its genesis in two fundamental challenges with relevance to corporate 
governance and public policy. First is the Corporate Governance Problem (CGP). Second is 
the Public Policy Problem (PPP).  The candidate in addition to wanting to make a personal and 
national contribution in helping to improve an inadequate corporate and political system, 
wants to do this consistent with his own professional aspirations, which is to further develop 
his management consulting experience, public policy analytical skills, and to contribute to the 
growing international body of scholarly work in the area of corporate governance through 
publications and policy dialogue. This is the first of this kind of research for the Caribbean and 
could serve as a springboard on which to build further empirically rigorous and sound studies 
in furthering both public policy and general academic interests in corporate governance within 
and beyond the Caribbean. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE CONTEXTUAL SETTING 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION   
 
The aim of this chapter is to outline the research contextual setting for a better understanding 
of the study environment.  In doing so, it examines the following issues: section 2.2, an 
overview of the Jamaican economy; section 2.3., challenges to CG development; section 2.4, 
local and global trends in CG, and ends with section 2.5, the chapter summary.   
 
2.2 OVERVIEW OF THE JAMAICAN ECONOMY  
 
Party Political History: Like both the US and UK, Jamaica’s economy grew rapidly 
during the post-war period with annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates of over 
6%, buoyed by healthy export growth, and substantial foreign investment flows (Jefferson, 
1972; Panton 2000).  This impressive rate of growth was sustained until the 1970s when 
international crisis, world recession and poor economic management emphasis added, and the 
leadership of Michael Manley, led to a slowdown in growth (Kaufman, 1985).  During the 
period of the 1970s, Michael Manley, leader of the People’s National Party (PNP) and Prime 
Minister, pursued a radical campaign to nationalise the commanding heights of the economy 
and make extensive reforms in education, health, housing and other social factors (Stephens 
and Stephens 1986).  As a result of external economic shocks and increased spending, 
Jamaica’s economy suffered under the PNP between 1976 and1980 as real GDP growth 
contracted by an average 3.2% per annum (Panton, 2000:78). 
The Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) under the leadership of Edward Seaga was victorious 
in 1980 with a landslide victory of 49 seats to the PNP’s 11.  The JLP quickly established 
close ties with the Reagan and Thatcher administrations, (speculations were rife that Seaga had 
been working for the CIA in counter communism operations long before the elections and 
received substantial election backing from both Britain and America.)  Seaga became the first 
foreign head of state to visit Reagan after his election in 1980.  Similarly, Thatcher’s principal 
advisor on privatisation (John Redwood of N M Rothschild) became senior advisor to the JLP 
government in its extensive privatisation programme (Adam et al, 1992).  In spite of an 
economic growth rate of approximately 8% per year and drastic cuts in social services, the 
national deficit ballooned during the 1980s (PIOJ 1998).   
Like the US and UK, Jamaica’s economic growth slowed in the 1990s as a result of 
world recession (EIU, 1998).  Since the 1990s and up to 2008, the economy grew an average 
of 0.9% per annum (PIOJ Data). In effect, what Seaga might have done is to experiment with 
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the western doctrine of neo-liberalism.8 Neo-liberalism has neither assisted in alleviating 
Jamaica’s economic woes nor fulfilled the ‘promise’ of an economic transformation for any 
other developing country, after nearly three decades.  
In early 1989, the PNP under Michael Manley was re-elected to power and shadowed 
his socialist practice by abandoning social democracy for the ideological convergence of the 
two political parties over the management of the economy towards greater market reform and 
economic liberalisation (Panton, 1993).  As a result, when Manley retired as Prime Minister in 
1992, his successor, P J Patterson, continued the party’s market-oriented reforms both in 
principle and practice.  Patterson went on to create history when he not only secured his own 
mandate in March 1993, but led his party to historic third and fourth terms in December 1997 
and October 2002, respectively.  Patterson resigned in March 2006 and handed over leadership 
to Jamaica’s first female Prime Minister, Portia Simpson-Miller.  After 18 months of her 
stewardship, the critics who had predicted a relatively short stint for her had their day when 
she was defeated at the polls by another newcomer, Orette Bruce Golding of the JLP on 
September 3, 2007 in the general elections.    
Drivers of the Economy: Jamaica’s small size limits its scope of growth and leads to 
dependency on four key pillars or drivers of foreign exchange:  bauxite and alumina, tourism, 
the informal sector, and remittances.  According to data from the World Fact Book 2008 (of 
the US CIA), Jamaica exported 71.3% of goods and services to the USA (30.2%), Canada 
(15.6%), China (15.21%), and the UK (10.3%) during 2006.  In terms of imports, Jamaica 
imported a total of 62.4% of goods and services from USA (39.3%), Trinidad & Tobago 
(13.6%), and Venezuela (9.5%).  
The bauxite and alumina industry contributes twenty-three per cent (23%) of exports of 
goods and services.  Tourism generates thirty-seven per cent (37%) of foreign exchange and 
directly and indirectly employs twenty per cent (20%), (250,000 persons) of the labour force.  
The informal economy is estimated to be equivalent to forty-three per cent (43%) of GDP, and 
remittances grew ten-fold from US$184 million in 1990 to US$1,870 million in 2005, a level 
that is equivalent to eighteen per cent (18%) of GDP (2006 ESSJ Report, PIOJ). GDP for 
fiscal year 2008 was US$20.88 billion with a per capita income of US$7,400.00 (CIA World 
Fact Book 2009).   
                                               
8
 Neo-liberalism is based on the fundamentalist notion that markets are self-correcting, allocate resources 
efficiently, and serve the public interest well. It was this market fundamentalism that underlay Thatcherism, 
Reaganomics, and the so-called “Washington Consensus” in favor of privatisation, liberalisation, and independent 
central banks focusing single-mindedly on inflation. 
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Socio-Cultural Dynamics:  On the socio-cultural level, Jamaica’s racial structure 
differs from that of both the UK and the US in that dominant racial and ethnic groups make up 
roughly 90% of the population and co-exist, relatively peacefully, with the minority groups. 
The majority of Jamaicans are of African descent and the primary minority groups are 
European, Chinese and Indian in origin. 
More importantly, the historical context out of which most Jamaican people arose is 
one of plantation slavery and colonial domination. This dates back to the late fifteenth Century 
when the island became part of the Spanish empire.  The Spanish developed the plantation 
system and initiated the importation of African slaves to provide plantation labour.  In 1655, 
the British conquered the island from the Spanish and further entrenched the plantation system 
by importing larger numbers of African slaves.  As a result, Jamaica never became a settler 
colony and African slaves always outnumbered the white population. 
Income from sugar made Jamaica a prized possession of the British Crown during the 
eighteenth Century, until Parliament ended the slave trade in 1807 and abolished slavery in 
1838.  It took upheaval and agitation among the Jamaican working class and tense and 
explosive riots prior to and during the 1930s to pave the way for adult suffrage in 1944, in 
which newly formed local political parties competed for the first time for leadership.  
However, it was not until 1962 that Jamaica gained full independence from Britain. 
Unfortunately, the systems, laws and government still remain a legacy of what obtains in 
Britain – the “winner” takes all model of governance and the British common law which 
dominates business and the judicial aspects of the Jamaican economy. 
Indeed, several authors have stressed the importance of these institutions in shaping 
and defining the structure and character of modern Caribbean society (Panton 2000:88 c.f. 
Lindo 1994 and Beckford, 1972).  Of note, while the vast majority of the population is 
represented by the descendants of African slaves, the minority classes control a majority of the 
nation’s wealth.  As this thesis develops, one of the critical legacies of Jamaica’s historical 
context, which is that of ownership and control patterns of Jamaican firms, is further examined 
in chapters 3, 5 and 6.  
Therefore, while Jamaica inherited its Westminster model of governance from Britain, 
whether or not this system remains relevant is beyond the scope of this study.  
Notwithstanding this, further research into such a system of governance should yield 
interesting findings.  
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2.3 CHALLENGES TO AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE  
 GOVERNANCE DEVELOPMENT IN JAMAICA   
 
On the surface, Jamaica has strong formal institutions and has passed laws in the last 
decade in an effort to strengthen the legislative structures of the business sector, particularly 
the financial sector, critical among the major economic drivers of the economy.  In the public 
service, Jamaica possesses a strong and competent civil service and in the area of political 
governance, a well-established parliamentary democracy and vibrant civil society.  
However, there are many signs of weakening governance in Jamaica that transcend and 
cut across various developmental spheres. Given Jamaica’s political history, especially the 
1970s which have been characterised by tribal and divisive politics, the society continues to 
show signs of social and political polarisation. This makes it rather difficult at times to forge 
consensus on key policy issues in the interest of the populace.   
Elements contributing to the weakening of governance in Jamaica, with particular 
emphasis on public policy relevance are reported in Taskforce Report:  Jamaica Development 
Plan 2030. These are as follows: 1.) an alienation from existing political institutions and 
processes and increased disregard for the norms of civil society by a growing number of 
persons, especially the young; 2.) the redefined position of the State from its previous function 
as a development agency to that of a facilitator of market driven policies; 3.) poor performance 
of the economy and persistent poverty; 4.) the inability of the State to sustain levels of welfare 
that were put in place in the post-independence era; and 5.) increased criminal activity, 
including  drug trafficking; and  6.0) sustained levels of ‘crony capitalism’ and competition in 
the public and private sectors (Shaw, A. 2007).  
Case studies of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Malaysia and South Africa 
suggest that there are forces working against significantly improved CG which may 
nonetheless give lip service to the need for improvement.  These forces include dominant 
shareholders and other corporate insiders in the private and public sectors in entrenched 
distributional cartels. The heightened risk associated with regulatory capital in countries with 
clientelistic relationship-based (as opposed to rule-based) systems of corporate governance 
reinforces the fact that good CG requires good political governance, and vice-versa (Oman 
2001:11). 
With the preceding point made, other very crucial Jamaican challenges may have their 
roots in its economically powerful minorities—the powerhouse of the business class or 
dominant and powerful vested groups.  Seventy-Five per cent (75%) of issued shares on the 
Jamaica Stock Exchange (JSE) among Jamaica’s 45 listed companies are held by institutional 
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investors and among the institutional investor groups there are significant cross-holdings (JSE 
Report 2006).  A small minority class, which is also connected by marriages between families, 
control almost all listed companies by being the largest shareholders and are also involved in 
the day-to-day management of these companies.  These immigrant minorities include 
Portuguese, Jews, Syrians, Lebanese and Chinese but also include the mixed offspring of 
wealthy white plantation owners and black Jamaicans who are referred to in Jamaican 
terminology as “brown” or “Jamaica White” (Stone, C. 1988).     
There are approximately twenty-one 21 of these families and they include the Issas 
(SuperClubs chain of hotels), Gordon “Butch” Stewart (Sandals Group of hotels and the ATL 
Group of Companies), McConnells (Lascelles DeMarcado Group, Carrearas Group and Trade 
Winds Farms), the Ashenheims (Carreras, Lascelles de Marcado);   Chris Blackwell (Island 
Records, Island Outpost, Golden Eye, Strawberry Hill Hotel, Jamaica Black Gold Rum and 
Premium Jamaican Rum); The Johnsons (shipping and agricultural czars); The Levys (Jamaica 
Broilers Group and Ethanol Production); the Matalons (construction, financial and distribution 
interests); Michael Lee-Chin (AIC Canada and NCB Group Jamaica, etc), the Chen, family 
including Michael Lee-Chin (SuperPlus Supermarkets); the Hendricksons (hotel, baking and 
agricultural interests); the Duncans (financial); the Myers (fast food); the Lyns (fast food); 
Campbell (Capital & Credit Merchant Bank Limited, and Halls (Jamaica Producers Limited).     
It is also instructive to note that the latter ten can be considered “new money” as they 
have earned most of their wealth only in the last one to two decades while the others have 
enjoyed more than three generations of wealth.  Except for Campbell, the Duncans (mixed 
race) and the Halls, the others are predominantly white, Chinese and mid-eastern by ethnic 
origins.  
This ownership arrangement poses several challenges to CG development.  First, the 
shareholder environment is concentrated with a reliance on family, bank and public finance 
(government papers), giving rise to an underdeveloped new issue market and limited takeover 
market.  For example, only four new companies have been listed on the JSE in the last twelve 
years, having gone through a ten-year ‘drought’, without the listing of a single stock between 
1992 and 2002.  In the corporate context, transparency and accountability (two pillars of good 
CG) are limited and there is inadequate minority protection.  Furthermore, the boards are 
largely non-independent9 with a majority of insiders and incentives formally aligned with core 
                                               
9
 Non-independent means that most Directors on these boards have vested material interest in the particular 
organisation (s).   
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shareholders. Only approximately twenty-five per cent (25%) of assets are listed for each 
major company on the Jamaican Stock Market (JSE information, 2008).   
Other challenges to CG have originated with scholars and practitioners.  At one end of 
the CG debate, there are proponents who are in support of such practices as having majority 
board of non-executive Directors, reducing the emphasis on CEO performance-based 
compensation, splitting the duality of Chair/CEO, improving the quality of corporate 
disclosure, inter alia.  In spite of the “hype” about the importance of good CG, questions are 
being raised as to whether or not there is credible evidence to support those claims. For 
example, do effective CG practices improve efficiency, effectiveness and accountability of 
corporations? This is just one of the many questions critics have been asking.   
At the other end of the spectrum, the issues at the centre of the debates include: 1.) 
many company Directors are opposing the level of objective decision-making which comes 
with the call for a greater number of NEDs and independent Directors on boards; 2.) Directors 
are refuting the growing pressure to communicate strategies and policies to the primary 
institutional investors; 3.) others believe the current global CG initiatives aimed at 
“improving” CG in the UK and elsewhere have simply served to slow down decision-making 
and create more red tape and bureaucracy (Solomon, G 2007:69).  One popular Jamaica 
corporate executive had concerns about what he calls “over-regulation” and had the following 
to say: 
“…Although there is a prescribed approach, in recent times, for CG 
that comes from state-empowered regulators, which make 
recommendations about what ought to be done…it is up to corporate 
executives to do the right thing to keep the State out of the 
boardroom…or else be exposed to the downside of over-regulation.  
(Jarrett, Earl, Business Observer, April 13, 2005: pg. 15B).  
 
However, Professor Clarke, the inaugural Director of Australia’s largest 
multidisciplinary research group on CG and a leading proponent of good corporate regulations 
posited both concurring and opposing views for corporate governance regulations.  According 
to Professor Clarke:  
A swathe of new…regulations and laws on CG do not amount to over-
regulation. The debacles of HIH, FAI and OneTel (problem plagued 
Australian firms) have been a reminder that the purpose of business is not 
only to generate wealth, but to retain it, and to see that it is used for the 
purposes for which it was intended. Further, with a raft of regulations and 
new laws coming, including the ASX CG Guidelines, CLERP 9, and the HIH 
Commission Report, it might be feared that Australia is moving into a period 
of over-regulation as occurred with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United 
States in response to the Enron and Worldcom collapse. This could occur, but 
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only if the guidelines are implemented in the wrong way. What is required is 
intelligent engagement with higher standards of corporate governance, not 
unthinking compliance. (Thomas Clarke, speech delivered at the launch of the 
Centre for Corporate Governance at the University of Technology, Sydney).  
(www.uts.edu.au/new/releases/2003/mark/18.html.)  
 
The Cadbury Report (1992), in a concurring view, emphasised the importance of 
avoiding excessive control and recognised that no system of control can completely eliminate 
the risk of fraud without hindering companies’ ability in a free market (Cadbury Report 1992, 
pg. 12, para. 1.9).  This is quite instructive and in reinforcing his argument, Jarrett (2005), 
went further: “…that real CG would only happen when it is intricately tied to one’s personal 
value system and that its absence would be an imminent step towards the ultimate collapse of 
any company.”  Another author said that human nature cannot be altered through regulation 
and checks and balances (Solomon 2007: 69). Yet, Sir Adrian Cadbury10, in a speech delivered 
at the launch of the Centre for CG at the University of Technology Sydney, states: “under-
performing boards were a greater threat than dishonest ones and that a main thrust of CG 
reform should be to raise standards of performance, as well as, to check malpractice”.  
From the ensuing discussion, it is important that a balance is struck between 
accountability and transparency of operations and the ability of entrepreneurs to operate 
competitively and efficiently.  In spite of the skepticisms as to whether good CG adds to the 
bottom-line and leads to prosperous companies, the evidence is overwhelming. See McKinsey 
and Company, 2000; Mackenzie, 2004; and Moxey, 2004.   
Richard Branson was the primary owner of the Virgin Company from its creation. 
After many years, he was persuaded to become listed on the London Stock Exchange as this 
would provide valuable funds for his varied business ventures and endless new projects. A 
number of trips to the City of London where he met with institutional shareholders and 
reported to other shareholders, seem to have cramped his style of business management, and 
he was in the least a proponent of the accountability regulation and corporate governance 
practices recommended by Cadbury.  Branson withdrew his company from the London Stock 
Exchange as soon as he could in the 1980s.  He reported that excessive corporate governance 
hindered his ability to make things happen and slowed down his decision-making processes. 
For Branson, the problems of accountability far outweigh the benefits.   
                                               
10
 Sir Adrian, Chairman of Cadbury Schweppes, drafted the first code of corporate governance in the UK in 1992 
and has advised the OECD and World Bank on corporate governance principles.  
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The Branson analogy finds favour with common criticisms of CG reform, especially of 
national codes, in that they slow down decisions at company board level and makes running a 
company unnecessarily difficult by hindering innovation and creativity (opinions expressed by 
fellow Directors of several boards). 
2.4 LOCAL AND GLOBAL TRENDS IN CG DEVELOPMENT   
 
In spite of the fact that there has been no formal national CG framework in 
Jamaica, there are many existing structures, and companies that have been made 
sensitive to the renewed attention being given to this subject. Since the meltdown of the 
Jamaican financial sector, the Government has taken the lead, in many regards, to ensure 
a healthier financial sector and CG environment.  In this section, emerging trends in 
Jamaica have been summarised in Table 2.1 under three sub-headings, namely, existing 
governance framework, changes in boards, and to some extent regulatory frameworks 
and current issues. Highlights of PSOJ Code of CG are presented in the next section.  
 
2.4.1   The PSOJ Code 
The PSOJ Code is based on The Combined Code on CG issued by the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) of the United Kingdom (UK) on 23 July 2003.  It has been compiled 
by the CG Committee of the PSOJ.  Part 1 (“the Principles”) of this Code sets out core Best 
Practices it hoped it would be effected for annual reporting periods commencing on or after 1st 
January 2007.  It was also hoped that those companies, if any, that are able to do so would 
adhere to Part 2 of the Code (“Best Practices”) as soon as may be practical.   
The Code presents the core Principles and Best Practices that the Committee proposes 
for adoption by all listed companies in Jamaica and non-listed companies engaged in the 
provision of financial services.  Also, it was the hope of the PSOJ that other non-listed 
companies would be guided by the Principles and adapt these Best Practices where practicable.   
According to the Code (para. 2: pg. 1): 
The Committee has tailored the provisions of the FRC code to suit 
the “Jamaican business climate”, in particular the embryonic state 
of CG. The Committee has also taken into consideration the small 
number of listed companies and consequently the small number of 
business people, who would qualify for appointment as non-
executive directors.   
 
 It can be gleaned from the Code that its authors intended for companies to have a free 
hand in the spirit of good CG and to explain their governance policies in the light of 
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Principles, including any unique circumstances which would have led to a particular approach.  
The Code requires a company to either confirm that it complies with the Code’s Principles or 
where it does not, to provide a reasoned explanation. This author believes that the Cadbury 
requirement to ‘comply or explain’ is a major weakness of the Cadbury Report (1992).  Even 
though it has gained wide acceptance by companies and investors worldwide, it may serve as a 
disincentive for others not to make the extra effort to be responsive to good CG practices—in 
that they can explain themselves out of being non-compliant. Additionally, markets cannot be 
run without mandatory rules which provide a level playing field for all. In the same manner, 
markets need flexibility so that businesses can respond rapidly to sudden changes which could 
otherwise ruin businesses. Therefore, as well-intended as the Cadbury Report is, a mix of both 
“hard” and “soft” laws would be more palatable from this author’s studied opinion. See 
Appendix 11 for the highlights of Core Principles of the PSOJ Code (also at 
http://www.psoj.org: assessed May 11, 2009).   
 In spite of the good intentions and significant efforts that have gone into developing the 
Code, it has been met with lukewarm responses from intended users. There are many reasons 
for this but I shall identify and briefly discuss the more salient ones.  
First, the PSOJ did no prior empirical assessment of the CG landscape to determine 
existing frameworks and practices with a view of filling the gaps—needed areas of reforms. 
Indeed, correction of this failure by the PSOJ is hoped to be addressed as a key aim of this 
study.  Second, the application of poor strategies to achieve buy-ins from key stakeholders 
which could have been more successful if employed at the front-end, especially before the 
imposition of the Codes on the intended users. Third, a Code of such importance should never 
have been designed and positioned to suit just listed companies, mainly the financial sector- a 
minority group in terms of numbers–only forty-four (44) traded at best on any trading day, and 
the non-financial companies which would have already had a swathe of regulations and are 
now even more concerned about “over-regulation” (Jarrett, 2005). Fourth, the “comply or 
explain” clause which might have relevance and workability in the UK, would not work easily 
in Jamaica with seventy-five (75%) per cent of companies owned by a few connected persons. 
With this level of ownership concentration, it is difficult to achieve buy-in when these owners 
see CG regulations (and self-regulation) as being expensive and unnecessary.   Fifth, the Code 
lacks even a presentation or explanation of the methodology used to develop it.    
In addition, as a member of the PSOJ CG Committee (2005-2008), this author tried 
assiduously to convince his colleagues of the value of the following combination of 
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approaches to increase the likelihood of acceptance of the Code by both the private and public 
sectors of Jamaica.   
Borrowing from the approaches and experiences of those establishing National CG 
Codes of South Africa (King Report), Singapore (CG Code), Canada (The Dey Report), 
Australia and many others, I suggested that planning and formulating relevant CG guidelines 
for Jamaica must include, in no order of priority, a mix of several important considerations: 1.) 
self-assessment of the state of member institutions must be achieved before any sound and 
meaningful agenda can be developed and implemented. Paradoxically, the PSOJ 
commissioned a study to determine CG structures and practices among approximately fifty 
(50) companies about twelve (12) months after the Code was launched and distributed; 2.) 
Knowledge on Best Practices must be disseminated; 3.) Government and the public must 
understands the merits of good CG and the urgent need for reform; 4.) Government should be 
encouraged to develop their capacity to implement reform and the capacity of self-regulatory 
bodies to develop and execute their own reform; 5.) build consensus for policy, regulatory, and 
legal institutional structures; 6.) frame CG strategies against the transient and vulnerable state 
of the Jamaican economy to globalisation, the internationalisation of local firms, and the 
realities of the increased regulatory demands of international financial markets and systems; 
7.) be prepared to address CG issues that go beyond Jamaica, to include the Caribbean; 8.) be 
opened to draw on local and emerging expertise; 9.) train the various professionals and the 
other agents who are essential to bring about a culture of compliance. These are not difficult to 
be achieved as training has begun, and there is a growing tendency towards greater awareness 
building and compliance. Notwithstanding the above, corporate governance is multi-
disciplinary and requires the contribution of intense academic and scholarly intervention.  
Equally, the practitioners must play their role. 
 The CG codes of South Africa, Singapore and Canada have been highlighted as 
possible sources guidelines for Jamaica from the perspective of similar governance (corporate 
and political) systems and as members of the Commonwealth, which also presents many other 
similarities.  In spite of the successes of each in their respective countries, to improve CG  
weaknesses in the public and private sectors, they should not be misconstrued to be panaceas 
or solutions to Jamaica’s CG challenges. In fact, there are many other good examples within 
the Commonwealth from which similar or other lessons could be drawn.  To just list a few 
others, Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia (and still others), were able to develop and 
establish CG guidelines and regulations within a few years because their Governments were 
fully on board from the beginning. The level of mistrust of politicians and lack of political will 
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to act were less problematic than the reality in Jamaica.  Furthermore, these countries all had 
what could be called a “Country Strategy” on CG. These Governments understood their role as 
facilitators too well, and were never seen as barriers to progress.  It must also be stressed that 
most of the countries CG Codes mentioned in the preceding were developed with the 
respective private sector groups playing a lead role. The conceptualisation and in-depth 
planning and strategising were left up to the private sector groups.  
 
Table 2.1:   Emerging Corporate Governance Trends in Jamaica 
Existing Governance Framework: 
 The Companies Act of Jamaica 2004 provides minimum requirements on disclosure of board practices, a 
diversity in the composition and structure of corporate boards, introduces the concept of a “Shadow 
Director”11, and penalty of up to $1,000,000 or six months imprisonment for neglect of fiduciary duties; but 
still does not provide recourse for compensation of shareholders where a company fails to fulfil its mandate 
to shareholders.  It does not stipulate who should be directors and how the board should be composed.   
 The Financial Services Commission Act of 2001 (the Act)12 establishes the Financial Services Commission 
(FSC) as the entity responsible for the regulatory and supervisory control of institutions providing financial 
services (which services do not include deposit taking services). The FSC succeeds the Securities 
Commission (1994).   
 The FSC in addition to its role as a securities’ regulator, has recently been conferred with the responsibility 
for the Insurance Act, Mutual Funds Act and Pension Funds Act. 
Regulatory agencies, boards of listed and unlisted corporations are undergoing changes: 
 In response to the financial crisis of the mid 1990s, the BOJ has since implemented new and more stringent 
‘fit and proper’ requirements for directors.  
 The establishment of the Financial Adjustment Company (FINSAC) as well as recommending more 
disclosures of personal and company activities and connections.  
 At March 2008, as many as 20 Jamaican (local) companies have been making CG disclosure in their annual 
reports. 
Current Issues:  
 PSOJ launches CG Code in 2006 but the Code has been met with lukewarm response from the private sector 
for whom it was drafted.  
 JSE Best Practice Awards Competition was launched in 2005.   
 The Jamaica Depository Insurance Corporation (JDIC) protects depositors up to the sum of $600,000 in the 
event of a failure of a depositor’s institution.  
 ICAJ has introduced International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) as mandatory requirements for 
companies.  
 Ministry of Finance and The Public Service had mandated all public entities to adopt accrual basis of 
accounting in line with IFRS.  
                                               
11
 A “Shadow Director” is a person in accordance with whose direction or instructions the directors of a Company 
are accustomed to act Section 741 (2), Companies Act of Britain 1985; Section 251, Insolvency Act 1986- 
Section 22 (5), Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. According to Field Fisher Waterhouse (2004), 
professional advisors acting in that capacity are exempt from being Shadow directors. A person can only be a 
Shadow Director of a registered Company under the Companies Act. This includes a Company limited by shares 
or guarantee. Firms not under the Companies Act such as statutory corporations or other corporate bodies, cannot 
have Shadow Directors.   
12
 The Act defines financial services as 'non-deposit' taking services which are provided in connection with 
insurance, the acquisition or disposal of securities within the meaning of the Securities Act, and units under a 
registered Unit Trust scheme within the meaning of the Unit Trust Act, as well as, such other services as the 
Minister of Finance may by order declare to be financial services. The financial institutions to which the Act 
applies are institutions or persons offering or providing the above-mentioned financial services to the public. This 
Act is response to the need for tighter regulatory powers and greater control of the financial sector arising out of 
the events of the 1990s.  
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2.4.2   Global Trends in Corporate Governance  
 The purpose of this section is to enrich the discussion by an understanding of 
developing CG trends beyond the Caribbean to examine how Jamaican CG stock when 
compared to these international trends.  The section draws heavily on the CG principles issued 
by the OECD in 1999 for its members and which have been serving ever since as a blue print 
for Best Practices standards around the world.  This author has identified from careful study 
and analysis of the literature, the ten most trendy practices and issues based on activities in at 
least 25 countries on all continents. See Table 2.2 (Jamaica and the Caribbean added for 
emphasis on comparative analyses). Notwithstanding the differences or similarities shown 
between Jamaica and the other countries, the focus of this thesis and the key issues it targets 
are necessary to gain a better understanding of the most appropriate applications of these 
principles in the Jamaican context given its institutional, historical, political and cultural 
uniqueness.  
After extensive and careful review of the OECD Principles (1999) that has chronicled 
developments in more than twenty (20) of its member-countries, two striking revelations came 
to the fore. First, differences among cultures, traditions, social institutions, laws, and stages of 
economic development have helped to shape CG practices, globally. Second, the largest 
multinational companies, major players in the global capital markets, are having more and 
more in common. For them, the question is not whether they will grapple with the same CG 
issues their Anglo-American counterparts have been facing, but when, and how, they will 
evolve a CG system which meets the needs of largely Anglo-American-dominated global 
capital markets. 
The 10-point Matrix represented by Table 2.2 summarises the ten (10) most important 
issues on the global CG agenda, particularly in the last five years, and as recently as the last 
quarter of 2007.  First, CG Codification, OECD through a World Bank funded programme, has 
been promoting the development of national codes of CG Best Practices in all its member 
countries, since 1999.  As stated earlier in chapter one, at the end of June 2008, at least 65 
countries would have established a national CG code.     
Second, board models-two-tier versus one-tier models: The former Soviet states of 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have gone 
through a CG revolution between 2000 and 2003 and have joined countries such as Germany, 
France, the Netherlands and Switzerland in having either full or partial two-tier board models. 
In Central and Eastern Europe, countries such as Russia, Poland, The Czech Republic and 
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Hungary have maintained a dual board model arrangement (both unitary and two-tier).  
However, these structural arrangements of the boards (one or two-tier) do not guarantee that 
they operate according to the ‘letter of the law’.  In fact, based on the author’s studied opinion 
in the Jamaican context, boards in the private sector (listed and unlisted companies), in spite of 
the rules of the industry or business laws, tend to do what they please by ignoring the rules of 
trade. In many European jurisdictions, anonymous informants also advised that many 
companies operate similarly to those in Jamaica, by ignoring the rules. Also, the source 
remarked that Directors are largely persons who are put in place to carry-out the wishes of the 
owners (personal communication).  
Third, board size and composition: There has been a noticeable global shift towards 
smaller boards in the last decade. For example, executive search firm Spencer Stuart’s 13th 
Annual Survey of board practices in large US companies found that average board size had 
shrunk from 15 in 1998 to 10.9 in 2002.  One quarter of S&P 500 boards had between eight 
and nine Directors, as opposed to sixteen, five years earlier. In a number of countries, 
minimum board size is determined by national law or listing requirements.  An analysis of 
Ethical Investment Research Services (EIRIS) data (Autumn 2004) show that average board 
size for a selected number of twenty-five (25) countries, including leading industrial nations 
across all continents, was 11.9.  Nell and Minow (2008) reported on data from The Corporate 
Library’ data base that the smallest board in that system was Wave Wireless with two 
Directors, i.e., the CEO and one outsider (following the resignation of three Directors).  The 
largest was Capital Bancorp at twenty-three (23).  
Fourth,  Chairman/CEO duality or separation:  It can be seen from data in Table 2.2 
that at one extreme, countries such as Austria, Ireland and Norway all have 100% separation of 
the role of Chairman from that of CEO, others such as Australia (97%), New Zealand (95%), 
Netherlands (97%) and the UK (94.2%) have near 100% separation.  The middle ground 
countries are France (52%), Greece (58%), Portugal (68%), and Spain (58%).  At the other 
extreme the United States of America is the only country with less than thirty per cent (30%) 
or exactly twenty-four per cent (24%) of separation of the roles of CEO and Chair (EIRIS data 
2004).  However, Spencer Stuart Board Index (2006), a globally authoritative source on CG 
information and a leading board consulting firm- have concluded that more  companies have 
separated the chairman and CEO roles in the last seven years.  For example, sixty-seven per 
cent (67%) of all S&P 500 company boards have a combined chairman/CEO, down from 
seventy-one per cent (71%) in 2003 and seventy-four per cent (74%) in 2001. Further, 158 
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companies had separated the roles in 2003 compared with 140 in 2002. Of these, 100 
companies have a non-independent chair (compared with 94 last year) and 48 have an 
independent chair (compared with 43 last year). Ten (10) companies did not list a chairman. 
Therefore, only ten per cent (10%) of boards (48/484) have a truly independent chairman.  
What are the advantages and disadvantages of separating these two roles? See Chairman/CEO 
Duality or Separation in Chapter 6.    
Fifth, the establishment of strategic board committees, such as audit, selection, and 
remuneration.  From Table 2.2, almost all countries examined, had at least three major board 
committees with audit, the most popular and an increasing trend of more CG and 
compensation committees being established.   
Sixth, is rule-based or enforced governance versus market-oriented or volunteered 
governance.  The emphasis has been on volunteered governance through the Cadbury (1992) 
recommendations, but there is also the enforcement of specific disclosure rules, and board 
composition issues as they relate to independent Directors, and that an outside independent 
Director should chair the Audit committee. These developments are becoming the norm rather 
than the exception in many countries. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of the United 
States which has been the most profound piece of financial legislation since 2002. 
Seventh, Best Practices CG incorporated in Stock Exchange Guidelines of most 
markets on some scale or another, directly or indirectly.  
Eight, issues of AGM, proxy voting and the publication of executive pay. Electronic 
voting is now accepted in countries such as Canada and the Czech Republic.  
Ninth, shareholder activism is no longer concentrated in the USA. It has now spread 
throughout the globe, and is gaining strong presence in Europe and Asia.   
Tenth, employee rights and representation: Employees continue to have board 
representation, mainly in countries where work councils and trade unions are highly 
developed, such as the USA, Germany and France. There is much to be desired in this matter, 
on a global level, and in Jamaica, in particular.   
The above discussion on global trends is meant to provide a feel of the critically 
emerging issues on the CG agenda at this time, and establishes the background for close 
empirical and theoretical scrutiny in chapter 6 where the researcher’s findings and analysis are 
presented.  
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Table 2.2: The Ten-Point Matrix of Global CG Trends 
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Australia  U  97.3  Dual  MB  NN 
Austria   TT  100  GE  NN   
Belgium  U  84.6  GE/GV  EV, MB  NN 
Canada  U  79.9  GE/GV  EV, MB   
Czech Re.  Dual  NA  GE/GV  NN   
Denmark  TT  NN  GE/GV  NN   
France  20%tt 
80%U 
 52.0  GE/GV  NN   
Finland   U  87.5  GE/GV     
Germany  TT  97.7  GE  EV   
Greece  U  58.3  GE/GV  NN   
Ireland  U  100.0  GV/GE  NN   
Italy  U  88.8  GE/GV  EV, MB  NN 
Japan  U  50.8  GE  NN  M 
Korea  U  NN  GE/GV  NN  NN 
Mexico  U  NN  GE/GV  NN  NN 
Netherlands  TT  95.0  GE  MB   
New Zealand  U  95.5  GE/GV  MB  NN 
Norway  TT  100.0  GE  NN   
Poland  Dual  NN  GE/GV  NN   
Portugal  U  62.5  GE/GV  NN  NN 
Singapore  U  78.0  GE/GV  MB  NN 
South Africa  U  NN  GE/GV  MB  NN 
Spain   U  58.3  GE/GV  NN  NN 
UK  U  96.2  GE/GV  MB  NN 
USA  U  24.9  GE  MB  NN 
*Emerging 
Markets  
 U   
NN 
 GE/GV Not 
always 
MB  M 
Caribbean*  U  In 
most 
cases 
 GE/GV  MB  M 
Source: Kerr, V (2005:61, updated 2008); Ethical Investment Research Services (Research Briefing, August 
2005); Mallin, C. (2007) 
Keys: U-unitary; TT –two-tier; NED –non-executive director; gv -governance volunteered; ge: governance 
enforced; mb –mail ballots; ev – electronic voting; NN-not known; M= Mixed *South Africa, Ghana, Kenya and 
India are the more advanced on CG Issues. **Jamaica being the most advanced (CG) is used as the model. 
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2.5  CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
 This chapter describes the contextual setting of Jamaica and seeks to provide a better 
understanding of the unique environment within which the study took place.  By this, it 
outlines an overview of the Jamaican economy, the challenges to CG development, and local 
and global CG trends.  The political economy can be described as a two-party stable 
democratic state which is characterised by the Westminster model of political governance.  
The major drivers of the economy include bauxite and alumina, tourism and information 
services.  
 In spite of having a strong civil service with highly competent civil servants, and having 
passed several laws in recent years to strengthen the financial sector—a linchpin of the 
economy - Jamaica still possesses many challenges in CG.  These include, but are not limited 
to an alienation from existing political institutions and processes and an increased disregard for 
the norms of Civil Society, by especially the young, the redefined position of the State from its 
previous function as a development agency to that of a facilitator of market driven policies, 
poor performance of the economy and persistent poverty, increased criminal activity, including 
several forms of corrupt activities, as well as drug trafficking, and sustained levels of ‘crony 
capitalism’ and competition in the public and private sectors. Additionally, the issue of 
concentration of ownership and control of most of its leading private sector and stock market 
listed companies, posses CG challenges that have implications for corporate control, 
information disclosure and equitable treatment of stakeholders.  
 In addressing the preceding challenges, there are several emerging trends, Best Practices 
and scientific studies that will be reviewed, tested and analysed in this study, as part of a 
broader framework to better understand the CG issues confronting Jamaica and to ultimately 
frame policy recommendations for improvement.  
The next section of the thesis consists of Part 2 (chapters 3 and 4).  Its aim is to explore 
the theoretical and empirical contexts (chapter 3) of the areas identified as important aspects of 
CG with a focus on the research problems raised in chapter 1.  The analysis of theoretical and 
empirical issues aims to identify weaknesses and gaps in the literature and to advance the 
development of early hypotheses. It is the hope of the researcher to weave appropriate research 
questions, choose suitable strategies for collecting and analysing data and information (chapter 
4), and be guided empirically and theoretically on the basis of the findings to be yielded from 
this review and methodological framework.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE THEORETICAL AND ACADEMIC FRAMEWORK   
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
The main focus of this chapter is on the key elements of CG as outlined in chapter 1, 
namely: regulation, corruption, ownership and control, stakeholder relations (representation), 
perception and role of institutional investors, board characteristics and processes (board size, 
Chairman/CEO duality or separation, NEDs and executive Directors and selection, board 
committee and composition, tenure of Directors; gender and inequality issues, board 
performance evaluation), the board’s role in strategic decision making and corporate 
disclosure.  It examines these key elements of the thesis by a review of the literature from a 
broad spectrum spanning business history, accounting, economics, political science, finance, 
law and sociology.   
The analysis integrates several specific areas of CG into a broader perspective which in 
turn is deeply grounded in the results of theoretical and empirical research rather than merely 
conceptual and theoretical debates. Where debates are entertained, they are supported by 
empirical findings.  The review of empirical literature has depended heavily on studies from 
the USA and the UK but integrates benchmark comparisons of Jamaica (where possible) with 
European countries and other parts of the world. In many instances, it employs secondary 
analyses from many empirical sources.  
CG in this study embraces established laws, regulations, guidelines, voluntary codes 
and the associated structures (the institutions) and practices (how boardroom and corporate 
affairs are conducted), Best Practices across the public, private and non- profit sectors, and the 
role of ownership and control arrangements.  The author’s view of a most suitable definition is 
one that is all-embracing and recognises that there are fundamental differences in cultural, 
sociological, philosophical, legal and religious dynamics rendering no single model as ideal 
for all situations. That is, “no one size fits all”.    
Tricker (1984), states: “If management is about running businesses, governance is 
about seeing that they run properly.  All companies need governing as well as managing”.   In 
interpreting (Ibid), there should be a clear distinction between corporate management and CG.   
Many other authors have their views as to what CG is and does, for example, Cochran 
and Wartick (1998), sees CG as an umbrella term covering many aspects related to concepts, 
theories and practices of boards, concentrates on the relationship between boards, 
shareholders, top management, regulators, auditors and other stakeholders. Cadbury (1993:9) 
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states: “corporate governance is the ability of the Board of Directors to combine leadership 
with control and effectiveness with accountability that will primarily determine how 
well…companies meet society’s expectations of them.” Vance (1983), opined that CG ensures 
that long-term strategic objectives and plans are established…proper management structure 
(organisations, systems and people) is in place to achieve those objectives, while making sure 
the structure functions to maintain the corporation’s integrity, reputation and responsibility to 
its various constituencies. 
The chapter is further organised into the following sections: 3.2 presents a brief history 
of CG development; 3.3 discusses relevant theories of CG; 3.4 features in section 3.4.1—
ownership and control patterns, role of stakeholder relations (representation) and perception, 
and role of institutional investors.  Section 3.4.2 assesses CG Practices: board characteristics 
and processes, board’s role in strategic decision-making and the nature and role of corporate 
disclosure.  The chapter closes with a summary and conclusions in Section 3.6. 
3.2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNACE DEVELOPMENT  
3.2.1 An Introductory Overview  
 
CG systems have evolved over many Centuries, often in response to corporate failures 
or systemic crises.  Perhaps two of the most significant cases of early incidents of corporate 
failures that have had far-reaching impact on the public’s confidence in private CG were the 
cases of the Mississippi Company and The South Sea Company.  In discussing these two 
examples, however, the approach is in no way exhaustive as other critical events have not been 
cited. For example, in the historical narrative about France, the case of the Credit Mobilier in 
the second half of the 19th Century and the importance of the Burse, in the context of pension 
fund versus shareholding—the latter is more widespread in France than in the UK. In addition, 
the Civil Law arrangement is believed to be dated back to the era of Napoleon. This section 
therefore serves to provide a brief perspective into the historical context of CG development 
and is by no means complete.    
 The failure of the Mississippi Company in 1720 nearly brought France to the brink of 
financial ruin, only avoided because it was rescued by a Scotsman, John Law, who took over 
all of its debts in return for a monopoly on trade with Louisiana.  John Law’s Company failed 
with heavy losses borne by the French Government and its wealthy citizens (Morck and Steier, 
2005). France banned joint stock companies (JSC) and Frenchmen shunned the financial 
markets and passed this knowledge on to their children. The South Sea Company, a deliberate 
imitation of Law’s French experiment in Britain, collapsed at about the same time and with 
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somewhat the same effect-hence the South Sea Bubble13. The Bubble Act of 1722 was passed 
and banned JSCs in Britain unless they secured a parliamentary charter. This meant that 
establishing each new JSC required an Act of Parliament. It was explained that the London 
Stock Exchange survived because pre-existing successful British companies such as the British 
East India and Hudson’s Bay were ‘grandfathered’. So traumatised were the French that they 
banned JSCs and stayed away from the Financial Markets (Ibid, 2005).  
 The JSCs by their nature allow for more than one person to hold shares (stocks) in a 
company.  With these stocks being willingly traded by their owners at speculative prices, 
(perception prevails over reality) creating the opportunity for greater and greater demand.  
Like real bets, pundits will wager their bets and offer to buy or sell these stocks at unrealistic 
and unsustainable value, hence driving a country into hyperinflation and other problems with 
resultant effects being a collapse in the stock markets of the countries involved.  
However, unlike France, Britain did not respond in like manner but instead sought to 
protect investor rights by legislative actions. This later approach by Britain as opposed to that 
of France could be partially explained by the difference in the legal systems between the two 
countries. In Britain, a common law country, financial crises were met by the passage of 
legislation while in the civil law European countries (such as Germany, France, Switzerland, 
etc.) the banks and state investment programmes became a substitute for capital markets (Ibid, 
2005).    
Not surprisingly, this early resentment in France and other civil law European 
Countries towards the capital market could well explain why nearly three hundred years later, 
market capitalization of domestic companies as a percentage of GDP (i.e., GDP divided by 
total market value of local companies) in France was 34.5 per cent compared to Britain, 121.7 
percent (Waimer and Pape, 1999:156).  In the same breadth, the stock market remains more 
important in Anglo-Saxon countries such as Britain (82.1% Market Value of Domestic Capital 
as a per cent of GDP) than in NAS civil law European countries such as France (34.5 per cent 
MVDC of GDP).   
According to Morck and Steier (2005), common law countries’ courts and governments 
sought to protect the weak from the strong through a shareholding model with “one share, one 
vote” (Anglo-Saxon countries), while civil law countries’ governments sought alternative 
                                               
13
 The South Sea [or plural "Seas] Bubble is the name given to the first great Stock market crash in England in 
1720. See www.dal.ca/~dmcneil/sketch.html 
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ways of implementing the public goal of efficient capital allocation with different shareholding 
models (cross-holdings as in Germany, France and other NAS countries).   
In spite of remaining hesitation to open the floodgates to this form of privately owned 
company, the UK Parliament passed the Chartered Companies Act of 1837 which included a 
provision for limited liability.  However, owing to the cost and difficulty of acquiring a 
charter, this form of company was not common and in 1844, the Joint Stock Companies Act 
was passed.  In strengthening this Act, two other pieces of legislation came into being which 
have served to partially establish the foundation for British company law.  First is the 1855 
Act, (‘an act for limiting the liability of members of certain joint stock companies’) introduced 
limited liability. Second is the 1862 Act (‘an act for the incorporation, regulation, and 
winding-up of trading companies and other associations’) to ‘consolidate and amend’ the 
previous legislation (Sheikh, Rees and Williams 1995).  
The 1855 Act essentially allowed a joint stock company (JSC), registered under the 1844 
Act, to obtain limited liability status, as long as it adopted the word “limited” as the last name 
of the company. The idea was that the single word would alert creditors, and investors, as a 
whole, to the risks implied by limited liability. So, for the first time, shareholders were 
protected, against lawsuits which could be pursued against the company. Such a provision 
reads:  
“If any execution, sequestration or other process in the nature of 
execution…shall have been issued against the property or effects of the 
company, and if there cannot be found sufficient thereon to levy or enforce 
such execution, …then such execution…may be issued against any of the 
shareholders to the extent of the portions of their shares…not then paid 
up…”, (Butcher, 1995: 221).    
 
The language of the above might have changed significantly since, but what is still 
relevant is its essence. A company is now given its own identity as a legal and sole person.  
However, where the said company fails to honour its obligations, the question of director 
liability may or may not be a matter for settlement.  
 The 1862 Act: The 1862 act consolidated all previous company laws. It was reported 
by Butcher (1995) citing Sheikh, et al (1995:223) to have been divided into as many as nine 
parts, in addition to a first schedule. Butcher, writing Reform of The General Meeting, recalled 
the following brief provisions: “While Part III of the act included a Clause 52 which read, in 
adequate of any regulations as to voting every member shall have one vote.” 
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However, Clause 44 reads: “Every member shall have a vote for every share up to ten. 
He shall have an additional vote for every five shares beyond the first ten shares up to one 
hundred and an additional vote for every ten shares beyond the first hundred shares.”  Tricker 
(1984), one of the most prolific writers on CG, has described the 1855 and 1862 Acts as 
making the UK Company law the most permissive in Europe, and many other parts of the 
world. However, it is doubtful Tricker’s postulation could be accepted today as Britain has 
since revised its company law since 2006. The aim was: “to develop a simple, modern, 
efficient and cost effective framework for carrying out business activity in Britain for the 
twenty-first Century.” 
 According to Butcher (1995), “the Cohen Committee of 1995 and Jenkins Committee 
of 1962) of Britain adhered to the same concept of what was to be known as “decreasing 
control” that shareholders are perceived to wield. Control referred to what should be 
happening at general meetings, and why, invariably it did not happen.”  The Jenkins 
Committee focused particularly on control issues. However, the statute is pretty much the 
same today, nearly sixty (60) years since the Jenkins Committee. The conclusion, therefore, is 
that these Companies Acts that resulted from the Jenkins Committee have not achieved much.  
 Adolphus Berle and Gardiner Means, in their seminal thesis, Private Property And The 
Modern Corporation (1932), found that as share holdings in companies became more 
dispersed, control shifted from family and large institutional investors into the hands of a new 
group of managerial elite. This group, while not the legitimate owners, effectively runs and 
controls the organisation, at times not in the best interest of legitimate owners.   
It was because of the recognition of the plight of shareholders that the Cohen 
Committee Report opened with the following claim: 
“We have also sought to find means of making it easier for shareholders 
to exercise a more effective control over the management of the 
companies. The result will be to strengthen the already high credit and 
reputation of British Companies. We must emphasise however, that this 
object will be attained more by the selection of the shareholders of the 
governing body of each company, than by the provisions of any statute.” 
(Butcher In: Sheikh, S. and Rees, W., 1995) 
 
This same Committee had voted to reject the suggestion that the Act be amended, to 
allow voting on resolutions by postal ballot, and invariably reverted to the need for a general 
meeting, despite having paraded, just like Cohen, the many well-known failings.  This was 
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justified (or attempted to be justified) when Butcher (1995) commented: “Where there is any 
possibility of there being a difference of opinion between members…we think there should be 
a meeting at which it may be discussed.”  
 In 1987, Mr. William Cash of Britain introduced the “private member’s” bill, called, 
“The Protection of Shareholders Act” (No. 58, Session 86/87), which came a quarter of a 
Century after Jenkins. It was intended as an amendment to the Companies Act 1985, and reads 
as follows:  
“Make provision for each company to establish a shareholders' 
committee; for the allocation of a Director in each public Company to 
such a committee; and to prescribe the functions of the auditor, 
Company Secretary, and solicitor of each such company in relation to 
that committee.” 
Clause 4 (same bill), reads:  
“The shareholders committee shall be so appointed to serve a proper 
balance between the interests of the different classes of members of the 
company and so as to secure adequate and independent representation 
for members generally and for individual members in particular, and not 
by Directors, by a body corporate or trust corporation, or by persons on 
their behalf or connected with them.” 
In the final analysis, this bill is believed to be the first of its kind to have sought, and 
presented, a meaningful “ownership” role for the individual shareholder, and is argued to 
have applied mainly to listed companies.  
Leading up to the 1920s, the global business landscape was dramatically changed, with 
significant bank bailouts that saw the shift of ownership and control of corporations largely 
from families to banks, both in Anglo-Saxon Britain and North America.  After the 1929 Wall 
Street crash, the USA established a well-celebrated Securities And Exchange Commission 
(SEC), it was hoped that this institution would help to curb the influence of a new and elitist 
group of corporate raiders, dubbed, “The New Princes of Industry” by Berle and Means 
(1932).  
Prior to the Berle and Means seminal work, Lewis Gilbert (ordinary American 
shareowner) who owned ten shares in New York’s Consolidated Gas Company, found that his 
questions were ignored at an annual meeting. Lewis and his brother pushed for reform. Finally, 
in 1942, the SEC adopted a requirement that companies put shareholder resolutions to vote, 
under specified circumstances (McRitchie, 1997).  
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In 1967, two and a half decades later, Saul Alinsky, a New York State, Rochester-
based community organiser, together with several national U.S. churches, targetted Kodak’s 
poor record of minority hiring.  In addition, empire building by CEOs led to a kind of merger 
madness (McRitchie, 1997), as conglomerates gobbled up unrelated companies. When many 
of these conglomerates lagged in price, in the 1970s, it heightened the realisation that CEOs 
needed oversight.  
However, these corporate crises were not limited to the United States as there were 
simultaneously many other business crises and/or failures in the United Kingdom.   In the 
USA, we saw the growth of hostile bids, and Wall Street corporate takeover activities, 
triggered by “junk” bonds, generated a new terminology: green mail.14  Fundamental issues of 
governance power came to the fore. In the U.K. during the 1980s, the raid of the Maxwell 
Group on the pension fund of the Mirror Group of newspapers, the collapse of Bank of Credit 
and Commerce International (BCCI) and Barings bank, placed heavy focus on the United 
Kingdom.  Simultaneously, in the USA, in the 1980s, it was the savings and loans debacle, 
followed rapidly by “Black Monday”, October 19, 1987, another Wall Street crash.  
The impact on employees and communities was often devastating, in the form of plant 
shutdowns and loss of jobs. While workers and communities struggled with massive layoffs, 
CEOs invented “golden parachute”15 severance packages, and designed “poison pills”16, which 
made takeovers less attractive, through “stock dilution” mechanisms that hit new shareholders.  
By the late 1980s, a backlash set in. The “junk bond” market imploded, and an irate public, 
and many corporate boards, began to demand a more visible role in CG. They recognised that 
their intervention could soften the impact of corporate restructuring on workers, operations, 
profits and communities at large.  
                                               
14The term Greenmail is a neologism combining the terms greenback and blackmail and said to be invented by 
Journalists and commentators who saw the practices of corporate raiders as a form of blackmail. The greenmailer 
commonly targets a publicly traded company that is cash rich but often undervalued, with large assets and 
possibly a solid customer base (http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/greenmail.asp).  
15
 Golden Parachute is a clause in an executive's employment contract specifying that he/she will receive large 
benefits in the event that the company is acquired and the executive's employment is terminated. These benefits 
can take the form of severance pay, a bonus, stock options, or a combination thereof 
(http://www.investopedia.com).  
16
 Poison Pill is a strategy used by corporations to discourage a hostile takeover by another company. The target 
company attempts to make its stock less attractive to the acquirer. There are two types of poison pills: (1) A flip-
in allows existing shareholders (except the acquirer) to buy more shares at a discount; (2) The flip-over allows 
stockholders to buy the acquirer's shares at a discounted price after the merger.  
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3.2.2  Corporate Governance Development and its Democratic Principles  
This section examines CG development drawing on the psychology of justice (Gomez 
and Korine, 2005; Thilbaut and Walker 1995; Lind and Tyler, 1990; and Satan, 1987) and the 
political economy of social choice (Rawls, 1971, Mackie, 2003).  CG is a set of contracts that 
defines relationships among three distinct actors in a corporation: the sovereign, who forms the 
vast majority of the modern legal system and are the shareowners; the governed, namely all 
stakeholders including owners of shares; and the governing, who directs and/or control the 
corporation.  Given the nature of the contractual triad of the sovereign, governed, and 
governing, and being equally embedded in a society of natural law, CG shares with modern 
political governance a common root in consent by the governed (Gomez and Korine, 
2005:739).   
 Consistent with the doctrine of political economy of social choice, consent by the 
governed in CG cannot be satisfactorily explained without reference to the collective value of 
procedural fairness that underlies markets.  With this analysis, the authors (Ibid) were 
compelled to suggest that the evolution of CG, too, can be understood in terms of 
Tocqueville’s17 well-known hypothesis that democracy eventually prevails in all spheres of 
organised activity.  Historical records of institutional reforms in France, Germany and the 
United States revealed that CG has indeed evolved to make increasing use of democratic 
procedures. When traced over a period of two Centuries of capitalist development, CG was 
seen to have been slowly and successfully incorporated into the fundamental democratic 
processes of enfranchisement, separation of powers and representation.  
 It is important to define the preceding terminologies:  Enfranchisement- in line with 
enlightenment philosophy of equal treatment and individual freedom (Locke), the law is the 
same for every citizen, and every citizen has the freedom to act independently, within the 
limits set by private property rights. Separation of Powers-again in the tradition of 
enlightenment (Montesquieu), a separation obtains between the power of direction (the 
executive) and control (the legislature and judiciary) to prevent the abuses of autocracy and to 
ensure the protection of individual freedom.  Representation with Public Debates - A critical 
element of these democratic principles is the opportunity they provide for debating opposing 
                                               
17Tocqueville’s democracy hypothesis much like Kant’s famous peace hypothesis (cf. Gomez and Korine, 
2005:13, 739-752), stood on a long-term reference for scholarly inquiry.  To Tocqueville, all of history can be 
read as the slow, but inexorable struggle of the collective values underlying democracy, namely the values of 
fairness and equality of condition, to assert themselves.  It is Tocqueville’s central hypothesis that democracy 
constitutes the sole model of acceptable governance in modern society and will eventually prevail in all spheres 
of organised activity.   
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views and this expression of contrasting views encourages consensus in decisions thus 
fostering individual freedom.  The authors also see this system as facilitating the delegation of 
sovereignty to representatives rather than in authoritarian regimes built on secrecy and 
information monopoly.   
 The work of Berle and Means (1932), in addition to advancement by institutionalists 
and agency theorists, described the evolution of CG in terms of changes in the relationship 
between ownership and control (Chandler 1977; Fligstein, 1990).  Three major phases have 
been posited, each having its own model of reference for CG, which have come to be accepted 
as standard for the times and are generally adopted, whether by a large, small, listed or unlisted 
company (Frentrop, 2003).  Phase one is typified by the dominance of the founding family and 
stretches from the Industrial Revolution to the 1920s.  The second phase is marked by the rise 
of the professional manager and spans the 1920s to 1970s. Phase three has its origins in the 
1970s and is characterised by increasing accountability to society.  These three time horizons 
represented distinct stages in the historical development of the corporation and each has its 
own historical features. See Table 3.1 
 
3.2.2.1 Phase One: Familial Control and Economic Enfranchisement 
 
The first phase of the development of CG involved the dominance of family owned and 
managed businesses. This period spanned the industrial revolution and lasted up to the 1920s. 
Familial control involved the governance of the company by the founding family while 
economic enfranchisement involved the opening up of the right to own businesses by the 
general populace. Various pieces of legislation were put in place that removed the class barrier 
to owning businesses and represented the first step in fundamentally reshaping the notion of 
economic sovereignty.  The legislation includes the French Code du Commerce (1808), The 
American Legislation on General Incorporation (1811 for New York), and the English Joint 
Stock Company Registration Act (1844). They opened the right to the ownership of a business 
corporation to any individual who can afford it, independent of social status, class or heredity 
and established that each owner of property has equal rights before the law.   
 However, the incorporation of the limited liability company was subjected (limited to a 
few individuals) until the second part of the 19th Century and, therefore, remained highly 
restrictive in practice. It took a period of 20 years commencing around 1860 (United Kingdom 
1856; France 1867, Germany 1870, but also Spain 1869, Belgium 1873, Hungary 1875, and 
Italy 1882) for the removal of the requirement of public authorisation. This latter development 
in property rights represents what has been called the “Magna Carta of emerging shareowner 
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power” (Rippert, 1951, p.63). By this, individuals are emancipated from the public authority, 
and shareowners acquire full sovereignty over the corporation. This is the era when, for the 
first time, individuals may freely create, buy and sell shares of ownership in a corporation. 
Therefore, it can be stated that CG in the 19th Century puts in place the first defining element 
of democratic procedure or so-called economic enfranchisement.  Unfortunately, there is no 
clear evidence that workers were economically enfranchised.  
 Notwithstanding the above, it is not to be construed that the corporation of the 19th and 
20th Centuries was governed by the procedures of democracy, i.e., equal rights to ownership 
only established economic enfranchisement. When one traces the beginnings of capitalism, as 
it is today, to the Industrial Revolution, the most striking revelation from a CG point of view is 
the lengthy dominance of the founding family. With the exception of a few nations, the family 
firm represented the model of CG throughout the 19th and early 20th Century (Kaeble, 1990 
and Coffee, 2001). The family owned and managed the assets of the corporation (no separation 
of powers) and decisions were made in secret family councils with no representation of 
outsiders and no public debate. These new entrepreneurs emerged from the skilled working 
class and benefitted from the legal order, appeared to have created the institutions of the old 
regime, constituting veritable dynasties of industry. A few examples are the Dupont de 
Nemours in the US, the Siemens in Germany or the Boussac in France, and the Courtaulds in 
the United Kingdom.  
While the majority of upheavals of the late 18th Century led to the political 
institutionalisation of enfranchisement, separation of powers and representation in much of the 
19th Century America and Europe, businesses adopted a form of governance that is much 
closer to aristocracy, with a concentration of power and lack of representation and public 
debate.   Not surprisingly, Tocqueville noted quite lucidly at the very beginning of this new 
era: 
 [T]hus, as a mass of the nation turns to democracy, the class occupied 
with industry becomes more aristocratic. Men show themselves more and 
more alike in one, and more and more different in the other, and the 
inequality increases in the small society as it decreases in the great. Thus 
when one goes back to the source, it seems that one sees aristocracy issue 
by a natural effort from within the very heart of democracy (Gomez and 
Korine 2005:13, 744 citing Tocqueville, A, (2000 [1830], DA,II, 320, pg. 
532) 
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3.2.2.2 Phase Two: Managerial Governance and Separation of Control  
As it approached the end of the 19th Century, some industries were already beginning 
to reach their limits and this was widened as World War I set in.  This phase fell between the 
1920s and the 1970s and saw the rise of professional managers who were hired to run family 
firms more efficiently as they grew in size and complexity requiring greater financial resources 
to continue growth.  Family firms were forced to look outside for investors rather than to 
depend solely on the family for financing expansion. Great corporations emerged out of once 
small family businesses and needed professional management to deal with the new challenges 
of size, product diversity, and modern manufacturing, even in those cases in which ownership 
remained in family hands. It was argued that familial governance could not cope with the 
changed economic conditions of the 20th Century and thus managerial governance arose to 
take its place (Berle and Means, 1932; Chandler, 1962).  
 With the new era heralded by professional managers in the 20th Century, CG integrated 
the separation of control, the second defining element of democratic procedure. Under 
managerial governance, ownership and control were separated, with owners providing capital 
and leaving day-to-day management and control of the business to hired hands—the managers 
(Berle and Means, 1932; Burnham, 1941). During this period, the limited liability corporation 
became the most popular form in western economies, and a swathe of laws was enacted to 
regulate and categorise corporations (Cheffins, 2002; Frentrop, 2003).   
 In an era of managerial governance many laws were passed and codes written to favour 
the separation of ownership and managerial control. For example, securities laws concerning 
the obligation of disclosure (1940s)-- France enacted laws for mandatory creation of the Board 
of Directors while German companies were obligated to create the two tier board during 1947 
and 1957. With these new laws, CG began to exhibit even more features of political 
governance. Shareholders began to meet and vote on major corporate decisions such as 
electing Board of Directors at AGMs and overseas professional managers. In some 
jurisdictions like Germany, shareholders voted on owner and worker representatives on the 
Boards. Most significantly, though, is the power conferred on the Board of Directors by 
shareholders to hire and fire managers hence instilling a counterweight to managerial 
authority.    
 According to Gomez and Korine (2005), with these historical changes, one cannot 
describe the adoption of the procedures of democracy in CG as a straightforward process.  In 
fact, Stanworth and Giddens (1974) opined that the managerial revolution has led to the 
replacement of the old capitalist aristocracy by a new capitalist technocracy.  It is felt that 
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although in theory the corporate board is supposed to be independent, in practice, it is 
controlled by a “managerial technocracy”–managers from other companies as shareowners and 
stakeholders are usually excluded (Bourdieu, 1998; Monks and Minow, 1995; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1973). The observation cited by Bourdieu et al earlier, holds similarity with 
Jamaican listed corporations at present time (Kerr, personal experience).   
 
3.2.2.3 Phase Three: Popular Governance and Representation 
The third time horizon has its origins in the 1970s and can be characterised by 
increasing accountability to society, popular governance and representation. The current state 
of affairs in major economies involved, by far, the most democratic of governance structures. 
This is best characterised by the feature of Representation. However, representation is still 
limited in most countries, depending on whether or not the debate includes stock market 
companies versus private unlisted corporations.   
As the corporation grows, it comes under the influence of society at large. Corporations 
have gone global, and in the process, public ownership shifted into the hands of mass 
shareholders through public share offerings. Employees share ownership and retirement 
investments are two of the more recent inventions arising from the approach to mass 
ownership.  It is instructive to differentiate this mass ownership from dispersed ownership as 
described by Berle and Means (1932). For if mass ownership were to mean further dilution of 
shareholding and hence more dispersed stocks, then this would have negligible influence on 
managerial governance in publicly listed companies.  This mass ownership comes in the form 
of large block owners, such as pension funds, who have been backed by laws passed in the 
United States since the 1970s that enable them to actively monitor and vote their holdings.  
 In this third phase, strategic direction must be informed by direct contact with 
shareholders and a majority of board members, the majority of whom should be independent. 
At AGMs, debate and discussion ensues, managers are held accountable and can lose their 
jobs if found wanting.  Requirement for consent from those whose interests are represented, 
holds true both in democratic political governance and in the CG arena. 
 Table 3.1 summarises the history and development of corporate governance as 
discussed in the preceding section. The next section focuses on selected relevant theories in 
corporate governance.  
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Table 3.1: History of Corporate Governance Development 
 
KEY 
FEATURES 
 
First Phase:   
19th Century (Industrial 
Revolution) to 1920s 
Second Phase:  
1920s to 1970s 
 
Third Phase: 
1970s to 21st 
Century 
Model of 
Reference  
 
Familial  
 
Managerial  
 
Popular  
 
 
Relevant 
Legislations and 
Important 
Voluntary Codes 
of CG 
 
General Incorporation (1811 
for New York) 
French Code du Commerce 
(1808) ; 
Bubble Act (1825) 
Chartered Companies Act 
(1837); 
Joint Stock Companies Act 
(1844); Limited Liability Act 
(1855); 1862 Act, “One share 
on vote principle”; 
 
Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) 
(1933), USA; 
Company law of  
France (1940) making 
BoD mandatory; Two 
tier board in Germany; 
Corruption Prevention 
Laws;  Freedom of 
Information 
regulations  
 
Cadbury Report 
1992; 
Sarbanes Oxley Act 
(SOX), 2002; 
Turnbull, 2003; 
Smith Report, 2003; 
Combined Code, 
2006; King III, 2008 
 
 
Separation of 
Ownership from  
Control 
  
 
None 
  
Implementation 
Generalisation of the 
limited liability form, 
with boards and 
disclosure 
requirements  
 
Reinforcement 
Increased board 
supervision over 
managers; close 
monitoring; 
performance 
appraisal  
 
Economic 
Enfranchisement  
  
Implementation 
Creation of rights to 
ownership independent of 
social standing 
   
Reinforcement 
Strengthened bylaws 
and corporate practice.  
Public general 
meetings become 
standard 
 
Reinforcement 
Strengthened by 
new rules on right to 
vote; protection of 
minority interests 
 
Level of Public 
Debate 
 
None 
    
None 
 
Implementation 
Dispersed and mass 
ownership; 
institutional  
stakeholder activism 
 Sources: Advancement to Gomez and Korine (2005: pg. 747). 
  
3.3 RELEVANT THEORIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
There are various theoretical frameworks that have evolved to explain and analyze the 
development of CG.  The more relevant of these theories to this thesis, specifically, and which 
have positively influenced the development of CG literature, generally, are discussed herein. 
These are agency theory, shareholder theory, transaction cost theory, stewardship theory and 
the volunteered governance versus enforced governance arguments. Although there are 
marked differences between the various theoretical frameworks as they each seek to analyse 
CG, they do share significant commonalities.   
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3.3.1 Agency Theory  
Agency theory18 is the dominant orientation in research on CG. It is built on the 
premise that corporate profit satisfies individual preferences and thereby ensures general 
consent (Gomez and Korine, 2005).  Agency theory discusses moral hazards and agency costs. 
It categorises the agency relationship in which one party, the principal, delegates work to 
another party, the agent. According to Solomon (2007)19, the introduction of limited liability 
and the opening up of corporate ownership to the general public through share ownership had 
a dramatic impact on the way in which companies were controlled. The market system in the 
UK and the USA, inter alia, is organised in such a way that the shareholder, the owner or 
‘principal’ of the company, delegates day-to-day decision making in the company to the 
Directors, who are the shareholder’s ‘agents’.  
 There is a separation of ownership and control that has led to the well-known “agency 
problem’. Much of agency theory as related to corporations is set in the context of the 
separation of ownership and control as described in the work of Berle and Means (1932). In 
this situation, the agents are the managers and the principals are the shareholders. Essentially, 
there is a connected group or series of contracts amongst the various players, arising because it 
is seemingly impossible to have a contract that perfectly aligns the interests of principal and 
agent in a corporate control situation. As a result the Agency theory views the firm as a nexus 
of contracts. This commonly cited agency relationship in the CG context can also cover 
various other relationships including those of company and creditor, and of employer and 
employee.   
Agency theory views CG mechanisms, especially the Board of Directors, as being an 
essential monitoring device to try to ensure that problems brought about by the principal-agent 
relationship are minimised.  Mallin (2007) explains that the agency relationship can have a 
number of disadvantages relating to the opportunism or self-interest of the agent: for example, 
the agent may not act in the best interests of the principal, or the agent may act only partially 
in the best interests of the principal. The agent may misuse his power for pecuniary or other 
advantage, and the agent may not take appropriate risks in pursuance of the principal’s 
interests. The principal and the agent may have access to different levels of information which 
means that the principal may be at a disadvantage because the agent will have more 
information.  
                                               
18The Agency Theory (or Agency Model) presents a legal or fiduciary relationship between two persons who 
agree that one (agent) is to act on behalf of the other (principal), subject to the other’s control. 
19Solomon, Jill in Corporate Governance and Accountability second edition, 2007, sought to explain agency 
theory by discussing its assumptions in the context of separation and control in the corporate governance context. 
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3.3.2  Shareholder versus Stakeholder Argument 
The central position of the stakeholder theory is that the purpose of the firm should be 
more widely defined than the maximisation of shareholder welfare (Keasey et al., 1997).  The 
welfare of other parties that have a long-term interest in the firm’s activities and its 
performance should also be considered. The stakeholders are not merely the firm’s 
shareholders and managers (the parties in the principal-agent framework of CG) but also its 
customers, creditors, suppliers, employees, etc. These stakeholders have a legitimate claim on 
the firm which derives from the existence of an “exchange relationship” (Hill and Jones, 
1992).  In order to maximise stakeholder welfare, there should be a sense of fairness in the 
way firms interact and conduct exchanges with other parties.  Moreover, an important 
proposition of stakeholder theory is that such “fairness” leads to socially efficient exchanges.   
 In contrast to the above, the “agency model”, which is an Anglo-American tenet, has 
long-term shareholder value maximisation as its main corollary. Indeed, the whole country’s 
CG movement was born and grew to revive, enhance and protect the rights and interests of 
shareholders (Spencer Stuart 1997).  The supporters of the “agency model” have another 
cogent point: there is a strong risk that a board accountable to many stakeholders may end up 
being accountable to none.  
 The detractors of the “agency model” contend that by focusing exclusively on the value 
of the corporation’s shares, one deliberately ignores the other assets of the corporation such as 
the skills of its employees, expectations of its customers and suppliers, the company’s role and 
reputation in the community, etc…They further argue that the “agency model” gives priority 
to short-term results and current shareholders, at the expense of long-term development and 
future stakeholders. 
3.3.3 Transaction Cost Theory 
Transaction cost theory provides views of the firm and of managerial behaviour in the 
context of CG. It assumes that people are often opportunistic and so managers 
opportunistically arrange their transactions.  In this way, it bears similarity with aspects of the 
agency theory.  The unit of analysis in the transaction cost theory is the transaction and it seeks 
to find answers to the problem of finding ways to persuade company management to pursue 
shareholders’ interests and company/shareholder profit maximisation, rather than their self 
interest. Solomon (2007 citing Williamson, 1996:25) argues that transaction cost theory was 
‘… an interdisciplinary alliance of law, economics and organisation…’. Cyert and March 
(1963) in A Behavioural Theory of the Firm, has been accredited with the initiation of this 
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discipline, and has become one of the cornerstones of industrial economics and finance theory.  
Transaction cost theory is based on the fact that firms have become so large that they, as a 
consequence, substitute for the market in determining the allocation of resources. Companies 
are so large and complex that price movements outside companies direct production and the 
markets co-ordinate transactions. Within companies, such market transactions are removed 
and management co-ordinates and controls production (Solomon, 2007, p.21). Therefore, it is 
the way in which the company is organised that determines its control over transactions.  
Transaction cost theory views the firm as a governance structure and is concerned with 
managerial diplomacy in which it assumes that managers are given to opportunism and moral 
exposure, and that managers operate under bounded rationality and regard the Board of 
Directors as an instrument of control. Managers will tend to satisfy themselves rather than 
maximise profits which are not in the best interest of the shareholders. Solomon (2007) 
explains that it is important that company management internalise transactions as much as 
possible in order to remove risks and uncertainties about future product prices and quality.  
Evidently, there are similarities between agency theory and transaction cost theory as both 
theories present a rationale for management to be controlled by shareholders. 
  
3.3.4 Stewardship Theory 
 
Stewardship theory draws on the assumptions underlying transaction cost theory and 
agency theory. This theory was introduced as an alternative approach to CG by Donaldson and 
Davis (1991). Mallin (2007:17) in highlighting the work of Donaldson and Davis, opined that 
stewardship theory stresses the beneficial consequences on shareholder returns of facilitative 
authority structures which unify command by having roles of CEO and chair held by the same 
person…The safeguarding of returns to shareholders may be along the track, not of placing 
management under greater control by owners, but of empowering managers to take 
autonomous executive action.  While this argument of unified command may have merits in 
Anglo-Saxon America, Britain, on the opposite side of the Atlantic, is rejecting this proposal. 
Cadbury (1992) and the Combined Code (2003) strongly recommended the separation of the 
roles of Chairman and CEO citing that it would render too much power in the hands of one 
individual.  There have been cases of this misuse of power in the UK such as the scandals 
surrounding the Mirror Group with Robert Maxwell and Polly Peck.   
Furthermore, British companies have been separating these roles more drastically than 
have been done in America in the last decade.  Not surprisingly, Davis et al (1997) suggested 
that mangers should be monitored as stewards or caretakers of organisational interests, which 
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is involvement and long-term oriented, and aims to maximise performance.  Their (Davis et al, 
1997) findings concluded that managers whose needs are based on growth, achievement and 
self-actualisation, and who are intrinsically motivated, may gain greater utility by 
accomplishing organisational rather than personal agendas.  Davis et al further stressed that 
managers in situations with collective culture and lower power distance are more likely to 
identify with their organisations, commit to organisational values, and serve organisational 
ends.   
 
3.3.5 Volunteered Governance versus Enforced Governance  
Since the Cadbury Report (1992), the term “self-regulation” has been widely used in 
similar, as well as widely diverging contexts.  Many authors interpret and describe self-
regulation as the voluntary or mandatory compliance to guidelines such as the Cadbury II and 
the Greenbury (1995) Reports. The literature, however, has not clearly separated the initiative 
by corporations to develop and implement their own guidelines from their adoption of or 
conformity with mandatory compliance requirements, based on laws or sector-specific 
operating guidelines.  For example, the Bank of Jamaica, like many other Central Banks issues 
clear operating standards for institutions they regulate.  These banking standards are usually 
rule-based or mandatory.  On the other hand, many professional bodies may not choose to 
comply with industry-specific guidelines, even though there might be penalties for non-
compliance.  However, when the CG requirements are not legal requirements (rule-based), 
there are no legal sanctions against those refusing to comply. 
This author, therefore, proposes two new perspectives which it is hoped will provide 
some clarity to the confusion surrounding self-regulation.  The first is volunteered governance, 
which may be used interchangeably with self-regulation.  With volunteered governance, firms 
willingly adopt established Best Practices such as the Cadbury (1992), or its more advanced 
Combined Coded (2003), to guide their activities. Also, firms develop and implement 
guidelines to enhance corporate reputation and to ensure business prudence and transparency.  
These two scenarios are within the firm’s total discretion, hence referred to as self-regulation.  
See Figure 3.1. The next concept is enforced governance.  With enforced governance, firms 
have no choice but to adopt Best Practices as dictated by markets, professional bodies or 
businesses to which they might have obligations. For example, the Combined Code of Best 
Practices (Cadbury II or Hampel, 1998) supplements the London Stock Exchange listing rules 
in some respects. According to the Combined Code, “corporations are required to report 
annually how the codes are applied, or provide explanations when they do not comply.” The 
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LSE listing requirements is one of the many examples of enforced governance.  Another 
example is the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act, 2002 (USA), following the 
scandals of Enron, Worldcom and Global Crossing.  For example, the  SOX requires the Chief 
Executive Officer and the Chief Financial Officer to certify that quarterly and annual reports 
filed on forms 10-Q, 10-K, and 20-F are fully compliant with applicable securities laws and 
present a fair picture of the financial situation of the company.     
  Figure 3.1: Governance Volunteered versus Governance Enforced  
              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Source: Kerr, V (2005: 10)  
  
3.4 REGULATION  
3.4.1 Introduction   
Regulation is the act of controlling and restricting human or societal behaviour by rules 
or restrictions.  It may take many different forms; in the context of this thesis, it is the legal 
restrictions promulgated by government authority and agencies which are established to 
enforce these rules (Bert-Jeep Koops et al, 2006). A number of these institutions have been 
discussed in this thesis and they include the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ), the Financial Services 
Commission (FSC), the Office of the Contractor General, the Corruption Prevention 
Commission, just to name a few. There is also self-regulation by individual firms or industries 
such as associations (bankers associations, accountant associations, market regulation such as 
stock market regulation as well as regulation governing the import and export of goods by a 
country.   
In essence, regulations can be considered as actions of conduct which improve sanction 
such as fine, suspension from a group, and in some cases, can lead to imprisonment. The most 
beneficial aspect to regulation is that it helps to create some order and consistency in markets 
and within each governmental body by prescribing the standard of behaviour and boundaries 
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which organisational mandate should be executed. Otherwise, what we will have is that  
market players will tend to do whatever they please –act like cowboys—and hence chaos will 
occur and businesses will be like casinos. Therefore, governments, through their public policy 
initiatives must play an important role in ensuring that adequate and appropriate regulations 
are in-place, enforced, and constantly reviewed.  
 
3.4.2  The Role of Public Policy    
In order to ensure soundness, preserve the integrity of the regulatory framework and 
satisfy the interest of the various players in the public and private sector communities, and 
others, the Government of Jamaica has undertaken a number of regulatory initiatives in the last 
decade, particularly in response to the financial sector meltdown of the 1990s.  Since then, the 
BOJ has revised and strengthened financial legislations and developed, enacted, and enforced 
others. In 2001, came the Public Bodies Management and Accountability Act (PBMA), in 
2002, the Access to Information Act, in 2003, the Corruption Prevention Act as well as the 
National Contracts Commission, in 2004, the Government of Jamaica Audit Commission as 
well as the Companies Act of Jamaica, 2004; and  in 2007 the passage of the Electronic 
Transaction Act.      
All these measures are aimed at strengthening the role of public policy and good 
governance in Jamaica, seek to promote and deliver an effective framework for guiding and 
monitoring corporations, and preserving the confidence of investors and other stakeholders in 
the soundness, integrity and transparency of business economic activities. Such a framework 
encompasses the internal structures of corporations that ensure effective and efficient 
management, as well as external relationships between a company and its community at large. 
This community of stakeholders includes shareholders, commercial lenders and other 
stakeholders, all of whom are important from a public policy perspective.        
The incidence and consequence of corruption threat to corporate and political 
governance is another important issue of this study. Corruption disproportionately advantages 
the strong and disadvantages the weak. In economic terms, corruption increases transaction 
costs for investment, for the production and distribution of goods and services, and officials 
offload these costs disproportionately onto the backs of the powerless. It is the mass of people 
who for the most part, pay for any additional irregular cost (Transparency International, 2000). 
 For the purposes of this study, the analysis is limited to two areas of governance, that of 
corporate (the affairs of the corporation) and political (the affairs of the State or political 
directorate) which form the major planks in the overall governance framework. However, 
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there are other streams of governance such as democratic governance, social governance, and 
inclusive governance. See glossary in Appendix 12.  In the next section, the different 
regulatory environments in Jamaica are discussed.  
 
3.4.3   The Political Governance Environment  
 The failure of CG cannot be thoroughly explained without an analysis of economic 
political governance. This is how the Jamaican state conducts its businesses and regulates 
economic transactions.  In this section, the drivers of political governance and a select number 
of the tools used in the regulation of economic transactions are analysed.  For the purposes of 
this study, political governance refers to the system, structures, and processes of the day-to-
day affairs of the political executive which is headed by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet.  
Specifically, political governance in the ensuing analysis focuses on the Constitution, 
Parliament, and its Houses (The House of Representatives or Lower House and the Senate or 
Upper House). Additionally, selected committees of the House of Representatives are 
discussed.  The Committees of the Houses of Parliament can be likened to the Committees of 
the Board of Directors of a corporation, at which level the work of government or corporation 
is done, or at least discussed in great detail. See Figure 3.2.  
 
3.4.3.1 The Constitution  
Under the Jamaican Constitution, Queen Elizabeth II (since 6 February 1952), is 
represented by a Governor General (GG) as Head of State. The executive head of government 
is the Prime Minister. There is the Cabinet of Ministers who is appointed by the GG acting on 
the advice of the Prime Minister. The monarchy is hereditary; the GG appointed by the 
monarch on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. Following legislative elections, the 
leader of the majority party or the leader of the majority coalition in the House of 
Representatives is appointed Prime Minister by the GG and the Deputy Prime Minister is 
recommended by the Prime Minister.  
 Jamaica inherited its White-Hall Westminster bicameral Parliament from Britain when 
it gained independence in 1962. This bicameral Parliament consists of the Senate (a 21-
member body appointed by the GG on the recommendations of the Prime Minister and the 
Leader of the Opposition. The ruling party is allocated 13 seats, and the opposition is allocated 
eight seats) and the House of Representatives (60 seats—members are elected by popular vote 
to serve five-year terms).  The ‘winner takes all’ feature of the Westminster Model of 
governance is probably a major deterrent to achieving democratic, corporate and political 
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governance in Jamaica. Under this structure, the party gaining the majority vote in a general 
election makes all appointments of Cabinet Ministers, senior members of civil of service, the 
judiciary and the Foreign Service. For example, although the general elections results of 
September 2007 showed the ruling JLP in popular vote: 50.5% and 32 of 60 seats and the 
opposition PNP 49.5% of popular vote with 28 of 60 seats, the JLP appointed the full slate of 
Ministers (at the political level).  
3.4.3.1.2   Selected Committees of the House of Representatives   
Similar to Board Committees to which various tasks of the main board are delegated, 
the Committees of Parliament have been established to carry out specific functions of both 
Houses.  Traditionally, the Government appoints one of its members to chair each House 
Committee, except for the Public Accounts Committee which the Constitution dictates must be 
chaired by a member of the Opposition.  However, for the first time since Independence, 
recently installed Prime Minister, Orette Bruce Golding, has moved to ensure that all House 
Committees be chaired by a member of the Opposition. This, the Prime Minister claimed, is a 
move to provide a balance of power to governance and to reduce the power of the executive, 
which he has long felt, is vested with too much power under the Westminster system of 
political governance.  
Public Accounts Committee (PAC): The Public Accounts Committee is assigned the 
responsibility of examining the accounts of Parliament. Specifically, this body must probe 
accounts recording the allotment of sums granted by the legislature to fund public expenditure. 
Accounts are also referred to the committee by the house or under the stipulation of particular 
laws. The Auditor General’s report on these accounts is also examined by the PAC. The 
second major function of this Committee is to examine and report on the Accounts and 
Financial Statements tabled in the House from Statutory Boards, Public Corporations, and 
Public Companies in which the Government holds majority shares.  
Standing Orders Committee: Headed by the Speaker of the House, the Standing 
Orders Committee meets occasionally to consider and report on any matters concerning the 
Standing Orders of the House that have been referred to it by that body.  
Regulations Committee (RC): The Regulations Committee monitors the draft 
regulations which are being developed by various Ministries. The RC has a duty to bring these 
to the special attention of the House if it detects certain features in these documents. 
Regulations are flagged when they feature expenditure or collection of public money, 
resistance to legal challenge, the extraordinary use or misuse of powers under an Act. They 
also elicit the attention of the Committee if there is an inordinate delay in presentation of the 
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document and a lack of clarity in the composition of the document. This Committee is not 
mandated to comment on the merits or policy stance of the document, rather it is to apply the 
terms of the Interpretation Act, among others, to examine regulations which are to be laid 
before the House.  
Public Administration and Appropriations Committee: This Committee monitors the 
spending and efficiency of Government Agencies in order to ensure that they are expending 
within approved parliamentary guidelines. The committee reports on this to Parliament and 
recommends ways in which the Government can operate more efficiently.  
Committee of Privileges:  The Speaker of the House chairs this committee, guiding the 
members as they examine any issue that pertains to the power or privileges of the House. 
Thereafter the Committee reports to Parliament on the matter considered. See Figure 3.2.  
 
3.4.3.1.3   The Senate  
 The Senate is the 'upper house' of the legislative branch of government. This house 
reviews bills sent to it by the lower house—the House of Representatives. If the Senate is not 
in agreement with any aspect of the bill it sends it back noting the desired changes. The lower 
house will then return the bill to the Senate, having made the recommended adjustments, or 
with a request that the Senate reconsiders these. The Senate can delay bills for months, except 
in the case of those concerning finances which must be cleared within a month. The Senate’s 
approval is only mandatory for constitutional amendments. 
Senators are appointed by the Governor General on behalf of the British monarch. 
Unlike members of the lower house, they are not elected by the general electorate. This gives 
individuals outside of representational politics an opportunity to have an input in the governing 
of the country. Of the twenty-one (21) members and thirteen (13) are recommended by the 
Prime Minister and eight (8) by the Leader of the Opposition. Between two and four can serve 
as part of the Prime Minister's Cabinet. Others may serve as Parliamentary Secretaries, 
assisting the Ministers in their duties.     
 
3.4.4   The Corporate Governance Environment 
3.4.4.1 Key Players   
   Figure 3.2 shows that CG addresses selected institutions, laws and guidelines 
(“structures”) in the public and private sector alike. These structures serve as frameworks, 
rules and laws with which corporations and individuals, whether private or public are expected 
to comply. The CG environment includes both private and public sector institutions and 
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various stakeholders who, by virtue of their interdependency, benefit politically, economically, 
socially, and otherwise, from each other.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Information extrapolated from the Standing Orders of the House of 
Representatives of Jamaica, 1964; personal experience 
 
However, the primary players are shareholders, Board of Directors (BOD), top 
management, employees, regulators and auditors, investors, clients/customers and suppliers.  
Secondary players are all other stakeholders. The key players identified in Figure 3.3 can be 
further divided into three other categories. First are CG Reputational Agents who are 
responsible for policy and compliance such as the company’s Board of Directors.  Second, are 
CG targets for whom the CG project has been established, and these are principally the 
shareholders. Third, are CG regulators who in this context are those responsible for 
maintaining the CG framework and compliance practices, i.e., BOJ, the FSC, JSE, and the 
JDIC.  The latter two are merely quasi-regulators20.   
Irrespective of the many stakeholders, the centre of controversy, and responsibility, has 
been on the BOD. Rwegasira (2000) argues that the BOD represents an organ that largely 
represents most of the stakeholders and still others act primarily as a fulcrum of accountability 
                                               
20
 These are institutions which do not have full regulatory powers but usually make basic provisions (guidelines) 
to which their members must subscribe.  For example, the Corporate Governance Listing rules of the London 
Stock Exchange—make that exchange a quasi–regulator in this context.  
Figure 3.2: Synopsis of Jamaica’s Governance Landscape 
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to shareholders.  Wang and Dewhirst (1992) suggest that the BOD is one of the greatest 
management innovations in the field of CG.  The proposed prototype posits the board as a 
pivot, around which most corporate activities revolve, and identifies the shareholder as merely 
one of many claimants to the corporation.  Therefore, the primary role of regulation is to shape 
a CG environment compatible with societal values that allows competition and market forces 
to work so that corporations can succeed in generating long-term economic gain.  Specific 
governance structures and practices will not necessarily fit at all companies (OECD 1999).   
  How then does Jamaica regulate economic transactions within the CG Environment?  
Jamaica regulates economic transactions through CG structures otherwise called regulatory 
institutions and legislations which themselves were derived in response to failures in market 
forces and to protect the economy from systemic weaknesses.  The soundness and integrity of 
these regulatory institutions and legislations have been undergoing perpetual testing as market 
dynamics change and thus infuse even greater demand for regulatory strengthening. They have 
been numerous incidents of failures, or “crashing”, of these private investment schemes. The 
most recent being several unregulated or “Pyramid Schemes” such as Cash Plus, Overseas 
Locket International Corporation, Inter Trade, and CARIEF, which had promised investors 
returns of over 100% per annum.    
Figure 3.3: Prototype Model of Jamaica's Corporate Governance Environment 
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These like many others, were unregulated because of the intricacies of the transactions 
and general nature of the businesses. There have been assertions from various quarters 
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(investors, regulators, and even the political establishments) that laws were just not in place to 
deal effectively with these new investment schemes.  Clearly, these calls have been given 
credence by former Minister of Finance, Omar Davies, who proposed, “…that the FSC and the 
BOJ (Bank of Jamaica) and the Ministry of Finance be asked to prepare in short order, a 
comprehensive assessment of steps which should be taken to improve regulatory efficiency," 
(Jamaica Observer, April 18, 2008).  Hence, this call by the former minister points to systemic 
weaknesses in the way economic transactions are regulated—one of reactivity rather than 
proactivity.  
 
3.4.4.2   The Public Sector Regulatory Environment  
 
What are some of the relevant CG legislations? 
 
Following on the features of the political governance environment described above, 
and which forms the umbrella structure of the public sector governance framework, the public 
environment can be further described as having several institutions and regulations.  Many of 
these regulatory structures have had their origins in one crisis or another and represent the 
Government’s responses to systemic weaknesses and attempts to enforce property rights and 
safeguard the integrity of the business and economic environment. A select list of these 
regulations has been examined in this chapter in the context of their importance in responding 
to one or more failures in CG in Jamaica, in addition to their coverage and effectiveness in 
addressing a broad spectrum of regulatory issues, as well as to ensure effective enforcement.  
These legislation include Public Bodies Management and Accountability Act, the Corruption 
Prevention Act, the Access to Information Act, continuous amendments and strengthening of a 
swathe of FSC and BOJ regulations, in addition to quasi-regulations and voluntary codes.  In 
addition, a brief overview of a proposed Whistleblower legislation is provided as it is believed 
that such a move by the Government of Jamaica is timely as this should have implications in 
dealing with corruption, a major focus of this study.  
There are also several key CG structural institutions that have been established to 
enforce and promulgate specific legislation in an effort to reinforce the effectiveness and 
success of implementation.  The two most important ones are the Government of Jamaica 
Audit Commission and the National Contracts Commission.    
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The Government of Jamaica Audit Commission21 has been set up to ensure that Audit 
committees required in all entities are formed and function in accordance with Best Practice. 
In addition, given the universally accepted significance of the audit process (both internal and 
external), the Audit Commission was established as an independent parliamentary 
Commission that helps to maintain the effectiveness of Audit Committees across public sector 
bodies.  
 As recently as 2004, less than thirty per cent (30%) of all government departments and 
agencies had an internal auditor, or such mechanism, and not all had the experience of being 
externally audited (personal communication, Ministry of Finance).  According to Section 33 of 
the Financial Administration and Audit Act (Amendment), each Government Ministry, 
Department and Executive Agency, should establish an Audit Committee to aid the 
Accounting Officer in effectively fulfilling his role.  
 The National Contracts Commission replaced the Government Contracts Committee as 
stipulated by the amendment to the Contractor General’s Act in 1999. Given the incidence of 
“Fat Cats”, the Financial Sector Melt-down and the extent to which the public sector was 
implicated, it was felt this body was needed to strengthen the Government of Jamaica’s 
procurement procedures and to safeguard the integrity and credibility of the government’s 
public officials while ensuring prudency, transparency and accountability in the business of 
Government. In spite of the presence of the Commission since 1999, unscrupulous persons 
have found creative ways of circumventing its stipulated procedures and have caused 
embarrassment to the Government by misappropriating billions of dollars through fraud, 
cronyism, nepotism, and sometimes negligence.   
 The Commission is mandated to ensure an open, efficient process characterised by 
integrity and fairness. In the execution of its duties, this 8 member team has authority to create 
regulations in keeping with the Contractor General’s Act. These individuals drawn from the 
public and private sectors must inspect tenders, recommend awardees, create and maintain a 
registry of awardees with assigned skill areas, and present recommendations for improvement 
in procedures to the Cabinet. The Commission has established and now oversees sector 
committees in an effort to more efficiently manage the public sector procurement process.  
(www.jis.gov.jm/gpages/html/20060517/; personal experience).   
 
                                               
21
 Sources:  Audit Committee Policy for Ministries, Departments and Executive Agencies, 2007. Government of 
Jamaica, Cabinet Office, January 2007. http://www.cabinet.gov.jm.  
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3.4.4.3   The Private Sector Environment 
   
 In this environment, the importance and soundness of the regulatory framework of the 
private sector through the lenses of key regulatory institutions (CG structures) in Jamaica are 
examined.  Notwithstanding the focus of this feature on the private sector, the institutions 
served the public sector on equal footing. The regulations include the Companies Act of 
Jamaica 2004, the BOJ, FSC, JSE (quasi-regulator) and the JDIC (non-regulator but a key 
complementary institution).  Except for the JSE, the other institutions cited are all government 
established regulatory institutions whose day-to-day focus serves both the private and public 
sectors.  The role of the regulatory environment is therefore to ensure the soundness, stability, 
security, and integrity of the financial sector.   
 
3.4.4.3.1 Companies Act of Jamaica, 2004 
 
In a move to strengthen the laws governing Directors’ responsibilities, provisions in the 
Companies Act of Jamaica, 2004 now codify the common law standard of Director’s Duty of 
Care and Skill.  Under the new proposal, every Director and Officer of a company in 
exercising his/her powers and discharging his/her duties must act honestly and in good faith in 
the best interests of the company. This expressly recognises the broad scope of stakeholders. 
In spite of these efforts to address these deficiencies, there are many gaps to be remedied in the 
Companies Act. Some relate to the recourse of minority shareholders and others have to do 
with seeking more specific interpretation of such terminologies as “skill”, “care”, and 
“qualifications” and the like, as the Act has not gone far enough in providing minimum terms 
of reference or credentials for such issues.  However, fundamental to the legal framework of 
Directors’ duties, Duty of Care means that a Director must exercise due diligence in making 
decisions.  He/she must discover as much information as possible, on the question at issue, and 
be able to show that, in reaching a decision, he/she has considered all reasonable alternatives 
(Nell and Minow, 2008).  
To address these deficiencies, there are the conflict of interest provisions in the 
Companies Act of Jamaica, 2004, which require approval of material contracts in which 
Directors are interested, by the BOD, and notification of shareholders. The Act requires that 
such contracts involving Directors be kept at the company’s office and be open to public 
inspection. Also, substantial property transactions (J$500,000) involving Directors, would be 
disclosed and approved by shareholders. The Act prohibits public companies from directly or 
indirectly giving financial assistance for any purpose by means of a loan, guarantee, or 
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otherwise, a shareholder, Director or Officer of the company or an associate of the foregoing 
(in certain circumstances). In addition, the Companies Act of Jamaica (2004) gives clear 
authority to the Minister to exclude from bank ownership or management, persons who pose a 
threat to the interests of depositors by virtue of their historical record of business malpractices 
or deceitful oppressive behaviour, or where they are rendered incompetent or dishonest. 
3.4.4.3.2 The Bank of Jamaica  
 
The BOJ started operations in May 1961. It is a regulated financial institution whose 
main objectives are as follows: 1.) to issue and redeem notes and coins; 2.) to keep and 
administer the reserves of Jamaica; 3.) to influence the volume and conditions of supply of 
credit so as to promote the fullest expansion in production, trade and employment, consistent 
with the maintenance of monetary stability in Jamaica and the external value of the currency; 
4.) to foster the development of money and capital market in Jamaica and; 5.) to act as banker 
to the Government.  In an effort to encourage economic growth and development and to 
strengthen its capacity to implement monetary policy, in 1985 the Bank joined forces with the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and introduced a programme 
for financial reform, dubbed the Financial Sector Reform Programme (FSRP).  
Role in the Regulatory Economy:  The Bank of Jamaica Act (1960) makes provisions 
for monetary policy: “the conduct of monetary policy is aimed at regulating the growth of 
money and credit in line with the resources expected to finance economic activity and generate 
employment, without undermining the conditions of price stability.” Certain considerations are 
taken into account when formulating this. These include: prevailing and prospective 
developments in the macro economy, fiscal operations, emerging and external sector 
developments; and any other market information that influences liquidity conditions.   
According to Christie-Veitch (2000), the BOJ regulates and supervises its licensees as 
a first step to promoting their safety and soundness so as to protect confidence, in and the 
integrity of the banking system and the interest of depositors.  
 The central bank has the responsibility to “promote and maintain financial system 
stability.” This is done by overseeing the activities of deposit-taking entities (BOJ Act Section 
34A) and of foreign exchange traders and remittance companies (BOJ Act Sections 22B and 
22G).  These systems, through which financial institutions execute and transfer funds for 
financial transactions, are supported and maintained by the BOJ. At the end of 2008, the 
supervised population numbered 14, down from 17 at the end of 2004 as shown in Table 3.2.  
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Table 3.2:  Bank of Jamaica Supervised Entities 
 
Institutions 
Dec. 
2004 
Dec. 
2005 
Dec. 
2006 
Dec. 
2007 
Dec 
2008 
Commercial Banks 6 6 6 6 6 
Merchant Banks 7 5 5 4 4 
Building Societies 4 4 4 4 4 
Total 17 15 15 14 14 
Source: www.boj.jm/superv-depositt-taking.asp 
 
  As Christie-Veitch (2000), puts it: “In fostering the objectives of safety and 
soundness in the financial sector, the supervisory authority assesses how much risk 
(credit risk, liquidity risk, yield risk, market risk, operational risk, 
ownership/management risk and others) each licensee is undertaking, resources 
available to manage these risks, which may be tangible (capital) or intangible (internal 
control systems, management experience and competence)—and whether the identified 
resource (s) is/are sufficient to manage the risks.”  In addition, it is there to promote an 
efficient and effective banking system that finances economic growth, allocates credit, 
and meets the needs of customers and communities they serve. According to the 
collective views of two respondents:  
“The BOJ executes its supervisory functions in the following ways 
but not necessarily in the order or en bloc as presented, by: ensuring 
that licensees comply with all applicable laws and regulations–
including the imposition of new regulations where the necessity 
arises, enforcing guidelines and performance standards; providing 
guidance through best practice standards, verifying and assessing the 
quality of licenses’ activities through annual on-site examinations and 
ongoing off-site monitoring; and seeking to achieve as much 
disclosure as is possible.”   
 
Although regulations and guidelines are important, the cornerstone of a bank’s 
supervisory process is through on-site examinationsi conducted at least once annually, along 
with off-site surveillance on an ongoing basis. With growth in a financial conglomerate and/or 
banks that form part of corporate groupings, there is the increased risk of financial losses or 
damaged reputation to the licensee itself due to the contagion effect, i.e., risk that financial 
difficulties affecting other members of the conglomerate either regulated or unregulated 
entities, will affect the licensed institution, leading to liquidity and solvency problems. As a 
result, the Financial Institutions Services Division also requires, on a regular basis, relevant 
information about related non-bank companies (BOJ Pamphlet No. 7, 2002).  
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BOJ’s off-site supervision process involves a number of steps, namely, data collection 
and verification checks, data analysis, reporting of findings (up to the Governor and Minister), 
identifying and documenting recommendations for corrective action and monitoring of 
appropriate implementation of corrective action.  Shippey and Christie-Veitch (2000) writes, 
“Off-site examination provides an important complement to on-site examination by providing 
early warning of actual or potential problems and a means of assessing broader patterns and 
trends within the system as a whole”.  
 
3.4.4.3.3 The Financial Services Commission (FSC) 
The FSC was established on August 2, 2001 by an Act (the FSC Act), replacing the 
Office of the Superintendent of Insurance (OSI) and Unit Trust Securities Commission. The 
purpose of the FSC is to act as supervisor and regulator for the insurance industry, the 
securities industry, and the private pensions industry, in line with its vision which reads: “to be 
a strong, credible, impartial and effective regulator”.  
 The FSC is an integrated financial services regulator structured with divisions such as: 
insurance, securities, examinations and investigations, legal, actuarial, corporate services, and 
pensions, all working towards achieving the organisation’s mandate.   The mission of the FSC 
is “to protect users of financial services in the areas of insurance and securities by fostering the 
integrity, stability and health of the financial sector, through the efforts of competent and 
committed employees.” 
What is the role of the Board of Governors of the FSC?:  The Board of Commissioners 
of the FSC operates similar to the Board of Directors of a private company, in the sense that its 
basic function is to provide policy direction and oversight. Unlike the Board of Directors, the 
Board of Commissioners also has the responsibility for the development of public policy as it 
relates to the supervision of the pension, insurance and securities industries.  In addition, the 
Commission has the responsibility for making certain supervisory decisions with respect to 
prescribed financial institutions. 
How does the FSC do it?  A function of the Commission is to ensure the proper 
administration of securities and insurance laws, thus the organisation of oversees registration, 
solvency, and consultation of approximately 114 firms and over 1200 individuals in securities 
and insurance industries.  It also has oversight responsibility for over 800 private pension 
plans.  Some of these firms are listed as: Securities Dealers, Investment Advisors, Securities 
Dealers’ Representatives, Investment Advisors’ Representatives, Mutual Funds, Unit Trusts, 
Insurance Companies, Insurance Brokers, Insurance Agencies, Insurance Managing General 
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Agent, Insurance Sales Representatives, Insurance Loss Adjusters, and Insurance Consultants. 
To ensure order and proper functioning of these entities the FSC employs a number of statutes 
and regulations. Among these are the FSC Act, the Securities Act, the Unit Trust Act, and the 
Insurance Act. See Table 3.3.   
Some of the FSC’s regulations cover important aspects of CG, for example, the 
Insurance Regulations has provisions in respect of the following: Establishment of Audit 
Committee, Establishment of Conduct Review Committee, Establishment of Investment and 
Loan Committee, Qualifications of actuary etc., Form of Actuary Report, Actuarial 
Regulations, Qualifications of auditor, Appointment of Auditor for Subsidiary, Conduct 
Review Committee, Restrictions on Self-dealing as a Fiduciary, Certain Related Party 
Transactions Permitted, Conduct Review Committee's Power to Approve Other Transactions,  
Proper Transaction, and Disclosure by Related Parties.   
The FSC has adopted several regulations within the last five years.  First, Interim 
Capital Standards, which give the Commission ability to specify a capital adequacy ratio that 
must be maintained by its licensees. This ratio to be maintained by each licensee is expressed 
as a percentage and is determined by comparing the entity’s capital base with its risk based 
assets, and its risk exposures after applying respective weights specified by the Commission. 
Second is Margin Requirements for Repurchase Agreements. The Securities Act provides for 
the making of regulations governing margin requirements. The guidelines for margin 
requirement for repurchase agreements will eventually be drafted into regulations. The 
guidelines were released to reduce risks arising from the practice of securities dealers 
financing large volumes of long term securities with short term repurchase agreements entered 
into with their investing clients instead of selling those securities outright to their clients. 
Third, are Early Warning Bulletins which involve key ratios to be used for the purpose of 
identifying signs of financial weakness in a licensee and determining whether a detailed 
assessment of the financial condition of a licensee should be conducted. Fourth, is enactment 
of the Pensions (Superannuation Funds and Retirement Schemes) Act. This law, among other 
things, establishes the FSC as the regulator for private pension funds and approved retirement 
schemes. 
Source: Personal interview with George Roper, Deputy Executive Director 
 
3.4.4.3.4 The Jamaica Stock Exchange (JSE) 
 
The JSE is a privately owned limited liability company.  It was incorporated in August 
1968 and began operations on Monday, February 3, 1969. The JSE highlights its mission as 
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being “to provide a fair, efficient, ethical and transparent medium for the conduct of a viable 
securities market that facilitates the mobilisation of capital to finance the growth and 
development of the nation.”  
The JSE has several objectives.  First, is to promote the orderly development of the 
stock market and the Stock Exchange in Jamaica. Second, is to ensure that the stock market 
and its broker-members operate at the highest standards practicable.  Third, is to develop, 
apply and enforce rules designed to ensure public confidence in the stock market and its 
broker-members. Fourth, is to provide facilities for the transaction of stock market business. 
Fifth and final, is to conduct research, disseminate relevant information, and maintain local 
and international relationships calculated to enhance the development of the Jamaican Stock 
Market.  The JSE is governed by a BOD which comprises: the Governor of the BOJ (or his 
representative) and representative from the MOF, up to ten seat holders and any three other 
persons. Today the JSE has a BOD comprising seventeen members, six of which are 
independent Directors. The Executive chairman of the JSE reported in the 2005 annual report 
that: 
“[C]onsistent with its stated position to improve its own corporate 
governance practices and with the adoption of its Statement of Corporate 
Governance Principles and Practices, the Jamaica Stock Exchange (JSE) 
now has independent Board members nominated by the Bank of Jamaica, 
the Ministry of Finance and Planning, the Jamaica Bar Association, the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Jamaica and the Private Sector 
Organization of Jamaica (Johnson, Roy, Executive Chairman, JSE, personal 
Comm., 2005).  
 
It was also reported in the JSE Report that the JSE, in an effort to improve governance 
among its members, has implemented rule changes requiring these companies to operate with 
a board appointed audit committee. Since 2005, the JSE has been recognising listed 
Companies and stockbrokerages for upholding standards of best practices.  They were 
adjudged in five areas, namely, Best Practices Annual Report, Best Practices Corporate 
Disclosure & Investor Relations; Best Practices Investor Relations Awards (Stockbrokerages), 
Best Performing Companies, and Best Practices Web Site.    
There were at least three objectives of this competition. First, was to provide an avenue 
to recognise stockbrokerages and listed companies in the securities industry who uphold Best 
Practices standards. Second, was to enhance the relationship between the JSE and its 
stakeholders.  Third, is to create an awareness of the standards for Best Practices in the areas to 
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be adjudged.  The Judges were drawn from a wide cross-section of the Jamaican business, and 
academic communities and include the author of this thesis.  
 
3.4.4.3.5 The Jamaica Depository Insurance Corporation 
Established in August 1998, the JDIC was created by the GOJ to protect depositors, 
promote stability and confidence, and strengthen the Jamaican financial sector’s regulatory 
framework. This institution came about in light of numerous bank failures of the mid-nineties 
when the Government realised a need for a formal deposit insurance agency, as depositors 
were never guaranteed money when banks failed.   
Table 3.3 details regulatory developments which have implications for an improved 
regulatory framework and hence good CG culture.   
Table 3.3: Regulatory Developments (2002-2007, Jamaica) 
YEAR DETAILS 
2007 Electronic Transaction Act, 2007 
2006 
• In March 2006, four Regulations were passed in the House of Parliament, allowing the 
Financial Service Commission to begin active supervision of the pensions industry.   
• In August 2006, the sale, issue and distribution of “stored valued cards” were designed as 
“banking business”. 
• Anti-Money Laundering/Counter-Financing of Terrorism Guidance notes were amended. 
2005 
• The Pensions (Superannuation Fund and Retirement Schemes) Act was made effective in 
March 2005. 
• The Companies Act, 2004, became effective in February 2005. 
• The Financial Services Commission (Overseas Regulatory Authority) (Disclosure), 
Regulations, 2005 became effective on May 6, 2005 
• The Anti-Money Laundering/Counter-Financing of Terrorism came into effect on 
February 3, 2005. 
2004 
• The Pension Bill was passed in March 2004 and the Pension Act was passed in November 
2004. 
• The 2004 Guidance Notes for the Prevention and Detection of Money Laundering and 
Terrorist Financing was finalized and took effect on August 31, 2004.  
•   Amendments to the Banking Act, Building Societies Act, and the Financial Institutions 
Act were tabled and passed in the Houses of Parliament. 
2003 
• Amendments were made to the Banking Act, the Building Societies, Act and the 
Financial Institutions Act to allow for better information sharing law enforcement  
authorities and regulators of financial institutions. 
• A draft of Guidance Notes relating to the Money Laundering Act was issued by the BOJ 
to all financial institutions which it monitors. 
• The Pension Bill was tabled in Parliament.  
2002 
• Amendments were made to the Jamaican banking laws to give the Bank of Jamaica  
additional power to supervise deposit taking institutions and to further refine the role of 
the Financial Services Commission 
Source: Economic & Social Surveys 2006 and 2007, Planning Institute of Jamaica 
 
The institution is answerable to Parliament through the Ministry of Finance and 
Planning. The Deposit Insurance Act, The Public Bodies Management and Accountability Act, 
and the Financial Administration and Audit Act, provide the framework for operations of the 
JDIC.  The primary goal of the JDIC is to manage a Deposit Insurance Scheme to protect 
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depositors from loss, up to a specified limit which is at J$600,000 at the time of writing. The 
main objectives of the organisation are to: protect depositors by providing the highest level of 
coverage possible to small depositors, provide a clearly defined system for dealing with 
problems that may arise in financial institutions covered under the scheme, and restore and 
maintain confidence in deposit-taking institutions, and by extension contribute to stability in 
the financial sector (www.jdic.org; personal communication with legal counsel of JDIC and 
experience).  
 
3.5 THE PERCEPTION AND INCIDENTS OF CORRUPTION 
3.5.1  Introduction  
 
This section presents a theoretical and empirical support on the perception and 
implications of corruption. It utilises mini case examples of the incidents of corruption and in 
the Jamaica context, particularly featuring public sector corruption and accompanied 
regulatory responses.  These regulatory responses (laws and regulations) usually followed 
incidents of corruption and aimed at addressing severe regulatory deficiencies and systemic 
weaknesses, mainly in the financial sector.  
First, what is perception in the context of corruption in this thesis?  Perception is the 
process by which individuals organise and interpret their sensory impressions in order to give 
meaning to their environment. It is also argued that a person’s behaviour is influenced by his 
perception or notion (his belief) of reality, but not necessarily of reality itself22.   
Second, what is Corruption? It is never easy to define corruption as it is a most 
contentious issue in the literature.  In essence, it is treated in various ways from one culture to 
the other. However, given that this study focuses on political (mainly) and corporate 
corruption, defining corruption will be therefore limited to these two areas.  
Political Corruption:  On the one hand, political corruption (the main emphasis of this 
section), is defined as use of legislated powers by government officials for illegitimate private 
gain. Misuse of government power for other purposes, such as repression of political 
opponents and general police brutality, is not considered political corruption. Neither are 
illegal acts by private persons or corporations not directly involved with the government. In 
sum, the World Bank defines political corruption as the misuse of public office for private 
gain. Forty five percent (45%) of Jamaican people define corruption as the misuse of public 
office for private gain (CaPRI, 2007:13).   
                                               
22
 CaPRI, Taking Responsibility, A Landscape Assessment of Political Corruption in Jamaica, June 2007 
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Corporate Corruption:  On the other hand, corporate corruption is defined as the abuse 
of power by corporate managers against shareholders or consumers.  Corporate corruption is 
closely associated with the science of criminology which refers to crimes committed by 
corporations (i.e., a business entity having its separate legal personality from the natural 
persons that manage its activities), or by individuals who may be identified with a corporation 
or business entity. Some recent examples are charges of conspiracy to defraud, corporate 
fraud, false statement and insider trading, for which top executives at Enron, WorldCom/MCI 
and Tyco have been imprisoned (all USA firms).   
However, such would exclude the abuse of office for personal advantage in spheres 
outside the public sector, in particular, such as in corporations and business impacting integrity 
not only on workers and shareholders but on pensioners, depositors in banks, insurance policy 
holders, churches, media houses, and communities, to name a few. Therefore, corruption by 
definition, whether in the public or private sector, means a departure from rules (laws) and 
non-legally binding codes that govern behaviour.  For example, paying to receive your driver’s 
license without going through the due process of taking a standard driving test, paying off the 
police when you are stopped for speeding instead of paying the authorities or going to court, 
receiving and giving kickbacks on contracts, and granting investment concessions.  
 
3.5.2 Theoretical and Empirical Discussion on Corruption 
The issue of corruption is of academic interest to many scholars dating as far back as 
Plato (Onuf, 1998; Warren, 2004). However, in recent decades, writers such as Huntington, 
(1968), Leff, (1964), Nye (1967) and others, have drawn attention to the existence, prevalence, 
causes, and implications of corruption in many different forms of societies, spanning the pre- 
and post-industrial era until it was brought to the attention of current academic and public 
policy scholars.  In recent times, other writers, and in particular Transparency International 
(2000-2008), have been at the forefront of studying the economic, political, and social aspects, 
and have been providing rich empirical and policy-driven literature about corruption.   
It is not surprising therefore, that Jamaica was chosen for closer scrutiny in this study 
and the ‘perceptions and incidences of corruption’ as one of its major planks.  Indeed, TI 
Corruption Perception Index, 2008, assigns Jamaica a score of 3.1—on a scale of 1 (bad) to 10 
(good)—and a ranking of 96 out of 179 (the same as, among others, Guatemala and Gabon). 
As a broad measure of the pro-business environment, The Heritage Foundation 2009 Index of 
Economic Freedom ranks Jamaica 52 out of 157.   
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Many forms of corruption have been articulated and the list is inexhaustible, depending 
on laws—which include or exclude particular behaviour in one country or culture versus 
another.  However, the most prevalent of these seem to suggest that corruption includes: 
misappropriation of funds, abuse of power, deceit and fraud, perversion of justice, treason, 
non-performance of duties, extortion, bribery and graft, nepotism, election tampering, 
unauthorized sale of public offices, misuse of insider knowledge and confidential information, 
manipulation of regulation, purchases of supplies,  contracts and loans, tax evasion, acceptance 
of improper gifts, illegal surveillance, misuse of office seals and stationary, and public 
officials linking with criminal actors (TI 2000).  
Lipset and Lenz (2000) find support in Merton’s assumption that “corruption is 
motivated behaviour stemming from social pressures that result in norm violations” 
(2000:116). According to these authors, many societies have social goals which people aspire 
to achieve—institutionalised norms. Not all persons have the knowledge, skills nor–generally 
speaking —opportunities to do so legally, as many societies either directly or indirectly restrict 
access to resources or what may be called “opportunity structure”.  This is argued (Lipset and 
Lenz) to be as a result of class, race, ethnicity, gender, lack of capital, skills, just to list some. 
What these authors have argued, is that while societies have stressed economic success as an 
important goal, they have nevertheless strongly restricted opportunities (p.117) and in this way 
people reject the rules of the game and try to succeed by unconventional (innovative or 
criminal) means. The authors opined that this is atypical.  
In testing their hypothesis with data from cross national 1990-1993 World Values 
Survey, it was found that “less affluent countries with high achievement motivation” were 
found to be the “most corrupt” (Ibid). The countries include Russia, South Korea, and Turkey, 
which were at the time deemed the most corrupt by Transparency International. By contrast, 
those societies with low achievement motivation and high access to resources such as 
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden had lower levels of corruption. Lipset and Lenz also 
performed multiple regression analysis using data from the 1990 World Values Survey.  From 
the findings the following conclusions were drawn: 
As to Merton’s theoretical analysis, it implies that serious 
corruption will plague countries with high levels of achievement 
orientation and low access to means (Lipset and Lenz, 2000: 
p.118) 
 
They further concluded that, “the availability of institutionalized means to achieve 
desired ends lowers levels of corruption,” (Lipset and Lenz, 2000:p.118).  The essential 
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themes highlighted in the work of Lipset and Lenz can be used to describe the Jamaican 
society as a less affluent country with high achievement motivation and very limited access to 
resources. Furthermore, from personal experience of the socio-economic and socio-cultural 
realities across all classes of people in Jamaica, it appears to me that the “haves” or more 
affluent Jamaicans are usually with low achievement motivation and are usually less inclined 
to be corrupt while the “haves not” are usually with very high motivation and more inclined to 
participate in corrupt activities in order to achieve their objectives. Therefore, the findings of 
Lipset and Lenz are truly applicable to some of the root causes of corruption in Jamaica.   
 
3.6 OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL, STAKEHOLDER RELATIONS AND 
PERCEPTION AND ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS   
 
In this section, a literature review is presented for ownership and control, stakeholder relations, 
and the perception and role of institutional investors.  
 
3.6.1 Ownership and Control  
 
The potential problems of the separation of ownership and control were first identified 
by Adam Smith in 1776 in his seminal thesis, “Wealth of Nations”.  According to Adam 
Smith, ‘…the Directors of such companies [Joint stock companies] however being the 
managers of other people’s money rather than of their own, cannot well be expected that they 
should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance [as if it were their own]”.  In 1932, Berle 
and Means published their highly acclaimed seminal piece called The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property, in which they argued that as countries industrialised and developed their 
markets, ownership and control become separated.  Mallin (2007) supports this by concluding 
that this was particularly so in the case in the USA and the UK where legal systems have 
fostered good protection of minority shareholders and hence there has been encouragement for 
more diversified shareholder bases.  However, the protection of minority shareholders was not 
fully entrenched until the 1980s. In many other countries, there has been less impetus for a 
broad shareholder base, especially where there is a code of civil law as opposed to common 
law resulting in less effective protection of minority shareholders.  
A drive for more effective shareholders, who act as owners, has come about because 
there have been numerous cases of corporate excesses and abuses, such as perceived 
overpayment of Directors for poor performance, corporate collapses, and scandals, which have 
resulted in corporate pension funds being wiped out and shareholders losing their investments.  
In the Caribbean, ownership is still not separated from control (in the majority of corporations) 
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as most stock market companies are still dominated by owner-managers who often own up to 
seventy-five per cent (75%) issued shares with approximately twenty-five percent (25%) 
owned by minority shareholders.  Therefore, the shift of control that took place based on Berle 
and Means (1932) observations from traditional owners to a new group of professional 
managers (managerial elites) in the United States, has still not fully been accomplished in the 
Jamaican and Caribbean context, albeit, there is a gradual transition to total separation.  The 
gradual transition is being partially facilitated by the children and grandchildren of the owner 
class, opting to go abroad for studies and remaining there rather than returning to Jamaica to 
join the family business. Hence, controlling families are being forced to hire more and more 
non-family (outsiders) professional managers. 
 
3.6.2 Nature and Role of Stakeholder Relations (Representation) 
In an abundance of literature on the role of stakeholders, critics have argued that this 
will lead to better decisions, more effectiveness in decision implementation and the possibility 
of better outcomes of intended business objectives (Filatochev et al, 2007). Much of this 
literature has been established in the fields of economics, accounting, political science, legal 
analysis, and sociology. In many instances, the stakeholder literature overlaps with the 
shareholder literature. Within the context of CG, there is an increasing amount of literature 
that draws parallels or contrasts between shareholder and stakeholders, some of which have 
been explored in this chapter under Shareholder-Stakeholder Theory.  
The proponents of ‘stakeholder representation’ posited the moral or political argument 
that there is an intrinsic case for the involvement of stakeholders in the firm in terms of 
democratic rights and voice (Freeman 1984; Donaldson and Preston 1995).  Another view is 
even more instrumental or economic, which holds that there is an intrinsic case for stakeholder 
participation in terms of team production, commitment, form specific investments, and risk 
sharing (Parkinson 2003). This latter view is also seen as the enlightened self-interest model. 
However, there are those who hold differing views. Opponents against all forms of stakeholder 
engagement go back to Friedman (1962) and Hayak (1969).  These critics wrote that apart 
from basic moral objections linked to the notion of private property, there were various 
practical problems with stakeholder representation: 1.) too many stakeholders, 2.) no clear task 
or accountability for management, 3.) the lack of pledgable income in the case of some, and 
4.) problems of mechanisms and deadlocks in decision making (Filatochev et al, 2007 cf. 
Sternberg, 1997; Tirole, 2001).   
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 Other writers have taken a middle ground and posit the enlightened shareholder value 
or instrumental stakeholder theory, or strategic corporate social responsibility, or ‘the good 
firm’ (Jones 1995, Campbell 1997; Keasey, Thompson and Wright 1997, Parkinson 1998). 
These writers argued that to forge meaningful stakeholder relations is both morally desirable, 
and makes good business sense, and that firms which build good relations with stakeholders 
gain competitive advantage. However, if this view is to be upheld, the primary responsibility 
for the running of the firm should be vested in managers, and their task is to balance or 
integrate the interests of the different stakeholders. More of these debates can be found in 
Vinten 2001; Kelly 2001; Letza et al, 2004; O’Sullivan, 2000).   
The Identity and Role of Stakeholders: There is still no consensus in the literature as to 
which groups rightfully constitute stakeholders.  The literature review included creditors and 
debt holders in the definition and posited that they have real claims on the firm, which are not 
necessarily the same as those of shareholders.  Employees are very frequently included in the 
definition of stakeholders and do have a stake in the firm’s existence and an economic stake, a 
voice, in decision making in varying degrees, and their involvement arguably affects 
performance. As part of the outer circle of stakeholders, local communities are often included 
in the definition—they have a stake in the firm’s existence and disregarding their voice can 
have negative effects on the firm (Filatochev et al, 2007). 
 
3.6.3  Perception and Role of Institutional Investors (IIs) in CG Development 
A review of the literature (Clark and Hebb 2004) about the role of IIs revealed both an 
active and a passive role for these corporate players.  Institutional investors contribute to CG 
as they ensure that board members have adequate experience and are truly independent. Due to 
corporate disclosure (chapter 7), IIs are privy to a wealth of information allowing for early 
detection of risk.  They also monitor to ensure the prudent management of company funds and 
that the board and the CEO are not flagrantly overpaid. Institutional investors possess much 
clout as it relates to the operational and informational efficiency of the financial markets, 
which engenders liquidity and transparency, as well as guaranteeing good quality public 
information. They hold such power as they can “vote with their feet”, enter into dialogue with 
the management, stage a proxy contest and voice concerns, boycott, display, or withhold 
needed loyalty and vote on key issues.  IIs have been successful in imposing new standards 
and regulations which favour the shareholder and ultimately put considerable pressure on 
Company Directors and business strategy (Morin, 2000; Orléan, 1999; Lordon cited in 
Theurillat, 2007).   
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 In spite of the preceding, there are cases where IIs have played a rather passive role 
(Clearfield, 2004) and thereby have little power to implement original policy (Aglietta and 
Rebérioux, 2004 cf in Theurillat, 2007) or make their voices heard (Engelen, 2003). The 
activeness of the IIs is in part dependent on the country and the governance structures in place. 
Particularly in America, there is the view that “[institutional] investors [are] leading capitalism 
to a new stage of development (Clark and Hebb 2004) and have come to manage the majority 
of financial assets (Orléan, 2000; Giraud, 2001 cf. in Theurillat 2007).  Radical IIs have gained 
quite a reputation for catalysing boardroom reforms and challenging boardroom ‘cowboyism.’ 
The latter is unlike Jamaica where, although institutional investors control in excess of  
seventy-five per cent (75%) of Jamaican listed companies, they have little or no interest and 
play insignificant roles in influencing CG on a day-to-day basis (Kerr 2006, interview with 
Iton23, 2002).  To remedy this passivity, IIs in the Caribbean are seeking to establish an 
investor code for regional institutions and to establish a CG code for listed companies that 
would be a part of the exchanges’ listing requirements.   
Theoretical studies on the contribution of shareholder activism to the improvement of 
the financial performance of corporations were indeed limited. The few available studies have 
mostly concentrated on shareholder activism in the United States and information on the role 
of IIs in other countries remains scarce.  The Greenbury Report (1995) states: “the investor 
institutions should use their power and influence to ensure the implementation of Best 
Practices as set out in the Code” (para. 3.4). Hampel noted, “the role of shareholders in CG 
will mainly concern the institutions, particularly [in the] UK” (paragraph 5.1) (Jackson, 2001).  
Institutional investors are especially important in the UK and the United States. In 
December 1999, 57.7 per cent of UK ordinary shares were held by UK IIs whilst 23.3 per cent 
were held by investors outside the UK, also largely by institutions. In contrast, individual 
holdings only accounted 16% (Jackson, 1999:7).  In the USA, IIs such as large pension funds, 
CalPERS, CalSTRS, TIAA-CREF, NYC and SWIB5, have taken the lead in shareholder 
activism. According to Pomeranz (1998), IIs have accounted for eighty per cent (80%) of all 
share trading in the US, which accounts for fifty-one percent (51.5%) of total market value of 
US equity securities in 1994–a potential to exert significant influences on corporations via the 
exercise of voting rights (Maassen, 2000). 
Rob Bauer (2003) posits that well governed companies perform better at the stock 
market, and encourages IIs to account for CG in their investment strategy. In fact, IIs have 
                                               
23
 Wayne Iton was the Managing Director of the Jamaica Stock Exchange in 2002. He is currently the General 
Manager of the Trinidad and Tobago Stock Exchange (April 2009).   
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been increasingly dominant players in the financial market and have an integral role in 
ensuring good CG. The latter is possible due to the increasing power of collective investment 
schemes and the concentration of these in the hands of IIs (Clark, 2000 citing Theurillat el al, 
2007).  To understand the influence which IIs possess, one must understand the historical 
phenomena of the all-powerful manager and the period of managerial capitalism.   
Given the preceding, there should not be any doubt as to whether or not IIs have 
important roles in CG. The questions are: What are their roles in CG in Jamaica? How do they 
perceive the state of CG development? To what extent are they demanding, if at all, CG 
guidelines from their investee companies?  These questions have been addressed in chapter 
six, section 6.4.  
 
3.7 BOARD CHARACTERISTICS AND PROCESSES (CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
PRACTICES) 
3.7.1 Introduction   
  
The CG practices of interest in this study have been guided by two of the most highly 
respected sources of literature that have influenced the field of CG, both in academia and 
practice, the world over. These sources are the OECD Key Principles of Corporate 
Governance, originally published in 1999 and revised in 2004 (See Appendix 7), and the 
Cadbury Report (1992).  See key elements/recommendations of the Cadbury Report (1992) in 
Appendix 8.  While this study has drawn heavily on the OECD Principles for theoretical and 
practical generality, the Cadbury Report (1992) has been used for its concurring and diverging 
views in selected circumstances and its evolution over various stages—Cadbury 1992, 
Combined Codes 1998, 2003 and 2006. Therefore, this study assumes that the signposts for 
CG Best Practices have been mainly supported by the OECD Principles and the Cadbury 
Reports.   
In May 1999, Ministers representing the twenty-nine (29) governments comprising the 
OECD voted unanimously to endorse the OECD Principles of CG. These principles were 
negotiated over the course of a year, in consultation with key players in the market (the views 
of many countries) including the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN).  The 
elements of CG from the ICGN were published, and, in doing so, took into account the views 
of many different countries and hence constitute the chief responses by governments and 
reflected the G-7 Summit Leaders’ recognition of CG as an important pillar in the architecture 
of the 21st Century global economy.  The principles were welcomed by the G7 leaders at the 
Cologne, France summit, in June 1999, and have since been adopted as the benchmark 
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standard for good CG on all continents, by the IMF, the World Bank, and the United Nations, 
and other international organisations.  As earlier stated, Appendix 7 summarises the OECD 
Key Elements and Appendix 8 details the relevant sections of the Cadbury Report (1992).   
However, in this section, the discussion is restricted to three broad areas which are: 
board characteristics and composition, board’s role in a firm’s strategic decision-making, and 
the nature and role of corporate disclosure in CG.  
 
3.7.2  Corporate Governance Practices 
 
In the past two decades, there has been increasing scrutiny of Boards of Directors, 
increased shareholder activism, and a raging public scepticism in light of questionable events 
of corporate failures.  Codes and guidelines have been issued by institutional investor groups 
calling on boards to become more involved in firms’ strategic decision-making processes.  
While there is evidence that boards are becoming more involved (Spencer Stuart, 2008 Index), 
the overwhelming impression, albeit, mainly from the business press, is one of boards’ 
passivity and reluctance to introduce contestability into the boardroom (Stiles, 2001). Though 
research on board involvement in strategic decision making have increased since the start of 
this decade, there remains a dearth of academic studies featuring the perceptions of Directors 
themselves as to their roles and influence in the core decision-making process of the 
organisation.   
The specific board characteristics and processes under review here are Chairman/CEO 
duality or separation, non-executive vs. executive Directors and director selection; board size; 
board committee and composition, director tenure, gender and inequality issues; board 
evaluation and training, and board’s role in firm’s strategic decision making.    
 
3.7.2.1 Chairman and CEO Duality versus Separation  
In many jurisdictions, the dual roles of Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the 
board are often delegated to one person, hence Chairman and CEO duality.  In other countries, 
banking laws, company laws or public policy regulation prevent this duality.  For example, the 
very nature of the German and Hungarian two-tier systems (just to name two of the many 
examples) of a Supervisory Board imposed atop the management board renders one person 
holding both positions impossible. On the contrary, in French law, the positions of Chairman 
(Président) and Chief Executive Officer (Directeur General) are statutorily linked together and 
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must be exercised by the same person (the “Pdg”).  However, the second Viénot24 Report is in 
favour of an amendment to the law governing commercial companies which would permit this 
separation, but the system would remain optional and left to the board’s discretion. The option 
of choosing between one and two-tier boards in France is also an option for a company which 
would affect the choice of having separation or duality of the positions. In the UK, the 
Combined Code (2008) states:  “There should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head 
of the company between the running of the board and the executive responsibility for the 
running of the company’s business. No one individual should have unfettered powers of 
decision.”  
The supporting rationale by the Combined Code is that the Chairman is responsible for 
leadership of the board, ensuring its effectiveness on all aspects of its role and setting its 
agenda, that the Directors receive accurate, timely and clear information, ensure effective 
communication with shareholders, facilitate the effective contribution of non-executive 
Directors in particular, and ensure constructive relations between executive and non-executive 
Directors.  
Table 3.4: Separation of Chairman and CEO 
Corporate Governance Systems 
and Countries  
Percentage of Companies with Separate  
Chairman and CEO 
Anglo-Saxon                                     USA 24.9  
UK 96.2  
Canada  79.7 
Australia  97.3 
Non-Anglo-Saxon            
                                   
 
Germanic         Germany  97.7 
Netherlands 95.0 
Switzerland  77.8 
Sweden  100.0 
Latin                    France  52.5 
Italy  88.1 
Spain  58.3 
Belgium  84.6 
Japan                                         50.8 
Source: EIRIS DATA 2005, August 
Table 3.4 shows the prevalence of the duality of Chairman and CEO in companies 
drawn from Anglo-Saxon and Non-Anglo-Saxon countries. In the USA, seventy-five per cent 
(75%) of the companies included in a study by Ethical Investment Research Services (2005), 
have the dual positions of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (or only 24.9 percent 
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 French Corporate Governance Report first published in 1995 and established by two employers federations 
(MEDEF and AFEP-AGREF) with the support of leading private sector companies.  
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separation).  This very low level of separation of the roles of Chairman and CEO puts the USA 
in a rather unique position at this time.  
 A separate study conducted by Spencer Stuart Board Index (The Changing Profile of 
Directors, 2006:20) finds concurrence with the EIRIS Data. Based on Spencer Stuart data, in 
2006, sixty-seven per cent (67) of all Standard & Poors (S&P) 500 companies have a 
combined Chairman and CEO, down from seventy-one per cent (71%), the previous year 
(2005) and seventy-four per cent (74%) in 2001.   
 According to the Spencer Stuart data, of the 158 companies that have separated the role 
in 2006, compared with 140 in 2005, 100 of these companies have a non-independent chair 
(compared with 94 in 2005) and 48 have an independent chair (compared with 43). Ten 
companies did not list a Chairman. Therefore, only ten per cent (10%) of boards (48/484) have 
a truly independent chairman. This represents a slight increase in 2006 over 2005’s nine per 
cent (9%).  At the 100 companies with a non-independent chair, the chairman is a former CEO 
at 67 companies and various non-independent categories (e.g., former executive officers, those 
who receive significant other compensation from the company, or relative of the CEO) apply 
in the 33 other instances (Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2006).  
As the global debate rages over this very controversial CG indicator, this researcher 
scours the social science literature on CG for the opinions of some of the leading CG actors.  
Michael Useem, Management Professor and Director of Wharton’s Center for Leadership and 
Change Management, points out that the CEO and Chairman’s posts at Enron were held by 
different people–Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling—in the months leading up to the disaster at 
the energy company.  Despite the separation of the CEO-ship from the chairmanship at Enron 
and the presumption of better oversight from the non-executive chairman, the company 
suffered a massive failure.  Research has also shown that the performance of U.S. companies 
in which the Chairman and CEO positions are held by different people is no better than that of 
firms in which those posts are held by the same person. Further, the issue of separating the 
CEO and the Chairperson’s jobs has been blown out of proportion (Ibid,   
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm).  In an opposing view, Kimbell25  opined that 
the board as a critical entity set apart from the day-to-day running of the business, is vitally 
important to the health of the company. In this regard, the board should not be run by a CEO 
                                               
25Separating the roles of chairman and chief executive: Looking at both sides of the debate David Kimbell, Tom 
Neff, July 2006 (http://www.spencerstuart.com/research/articles/1022) 
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with his or her own agenda who seeks to dictate to, or unduly influence, the board on key 
issues such as the recruitment of Directors. Instead, a chairman who is independent at the time 
of appointment is better place to run the board in an even-handed manner, with the interests of 
shareholders being paramount (David Kimbell, Co-leader of Spencer Stuart’s Board Services 
in the United States).  
Eisenhardt (1989) opined that separating the CEO/Chairman roles is consistent with 
agency theory based on his assumption that separation of ownership and control of 
corporations can lead to the self-interested actions of managers, and conflicts of interest in the 
role as agents of the owners. What is apparent is that Chairman/CEO duality reduces the 
monitoring effectiveness of board over management, and on this basis is suggesting 
(Eisenhardt) the separation of the CEO/Chairman roles. Stewardship theory (Davis, 
Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997), on the other hand, regards managers as inherently 
trustworthy and unlikely to appropriate organisational resources for their own ends. They view 
Chairman/CEO duality as fostering strong and unified leadership, rather than as weakening the 
board’s independence from management and its monitoring role.   
Empirical evidence, while sometimes supporting this CEO/Chair separation (e.g. 
Rechner and Dalton, 1991), at other times calls it into serious question.  Daily and Dalton 
(1997), for example, found that CEOs who are also Chairpersons of boards are not necessarily 
more independent from board influence than CEOs who are not.  Baligna, Moyer and Rao 
(reported in Heracleous, 2001), found no significant relationship between duality status and 
organisational performance, and suggested that a change in this status from duality to non-
duality may be a symbolic move by board to signal that they are exercising their governance 
role rather than a substantive move that can affect performance.  Also, Heracleous (2001) 
found no systematic link between duality status and organisational performance or market 
value, and is arguing that if anything, the evidence is suggesting that dual leadership is 
associated with systematically lower cash flows and value, as reformers claim (Ibid). 
3.7.2.2  Non-Executive Directors versus Executive Directors and Director  
 Selection 
 The increasing influence of Independent26 Non-Executive Directors is another 
significant development in CG. Non-Executive Directors are there to protect shareholders 
                                               
26
 An Independent Director can be considered as one who is not employed in the firm or closely related to the 
company or its management through significant economic, family or other ties. Further, the Cadbury report 
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interests, check the power of the executives, and bring outside experience and objectivity to 
the board (Spencer Stuart, 1997). Their workload is rising as important issues such as 
executive remuneration in the UK are developed exclusively by them. Preliminary research 
conducted by Kerr (2002) found in a case company that the Chairman/CEO and his senior 
managers’ remuneration is now exclusively dealt with by the Compensation Committee.  The 
European Board Index (1999)27 found that non-executive directors make up the majority of 
both one and two-tier boards in all eight (8) countries it studied.  
 The agency theory supports the idea that boards should be dominated by NEDs to 
increase the board’s independence from management. The Cadbury Code states: “the board 
should include NEDs of sufficient calibre and number for their views to carry significant 
weight in the board’s decisions”.  Stewardship theory, on the other hand, suggests that control 
should accrue to the firm’s managers rather than outsiders, since there is no need to monitor 
management who are regarded as able and trustworthy.  
 A study by Bhagat and Black (1999), found no evidence that increasing outsider board 
representation can improve firm performance, that firms with a super-majority of NEDs 
perform worse than other firms, and that firms with a higher proportion of inside Directors 
perform as well as firms with a higher proportion of outside Directors. The common 
assumption that the existence of social or business ties between CEOs and board members is 
detrimental to board effectiveness because it reduces the board’s independence from 
management was shown to be inaccurate. In fact, such ties can promote more collaborative 
strategic decision making without necessarily reducing effective board control or vigilance 
(Westphal, 1998).     
 
3.7.2.3  Board Size 
In many countries, the minimum size of a board is determined by national laws or 
stock market listing requirements. There can be no appropriate board size as this would be 
challenged by a number of factors such as the qualifications, experience and ability of 
individual board members, and the nature and scope of the corporation, to list a few.  
However, an optimum number may be dependent upon company size and sector. Board size is 
hardly prescribed in most CG codes as they tend to shy away from such a restrictive task.  
                                                                                                                                                    
(1992) insisted that they should have no links, present or past that might affect the exercise of genuinely 
independent judgment.  
27
 Is a publication of Spencer Stuart Board Services, the world’s largest director recruitment firm with offices in 
over sixty two countries.   
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Instead, many codes have adopted a more general approach.  For example, Higgs Review 
(2003), states: 
 An effective board should not be so large as to become unwieldy. It 
should be of sufficient size with a balance of skills and experience 
that is appropriate for the requirement of the business that changes 
in the board’s composition can be managed without undue 
disruption. 
 
While the practical concern of board sizes around the world is important, the 
theoretical implication is another consideration.  According to Herman (1981), large boards 
are ‘weak’ boards since these boards make in-depth discussion unlikely, and increase the 
prospect for diversity and fragmentation.   
There has been no limitation as to the maximum number of Directors a company may 
have.  However, in Jamaica, the revised Companies Act 2004, states that “A company may 
have at least one Director, but a public company shall have at least three Directors, at least 
two of whom should be employees of the company or any of its affiliates”.  The Model Act28 
and Modern Corporation Law of Delaware require companies to have a minimum of one 
Director.  The articles of incorporation establish the initial size of the board, and may 
determine a minimum or maximum number of Directors. The bylaws of the corporation 
finally prescribe the exact number of Directors (Maassen 2000, citing Varallo and Dreisbach, 
1996). 
Academic studies on board sizes while not profuse have been generated by both 
quantitative and qualitative research. Herman (1981) posits that large boards are usually 
‘weak’ boards since these boards make in-depth discussion unlikely, and increase the prospect 
for diversity and fragmentation.  Agency researchers are also sceptical about the effects of 
board size on monitoring capacity of independent Directors (Jensen 2003), claiming that when 
boards become too big, agency problems such as Director free-riding or ‘social loafing’ 
increase within the board, and it becomes more symbolic and less a part of the management 
process (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003).  
In contrast to the likely agency problems articulated by the agency theorists, resource 
dependence theory has been the primary foundation for the perspective that larger boards are 
associated with higher levels of firm performance and suggest that board sizes may be a good 
                                               
28
 Some 37 states, excluding the state of Delaware, have adopted sections from the Model Business Corporation 
Act (MBCA or “Model Act”) to regulate the governance structure of corporations. Although no single state has 
fully adopted either the entire Model Act or the revised version of 1984, the Model Act is recognised as a 
codification of modern corporation law in the USA (Clarkson et al., 1989). 
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measure of an organisation’s ability to form environmental links to securing critical resources 
(Dalton et al, 1999; Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978; Provon, 1980). Yet, there are still others who 
believe that, from a monitoring perspective, larger boards are less likely to suffer from 
managerial domination than smaller counterparts (Zahra and Pearce, 1989).  
Table 3.5: Board Size in Selected Countries 
 Average Board 
Size (Directors) 
Minimum 
Size  
Maximum 
Size  
Range  
Anglo-Saxon 10.8    
USA 10.7 5 23 18 
UK 11.4 6 25 19 
Canada  13.0 6 22 16 
Australia  8.1 5 14 9 
Non-Anglo-Saxon                 
                 Germanic   14.43   
 
Germany  22.8 8 32 24 
Netherlands 12.9 9 16 7 
Switzerland  9.7 5 28 23 
Sweden  12.3 6 15 9 
                 Latin 14.65    
France  13.5 5 24 19 
Italy  15.0 7 23 16 
Spain  15.2 10 21 11 
Belgium  14.9 8 27 19 
Japan                                        13.0 3 50 47 
Sources: EIRIS data: August 2005 
 
As shown in Table 3.5, board sizes vary in non-Anglo-Saxon Europe, with an average 
of 14.54 Directors among eight countries, down to 13.0 in Japan and 10.8 in Anglo-Saxon 
countries.  For Germany, average board size was 22.8, which is by far larger than in any other 
country.  In a separate study by Spencer Stuart European Board Index (SSEBI), 2008, the 
average size of German boards was 7 for the management board and 19.3 for the supervisory 
board.  This indicates that average size of German supervisory boards decreased by 15.4% 
between 2005 (22.8 %) and to 2008 (19.3 %). In the SSEBI study, the average number of 
Directors on a UK board was 11 with 5.4 Executive Directors and 6.6 NEDs. Also, a random 
sample of 150 Second SGX-listed Mainboard and Second Mainboard companies, based on 
their 1998 and 1999 annual reports found average board size in Singapore to be 7, with a 
range of 4 to 15 board members PWC, 1997 and PWC, 2000 surveys. In Jamaica, average 
board size was found to be 8, with a range of 4 to 22 (Kerr 2002).  Therefore, it can be 
concluded, based on these data, that countries with an outright two-tier board system (such as 
Germany and the Netherlands) or partially, (such as France) have larger boards than countries 
of Anglo-Saxon origin (with exclusively one-tier boards). 
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3.7.2.4 Board Committees and Composition 
Academic studies that have analysed board committees have been scanty.  The few 
papers have focused mainly on how independent Directors can impose structural constraints 
on managers by limiting their participation in important committees such as audit, 
compensation, corporate governance, and nomination. The empirical literature finds that 
greater proportions of affiliated Directors on the audit committee have greater influence on the 
structure and length of bankruptcy procedures (Daily, 1995).  Filatotchev et al, (2007) citing 
Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1997), report that CEO compensation was related to the composition 
of the compensation committee. In examining the extent to which the CEO is involved in the 
board selection process, Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) found that the CEO’s involvement in 
nomination committees decreases the firm’s subsequent number of Independent Directors. See 
Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Golden and Zajac, 2001; Lorsh and MacLver, 1989. 
 
3.7.2.5 Director Tenure  
Tenure may be defined as the length of continuing appointment that may be granted 
and is made effective by nomination by the Chairman and election at AGM.  What constitutes 
as an appropriate length of tenure is debatable as some academics argue that tenure should be 
limited to two terms to ensure the infusion of new and fresh Directors, skills and perspectives. 
(Director Compensation Report, 2008).  
 According to Gretchen Michals (2008), “Directors are also increasingly leaving, or 
being forced out, after shorter stays as disgruntled shareholders force boards to re-evaluate 
their term-limit and retirement-age policies.” Shareholders are making use of “board 
evaluations as the impetus for a review of term limits and a discussion of retirement age 
policies29”.  The result is that term limits are being imposed and present limits shortened in 
contrast to the ‘long tenure’ view (Michals, 2008).  According to the Spencer Stuart Board 
Index Report (2008), the length of terms for Directors has been reduced from an average of 3 
years to 1 year in two-thirds of America’s S&P 500 companies. Added to this, there is the 
acceptance of majority voting, which results in the possibility of Directors losing their board 
seats, should they fail to secure a majority of the votes. 
Opponents of term limits argue that while turnover is good and inevitable on a case by 
case basis, continuity and experience is just as important. In an attempt to balance the term 
limits and continuity, “some companies have opted to retain Directors with valuable 
                                               
29Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2008, found that 74% of Boards have a mandatory retirement age.  
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experience by permitting service beyond previously mandated age limits” and beyond term 
limits (Director Compensation Report, 2008).  
 According to the Executive Director Experience and Tenure Survey (2000)30 the 
average length of a Director’s tenure is 6.1 years and in at least one instance, a Director had as 
much as 38 years experience in the post.  In a different study by Spencer Stuart Board Index 
(2008), the average length of service was 4.2 years for non-executive directors as well as the 
Chairman. The length of tenure was not only influenced by mandatory term limits and 
organisational objectives, but personal term limits and personal goals as well. It has been 
observed that many Directors are also likely to leave the post of Director for other more 
profitable, meaningful or beneficial opportunities including other board positions.  
The Executive Director Experience and Tenure Survey (2000) also revealed that  six 
per cent (6%) of respondents expected to stay in their post less than a year, fifty-one per cent 
(51%) would remain for 1-5 years, seventeen per cent (17%) would remain 6-10 years and 8 
percent would remain in excess of 10 years. In addition, thirty-two per cent (32%) of the 
respondents would take up another Executive Director position. The survey also revealed that 
tenure was dependent, in part, on compensation and salary, board support, belief in the 
mission, other professional opportunities, the desire to retire, a feeling of ‘burn out’ and 
whether Directors felt they were able to contribute meaningfully to the organisation.  Other 
factors which have weighed heavily in deciding the length of a Director’s tenure include 
opportunities for professional growth (55%) and Directors feeling ‘burn out’ (56%).”   
In concluding, there is a debate as to the appropriate length of tenure and the limits 
which should/should not be imposed. As shown in this study, the tenure of Directors is 
determined by several factors including support of the board, other opportunities and 
impending retirement. However, there is still very little or no evidence as to whether or not 
extended director tenure on a board, would increase board and organisational performance.   
  
3.7.2.6  Gender and Inequality Issues 
This section explores the importance of gender as it relates to the composition, impact, 
performance and governance of Boards of Directors. Traditionally men have held a tight 
monopoly on the positions of power in the public sphere and particularly in the corporate 
world. As the latter is being challenged, the issue of board composition as it relates to gender 
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 By Maureen Singleton and Renee Cunningham Daniel J. Evans School of Public Affairs in Partnership with: 
The Volunteer Centre, United Way of King County & CompassPoint Nonprofit Services. Web 
site:www.unitedwayofkingcounty.org 
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has surfaced. Issues of unfair opportunities, discrimination, ‘old boy’s club’, ‘glass ceiling’, 
women as solely the labor force, ‘sticky floor’, and the very ontological foundations of the 
commercial, managerial and directorial corps are being reevaluated in keeping with the value 
of good CG.  
While women make up a majority of the voting population and of the civilian 
workforce, they constitute only 14.7 per cent of the total Directors and senior executive officer 
positions in the 100 largest public companies in New York (New York Census, 2007).  
Comparatively speaking, very few women are appointed to boards and the latter is attributed to 
the presence of a ‘glass ceiling,’ (Zelechowski, 2004).  The presence of a glass ceiling results 
in the present situation where women “hold fewer directorships of corporations, less powerful 
corporate titles, occupy disproportionately more organisational responsibilities, are less likely 
to be top earners of  the corporation”, (Zelechowski, 2004).  A case in point is illustrated in the 
New York Census (2007) which showed that 1 in 7 of the top 100 New York firms have no 
women Directors, while less than twenty-five per cent (25%) had three (3) or more females. 
While women are increasingly holding positions of directorship,31 Catalyst (2008) posits that 
“at the current rate of change, it will take women 73 years to reach parity with men in the 
boardrooms of the Fortune 500 companies.” 
The greater inclusion of women into corporate boards is credited to the changing 
outlook of younger men, the precedents set by women forerunners, their proven competence in 
management and executive positions, the increasing experience and knowledgeable pool of 
women to draw from, and benefits realised by a more diverse board. There has been a proven 
and significant correlation between women and better financial performance, a more positive 
business and political impact, greater competitive advantage, a more concerted strategic 
planning approach, and a better understanding of consumers of which women are the majority 
(Daily, 1999; Catalyst, 2008).  The example of the first female board Director of Nike can be 
drawn on as she lobbied for the company to invest in sports shoes for women. This corporate 
venture accounts for thirty per cent (30%) of all Nikes revenue to date. 
 The debates are numerous but there is very little evidence to make conclusive decisions 
about the role of female Directors versus males on corporate boards. Research needs to be 
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 Spencer Stuart survey of the United State found that 90% of Board of Directors had at least 1 woman Director 
in its composition. 
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directed at determining whether or not the inclusion of women on boards makes any 
significant difference on board performance, board attitude, and organiSational outcomes.  
 
3.7.2.7 Board Performance Evaluation and Training  
 
 There are few reasons posited by board process researchers in terms of the importance 
of performance evaluation and development of Directors. First, is that board should undertake a 
formal and rigorous annual evaluation of its performance, as well as, performance of individual 
Directors.  Second, board assessment would lead to changes in the composition of boards to 
make them more effective (Shen, 2005). Third, an assessment of the skills, knowledge, and 
experience on the board, periodically and before making new appointments, is an important 
aspect of maintaining board effectiveness. Fourth, an orientation, indoctrination, and continued 
development programme could ensure that Directors are kept abreast with current best practices 
and trends in modern board operating practices (Roberts et al, 2005; Kerr, 2005). 
 
3.8 BOARD’S ROLE IN FIRM’S STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
3.8.1 Introduction  
 
To formalise boards’ involvement in these activities, theoretical models on corporate 
decision-making process generally identify a sequence of decision-making steps. In general, 
these steps concentrate on the formulation, the implementation and the evaluation/monitoring 
of decisions (Maassen, cf. Judge, 1989).  Fama and Jensen (1983) recognise the following four 
steps in decision-making: 
 initiation – the generation of proposals for resource utilisation and structuring of contracts; 
 ratification – the choice of the decision initiatives to be implemented, 
 implementation –the execution of ratified decisions, and 
 monitoring –the measurement of performance of decision agents and implementation 
rewards (Maassen, 2000); Fama and Jensen, 1983:278).  
 
3.8.2 Theoretical Models of Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-Making  
The Separation and Integration of Decision-Making Steps in Board Model Prototypes: 
The presentation of different board models in this review suggests that the two-tier board 
model is based on a structure that separates these steps in decision making.  Maassen (2000) 
argues that decision management is delegated to the managing Directors in the executive 
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management board while decision control lies in the hands of non-executive supervisory 
Directors in the supervisory board.  
Figure 3.4: Board Roles in the Two-tier and One-tier Board Models 
Two-tier Board Model  One-Tier Board Model 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Maassen (2000:23) 
 
 
Figure 3.4 shows that one-tier boards are formally based on a structure that integrates 
the four steps in decision management with decision control. According to Fama and Jensen 
(1983), decision management involves initiation and implementation (steps 1 and 3), while 
decision control involves the ratification and monitoring processes (steps 2 and 4).  Fama and 
Jensen suggest that service roles are responsible for decision management function, while the 
control roles are performed under decision control.  A combination of both service and control 
roles forms the strategic roles of boards (Table 3.6). Furthermore, the distinction between 
decision management and decision control is useful in understanding the roles of boards in 
decision making.   
 Role of Corporate Board of Directors: A Theoretical Classification: The literature on 
CG recognises different roles of BOD in decision-making (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1996; 
Hung, 1998).  The resource dependency theory and the stakeholder theory emphasise the 
resource allocation and boundary spanning roles of corporate boards. Goodstein et al. (1994), 
Pearce and Zahra (1991), Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), argue that by increasing the size and 
diversity of the board, the links between the organisation and its environment and the securing 
of critical resources (including prestige and legitimacy) will be strengthened, and this 
boundary spanning activity can bring new strategic information.  Directors interlocking 
corporate networks seem also to support this boundary-spanning role.   
Zahra and Pearce (1989), suggest that theories originating from organisational 
economics, such as the agency theory and the legalistic approach, focus on boards’ roles to 
mitigate agency problems and to monitor management. Further, they argue that the agency 
theory places a premium on board’s strategic contribution, specifically the board’s strategic 
contribution in the articulation of the firm’s mission, the development of the firms strategy and 
The Supervisory Board 
In charge of decision control 
The Board of Directors 
In charge of decision management 
and decision control 
The Management Board  
In charge of decision management 
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the setting of guidelines for implementation and effective control of the chosen strategy.  The 
involvement of Directors in the strategic course of the corporation is mainly understood by the 
stewardship theory.  The managerial hegemony theory, however, describes the board as a de 
jure, but not the de facto governing body of the organisation. Corporate management assumes 
the real responsibility of running and controlling the company.  According to this theory, the 
BoD is, in effect, a legal fiction and is dominated by management, making it ineffective in 
reducing the potential for agency problems between management and shareholders (Stiles, 
citing Kosnik, 1987; Mace, 1971; Vance, 1983). Taking a similar view, organisational 
theorists who traditionally recognise the peak of organisational structure as the CEO, and the 
BOD as mere imposition on such structure, strongly believe the board will remain a mere 
rubber stamp of the CEO’s decisions (Yakasai, 2000). 
Zahra and Pearce (1989), Gopinath et al. (1994) and Jonnergard et al. (1997), suggest 
that these theoretical schools recognise three generally accepted board role categories.  These 
roles are shown in Table 3.6 as 1.) service roles, 2.) control roles and 3.) strategic roles of 
corporate boards of Directors. Also, the Table 3.6 shows that the strategic roles of corporate 
boards combine boards’ decision management and decision control activities.    These roles 
show similarities with the four decision-making steps identified by Fama and Jensen (1983).  
The service roles can be derived from resource dependency theory, stakeholder theory, the 
managerial hegemony theory, and can be related to the decision management activities of the 
board. Proponents of the agency theory and the legalistic approach to board organisation 
suggest the control roles strongly focus on decision control activities of the board.  Daily 
(1991) indicates that these perspectives are not necessarily mutually exclusive.   
3.8.3 Competing Theoretical Perspectives of Board Involvement 
The theoretical perspectives of board involvement in decision management and 
decision control are also summarised in Table 3.6.  The table indicates that proponents of the 
resource dependence theory, the stakeholder theory, and the managerial hegemony theory, 
have recognised boards’ service roles. With regard to the four steps in decision making as 
identified by Fama and Jensen (1983), it is suggested that service roles of boards concentrate 
on activities related to the support of management such as the initiation and the 
implementation of strategic decisions (decision management). The control roles are best 
explained by theories originating from the organisational economics school, i.e., the agency 
theory and the legalistic approach to board organisation (Maassen, 2000). The ratification and 
monitoring steps of strategic decision making process (decision control) are usually associated 
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with board control roles. Table 3.6 further illustrates that the stewardship theory and 
organisational theory recognise the strategic roles of boards. Board involvement in the 
initiation and implementation steps, as well as ratification and monitoring steps in the process 
of strategic decision making, explains the strategic roles of board.   
Table 3.6: Theoretical Schools of Board Involvement 
Decision Management Decision Control Decision management  + 
decision control 
 Resource dependence 
theory;  
 Stakeholder theory 
 Management hegemony theory 
 Agency 
theory; 
 Legalistic 
approach 
 Stewardship theory 
 Organisational theory 
Service Roles Control Roles Strategic Roles 
Sources: Maassen (2000: 24) based on Kosnik (1987); Mace (1971); Vance (1983); Yakasai (2000)  
 
The role of the board in the managerial hegemony approach is, therefore, limited by the 
domination of management. Consequently, the board is passive, and neither has any input in 
organisational decision-making nor does it exercise control over the performance of the chief 
executive or the company as a whole, which, in the eyes of shareholders, makes the board 
ineffective (Maassen, 2000).  
 
3.9  THE NATURE AND ROLE OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE  
Corporate disclosure encompasses the processes of communication and dissemination 
of information to the public. Theoretically, a thorough disclosure regime contributes to market 
transparency and arguably creates an impediment to fraudulent activity.  Eccles, 1995, argues 
that corporate disclosure in the last decade has been strengthened by increased management 
credibility, analysts' understanding of the firm, investors' patience, and potentially, increases in 
share value.   The starting point for most analysis is that ‘information asymmetry’ (Akerlof, 
1980) or ‘information impactedness’ (Williamson, 1985) is pervasive in firms and has negative 
effects in terms of uncertainty, adverse selection, moral hazard, and opportunism. This then 
leads to higher transaction costs, the false pricing of assets, misallocation of resources, and 
lower liquidity.   
 There are various holders, producers, withholders, donors, recipients and users of 
information, dubbed, the stock and flow of information.  The main producers and holders are 
usually the top management.  However, even within the managerial hierarchy there are vertical 
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and horizontal flows of information that may have implications for CG, business strategy, and 
performance.  Different levels of authorities will have information which they may or may not 
give to their superiors; junior managers may or may not provide critical information to senior 
managers and senior managers will have information relevant to Directors (Ibid). Many 
jurisdictions have codified the duty of Officers (senior executives) to provide accurate, 
relevant and timely information to the Board of Directors, failing to do so may result in serious 
penalties.  Finally, information may flow from senior managers to fixed claim holders, 
employees, and other stakeholders.  In this section, the literature perused and presented herein, 
focuses on the importance of the information provided. 
The literature is mainly concerned with voluntary disclosure and refers to information 
disclosure in terms of both quality and quantity of information (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Core, 
2001). The essential notion gleaned from the literature is that greater disclosure will allow 
investors to monitor management better and to effectively exercise their rights. It also makes a 
number of distinctions, which are useful for analysis. As earlier said, information disclosure 
can be divided into mandatory and voluntary, the latter also encompasses requirements of a 
“comply and explain” nature (Cadbury Report, 1992). There can also be the distinction 
between private and public information and there are various kinds of information.  Case in 
Point: financial information (profits, losses, etc.), operating information (strategy, performance 
against objectives), and CG information (board composition, executive remuneration etc.). 
Information may also be backward, or forward-looking, with the latter usually adjudged to 
have a premium.   
Even as debates rage over the appropriate extent and frequency of disclosure, and there 
is no universally accepted model of disclosure, corporations are expected, if not required, to 
publicly disclose certain basic information such as their standing, address, officials, and 
constitution.  In conclusion, there are several roles of corporate disclosure. Among them is the 
facilitation of CG, the evaluation of management and the board, the assessment of the 
performance of the firm, an increased understanding of the firm by potential investors and 
present shareholders, and the regulating of the market.  
Given perennial market failures and out of fears of competitive disadvantage, most 
states have intervened with laws to make firms disclose. In this regard, firms themselves have 
an interest in disclosing above what is legally required with the hope of accruing benefits such 
as reduction of uncertainty and the price of capital. To a large extent, much of the literature 
argued that an optimal disclosure regime is one where firms supply maximum information 
(Filatochev et al, 2007), subject to legal, cost, and propriety constraints.  More in-depth 
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reading on the concepts and theoretical literature can be had from Jensen and Meckling, 1976, 
Grossman and Hart, 1980, and Milgrom, 1981. 
 
3.10  CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS   
This chapter examined a broad spectrum of social science literature in CG covering 
business history, accounting, economics, political science, finance, law and sociology.  The 
analysis integrates several specific areas of CG into a broader perspective which in turn is 
deeply grounded in theoretical and empirical research findings, rather than conceptual and 
theoretical debates. The study reviews the literature in line with the key elements (research 
questions) and the problems under study as introduced in chapter 1. The main issues that were 
examined include, but are not limited to: a theoretical discourse on the definition of CG; a 
history of CG development,  relevant theories of corporate governance; regulation; corruption, 
ownership and control patterns; role of stakeholder relations (representation), perception, and 
role of institutional investors, CG Practices such—board characteristics and processes (board 
size, Chairman/CEO duality or separation, NEDs and Executive Directors and selection; board 
committee and composition, tenure of Directors, gender and inequality issues; board 
performance evaluation); board’s role in strategic decision-making; and the nature and role of 
corporate disclosure.  
The review led to several interesting conclusions. First, the historical development of 
CG (albeit limited) is replete with corporate crises followed by reforms. From the failure of the 
Mississippi Company (France) and South Seas (Britain) in 1720, during which time both crises 
appeared to have partially influenced the invention of the Joint Stock Company, through to the 
1929 stock market crash in the USA (period familial governance and economic 
enfranchisement) which was followed by the creation of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in 1933, to the demise of Enron in 2002 (a period of popular governance and 
representation), which was met by the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.   
Further examination of the scholarship on CG reveals that serious gaps exist. Hardly 
any, or at best, few empirical studies are available that yield sound and conclusive results in 
areas of director tenure, board-related issues, such as gender and inequality, board size, 
majority of NEDs versus insiders, types and composition of board committees, board 
performance evaluation, training of Directors, employee and trade union representation, and 
the quality and quantity of corporate disclosure.  While there is a preponderance of sound 
empirical evidence on Chairman/CEO duality and the separation of the roles; corruption; the 
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role of the board in strategic decision making, stakeholders, corporate disclosure and 
institutional investors, findings remain inconclusive as to the net and effective contribution of 
these factors on company bottom-line as these findings have been limited in many regards 
based on cultural, political, economical, and methodological differences. The latter three 
issues--stakeholders, corporate disclosure and institutional investors have been highly studied. 
However, the scope of studies was either too narrowly focused (IIs–mainly USA information, 
stakeholders (mainly shareholders), and has not been addressed for more contentious issues. 
Corruption (mainly economic and political, rather than the social and behavioural causes) has 
also not been addressed in addition to voluntary disclosures, in preference of legal reform –
disclosure of Director inter-directorship, remuneration and age and stockholdings.    
The basis of the findings of this chapter will serve to refine the direction of the 
remainder of this study and the motivation of the research questions in the next chapter.  The 
research questions and key elements are aimed at addressing theoretical and empirical gaps, 
and to provide a framework for recommendations to resolve issues in public policy corporate 
governance in Jamaica.  
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CHAPTER 4.0:  THE RESEARCH STRATEGY AND METHODOLOGY 
  
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter adopts a method triangulation (interviewer’s administered questionnaire 
survey, case study and focus group) of data collection approach.  Given that a primary focus of 
this research is on theory testing and theory development, it is necessary to follow a clear and 
concisely documented research protocol. In this regard, a research protocol is outlined, which 
is accompanied by a framework of an audit trail.  An audit trail facilitates a quick and easy 
retrieval of the step-by-step approach taken in the study for access by other researchers who 
might be interested in the study.  
 The remainder of the chapter includes: section 4.2, research objectives and themes, 4.3; 
the research strategy—this includes the focus of the research, epistemological issues, and 
research design and data collection issues; 4.4, the research methods and populations; 4.5, data 
analysis and coding issues; 6.6, fieldwork overview; 4.7, aims and target users of the research; 
and 4.8, chapter summary and conclusions.  
 
4.2  RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND KEY ELEMENTS    
4.2.1 General and Specific Objectives  
Given the overarching emphasis on the exploratory nature of the research, the 
problems under study, and a need to satisfy different but complementary groups of 
beneficiaries (academicians, and public policy professionals and private practitioners), 
this study explores CG Structures  and Practices in Jamaica with a view to influence policy 
reform.   
The two general objectives of this study are: 1.) to acquire appropriate knowledge 
about the realities (the regulatory framework, structures, and practices) of CG in Jamaica so 
that a framework for reform can be recommended, and 2.) to influence international CG 
development agenda by disseminating findings at conferences, seminars and through 
publications in recognised academic journals. The emergent theory-testing and development 
aspects will add to, and influence, the already growing volume of academic literature, and 
provide new knowledge from a developing country’s perspective. This study is, therefore, 
designed to find answers and to determine the “what”, “how”, and “why” of the regulatory 
governance framework and CG structures and practices of Jamaica.  
 
4.2.2 Research Key Elements (Questions) 
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The key elements or main issues of focus of this thesis are listed below (sections 
4.2.2.1 through to 4.2.2.8), represent both broad and narrow issues, and are not complete 
without the inclusion of the more refined questions to be found in the IAQS instrument,  Focus 
Group Moderator’s Guide, and Case Study respondent questionnaire (Appendices 2, 3, and 5).  
The key elements listed and briefly defined hereunder have been earlier introduced in the 
introduction of chapter 1 and comprehensively discussed in the literature review of chapter 3.  
These key elements are meant to address several weaknesses in the existing literature by the 
utilisation of different research methods and techniques summarised in the introduction and 
methodological overview above and elaborated in the remainder of this chapter. The areas 
presented hereunder serve as the basis for the analysis and discussions in chapters 5, 6, 7 and 
8.  See Appendices 3A, 3B and 3C for research questions associated with the key elements 
identified immediately below.   
 
4.2.2.1 Regulation 
This study seeks to determine the nature, structure and effectiveness of the regulatory 
framework in response to the hypothesis/problem of systemic weaknesses in the financial 
sector and a weak and inadequate regulatory framework of Jamaica.  
 
4.2.2.2  Corruption  
This study seeks to explore available empirical evidence on the perception, incidence of, 
causes and impact of corruption on Jamaica, and efforts to reduce corruption. This comes 
against overwhelming claims that corruption is a serious problem in Jamaica.  
 
4.2.2.3 Ownership and Control  
This study investigates the nature of existing corporate ownership in Jamaica and how, if at all, 
it influences important CG drivers such as board composition and leadership responses to 
emerging CG practices. High ownership concentration is assumed to characterise Jamaican 
firms and is associated with several governance problems.  
 
4.2.2.4 Stakeholder Relations (Representation) 
Given the growing importance of stakeholder relations and representation in the international 
CG debate, and based on claims of stakeholder underrepresentation and voice among Jamaican 
corporate boards, this study explores a wide range of stakeholder issues to better understand 
how employees, trade unions and others, contribute in firm-stakeholder interrelationships to 
organisational outcomes. 
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4.2.2.5 Perceptions and Role of Institutional Investors (IIs) 
Jamaican IIs have been reported to control 75% of listed firms and are primarily concerned 
about investment decisions that directly impact corporate profits (JSE Report, 2008). They are 
not keen on adopting or applying CG Best Practices (personal information). Therefore, this 
study seeks to obtain a firsthand empirical understanding of these assumptions and their 
underlying and potential CG problems.  
 
4.2.2.6 Board Characteristics and Processes  
The specific issues of importance here are board size; Chairman/CEO duality or separation, 
non-executive versus executive Directors’ on boards,  board committees and their 
composition, director tenure, gender and inequality issues, board performance evaluation and 
director training, frequency of board meetings and timing of distribution of board papers and 
proxy forms.  
 
4.2.2.7 Board’s Role in Firm Strategic Decision-making  
With the one-tier board in Jamaica which gives rise to a mix of executive and non-Executive 
Directors, it is often difficult to define the role and contribution of the board as a whole versus 
that of management.  Also, the literature (Maassen, 2000; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1996) has 
overwhelmingly positioned the role of the management to be limited to initiating and 
implementing strategy while the board (NEDs) monitors management and ratifies strategic 
decision. However, with a mix of NEDs and executives, this has raised new concerns that 
warrant further research in Jamaica and in the context of this study.  
 
4.2.2.8 Corporate Disclosure 
This area is critical in any CG debate and hence no less in the Jamaican context. There are 
many claims of weak disclosure regimes and inadequate coverage of published CG 
information. In response, this study seeks to determine the nature, role, coverage, 
appropriateness of existing disclosure regimes and downsides, if any, with the intent of 
proposing others and strengthening existing regimes.  See Appendix 3C for the detailed 
questions under the respective broad themes.  Having outlined the research objectives and the 
key areas elements of this thesis, the next section outlines the research strategy.   
 
4.3 THE RESEARCH STRATEGY  
Exploratory research into CG in Jamaica required an appropriate research strategy that 
would provide an operational framework which stipulated the nature and sources of 
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information to be collected.  This research strategy was used to determine the appropriate 
research techniques (interviews, case studies and focus groups etc.) for data collection, 
measurement, and analysis. The research strategy was guided by several factors. First, it 
depends on the purpose of the research (exploratory, descriptive and prescriptive). Second, it 
depends on the focus of the research. In this study, it aims at both theory testing and theory 
building.  Third, it depends on the research questions and practical research constraints (time, 
access, resources, etc.).  Fourth and finally, it depends on the degree of researcher control over 
the phenomena under study.   
There is a huge body of prescriptive literature available on how Directors should 
govern corporations, but not enough literature that actually describes real happenings in the 
boardroom. Although there is growing interest in the role, behaviour, and characteristics of 
boards, from both the perspectives of academicians and practitioners, there are several factors 
that challenge a broader CG agenda, such as the nature of this study, particularly involving the 
issues that take place behind closed boardroom doors. It is reported by Judge (1989) and Judge 
and Zeinthaml (1992), that researchers simply do not know what boards’ roles are in decision 
making.  Therefore, the factors that challenge the research agenda on Boards of Directors, 
specifically, and CG structures and practices, generally, are discussed in the next section.  
Figure 4.1 provides an illustrative view of the research strategy and methodology employed in 
this study.  
 
4.3.1 The Focus of the Research  
In this exploratory study, the focus is on theory-testing and theory-development.  To 
the extent that a beneficial aspect of this study is to prescribe a policy framework for 
improvement in CG in Jamaica, this research therefore, presents a third focus. However, given 
the existing limited literature and empirical work on CG among organisations in Jamaica, the 
study is more concerned with generating a dualistic theoretical and practical (policy-driven) 
framework for CG structures and practices. The theory building process adopts a research 
triangulation approach (IAQS, Case Study and Focus Group) which is inductive as much as it 
is deductive in methodology and relies primarily on the interpretation and analysis of data 
collected from closed and open-ended, semi-structured and unstructured questions, 
unpublished archival data and secondary published data (Figure 4.1).    
In addition, this study seeks to contribute to the growing literature on CG structures 
and practices by examining and analysing how empirical data from Jamaica compares with 
similar research in other countries and regions. In this way, this study combines the inductive 
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and deductive methodology. The deductive methodology starts from a pre-determined 
theoretical perspective and thus evolves theory-testing or, more accurately in this study, theory 
development. 
  Several researchers have noted that in combining elements of induction and 
deduction, this can be both necessary and useful in providing greater insight and understanding 
into complex phenomena under study such as the context of this study.   For example, Strauss 
and Corbin (1990:148) opined: 
[D]eductive as well as inductive theory are both very much a part of the 
analytical process. For instance, there may be times when the analyst is not 
able immediately to find evidence of process in data….When this happens, 
the analyst can turn to deductive thinking and hypothesise possible potential 
situations of change, then go back to data or field situation and look for 
evidence to support, refute, or modify that hypothesis.   
 
 Finally, this thesis attempts to apply findings on the existing realities of CG structures 
and practices in Jamaica for the purpose of prescribing appropriate and workable policy 
solutions for the way forward.  In this way, it relies on and engages several experts for their 
views in fulfilling the above stated objective. In sum, the study seeks to understand and build 
on existing theoretical developments in as much as it attempts to develop new theories and to 
determine how the study either fits in or changes the paradigm.   
 
4.3.2   Epistemological Issues 
In an attempt to detail the proposed research strategy of this study, it is helpful to be 
engaged in a brief discussion on the main philosophical approaches to research in the social 
sciences. In this section, views from positivism and anti-positivism are briefly discussed. 
According to the positivist epistemology, science is seen as the way to get at truth, to 
understand the world well enough so that it might be predicted and controlled. Flowing from 
its scientific assumptions, the positivist adapts the quantitative stream of research and their 
perspective focuses on issues of testability, replicability and feasibility. Thus, the ultimate aim 
of positivism is to understand, manipulate, and control the natural world. As such, positivists 
separate themselves from the world they study, while researchers within other paradigms 
acknowledge that they have to participate in real-world life to some extent so as to better 
understand and express its emergent properties and features (Healy and Perry, 2000).  
In contrast, many anti-positivists are usually loyal to the qualitative research paradigm, 
which may operate under different ontological assumptions about the world. They do not 
assume that there is a single unitary reality apart from our perceptions. Since each of us view 
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the world from our point of view, each of us experiences a different reality. As such, the 
phenomenon of “multiple realities” exists. Conducting research without taking this into 
account violates the qualitative researcher fundamental view of the individual. Consequently, 
they may be opposed to methods that attempt to aggregate across individuals on the grounds 
that each individual is unique. Anti-positivists also argue that the researcher is a unique 
individual and that all research is essentially biased by each researcher’s individual 
perceptions. There is no point in trying to “establish validity” in any external or objective 
sense (Krauss, S., citing Trochim, 2000).   
Contrary to Anti-positivists, the positivists see science as largely a mechanistic or 
mechanical affair. Deductive reasoning is used to postulate theories that can be tested. Based 
on the results of studies, we may learn that a theory does not fit the facts well and so the theory 
must be revised to better predict reality. Also, positivists believe in empiricism, the idea that 
observation and measurement are at the core of the scientific endeavor. The key approach of 
the scientific method is the experiment, the attempt to discern natural laws through direct 
manipulation and observation (Healy and Perry, 2000).  
In contrast, the purpose of social investigation for anti-positivists is to make human 
behaviour intelligible by interpreting it in relation to subjective intent.  Importantly, anti-
positivists feel that such interpretations involve a projection of cultural prejudices grounded in 
a network of socially-constructed expectations and assumptions that make up a cultural 
tradition. Thus, the aims of naturalistic inquiry are not to duplicate or confirm previous 
research, but to revise prejudice by illuminating new dimensions of a phenomenon. From the 
two broad philosophical approaches presented, a continuum of research methodologies can be 
identified which are based on their relative emphasis on deduction or induction, their degree of 
structure and the data they generate, and the explanatory forms they create (Gill and Johnson, 
1991:36).  At one extreme, is the nomothetic methodology that falls into the positivist realm 
and is based on systematic protocol and emulates natural science methodology by focusing on 
the process of testing hypotheses in accordance with standards of scientific rigor. As such it 
calls for accurate models and adopts standardised research instruments and techniques that are 
used to measure, quantify and operationalize concepts. At the other extreme, is the idiographic 
methodology that emulates from anti-positivist views.  
Idiographic methodology in contrast to nomothetic, adopts a subjective account 
generated by “getting inside” situations. It emphasizes theory grounded in empirical 
observations that take account of subjects’ meaning and interpretive systems in order to 
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acquire greater understanding.  Ethnography is the dominant branch of idiographic research 
and is derived mainly from anthropological and sociological research traditions. Ethnography 
enables the cultural settings of an organisation to account for the observed phenomenon and its 
ultimate aim is to uncover, understand, and explicate the ways in which individuals and groups 
understand and take action of situations in their environment (Samra-Fredericks, 2000).  
Nomothetic methodology places a priority on quasi-experimental designs and 
quantitative surveys. It often includes statistical measurements that are cross-tabulated with 
one another to explain the variability of social events.  Idiographic methodological approaches, 
and particularly ethnography, rely instead on fieldwork and case studies that use interviews 
and participant observations (and sometimes surveys) as its main research technique.  The aim 
of these designs is to provide an in-depth, detailed descriptive account of social actions 
occurring at a specific time. This qualitative technique allows the researcher to uncover 
complex and dynamic interactions among organisational actors, functions, and processes.   
 In contrast, quantitative approaches associated with nomothetic methodology have 
been argued to provide greater objectivity, reliability, and generalisability (Panton, 2002:55), 
but often ignore many important and complex organisational realities. It is these organisational 
realities that are most important in this thesis in uncovering what goes on in the boardroom.  
How Directors behave, what structures and processes of CG exist in the Jamaican context,  and 
how these realities are impacting public policy decisions. An understanding of these 
organisational realities can help to shape the way forward for the improvement of 
organisational effectiveness and inform public policy directions and decisions.  
 
4.3.3 The Research Designs and Data Collection Issues  
4.3.3.1 Research Designs   
  
In the last decade, much research on CG has been conducted, but little of it from inside 
the boardroom.  Research conducted on such issues as CG structures and practices (ownership 
and control, board practices, CEO/Chair duality, balance between executive and non-executive 
Directors, executive compensation, board committee structures) have been conducted using 
secondary information and archival data.  In addition, researchers have attempted to show co-
relations between variables (Stiles, 2001).   
Although many of the studies on CG can be considered methodologically sound, they 
suffer from the lack of peer review.  According to Tricker (1994:2), such research is produced 
without talking to a Director, or anyone else in the CG power base.  There is, therefore, a 
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dearth of primary research on Boards of Directors (from developing countries, for emphasis) 
from which to draw any methodological insights.  In a concurring position, Stiles (2001) 
argues that to understand the nature of boards in operation, we must have reports from 
Directors themselves.  This study is, therefore, grounded primarily on the perceptions of senior 
executives (Chairmen, CEOs and Company Secretaries) from main boards and subsidiaries of 
similar entities. 
 In the application of case study, three companies were studied in-depth, a 
conglomerate, a mutual society and a merchant bank, and involved interviews with twenty-
eight (28) respondents.  All three case companies were domestically owned and controlled.  
The techniques applied were structured and semi-structured interviews with Chairmen, CEOs, 
and Company Secretaries and semi-structured and unstructured interviews with several 
external stakeholders. In addition to structured, semi-structured and unstructured interviews, 
informal discussions were held with several parties external to the case companies but who 
could relate in some way or another to the review cases, or other aspects of this study 
(Appendix 15). These external parties include members of the PSOJ, JSE, JCC, the 
institutional investor community, politicians, senior civil servants, international corporate 
governance experts and others.  Also, there was a deliberate approach adopted by the author to 
sample a wide range of Jamaican companies to mirror the diversity of the economy under 
study. 
Figure 4.1: Research Methodological Model for Data and Information Collection and 
Analysis  
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The third strand includes the conduct of two Focus Group studies. The total 
respondents between the two groups were fourteen (14), with seven (7) respondents each.  
Additionally, the research design and data collection techniques detailed the research 
populations, the construction of the sample frame, reliability of data, fieldwork overview, the 
different strands of research (IAQS,  case study, focus groups), and data collection and 
analysis of issues.  Figure 4.1 summarises these approaches.  The research techniques and 
data collection methods applied included: open-ended questionnaires in face-to-face 
interviews; tape-recorded and transcribed responses; observation and interaction with 
case companies’ CEOS and Board of Directors, staff, managers and Directors in a natural 
setting (snippets); and the analysis of secondary data on Jamaican case companies, 
regulators, watchdog groups and institutional investors.   
4.3.3.2 Data Collection Issues  
 Notwithstanding that data collection techniques would have been dealt with in earlier 
sections, the focus here is on the integrity, credibility, and reliability of the data sources, 
collection and analytical processes.  The goal of any reliability test is to minimise errors and 
biases in a study.  Essential to the reliability of the research findings is the accuracy of the 
collected data. Where possible, the research should focus heavily on primary data collection 
(Yin, 1989).  
 The primary data in my study was obtained first hand from institutional actors who 
themselves were briefed on the nature and purpose of the research and therefore provided the 
most credible data and information available at hand and via several in-house and public 
documents.  Secondary data though was sometimes dated, in which case updated versions 
were sought and obtained, from annual reports, press releases, media briefs at investor briefing 
meetings, as well as newspaper clippings, archival databases and publications by executive 
search firms and many other sources.   
 While the data in some of these publications of executive search firms were mainly 
derived from proxy statements and annual reports, corporations were generally requested by 
these executive search firms to verify the information before publication of such information 
as part of their research tradition. In this thesis, the accuracy and reliability of data were 
directly controlled where it concerned secondary data from annual reports, published surveys, 
and information from proxy forms and other company documents.  From these secondary data 
sources, reliable and accurate information were obtained from credible sources such as the 
JSE, the FSC, BOJ and the ICAJ. The information was obtained either verbally, from 
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authoritative sources, or from study visits to the various institutional libraries, published 
reports the printed and electronic media. Therefore, there can be no doubt that data and 
information obtained was accurate, credible and reliable. 
 In addition, with access to the various CG reputational agents, where there was any 
doubt about any information, verifications were made easily as the researcher remained in 
Jamaica for the entire period of the fieldwork and beyond. An added advantage of being in the 
research environment is that he was kept abreast of CG developments as they unfolded, and 
was able to make necessary adjustments to the research strategy which would have influenced 
the outcome.  The SPSS software was used and a framework designed and followed for 
inputting and analysis of the data.  See data analytical model in Appendix 10.  Initially, the 
IASQ consisted of sixty-six (66) questions. However, several of the questions had to be broken 
down further for easier interpretation and convenience in data input and analysis.   
Finally, the researcher was the sole interviewer for the majority of the IAQS, all 
institutional investors and case study respondents, and served as moderator at the Focus Group 
Discussion forums.  Several other shorter interviews and follow up activities were made across 
the Research Design Methods to clarify responses and obtain more detailed explanations.  
 
4.3.3.3 Arguments Against Open-ended Questions  
The use of open-ended questionnaires is by no means perfect and it is often the 
subject of various criticisms for being prone to bias and veracity by respondents (Panton, 
2000). In addition, though the level of quantitative rigor in the survey administered was 
limited to basic statistical analysis, the strength of balancing quantitative with qualitative 
and vice versa was recognised. As Miles and Huberman (1994:42) put it: “When they 
[quantitative and qualitative] are combined with the up close, deep, credible 
understanding of complex, real world contexts that characterise good qualitative studies, 
it makes a powerful mix.” Furthermore, with open-ended questionnaires, interview 
supervision and control is difficult to achieve. According to Churchill, Jr., & Gilbert 
(1991), the open-ended questionnaire is generally the most expensive method to 
administer, costly to revisit, is subject to interviewer bias and can be slow to administer. 
 
4.3.3.4 Arguments in Support of Open-ended Questions  
 The use of open-ended questionnaires proved to be important for a number of 
reasons. First, it ensures that the highest response rate is achieved.  Second, it allows the 
use of any type of question/questionnaire. Third, most Researchers find it easier to 
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communicate by the application of probing questions. Finally, it permits easy use of 
visuals (Churchill, Jr., & Gilbert, 1991). The use of open-ended questions, as is assumed, 
would have revealed accurate and truthful perceptions from respondents about CG 
issues. As Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest the researcher, in identifying the primary 
associations and similarities of responses, made an attempt to dissect comments and 
then grouped them in the various categories of responses. This improved accuracy and 
expedited the research initiative. 
 
4.4 THE RESEARCH METHODS AND POPULATION ISSUES      
 
This section examines and rationalises the theoretical basis for this study as an essential 
building block for theory-testing and theory development.  It spans all three methodological 
approaches (interviews, case studies, and focus groups) by rationalizing their theoretical 
foundation in the introductions, study sample frame, and research populations. Section 4.4.4 
summarises the approach to studying eight (8) of Jamaica’s largest institutional investors.  
4.4.1 Interviewer’s Administered Questionnaire Survey 
4.4.1.1 The Approach     
While an interviewer’s administered questionnaire survey (IAQS) was utilised, the 
emphasis was on qualitative analysis rather than quantitative, albeit there were some elements 
of the quantitative in as much as processing the data was concerned.  Justifiably, there are 
serious problems associated with quantitative survey designs that collate numerical data on 
frequencies of Board of Directors’ actions and operationalised written questionnaires to 
ascertain board attitudes. First, board structures and practices (including board processes and 
attitude) may be very difficult to predict using a quantitatively designed instrument without 
getting into the boardroom (as in ‘board-in-action’ observation and recording, and bringing 
Directors and Officers together in focus group settings) to see, hear, interpret, and understand 
how, why, and under what circumstances Directors take certain strategic actions about the 
firm’s direction.  Moreover, written questionnaires offer only a snapshot of Directors’ views at 
a particular time, and purpose of board performance from a historical perspective, or what 
Directors advised had been implemented or would happen. Again, written questionnaires can 
merely reflect what is actually happening, particularly in a changing organisational setting. 
Heracleous (1999:262) suggested that: 
[D]eveloping criteria of effectiveness based on actual behaviours 
and group dynamics within the board goes at the heart of what we 
see as an important issue in existing research.  If quantitative 
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designs are not based on adequate qualitative in-depth data, this can 
lead to potentially vital factors being ignored… [and] untenable 
assumptions (Heracleous, 1999:263).  
 
 Notwithstanding the above, an IAQS was used in this study as the most appropriate 
means of capturing a sense of existing CG practices, what they were, why they were used and 
among whom (which companies) of the respondent companies. Given the broad spectrum of 
areas covered in the questionnaire and the number of companies involved, a qualitatively-
designed approach ensured the attainability and practicality of this research project. Following 
the stream of the idiographic case-study approach, and rather than be concerned about testing 
hypotheses and measuring effects and relationships, the substance of the analysis of this 
section was used to identify and explain trends and produce hard descriptive interpretations 
about board practices, characteristics, composition and attitude.  The questionnaire covers 
three broad areas: 1.) ownership and control patterns; 2.) board characteristics and processes 
(composition and other issues); 3.) the involvement and role of the Board of Directors in the 
firm’s strategic direction. The SPSS Package was utilised to produce the data analysis that is 
reflected in the descriptive statistics developed in this study (Appendices 2 and 10).  
With prior knowledge that research on Board of Directors specifically and CG 
generally in developing countries is still underdeveloped, there was a desire for exploratory 
research in Jamaica. For this reason, the research approach focuses on the interviewer’s 
administered instrument as the primary means of collecting data, while incorporating focus 
group discussions and case studies as well as informal discussions with CG experts. This 
multi-technique approach rests on the premise that the limitations of a given technique are 
compensated by the counterbalancing strengths of other techniques. Also, the use of multiple 
techniques increases the confidence of the researcher that variance among subjects reflects 
differences in subjects’ attitudes rather than in techniques (Snow and Thomas, 1994).  
 
4.4.1.2  Construction of Study Sample Frame   
The interview schedule (Appendix 2) was mainly structured with closed-ended 
questions and a minority of open-ended questions that allowed for probing, thus facilitating the 
participants’ revelations about a range of organisational issues to be captured and recorded.  A 
separate semi-structured questionnaire instrument was used to collect data on institutional 
investors (Appendix 3). . 
In addition to seventeen (17) respondents interviewed in the preliminary phase of the 
fieldwork (doctoral project proposal), an additional five (5) questionnaires were used as pilot 
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during the first week of the fieldwork.  The experience with these schedules led to slight 
adjustments to the final schedule, particularly in the aspects of technical language used as well 
as the reconstruction of a few questions.  Revisions to the first draft interview instrument were 
also inspired by several suggestions made during the doctoral research proposal presentation. 
This led to further improvement in the final script, particularly the conciseness of questions.  
 Notwithstanding the consideration that access to board Chairmen, CEOs and Company 
Secretaries would be a problem, and given that there was prior knowledge on the researcher’s 
part that the quality of information to be had from the second tier (top 200) Jamaican 
companies would be patchy, and unreliable at best, it was decided to limit the sample frame to 
Jamaica’s 100 largest companies (by annual revenue) which included all forty-four (44) JSE 
listed companies.  
With this first constraint, the selection of respondents was further restricted to 
Chairmen, CEOs and Company Secretaries.  The reason for this is simply, Chairmen, CEOs 
and Company Secretaries represent the ultimate or highest power centre in each organisation.  
The Chairman heads the Board of Directors who monitors the CEO and signs off on strategic 
decisions.  The CEO runs the day-to-day operations of each entity and therefore has intimate 
and first-hand knowledge of the company’s present and future strategies.  The population 
included Chairmen (8), CEOs (20) and Company Secretaries (22).  Company Secretaries 
completed a majority (44 per cent or 22/50) of the interviews (Table 4.1).  
Table 4:1 Categorization of Respondents of Administered Survey   
Respondents Group No. Percentage (%) 
Chairmen 8 16 
CEOs 20 40 
Company Secretaries 22 44 
Total  50 100 
 
The Company Secretary is the chief custodian of detailed minutes, confidential and 
private information on individual Directors and most importantly, records of minutes of board 
meetings and distribution and filing of these minutes.  Furthermore, the position of Company 
Secretary is provided for under the revised Companies Act of Jamaica, 2004 which prescribes 
that all companies must name and register a Company Secretary.  Finally, the Company 
Secretary plays a critical role in filing statutory returns and by virtue of not being a Director, is 
less prone to self-serving.  Therefore, responses from Company Secretaries can be more 
objective than those from Directors in questionnaires (Stiles, 2001:633).   It was not surprising 
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that on many occasions, sections of the questionnaire when completed by Chairman or a CEO 
had to be sent to the Company Secretary for final completion or vetting.  
Obtaining critical information on Directors’ roles, attitudes, board characteristics and 
functions can be best done by studying Directors and/or executives who have in some sense, 
real power within the companies (Stiles, 2001 citing Fidler, 1981).  Furthermore, the issue of 
ownership and control which forms a central plank of the CG debate was bound to be reflected 
in the make-up of the board.  It was felt that studying publicly-listed companies would 
advance the debate on the role of NEDs.  This has to be reinforced as a key focus in both 
academic and policy driven research in CG. 
 
4.4.1.3 Industry/Sectoral Distribution of Research Population  
 There was a deliberate effort to include a wide cross section of Jamaican companies.  
Also, given the significant interest being given to CG relating to stock market-listed 
companies worldwide, there was the need to include as many Jamaican listed companies as 
possible. Of the fifty (50) companies which participated, twenty-seven (or 54%) were members 
of the JSE. The research population of this aspect of the study was further divided according to 
industry sector representation.  See Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2: Research Population: Interviewer’s Administered Survey 
Industry Frequency 
Percentage 
(%) 
Non-Banking Finance 
Banking 
Generic Services* 
Agriculture 
Media 
Hospitality  
Retail 
Manufacturing 
Insurance 
Distribution 
Others 
12 
8 
5 
5 
5 
4 
4 
3 
2 
1 
1 
24 
16 
10 
10 
10 
8 
8 
6 
4 
2 
2 
 50 100 
                                                          *Conglomerate or multi-domestic 
Table 4.2 also reflects a representativeness of the targeted sample of the 100 largest 
Jamaica firms by annual revenues.  It is merely coincidental that 27 firms or 54% of the actual 
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informant companies are stock market listed companies.  Within this group, there is also a 
diversity of industry sectors (manufacturing, conglomerate, media, retail, agriculture) and a 
dominance of financial firms, which are usually the largest and most highly profiled. The 
financial sector which comprises commercial, merchant, and investment banks, mutual 
societies, thrifts or credit unions, and insurance (life, health, property and general) forms the 
bedrock of the Jamaican business sector and plays a critical role in driving the rest of the 
economy. Therefore, with 44% representation (Table 4.2 above: non-banking finance, banking 
and insurance, in addition to financial firms under Generic Services and agricultural finance), 
the informant companies have been heavily weighted towards the financial sector. From the 
ten (10) identifiable categories above, it can be concluded that all leading sectors and 
subsectors of the 100 targeted sample, have been adequately represented in the fifty (50) actual 
interview surveys conducted, and thus reflects a true representation of the largest of Jamaican 
firms.  See Section 4.5.2 for Data Analysis and Coding.    
4.4.2  Case Studies 
4.4.2.1 Approach and Methodological Issues   
An idiographic approach utilising the case study method, and particularly the 
qualitative technique of analysis was chosen as one of the most appropriate strategies because 
it satisfies the need for exploration, obtains explanation and provides description of complex 
and dynamic interactions among organisational actors, functions and processes. Case study 
requires the researcher to make an effort to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of 
real-life events within the cases and to acquire a greater understanding of the contemporary 
historical context in which the firm functions (Yin, 1984). On the other hand, these 
interactions would be too complex to be captured by applying purely a quantitative 
methodology. Supporting the theoretical arguments of the preceding, are many other reasons 
why utilising case studies is beneficial. In the next section, some of these arguments are 
examined.  
 
4.4.2.2 Arguments against Case Study Research   
Case study, notwithstanding its many benefits may pose some challenges.  Critics feel 
case study is too specific and unique, is prone to researcher bias (in data selection, collection, 
and interpretation), cannot test hypotheses well, and cannot be replicated, compared or 
generalised (Panton, 2000).  In response, Lincoln and Guba (1985) posit four streams of 
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qualitative research constructs similar to those for the positivist research that are designed to 
establish the “true value” of the study, as well as its applicability, consistency, and neutrality.   
While the case study method is not the sole research technique in this study, an attempt 
was made to review at least four critical constructs.  First, credibility (internal validity) 
questions whether the subject was accurately identified and described. Second, transferability 
(external validity) assesses the applicability of the study’s findings to other similar contexts. 
Third, dependability (reliability) seeks to account for changing conditions in the phenomenon 
being studied. Fourth and finally, confirmability (objectivity) determines if other researchers 
can confirm the study’s methodology and findings.  
 The issue of credibility was addressed by attempting to obtain an intimate knowledge 
of the case study organisations. Using a combination of techniques, standard criteria across 
cases and different organisational actors within each Company is the best method to 
accomplish this goal. As indicated earlier, the multi-technique ensures that the limitations of a 
given technique are compensated for by the counterbalancing strengths of other techniques 
(Snow and Thomas, 1994). Not surprisingly, at least one researcher has posited that the unique 
strength of the case study method is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence from 
different sources (Yin, 1984). As such, various research techniques were utilized to obtain 
responses from participants.  These included a semi-structured interviewer’s administered 
questionnaire and several informal meetings and one-to-one telephone conversations. In 
addition, several company documents (published and unpublished) such as formal archival 
records, annual reports, brochures, a book published about the conglomerate case company, 
board minutes and internal memoranda were used.   
 In addressing transferability, an attempt was made to develop in-depth studies that 
provide rich descriptions and contextualization that allow practitioners to assess the 
applicability of the findings to their own particular circumstances.  This required the 
establishment of a sufficiently adequate database that involves interviews with several 
members of each case company, and external stakeholders.   To address confirmability, an 
audit trail was established which included a delineated record of the research material 
collected and analysed in this study. As such, the different categories of research materials, 
namely: 1.) interview questions; 2.) raw data (interview transcripts, field notes, all company 
documentation, 3.) summaries of notes, changes to research questions/working hypotheses, 4.) 
notes on research procedures, strategies and rationale, 5.) disposition materials (inquiry letters 
and notes, appointment dates, and 6.) findings and conclusions and final report have been kept. 
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In anticipating the need to address dependability, an effective record keeping system 
was maintained to ensure that the methodological approach remained transparent.  In addition, 
field notes, transcripts, and research design strategies were kept, as well as rationale and 
justifications for decisions and changes provided.  Keeping data on decision-making in an 
organised and retrievable form ensured easy access for interested researchers (Panton, 2000). 
In addition to the above multi-approach applied to data collection, three sources of 
research triangulation were applied in this study: data, source, and technique triangulation 
(Bennett, 1983; Sieber, 1982). The data collected included factual information on the structure, 
composition, characteristics of the Board of Directors, role of each interviewee in the case 
company, company performance, history and leadership continuum, as well as subjective 
information (e.g., attitudes and behavior) from various parties, both internal and external to the 
case companies. Source triangulation was to ensure that the information came from a wide 
variety of sources.  
 
4.4.2.3 Arguments in Support of Case Study Research  
Notwithstanding the foregoing criticisms and methodological solutions based on Snow 
and Thomas et al (1994), there is still further support for the use of the Case Studies as one of 
the most appropriate approaches to this study. Maassen (2000) indicates a number of 
characteristics of case studies that make the use of this research design particularly useful in 
my study.  These are as follows:  the phenomena are examined in a natural setting; data are 
collected by multiple means; one of few entities (person, group, organisation or country) are 
examined; changes in site selection and data collection methods can take place as the 
investigator develops new hypothesis or research questions; the complexity of the unit is 
studied intensively; case studies are more suitable for the exploration, classification, and 
hypothesis development stages of the knowledge building process; the investigator should 
have a receptive attitude toward exploration; where no experimental control and manipulation 
are involved, the investigator may not specify the set of independent or dependent variables; 
and case study research is useful in the study of the “why” and “how” questions because these 
deal with operational links to be traced over time rather than with frequency or incidence.  
Also, according to Panton (2000), a focus of case studies is on theory-testing and 
theory development. In this study, the emphasis is on theory-testing and enhancement through 
analysis of primary and secondary data and information. As such, less emphasis was placed on 
statistical generalisation and more on evaluating the different CG practices and structures 
against what existed elsewhere in an effort to identify patterns and to illuminate interesting 
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dimensions, and to allow greater understanding of the role of the different “actors” in 
influencing CG practices and structures. In spite of these arguments for case studies, there are 
opponents who believe this research approach is beset by many challenges, as discussed 
earlier.  
 
4.4.2.4 Process of Soliciting Responses   
It was very important to solicit information based on the objectives of my research and 
in so doing, to satisfy the beneficial aims of this study. As such, a very careful approach was 
employed in soliciting responses to fulfill the aforementioned criteria. The first was to build a 
coherent, logical, factual and sound basis to achieve replication logic, like an experiment – and 
validate reliability. Second, the researcher wanted answers to the “what”, “how” and “why” 
questions—a basis to cross-check and confirm statements. This was more than just doing 
detective work; it was a matter of strengthening validity. Third, there was the need to gain 
historical perspective, current views and a prognosis for the future from those currently 
employed. These were particularly important for this research.  
Fourth, is to establish the basis for views on different areas and gain insight on similar 
company issues from these persons with a likelihood of differing perspectives. Fifth, but by no 
means exhaustive, was to track operational links over time in conjunction with frequency of 
incidence (Maassen).  
Several factors directly and indirectly influenced the selection of each case. First, it 
was based on published information in the printed press of Jamaica. Second, is the popularity 
of each case company in their respective business segment or (industry sector) as a ‘model’ 
company. Third, was a perusal of several other company websites, my personal knowledge of 
the CG landscape, and preliminary informal interviews with senior officials who were 
responsible for major CG initiatives in the three cases selected (conglomerate, merchant bank 
and mutual companies).  These cases were chosen for their varied activities in CG and social 
responsibility in the local environment.  The standard menu of themes across cases was 
directly linked to the research objectives and outlined in this Chapter.  
  Although statistical generalisation was not a primary goal in selecting these case 
companies, the three companies (two shareholding and a mutual society) came from various 
industries, had different sizes and backgrounds, with Headquarters in the capital city of 
Kingston, Jamaica, and had extensive networks of agencies island-wide. These companies 
provide a depth of diversity, demonstrated capacity to rise above challenges, economic and 
other contextual realities other than being known for their CG activities. Although the 
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companies agreed to have their names used in this study, industry-based pseudonyms are used 
for simplicity and ease of reference for the convenience of the researcher.   
Three (3) main research techniques were used in this segment. First, was semi-
structured interviews (all open-ended questions) administered on a one-to-one basis with 
respondents of all three case companies.  Second, was a detailed analysis of a wide range of 
written published and unpublished company documentation. Third, was participant 
observation in the case study companies. This strand of fieldwork was conducted over a six 
year period (2003-2008) formally and informally—as board invitee, attending AGMs and 
investor briefing meetings, as well as interviewing company executives and Directors, and 
accumulating press releases and financial analyst reports and Annual Reports. Questions posed 
to external respondents were framed differently and had differing objectives from those fielded 
at the internal respondents (Company Directors, executives and other members of staff). See 
Appendix 15.  
Against the preceding contextual realities, this researcher had to make repeated 
appointments for face-to-face meetings and telephone calls to update data and information, and 
kept abreast with developments, both within the case companies and those associated with the 
regulators, and attended AGMs, investor briefings, collected newspaper clippings on the 
review cases and analyst reports, all in an effort to stay abreast with developments in these 
companies.  
 
4.4.2.5  Selecting Case Companies and Respondents 
As intimated earlier, predetermined and standard frameworks were devised for 
consistency in analysis. The in-depth study into the cases served to reflect the complexity of 
the issues that take place in these organisations. First, the conglomerate was chosen on both 
practical and theoretical grounds. While there is a dearth of empirical information on CG in 
Jamaica, a book published by the late, distinguished Professor Douglas Hall about the 
conglomerate has helped to fill critical information gaps in my study pertaining to this specific 
case company. Professor Hall employed interviews, archival data analysis, observations and 
case study approaches and provided insightful and in-depth theoretical knowledge on the 
development, history and performance of one of the most recognised and resilient Jamaican 
brand names. In addition, the following factors justified the importance of the conglomerate’s 
existence among the cases studied. Second, it is multi-domestic (as well as multi-
jurisdictional) and is influenced in one or more ways by regulatory institutions, watchdog 
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groups, institutional investors—thus impacted by almost, if not all, relevant stakeholders. 
Therefore, these features provided much scope for and an in-depth analysis of both theory-
testing and theory development. Second, the conglomerate has a strong and positive corporate 
reputation for quality products, profitability, integrity and corporate social responsibility. 
Third, it is the first Jamaican firm to have made public its adoption and implementation of 
principles associated with good CG, this was about January 2000.  
Unlike the conglomerate, the merchant bank is exclusively in the financial services 
business, ranging from money market-type instruments to the trading of foreign exchange, 
investment banking, corporate finance activities, and the issuing of loans and internal money 
transfers. At 15 years old (January 2009), it has become Jamaica’s largest and most profitable 
merchant bank with assets under management of more than US$606 million (as at Dec. 31, 
2007) and shareholders’ equity of approximately US$65 million (as at Dec. 31, 2007).  The 
merchant bank operates businesses primarily in Jamaica with a recently established subsidiary 
in Florida, USA. Bank of Jamaica regulations prevent financial institutions directly under their 
supervision from having the position of Chairman and CEO being held by the same person. To 
this end, there is a separate Chairman from the CEO of the merchant bank. The holding 
company, of which the merchant bank is its flagship business, has the duality of positions 
being held by the same person. The duality of positions remains a topical issue in the global 
CG debate as a key area of focus and also in this study.   
 The third case, a mutual society which was established in 1874, stood the test of time 
and has become Jamaica’s largest specialised home mortgage provider and most capitalised 
financial institution with approximately US$750 million of assets held (as at March 31, 2008). 
A mutual society is an organisation which is often, but not always, a company or business 
based on the principle of mutuality. Unlike a true cooperative, members usually do not 
contribute to the capital of the company by direct investment, but derive their right to profits 
and votes through their customer relationship. Research into the CG practices of mutual 
societies is at best scanty globally and non-existent within the Caribbean. Therefore, choosing 
a mutual society as one of the subjects for theoretical examination, albeit exploratory, is meant 
to unearth new understanding of the CG realities in one of the largest and oldest of all 
Jamaican organisations.   
[139] 
 
 All three cases present many opportunities for analysis given their differences and 
similarities. When blended and analysed, it is hoped that the process will yield theoretical 
variety and understanding into CG realities of these Jamaican companies.   
Both the conglomerate and mutual company have significant international presence 
spanning the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, and the Caribbean, particularly 
concentrating businesses in the Jamaica Diaspora of these major markets.  The mutual 
company is a leader among the few mutual societies to be found in Jamaica. 
 
4.4.2.6 The Case Study Respondent Populations 
See Table 4.3 below for Case Study respondent populations.  The respondents of the 
cases studied have been categorised into two groups: 1.) Internal respondents and 2.) External 
respondents.  In terms of internal respondents, the primary subjects were drawn from amongst 
the Board of Directors, former Directors, senior executives, middle managers and entry level 
employees. They were interviewed with the aim of discovering important facts and acquiring 
explanations.   
In the case of the conglomerate, the internal respondents include the following current 
and former Directors: 1.) a retired Chairman & CEO—who is still a director, 2.) the Chairman 
& CEO, 3.) the appointed lead Director who had served for thirty unbroken years, 4.) the NED 
who is Chairman of the compensation committee and is also Chairman of the National 
Investment Fund (at the time of interview); 5.) a former director (casualty of board size 
reduction) who is Chief Operating Officer (COO) of the conglomerate’s Information 
Technology Division; and 6.) a former Director who was Chief Risk Officer and Secretary of 
the CG Committee and Trustee of the conglomerate pension fund (now retired from active 
service). 
In the case of the merchant bank, the internal respondents were the Group President 
and CEO, the President of the merchant bank, who is also a Director, a senior vice president of 
risk management, its Company Secretary, and three members of staff at entry and supervisory 
levels. For the mutual society, the internal respondents were the CEO/General Manager, a 
Director, the Company Secretary, a marketing executive, an accountant and two entry level 
staff members. The external respondents have been discussed as a group given the importance 
of stakeholder representation to the general analysis of this chapter and the thesis by extension.  
Additionally, several respondents from outside the case companies were interviewed formally 
and informally to solicit information. By way of the organisations represented, they included 
the Companies Office of Jamaica (COJ), BOJ, PSOJ, FSC, JSE, Institute of Chartered 
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Accountants of Jamaica (ICAJ), Jamaica Chamber of Commerce (JCC) and at least one radical 
independent shareholder. Also, see Appendix 13.  
Table 4.3: Case Study Respondent Populations 
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Conglomerate 17 2 3 0 1 - 11 
Merchant Co. 17 1 1 1 1 2 11 
Mutual  17 1 1 1 1 2 11 
 51 4 5 2 3 4 33 
 There were good reasons why these stakeholder groups, as well as the respective 
respondents were chosen. First, they cover the gamut of the primary CG influencers—those 
whom regulate, those whom lobbied government, and those whom dominated the investment 
landscape—and the institutional investors (pension funds). Second, the respondents were 
either proactive or being perceived as influencers of public policy initiatives on CG. Third, the 
Companies Act of Jamaica 2004, administered by the Companies Office of Jamaica, aims to 
regulate all Companies in Jamaica, including activities such as registration and de-registration, 
filing of annual returns, changes in shareholdings and Directors, and many other transactions 
which need to be reported.  Fourth, the BOJ regulates all deposit-taking institutions, building 
societies, and credit unions. Fifth, the PSOJ has a membership of about three hundred, 
including all stock market-listed companies. Sixth, the FSC regulates all non-deposit-taking 
financial institutions—pension funds, insurance and securities dealers, while the ICAJ 
monitors and registers all members of the chartered accounting profession.  
In addition to the above, non-case study respondents were chosen based on their ability 
to identify with and respond to in-depth and probing questions which at times, though not 
personal, could be construed as intimidating.  
Preliminary scouting was necessary among the major external respondent organizations 
to make certain that potential interviewees were well-informed and able to effectively 
articulate, in great detail, the issues of interest. It was also important to ensure that targeted 
subjects were thoroughly informed about many aspects of the companies and were key players 
in the decision-making processes. As such, senior Directors and executives were targeted and 
while years of service was not a requirement, careful attention was paid to securing 
                                               
32
 External respondents were interviewed about all three case companies.  
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interviewees who would have gained long tenure with that organisation, or alternatively, a 
longstanding relationship with the firm. See Section 4.5 for more detail.   
 
4.4.3. The Focus Groups 
 4.4.3.1 Introduction   
  Human-to-human interaction revolves around group discussions in families, 
workplaces, peer groups and communities, but not all of these discussions are usually 
structured.  However, focus groups are structured, guided discussions that have their sole 
purpose as the gathering of data and information for scientific purposes (Mirton, et al, 1956; 
Billson, J. 2006).  As a type of in-depth interviewing, focus groups are used to provide 
invaluable insights into complexities of different fields of study and professional practices. 
They harness the collective views and understanding of complex human interaction and seek 
to uncover information that are not easily obtainable or accessed through other scientific 
methods such as structured questionnaire survey designs that require quantitative analysis. 
Focus groups are forms of group interviews that capitalise on communication between 
research participants in order to generate data.  Generally, group interviews are often used to 
collect data in a simple and quick way from several persons simultaneously.  Although focus 
groups are explicitly used to respond to a question in turn, people are encouraged to talk to one 
another--asking questions, exchanging anecdotes and commenting on each other’s experiences 
and view points (Kitzinger, J., 1994:16).   
 
The review of literature conducted for this study has identified several critical factors 
appropriate for explanatory and, in some cases, in-depth study on the existence, use, and 
impact of CG structures and practices in Jamaica, how these (structures and practices) impact 
the system of governance, and their potential for policy reform. 
Given the dynamic nature of human behaviour and the unpredictability of one’s 
motivations and emotions during complex and sometimes little understood phenomena, 
quantitative design with measurability which provide multiple answers from which 
respondents are asked to “select one of the following” or “the one most closely related to your 
situation,” is not accurate enough to provide or reflect the exact realities of what happens in 
the boardroom, how Directors behave or the pros and cons of having a chairman also serving 
as the CEO versus the separation of these two roles. 
 
4.4.3.2 Arguments against Focus Group Research   
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Like many other research techniques used to collect and analyse data, focus group 
study has often come into question for various reasons.  First, for its accuracy and legitimacy 
(or inaccuracy and illegitimacy) being a part of qualitative research in general (Luntz, F. 
(1994). Second, the problem might be associated with the end users of the results themselves. 
Many persons do not understand enough about focus group research, especially because it 
does not appear with the numbers and hard numerical data like other techniques (surveys and 
more controlled laboratory experiments). However, absence of “hard numbers” and a formal 
structure does not make qualitative research unscientific, but often times too few users are 
academically trained behavioural scientists, and they are intimidated by what they do not 
understand.  Third, group data are neither more nor less authentic than data collected by other 
methods, but focus groups can be the most appropriate method for researching particular types 
of questions.  Fourth, the participants are usually chosen scientifically, but, as a group of 10-12 
people, these findings cannot be projected onto the entire population. The results are 
dependent upon the interaction between the respondents and moderator, and unprofessional 
moderating can lead to inaccurate conclusions (Luntz, F., 1994).  
 
4.4.3.3  Arguments in Support of Focus Group Research  
Although there are several justifiable criticisms levied against focus group research, 
when properly applied, this highly used social science technique can produce reliable, hard 
data.  A key element to its application is that it is a versatile and flexible technique which has 
been successfully applied in very different settings and to varied questions.  It affords depth 
and insight into the research questions and helps contextualise quantitative data (Krueger and 
Casey, 2000; Billson, 2006; Puchta and Potter, 2004). Focus groups were one of several 
methods employed by Sir Adrian Cadbury and his team  who gave life to the highly published 
Cadbury Report (1992), now known as the Combined Code (2003) and the most recently 
revised version, Combined Code 2006.   
In spite of the shortcomings of focus groups, as identified in the previous section by 
authors such as Luntz, this unique interaction between participants can be used to achieve at 
least seven main aims according to Kitzinger (1994:16, 103-21).  First, is to highlight 
respondents’ attitudes, priorities, language, and framework of understanding.  Second, is to 
encourage research participants to generate and explore their own questions and develop their 
own analysis of common experiences.  Third, is to encourage a variety of communication from 
participants tapping into a wide range and form of understanding.  Fourth, is to help identify 
group norms and cultural values. Fifth, is to provide insight into the operation of group social 
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processes in the articulation of knowledge. An example is through the examination of what 
information is censured or muted within the group. Six, is to encourage open conversation 
about embarrassing subjects and permit the expression of criticisms. Finally, to facilitate the 
expression of ideas and experiences that might be left underdeveloped in an interview and to 
illuminate the research participants’ perspectives through the debate within the group. 
In the final analysis, the most effective uses of focus groups, depends on the objectives 
and purpose of the qualitative stream of data required.  It is definitely a more effective 
technique than quantitative measures when the interviewer has a series of open-ended 
questions and wishes to encourage research participants to explore the ideas of importance to 
them, in their own vocabulary, generating their own questions and pursuing their own 
priorities. 
 
4.4.3.4 Aims, Objectives and Research Questions    
The general aim of the focus group section of this study was to provide a discussion on 
critical themes with a view of obtaining deeper and richer insight into how practitioners and 
policymakers feel about critical and emerging CG issues in Jamaica. 
 In summary, the focus group strand of this study was designed to achieve five aims 
outlined below.  First, was to determine and develop an in-depth understanding of the 
adequacy of CG structures and practices identified and how these structures and practices 
impact the adaptation level of CG Best Practices in Jamaica. Second, was to obtain from 
respondents their views on gaps which might exist among the practices and structures and the 
implications for specific areas of public policy.  Third, was to generate practical insights about 
pressures for and against CG reforms. Fourth, was to determine the players’ exerting these 
pressures as identified in the preceding, and what are the suggestions for improving CG in 
Jamaica.  Fifth, was to provide opportunities to respondents to identify other relevant themes 
which could impact the overall outcome of this study from theoretical, practical, and public 
policy perspectives. See Appendix 5.   
 
4.4.3.5 Focus Group Participants and Methodological Issues   
Two half-day focus group sessions (one session for each of two Focus Groups) were 
conducted to discuss the issues under review, as well as identify gaps in public policy as they 
present potential impacts on key CG development in Jamaica. The utilisation of the Focus 
Groups allowed for and enabled various governance-related aspects to be discussed in a more 
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unstructured way and then further incorporated within the overall view of CG, and in 
identifying gaps as presented in chapter 8.  
This study benefitted from a third Focus Group which draws on the views of one 
hundred and twenty (120) participants from sixteen (16) countries who attended a two-
day Corporate Governance Forum which focused on current, emerging and future issues 
affecting Caribbean CG.  The Forum was held at the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank 
Headquarters in St. Kitts from September 3–5, 2003. Sponsoring organisations included 
Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), Commonwealth Secretariat (COMSEC), Eastern 
Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB), Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange (ECSE), Global 
Corporate Governance Forum (GCGF), and various Associate Partners.  Countries 
represented were: Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Maarten, St. Lucia, 
St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.  The respondents were 
regional and international academic experts and policymakers who participated in 
specialist subject matter sessions (groups) of between 10 to 25 persons. The focus was 
on theory-based deliberations, interactive sessions through the use of short 
presentations, and panel and group discussions. Finally, a set of recommendations for 
enhancing CG practices for the Caribbean was weaved from the discussions.    
4.4.3.6  Selecting Participants and Sample Frame Issues  
The participants in Focus Groups 1 and 2 were chosen for various reasons.  First, the 
researcher had prior knowledge of the expertise and CG mindset of most, if not all, the 
respondents. Second, the respondents having drawn from a depth of experience and 
knowledgeable persons provided concurring and opposing views from their respective 
organisational context and individualistic positions as well as the broader national 
perspectives.  Third and final, the respondents have collectively in one or more ways been 
involved in some form of CG issues either at the organisational (public and private sector), 
national and/or international level.  Given the level of complexity and depth of the issues 
explored in this research, it was felt that an expert panel of at least six (6) was needed to 
provide the impetus and direction for the way forward for CG development in Jamaica.  
Focus Group 1 consisted of all senior and retired (or soon to be retired) professionals. 
There were 5 males and 2 females all representing 7 different organisations with one being an 
independent consultant.  They were homogeneous from the perspectives of their involvement 
in the local CG debates as practitioners representing their respective organisations and 
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professions. Additionally, these respondents collectively had significant experience and 
academic accomplishments in various disciplines related to CG.  Their focus was on sharing 
views about pressures for and against CG reform in Jamaica. 
Focus Group 2 included 7 participants (6 males and a sole female) with average age of 
approximately 50 years, an exceptional track record in their respective fields, and high 
visibility in the Jamaican corporate landscape. They were also chosen for their knowledge on 
the local issues affecting CG and their perceived ability to understand and inform the study. 
Also, group 2 experts were drawn from the finance industry, academia, public policy, the 
central bank, public sector, politics, and the legal profession. The wide spectrum of individual 
attributes was chosen to reflect the variety of issues that were under discussion.  This group 
explored the following themes: 
• Board Composition and Director Selection 
• Chairman/CEO Duality or Separation 
• Separation of Ownership and Control 
• Director Age, Gender and Years of Service 
• Training and Evaluation of the Board 
• Corporate Disclosure 
• The Role and Perception of Institutional Investors in Corporate CG Development 
• The Role of the Board in Strategic Decision Making 
 
Finally, the presence of several participants, seven (7) in Focus Group 1 and seven (7) 
in Focus Group 2, was necessary in order to provide adequate diversity in terms of the 
stakeholder interest, which spans many sectors and enterprises.   
In line with research protocol and grounded theory in conducting focus group research, 
some of which would have already been established in this chapter, all participants were sent 
an introductory note prior to each session and this was further reinforced by an introductory 
briefing on the given day. Team members were subsequently encouraged and allowed to be 
facilitators and managers of the discussions in order to encourage involvement by all members 
of the group and to maintain its intended focus.  Participants also were informed at the time of 
invitation that their participation in the debate about the various issues was needed for 
academic purposes but more importantly, to be informative and practical enough in 
contributing to the future of public policy concerning CG in Jamaica.    
 
4.4.4 Assessing the Perception and Role of Institutional Investors (IIs) 
 Given the limited number of IIs in Jamaica, a deliberate effort was made to carefully 
select the largest and most established entities to serve as respondents to this study.  At the end 
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of the attempts to solicit the participation of the identified IIs, the eight largest companies were 
interviewed. These represent US$2.73 billion of Jamaican institutional investment funds, of 
which the total remains unknown. An open-ended semi-structured interviewer administered 
survey instrument was employed. See Appendix 3.  After having asked wide-ranging 
questions, selected aspects of the responses were chosen to narrow the focus of discussion for 
this purpose.  
 The key areas covered included total asset under management by the informant 
companies, key elements of their portfolios, and the respondent companies’ investment 
criteria, if any, on which they rely as pre-conditions before funds are placed with investee 
companies.  The other key criteria were CG guidelines used by informant companies to 
determine potential companies in which to invest.  
 
 
4.5  DATA ANALYSIS AND CODING 
4.5.1 Introduction 
 
The data were analysed using a mix of approaches given their nature of being 
quantitative and qualitative approaches. The survey information was analysed using the 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), focusing on key descriptive variables 
collected by the questionnaire, as well as exploring possible significant co-relational 
associations between variables.  Given the small number of questionnaires (respondent 
companies), analysis was limited to a few highly aggregated levels in keeping with the 
indicative nature of the study. Analysis at the level of economic sector and industry sectors 
(public versus private, retail, manufacturing, banking, agriculture, etc.) was not possible due to 
the very small sample size.  
The case study interviews and focus group discussions were examined for main themes 
and key issues, with the analysis closely linked to primary data form and to the secondary data.  
In the next sections, more detailed discussion is ensued under each broad methodological 
approach about the analysis and coding of the data in this study.  
 
4.5.2 Interviewer’s Administered Questionnaire Survey   
 
Using a data set representing data collected on ninety-seven variables from fifty (50) Jamaican 
firms, the following statistical tests were completed: 
1. Percentage  
2. Means  
3. Median Values 
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4. Cross tabulations (Chi Square χ²) 
 
The nature of the variables (ordinal) did not facilitate accurate calculations of averages. 
This was especially true in the instance where scales, which have no exact mathematical value, 
were used. Means were, however, performed using the sum of all the available values divided 
by the number of values.  The mean or the arithmetic mean is the sum of all the values and 
dividing by the number of values. Equal to the sum of n divided by the number of n. This is a 
method of measuring the average of a distribution. Given the preceding, median values (the 
mid-point in a distribution of values) were used in strengthening the validity and presentation 
of data.  In many of the variables analysed, percentage calculations were used as the most 
appropriate means for presenting the descriptive data.  
 
Cross tabulations were used in addition to median values for a selected number of 
variables. While these values derived are indicative of association, they do not explain causal 
relationships.  Additionally, for ease of analysis, two variables were ‘recoded’, this action was 
taken to create new variables that would be useful for more defined analysis, the data 
transformation (recode) was also done to ensure the reliability of data being analysed. 
 
1. The variable ‘owner’, which refers to the dominant ownership structure of a firm, was 
recoded to a dichotomous variable ‘Rowner’, which indicated listed and unlisted firms. 
This transformation of the variable allowed for easier and more accurate analysis and 
for trends between listed and unlisted companies to be identified. 
2. Further data transformation was done to create a variable ‘NRowner’, which indicated 
the kind of ownership structure of a firm, whether dispersed or closely held firm, 
among the listed firms. 
 
Ordinal Variable: categories associated can be ranked from highest to lowest based on 
specific criteria. A set of data is said to be ordinal if the values/observations belonging to it can 
be ranked (put in order) or have a rating scale attached. You can count and order, but not 
measure, ordinal data. The categories for an ordinal set of data have a natural order. 
 
Chi Square Coefficient (χ²): used for measuring relationship between variables. This 
nonparametric test was applied to determine whether there is a significant association between 
two variables.  
 
Formulae:  
 
A 
number of cross tabulations were performed between dominant-owned dispersed and closely-
held listed firms which have been disaggregated from the findings based on different 
categories and groups.  Against the forgoing groups/categories, several variables were then 
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tested. These variables are board size, Executive Directors, Independent Non-Executive 
Directors, female Directors and Executive Chairmen.  Similar cross tabulations were done 
using the said variables but looking for relationships between listed versus unlisted listed 
companies as two broader categories.  
This method is not without limitations.  In the interpretation of the results, it is 
important to note that due to the size of the sample (50 cases), while the data may be indicative 
of trends within the Jamaican business sector with regards to practices of corporate 
governance, the data will not hold up to robust statistical data analysis, which would require a 
far more comprehensive data set, nor can it be totally applicable to the broad context of 
Jamaican corporate structures.  
Furthermore, there are only 27 listed companies under the dominant owned dispersed 
and closely-held firms.  This therefore limits the effectiveness of applying statistical analysis 
to these data.  
 
4.5.3 Focus Group and Case Studies Data 
Pre-Analysis Considerations: Analysing focus groups is no different from analyzing 
any other qualitative self report data (Blitten, N., 1995).  However, for optimum and 
meaningful results to be obtained and subsequently reported on, even the pre-analysis 
arrangements are necessary. Adequate arrangements were put in place (including both tape 
recording of the discussion and note taking) to captured all the discussions.  Although it was 
sometimes difficult to cope with the range of behaviours taking place at once, and while the 
facilitation was taking place, probes and follow-ups were carefully conducted to ensure that all 
participants were given the opportunity to voice their comments. Another consideration 
addressed was that enough time was given to members before the closing and dismissal of the 
focus group to clarify specific questions. This was important to verify accuracy of recording of 
information brought forward in the previous two hours (during each focus group).   
Data Analysis: To utilise information obtained from focus groups, researchers must 
engage in the process of analysing data. Analysing qualitative data involves development and 
assignment of themes and categories and looking for patterns and contrasts. The process 
includes data reduction and interpretation of meaning.  
In analysing the data of the focus groups in this study, discussions, and data of 
common themes were drawn together and examined in accordance with the questions posed.   
While it is not always appropriate to give percentages in reports of Focus Group data, it was 
important to try to distinguish between individual opinions expressed versus the actual group 
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consensus (Kitzinger, 1995).  Like all qualitative analysis, deviant case analysis can add a rich 
dimension to the essence of discussions and as accommodating a minority of opinions and 
examples that do not necessarily fit with the researcher’s overall position.  For this reason, the 
researcher and even more so if he/she is the moderator, must remain neutral throughout the 
process of the discussions during the group studies. 
In this research, keen attention was given to both collective as well as minority 
opinions and examples that did not fit the overall theory or expectations.  These anomalies in 
the line of discussions were often captured and documented uniquely. Where there was no 
supporting consensus on the opinions, they were ‘thrown out’ from the accepted responses in 
the final analysis. 
In analysing the data from the Focus Group, an attempt was also made to extract the 
impact of group dynamics and analyse the sections in ways that full advantage was taken of 
the interaction between participants. Consistent with Kitzinger (1995), a focus group that is 
true to its data should also usually include at least some illustrations of the talk between 
participants, rather than simply presenting isolated quotations taken out of context.  In this 
regard, real anecdotes of some of the discussions held between participants were presented in 
my analysis of the findings of the focus group. 
Method of Coding:  While there were two approaches available (or appropriate for this 
study) to code the focus groups data, namely, open coding, in which the researcher remains as 
open as possible in his attempt to “uncover” what is the data, and focused coding, in which the 
researcher identifies themes and looks for associated data fitting under categories of interest. 
In coding the focus group data in this study, the latter was opted for (focused coding) as the 
most convenient method. Here, the approach was taken first by following the typed transcripts 
under each research question as guides, and highlighters used (different colours to denote 
different meanings or responses), paragraph by paragraph, to identity relevant and similar 
themes. As themes were developed, a working definition was assigned to each code. In this 
way, in going through the transcripts, the definition was continually being challenged, and 
sometimes new codes were developed where the properties did not fit the text. Also, codes that 
were rarely used were dismissed and some categories were broadened to accommodate the lost 
code.  It is important to note that this type of analysis is not linear, but circular. Constant 
comparison (See Glaser and Strauss, 1967) means that the researcher must continually 
compare the categories and codes of new transcripts with existing categories and codes in 
order to more fully develop the properties of the overarching categories for individual codes.  
This process is on-going until saturation is reached. Simply put, saturation is the idea that no 
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new codes or categories emerge and that coding more transcripts would only produce 
repetition of themes.  See Appendix 5.  
Case Studies:  Like the focus group approach, the case study method was used to 
support the findings of the Interviewer’s Administered Questionnaire Survey (IAQS).  This 
study, accordingly, chose to concentrate on qualitative research as the primary means of 
collecting data.  The interview schedule was semi-structured and intended to allow Directors 
to reveal their perceptions concerning a range of board activities. The schedule was drawn 
from an analysis of existing literature.  Like the larger study (IAQS), the interview schedule 
was piloted by a few Directors and following revisions of some questions on the basis of 
ambiguity or framing, an initial schedule of sixty-six (66) questions was settled on and then 
extended to ninety-nine (99) for final statistical analysis.   
The process of analysing the interview and coding data followed that of the initial 
round of interviews.  Patterns were matched to the model, with checks made for new 
information of potentially new categories. This buttressing of the original findings through 
testing in three different research sites (cases), affords a further element of triangulation into 
the study, with the new data from the cases testing the validity and generality of the initial 
findings.  This corroborative work is advanced by Yin (1984) and Eisenhardt (1989b) as an 
important source of validity and reliability.  A further source of confidence in the findings 
rests on the fact that a draft of the findings was sent to the case companies who were invited to 
give any comments. These comments were incorporated into the final draft and served as a 
valuable reliability check to the interpretations of the researcher.  
 
4.5.4  Secondary Data Analysis 
Sections of this study were made possible through access to and reliance on a number 
of secondary sources of information. These sources were particularly reliable as most 
companies were either publicly listed and/or operated within the financial sector.  Stock 
market listing requires stringent compliance with onerous Stock Market Listing Rules—
to be found in the Rule Book of the JSE. Additionally, credible and factual information was 
obtained through access to the following documents: a book written by the late, 
distinguished historian, Professor Douglas Hall about the Conglomerate, A Story of a 
Jamaican Enterprise; other publications by case companies including  Philosophies & 
Policies of Grace, Kennedy & Company Ltd.; selected annual reports of all case companies 
and other individual stakeholder groups; text of presentations made at the Investor 
Briefings held between March 2002  and March 2008; media appearances and 
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statements,  third party sources connected to participant companies; other respondents 
of this study, information posted on case companies’ websites; official publications—
technical reports, brochures published by respondent groups named in the study; and 
the printed press.   
 
4.6 THE FIELDWORK OVERVIEW 
In relation to the IAQS, the initial approach was to send questionnaires with a letter to 
Chairmen, CEOs and Company Secretaries. This was done and a telephone call followed, but 
the rate of response was extremely low and the length of time that some respondents took was 
in excess of three months.  There were many instances when the questionnaires could not be 
found and had to be resupplied, at least three times in about 10% of the cases.  After about 6 
months elapsed, with a completion rate of about 25%, it was decided to schedule face-to-face 
interviews at the offices of the targeted respondents.  This approach resulted in a significant 
increase in the success rate of those interviewed within a short period of time thereafter. On 
the best days, up to three interviews were completed with each lasting approximately 120 
minutes.  A total period of 18 months had elapsed between the completion of the first and last 
of the 50 completed interviews (37 actually as 13 were done by the respondents themselves—
without the presence of the researcher). 
More than half of the 13 respondents who independently completed the questionnaire 
instrument took an average of 12 weeks to return the documents. For those completed 
independently of the researcher, only 4 respondents contacted him for clarifications.  One 
participant was keen enough to point out that the numbers for two questions were repeated 
(questions 62 and 63).  Two other respondents requested that the difference between an 
‘independent” Director vis-à-vis a “Non-Executive” Director, be explained to them.  
Similar approaches in fieldwork were taken to conduct and complete interviews in the 
cases and focus group studies in terms of preliminary arrangements, experiences with down-
time and availability of potential participants for interviews with watchdog groups and 
institutional investors. See Focus Group Moderator’s Guide in Appendix 5.  
There are many reasons for this. First, interviews had to be scheduled at the 
convenience and availability of the targeted respondents.  Often times, they would call to re-
schedule.   Second, with re-scheduling, the time elapsed was sometimes up to a month. Third, 
the researcher was engaged in professional work during the course of doing interviews.  This 
was unavoidable due to a high demand for his newly acquired expertise in the field of CG.  
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Additionally, as a self-funded doctoral student, he had no alternative but to ‘earn while he 
learns.’  Fourth, was due to the long time period that would have elapsed between scheduling 
of the first appointment and the actual time of conducting the interview.  For example, the 
questionnaire instrument often times was misplaced and had to be re-supplied.  Fifth, the rate 
of completion was also affected by attrition among executives and/or within managerial and 
board level ranks, that rendered the process frustrating at times, as new respondents had to be 
sought.  
In spite of the fact that there was an 18-month time horizon between commencement 
and completion of the IAQS, there was only one contextual change which was not significant 
enough to alter the credibility and reliability of my findings.  That change was the release of a 
revised Companies Act of Jamaica 2004. These changes were noted and appropriately dealt 
with and recorded in the relevant sections (chapter 2) which deals with the contextual and 
regulatory setting of Jamaica.  In fact, many informants of the Focus Groups were very aware 
of these changes to the extent that they believed there still remained many gaps in the revised 
Company legislation.  
  Finally, the researcher was also engaged in completing his first book.  Therefore, in 
many instances interviews were done at the mutual convenience and availability of the 
researcher and interviewees.  
 
4.7 THE AIMS AND TARGET USERS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The findings will be aimed primarily at academics and individuals in organisational 
contexts and policymakers (e.g., members of the private sector of Jamaica, regulatory 
institutions, watchdog groups and institutional investors). First, the results are intended to 
contribute to their understanding of what CG structures, board practices and composition exist. 
Second, an improved understanding of CG realities will redound to better equipping 
practitioners in building awareness and better inform the public at large about the importance 
of good governance. It is felt that the more aware the public is the greater will be the 
likelihood of CG reform being demanded.  Third, the results may be used by any organisation 
in guiding it towards the establishment or improvement of its own governance principles and 
practices. Fourth, the findings may serve as relevant reference material from which 
sophisticated technical proposals and background information can be accessed by international 
funding agencies such as IDB, USAID, British Council and others, who have already been 
involved in financing governance initiatives throughout the Caribbean.  
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4.8    CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
A clear and concisely documented research protocol is important to any 
successful research initiative. Therefore, a research protocol was outlined and 
accompanied by a framework of an audit trail.  An audit trail will provide a reliable and 
organised retrieval system to facilitate other researchers who might be interested in this 
study to follow the step-by-step processes applied. This chapter also discussed aims and 
objectives of the research, its purpose and interviewees, and presents a reasoned account 
for the research approach chosen, and attempts to fulfill the needs of target users.  It 
argues for and against the methods and techniques chosen for data collection and 
analyses.  
The Research Design used was both descriptive and explanatory. The Survey Research 
Methodology was complemented by the Case Study and Focus Group Methodologies.  While 
there are possible methodological disadvantages, it was deemed feasible as the questionnaire 
was self explanatory and the education level of the target audience high.  The approach also 
helped to increase the rate of response and captured a wider spectrum of critical respondents.  
This multi-technique approach seeks to ensure that the limitations of a given technique will be 
offset by the counterbalancing strengths of other techniques. The data collection occurred over 
a period of approximately 24-36 months. Approximately 100 individuals were interviewed 
directly, based on pre-determined design arrangements: Interviewer’s Administered 
Questionnaire Survey (IAQS) (sample size: 50), Case Studies (28), Focus Groups (14) and 
Institutional Investors (II) (8). Additionally, the study benefitted from the views of an 
unspecified number of informal respondents—approximately 15.  
The next section of this study is Part three (3) which synthesises the results of the  
fieldwork into three chapters, namely chapters 5, 6 and 7. The more detailed themes are 
identified and explored under the respective chapters.  Chapter 5 examines regulation and 
corruption, chapter 6 addresses ownership and control, stakeholder relations (representation) 
and the perception and incidences of corruption in Jamaica. Chapter 7 explores CG practices 
that cover three broad areas: board characteristics and composition, board’s role in firms’ 
strategic decision-making, and the role and nature of corporate disclosure.  
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PART THREE: RESULTS, FINDINGS, AND ANALYTICAL DISCUSSIONS 
 
 
 
 
[155] 
 
CHAPTER 5: REGULATION AND CORRUPTION: ISSUES FOR PUBLIC  
 POLICY ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 This chapter examines regulation and corruption by utilising secondary data from 
Transparency International (TI), the World Bank, Caribbean Policy Research Institute 
(CaPRI), Bank of Jamaica (BOJ), Financial Services Commission (FSC), Jamaica Stock 
Exchange (JSE), Jamaica Depository Insurance Corporation (JDIC), Government of Jamaica 
(GOJ) Audit Commission, and the Jamaican printed media, among other sources.   Primary 
data was generated through personal interviews with several executives of the institutions 
already named, and additionally, an in-depth case study of three companies utilising face-to-
face personal interviews (unstructured and semi-structured instruments).   
The remainder of the chapter addresses in sections: 5.2, the role of public policy; 5.3, 
the regulatory and governance framework; 5.4., the impact of regulation, utilizing a case study 
approach; 5.5, evidence of systemic weaknesses; 5.6, perceptions and incidents of corruption, 
and 5.7, summary and conclusions. The more detailed themes (sub-sections) have been 
provided under each salient heading, where necessary.    
 
5.2 THE IMPACT OF REGULATION: A CASE STUDY APPROACH  
5.2.1 Introduction   
Weak regulatory framework and systemic weaknesses have been argued (chapter 1) as 
a critical plank of the problem statement.   From these stages of development of the ‘regulatory 
thesis’ of this study, critical questions evolved in chapter 4 which sought answers and 
explanations for the nature of the regulatory framework in Jamaica and the relevance of CG 
legislations.  Have regulations been helpful or inimical?  Have legislation been helping to 
minimise corruption and CG misdeeds? Some of these have been addressed in the preceding 
sections.  
The remainder of this section includes a conceptual framework: findings cover a wide 
range of issues examining the relationship between the case companies and institutions such as 
BOJ, FSC, JSC, JDIC and the PSOJ, as well as local and international enforceable and 
emerging legislation, and proposes a case study prototype regulatory framework. This 
expresses the theoretical underpinnings of the complex relationship existing between the 
review cases and their stakeholders. The final sub-section features systemic weaknesses and 
again, utilises case evidence.    
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Given the myriad industries and sub-sectors, products and services the case companies’ 
business represent (conglomerate, merchant bank, and mutual society), these  cases are 
entangled in a web of legislation, spanning banking, financial, international, labour and 
employment, stock exchange rules, private sector guidelines, and even emerging legislation, 
and a voluntary compliance regime.   
The regulatory framework of the case companies in this study is also influenced by the 
nature and type of services and products they offer.  In other words, while a commercial bank, 
for example, is regulated by its local central bank because it is a deposit taking institution (the 
nature of service), an investment bank (like the case study merchant bank), not being a 
deposit-taking institution, instead offers investment type products (T-bills, different bonds, and 
mutual funds) as well as financial advisory services, attracting a different set of regulations 
(though it may share some in common with commercial banks). Therefore, the principal 
regulator of the merchant or investment bank happens to be the FSC.  
Table 5.1: Case Companies’ Product and Service Menu 
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No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Mutual Society  
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Yes  
 
Yes  
 
Yes  
 
Yes  
 
Yes  
 
Yes  
Key: Yes–in this business; No–not in this business. *Through First Global Commercial Bank and FGB 
Securities; **While the bank provides home mortgages it does so under its credit department as it does not have a 
dedicated business in this segment of the market.  
 
Against the preceding background, it is therefore necessary that the products and 
services offered by the case companies be presented and examined as the basis for 
understating their regulatory framework.  Table 5.1 highlights eleven portfolio areas in which 
one or another of the three case companies is engaged. The conglomerate provides services in 
all but two areas (home mortgages and IT consultancy) while the mutual society competes 
favourably with both conglomerate and merchant bank in all areas except food business, and 
commercial, merchant and investment bank. The merchant bank on the other hand, having a 
presence in only four (merchant banking, money market funds, remittance and foreign 
exchange trading) of the eleven areas listed in Table 5.1, and with all its portfolio cannibalised 
by the conglomerate and the mutual—except merchant banking—has to contend with much 
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less revenue and profitability.  This product and service diversity and multiple jurisdictional 
nature of the operations of these case companies, demanded compliance with both local and 
international financial regulations.  
 
5.2.2 Findings  
 
To what extent have regulations impacted good or bad CG in Jamaican firms?  Is there an 
emerging framework model?  
 
5.2.2.1 The BOJ and Case Companies   
The role of the BOJ in the Jamaican regulatory economy has already been 
established.  Therefore, the focus in this section is on its relationship with the case companies 
in as much as it regulates and monitors them.  The BOJ’s supervisory authority and 
responsibility for deposit-taking financial institutions (mutual company) is established by 
virtue of a number of primary and secondary Legislative Acts of the Jamaican Parliament. 
These laws form the legal and policy framework for the licensing and supervision of financial 
institutions like the merchant bank company and the mutual society.  The companies it 
regulates are required to supply a wide range of financial data based on strict guidelines set out 
in ‘FIA Licensees’ Comprehensive Financial Return’ (BOJ, June 1996).                                                       
 
5.2.2.2   The FSC and Case Companies 
The FSC being the primary regulator for insurance, securities firms/dealers33, unit trusts, 
private pension funds, and mutual funds, as discussed earlier, plays a key role in regulating the 
activities of the case companies.  The merchant bank and its subsidiaries and the securities’ 
arm of the conglomerate, are licensed under the Financial Institutions Act and are regulated by 
the FSC rather than the BOJ since they are not deposit-taking institutions.  Likewise, the case 
companies at one level or another deal in foreign exchange trading and as such are mandated 
to be licensed FX dealers.   
The case companies’ regulatory framework is presented in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1. 
Apart from the traditional commercial and merchant bank, the case companies have 
established relationships with Affiliated Financial Institutions (AFIs).  As such, they are able 
to access cheaper funds from AFIs such as the Development Bank of Jamaica (DBJ) and the 
Export Import Bank of Jamaica (EXIM), which they then un-lend at a pre-determined interest 
                                               
33The BOJ has designated 12 of these institutions as ‘BOJ Primary Dealers' which provide access to BOJ's Open 
Market Operations Instruments and GOJ instruments in the primary and secondary markets. These entities must 
simultaneously satisfy the requirements of their regulator, the Financial Services Commission, and the specific 
BOJ requirements for Primary Dealers to be designated as such (www.boj.org.jm). 
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rate with a narrow spread built-in as interest income. These added arrangements are bound to 
intensify the regulatory regime and hence cause compliance to become even more onerous for 
these companies. Licensees of the FSC are required to meet a number of compliance issues, 
including the payment of prescribed fees when become due, maintaining liquidity 
requirements, the return of Certificate of Registration, maintain record of securities, issue 
Notice of ceasing to be a dealer, the disclosure of interest in securities, the keeping of proper 
accounting and the appointment of auditors, to name a few (Securities Act 2001).  
 
Table 5.2: Regulatory Framework of Case Companies 
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o  
√ √ 
*The Conglomerate operates several financial subsidiaries locally and internally.  
 
Key:  (1) Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) Principal and Subsidiary legislation:-The BOJ Act, 1960 
(amended 1992, 1994, 1995, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005), The Banking Act,1992 (amended 1997, 
2002,2004), The Financial Institutions Act, 1992 (amended 1997, 2002, 2004), The Building 
Societies Act,1897 (amended 1995, 2002, 2004), Subsidiary legislations: The Bank of Jamaica 
(Building Societies) Regulations, 1995 (amended 2005), The Building Societies (Licences) 
Regulations, 1995, The Banking (Establishment of Branches) Regulations, 1996, The Banking 
(Amalgamation and Transfers) Regulations, 1996, The Banking (Licence Fees) Regulations, 
2003, The Financial Institutions (Establishment of Branches) Regulations, 1996, The 
Financial Institutions (Licence Fees) Regulations, 2003, The Banking (Capital Adequacy) 
Regulations, 2004; (2) Other Legislation: Companies Act 2004, Terrorism Prevention Act, 
2007, Deposit Insurance Act, 1988, and the Income Act, Proceeds of Crime Bill,2007; (3) 
Financial Services Commission (FSC) Regulation:-Securities Act, The Insurance Act, The 
Pension Fund Act, the Unit Trust Act; Applicable International Legislation: The Patriot Act, 
Securities and Exchange Commission Regulation: Securities Investor Protection Corporation 
Regulations; (5) Emerging Legislation: Credit Classification Provision, Qualifications of 
Auditors, Omnibus Bill, Conglomerate/Consolidation Provision, Financial Investigations 
Division (FID) Bill; (6)Jamaica Stock Exchange (JSE) and (7) Private Sector Organisation 
of Jamaica (PSOJ) Corporate Governance Code; (8) Self-regulation—auditing and internal 
control, code of ethics and business conduct, CG policy and risk management policy.    
 
5.2.2.3  Other Local Legislation of Relevance to Case Companies 
This a select group of legislation which includes Companies Act 2004, Deposit 
Insurance Act, 1988, the Income Tax Act, 1955, Proceeds of Crime Bill, 2007, and Terrorism 
Prevention Act, 2005.  The Deposit Insurance Act, 1988 (under JDIC) and The Companies 
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Act, 2004, have been discussed earlier.  The merchant bank and the mutual society are 
members of the JDIC and hence are subjected to its requirements.  Like all registered 
companies, these case companies are subjected to the stipulations of the Companies Office of 
Jamaica and hence have to file Annual Returns in accordance with the Companies Act of 
Jamaica, 2004. Likewise, all Companies in Jamaica are required to file Income Tax Returns 
annually, failing to do so, they can be held liable and be prosecuted for breaches under the 
Income Tax Act.  
Proceeds of Crimes Act (POCA): POCA is a wide-ranging legislation that targets the 
benefits (proceeds) of crime and incorporates the concept of money laundering as well as 
introduces the principle of civil procedure. With the passage of POCA since March 2007 and 
which came into effect on May 30, 2007, the Drug Offences (forfeiture of Proceeds) Act, 
Dangerous Drugs Act, Money Laundering Act, 1996, and the Money Laundering Regulations, 
1997, have been effectively repealed and replaced. The merchant bank and the mutual society 
are expected to comply with the relevant requirements and to file, as necessary, suspicious 
transactions under this piece of legislation.   
 
5.2.2.4. International Regulations and Case Companies   
A few of these regulations are highlighted to provide completeness to this discussion. 
The ones under consideration are the Patriot Act, the Securities Exchange Commission, and 
the Securities Investor Protection Corporation, and Basel Standards for Banks.   
First is the Patriot Act34, the merchant bank, through its Florida-based subsidiary, as 
well as financial subsidiaries of the mutual and conglomerate operating in US territories, are 
required to designate an anti-money laundering compliance officer, establish training 
programmes for appropriate personal, arrange independent testing for compliance with related 
laws and regulations and to establish policies and procedures to detect and report suspicious 
transactions.  In response to anti-money laundering measures, potential customers must 
provide various identification documents, without which an account may not be opened on 
their behalf.  Additionally, the Act increases the power of law enforcement agencies to search 
telephone, email, communications, medical, financial, and other records, and eases restrictions 
on foreign intelligence gathering within the United States. Under an agreement with the BOJ, 
                                               
34The Act gives law enforcement agencies the power to search telephone, e-mail communications, medical, 
financial, and other records thus easing restrictions on foreign intelligence gathering within the United States, and 
targets financial transactions, particularly those involving foreign individuals and entities.  
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local financial institutions are now required to produce a range of information about their 
customers.   
Second, is the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) of the United States  
which protects investors up-to the amount of US$500,000 while the JDIC in Jamaica provides 
protection to depositors of up to J$600,000 (US$6,800) for every account held by a depositor 
in any of their member institutions (commercial banks, merchant banks and building 
societies), in the event there is financial distress which leads to ultimate failure.  However, the 
SIPC restores funds to investors with assets in the hands of bankrupt and otherwise financially 
troubled brokerage firms. None of these two entities is entrusted with direct regulatory power.  
The licensees of deposit-taking firms hold membership with the JDIC unlike the SIPC, which 
caters only to securities houses. 
Third, the SEC of America covers a wide gamut of legislation to which publicly-listed 
companies and securities brokers must comply.  The case companies at one level or another 
and through their subsidiaries, (merchant bank subsidiary in Florida, conglomerate remittance 
business in the USA, and the mutual society in the Cayman Islands), are obliged to meeting 
SEC stipulated regulations while trading in the US territories.  
Fourth, Basel II regulations seek to create an international standard as a guide for 
banking regulators when creating regulations on capital adequacy (how much money to put 
aside) to guard against all types of financial and operational risks. It is felt by advocates that 
such an international standard can help protect the international financial system from the 
types of problems that might arise should a major bank or a series of banks collapse, and 
therefore, encourages the establishment of rigorous risk and capital management requirements 
designed to ensure that a bank holds capital reserves commensurate with its risk exposures.  
These four pieces of international legislation are not exhaustive as local institutions, 
even many other than the case companies and many more operating in various other 
jurisdictions, are obligated to meeting the compliance requirements of their host countries. 
These laws can only serve to safeguard individual territories and organizations from 
reputational damage and the erosion of credibility, from illicit activities—hence reinforcing 
good corporate governance.  
 
5.2.2.5 JSE Listing Rules and the Case Companies  
 
The role of the JSE has been discussed in chapter 2. Given that both the conglomerate 
and merchant bank companies are members, they are therefore, subjected to the listing rules 
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of the JSE that are contained in the JSE Rule Book. There are strict guidelines for acceptance 
into membership and members are expected to comply with various requirements outlined in 
the Rule Book. Amongst the most onerous is the JSE Policies on timely disclosure of 
Information and disclosure of material informationii in particular.  
 
5.4.2.6 PSOJ Corporate Governance Code and the Case Companies 
This Code has been adequately discussed in chapter 2 and reference is made of the 
relevant sections in Appendix 11.  In spite of a very close relationship between the PSOJ and 
each of the case companies, very little interest has been shown in adopting part of, or all, 
aspects of the PSOJ Corporate Governance Code (personal knowledge).  Notwithstanding this, 
these case companies have long established their own voluntary-governance policies and have 
remained committed to the tenets of self-imposed regulation.    
 
5.2.2.7 Case Companies and Self-Regulation  
Complementing mandatory requirements are self-regulatory activities initiated by the 
case companies which sometimes exceed stipulated legal requirements. The case companies 
are found to have been operating for an extended number of years, with their own Code of 
Ethics and Business Conduct policies, board operating (corporate governance) manuals, and 
risk management policies and practices. All three case companies have established well-
documented policies of risk management (including the appointment of Chief Risk Officers—
merchant company and conglomerate, while merchant company maintains the position of vice 
president for risk management) Codes of Ethics, and Business Conduct for management 
officers, as well as BOD.  All three case companies report on their CG and risk management 
practices in their Annual Reports, in keeping with both mandatory and self-regulatory 
practices.   
Additionally, auditing and internal controls while having been prescribed for all 
financial and stock market listed firms worldwide, and hence are seen as a part of mandatory 
regulatory framework, are equally self-regulatory in many instances based on the rigidity and 
details each individual institution may include. Like auditing and internal controls which have 
not been given significant attention in the literature as self-regulatory measures, reporting on 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a growing trend in Jamaica and all three case 
companies, especially the merchant bank and the conglomerate companies, have been 
reporting on CSR, at least since the last four years with the advent of the JSE Best Practice 
Awards Competition.  
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5.2.2.8 Emerging Legislation and Case Companies  
In order to keep relevant, and in light of the dynamic nature of the international 
regulatory environment, particularly in banking, case companies must at all times be in a state 
of readiness to respond to the emerging and sometimes sudden demands of the regulatory 
authorities, especially the financial sector primary regulator, the BOJ.  BOJ has been involved 
with making amendments to several pieces of legislation and developing others.  First, Credit 
Classification/Provisions which will regulate loan accounting, credit classification, and loan 
provision requirements, that take into consideration developments in Basel Core Principles, 
Basel Standard for Sound Credit Risk Valuation Loan, as well as IFRS while meeting relevant 
local conditions and requirements (Figure 5.1).    
Second, Qualifications of Auditors: Regulations that specify expectations for auditors 
in undertaking an external audit of a supervised financial institution specify the criteria related 
to independence, experience and academic qualification of the external auditors. These 
proposed regulations would also require prior notification to the BOJ of proposed 
appointments. One would hope that these new developments will go as far as regulating the 
rotation of external auditors and their signing partners in spite of the small pool of local 
external auditors available.  
Third, Omnibus Bill: the need has been identified to consolidate the Banking Act, the 
Financial Institutions Act and the Bank of Jamaica (Building Societies) Regulations, in tandem 
with related subsidiary regulations. The new ‘Omnibus' Bill also seeks to include all legislative 
amendments necessary to achieve the fullest possible compliance with the Basel Core 
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision.  
Fourth, Conglomerate/Consolidated Supervision: although aspects of this supervision 
has been in place for ‘fit and proper’ assessments of principals of parent companies of licensed 
entities, requirements for submission of audited financial statements of all members of the 
conglomerate group of which the licensee is a part—there is need to widen the supervisory  
scope consistent with international standards. These regulations are intended to allow the 
Supervisory Authority to regulate not only the activities of the licensed deposit taking entity, 
but also of the financial holding company, as well as facilitating supervisory reach to the entire 
financial group of which the licensee is a part.  
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* The case companies have been duly registered under the relevant business laws in the jurisdictions they operate, 
both locally and internationally. 
 
Fifth, the Financial Investigations Division Bill: The BOJ by virtue of its chairmanship 
(at the request of the Minister of Finance) of the Task Force on Financial Crime has been 
involved in the development of a law to govern Jamaica's Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), 
namely the Financial Investigations Division (FID). When passed, the FID legislation will, it is 
hoped, among other matters, establish the FID on a statutory basis thereby increasing the 
independence of this Unit and facilitating the Unit's admission to membership of the Egmont 
Group (the international body of FIUs), expand the investigative tools available to the FID for 
the investigation of suspected financial crimes, and establish specific penalties for non-
compliance with directives or requests for information issued by the FID. 
Sixth, but by no means exhaustive, is the Whistle-Blower Legislation. The Government 
of Jamaica has identified the enactment of Whistle blower legislation as a matter of priority. 
Whistle-blowing involves a person making a disclosure about an act of wrongdoing or 
procedural breach which occurs within an organization. The enactment of whistleblower 
legislation is usually one of the measures employed to combat corruption. Other legislative 
measures include the Access to Information Act, 2001, and Corruption (Prevention) Act, 2001, 
Figure 5.1: Case Companies Prototype Regulatory Framework 
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which currently exist in Jamaica and are examined in the next section of this chapter, featuring 
the perception and incidence of corruption in Jamaica.  
An important advantage of whistle-blower legislation is its tendency to require or 
foster development of internal mechanisms for handling disclosures of wrongdoing within 
organisations, as this helps to increase accountability and transparency.  Also, the extent to 
which wrongdoers will go to protect themselves from the consequences of their actions can be 
quite varied, and potentially dangerous, depending on the individual in question 
(www.mns.org.jm). It is for these reasons that Governments have sought to enact the whistle-
blower legislation in several countries. The main objects of such laws are usually to facilitate 
whistle-blowing by establishing clear procedures and to offer protection to whistleblowers.  
This legislation is to be debated before the Jamaican Parliament in the ensuing months (at the 
time writing).   
 
5.2.3  Evidence of Systemic Weaknesses: Causes of Jamaica’s Financial Sector 
Meltdown and Lessons Learnt  
5.2.3.1 Introduction    
In spite of the comprehensive and detailed regulatory regime presented in the 
preceding section, and the fact that The World Bank Institute’s Governance Research Indicator 
puts regulatory quality and control of corruption above average in Jamaica, there remain 
regulatory gaps and systemic weaknesses which could continue to constrain growth and 
threaten financial stability (David Atkinson)35.   
In this section, the case of the Financial Sector Meltdown of the 1990s in Jamaica is 
explored as an illustration of how systemic weaknesses led to the collapse of the general 
financial system and how public policy responses (and regulation) through governmental 
intervention have helped to create financial stability, albeit at a high cost and through a rather 
treacherous period.  
 
5.2.3.2 The Crisis   
 Between the mid and late 1990s Jamaica experienced a Financial Sector Melt-down 
which resulted in the demise of more than 150 companies, including 15 banks (5 commercial 
banks accounting for about sixty per cent (60%) of deposits in the population of nine 
commercial banks), 21 insurance companies (including all major life insurance companies 
with five accounting for over 90% of premium income in business), one-third of all merchant 
banks, 34 securities firms, and several building societies (Bonnick, 1999).  
                                               
35
 Analyst, Euler Hermes UK Plc, Country Review Jamaica, February 12, 2009, pg. 5 of 6.  
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The meltdown of the financial sector triggered a “ripple effect” throughout the entire 
Jamaican economy resulting in loss of thousands of jobs, loss of national ownership of several 
financial institutions, and a general erosion of business confidence.  Many key institutions 
once seen as national symbols were now in the hands of foreign ownership or were no longer 
in existence.  See Appendix 1 for a comprehensive list of affected Companies.   
The privatisation of some government institutions that had been acquired from foreign 
interests during the 1970s favoured indigenous investors. For example, 51% of shares in 
National Commercial Bank (formerly Barclays Bank) were offered to the public in 1986. 
Groups of domestic entrepreneurs owning several types of financial institutions gained 
increased importance in the ownership and control structure of the sector. Each group would 
seek to include a commercial bank, merchant bank, building society, life insurance, investment 
trust, and a leasing company (Bonnick, 1999).  In 1991 Jamaica began to relax controls over 
the borrowing, dealing, and surrendering of foreign exchange. Restrictions were removed from 
the domestic requirements of customers to prevent illegal outflow, gradually liberalised and 
then totally eliminated. Exacerbating the situation, in 1992 the Exchange Control was 
repealed, effectively ending controls on capital transactions between residents of Jamaica and 
residents of other countries. 
  Another critical economic development was in the annual rate of inflation (point-to-
point) that increased from 17% in 1989 to over 80% in 1991. This was brought under control 
through monetary and fiscal policy and gradually reduced to 9% in 1997, and to 7% by 2006.  
Further, there was rapid growth in the sector that was attributed to the increasing number of 
financial institutions—mainly banking and insurance businesses—from 67 in 1989 to 105 in 
1995, with majority increase among building societies and merchant banks (PIOJ Data). 
 Critical to the above discussion must be the role played (or not played) by government 
policies (of absence thereof).  The rapid growth of the financial sector during the 1990s was 
not met with commensurate establishment and enforcement of financial sector regulation. As a 
result, many of the activities of the newly created financial institutions were either 
inadequately supervised and monitored, or not at all, given the lack of appropriate legislation 
to do so.  Therefore, the inadequacy and absence of appropriate government policies were 
partially responsible for the nature and magnitude of the crisis (personal experience).   
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5.2.3.3 Possible Causes of the Crisis 
According to Ministry Paper No. 13 that was submitted to Parliament with the 1998 
budget, the rapid expansion in the Financial Sector placed severe strain on the management of 
financial institutions. In addition, poor CG practices intensified the problems arising from an 
under-developed macroeconomic and regulatory framework. Many management weaknesses 
contributing to the failure of the Jamaican financial sector have been argued (Hilton, P., 1998).  
Some of the weaknesses that have been indentified include: failure to exercise due diligence 
and care on the part of corporate Directors, specifically, lack of, or non-compliance with 
proper internal control procedures and ineffective risk management, inadequate 
credit/investment monitoring, poor strategic planning and CG oversight, inadequate capital 
levels, ineffective supervision of the management of these institutions by their BOD, and 
excessive credit concentration.   
In critically assessing these causes against the responsibilities of Directors in the 
Jamaican context, it appeared evident that several Directors of these distressed companies 
failed in upholding their fiduciary responsibilities. Personal interviews conducted with many 
respondents (casualties) by a former Managing Director of FINSAC, and consultant reports, 
have concluded that Directors did not fully understand their roles, duties and responsibilities. 
The lack of knowledge and understanding among Directors of their roles and responsibilities, 
particularly in the Caribbean, comes as no surprise as duties and responsibilities were not 
codified (or only minimally where this existed—emphasis added) in law until significant 
improvements in the revised Companies Act of Jamaica, 2004.  
 In spite of the enormity of the above crisis and its implications on the financial sector, 
the labour market, economic growth, and significant social deterioration in the economy, the 
causes and full impact of the crisis was not investigated until the current Jamaica Labour Party 
(JLP), which formed the Government in September 2007, established a Commission of 
Enquiry to investigate such.  The Commission of Enquiry is being held at the time of writing.  
 
5.2.3.4 Other Public Policy Responses to the Financial Crisis  
 Most fundamental to the government’s intervening measures was the creation of the 
Financial Sector Adjustment Company (FINSAC) in 1997, to deal with the troubled 
institutions. This was followed by an announcement in Parliament on the 7th of February 1997 
by the Prime Minister, that the government would guarantee depositors’ funds in licensed 
deposit-taking institutions, pension funds managed by authorised institutions, and policy-
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holders’ funds in insurance companies.  The work of FINSAC was initiated in three phases. 
First, was intervention—there was negotiation with owners/managers leading to FINSAC’s 
provision of recapitalisation based on an agreed rehabilitation plan or acquisition, or closure 
where rehabilitation did not seem a feasible option. A sector overview study was completed 
during this stage. The second phase was the rehabilitation of institutions (including 
restructuring of portfolio of investments and work-out of non-performing loans, and 
improvement of management and control), and the strengthening of the regulatory and 
supervisory framework of the sector.  The third phase would complete the divestment of assets 
acquired in the process of liquidating entities for which deposit guarantees were called, review 
of the legislative framework, and winding down of FINSAC operations, among others.   
The overall rehabilitation of the Jamaican financial sector could be described as a long 
and onerous process that has remained a work-in-progress approximately twelve years later at 
the time of writing. Other critical elements in the process of reform include, but were limited 
to, the following four measures 1.) the conduct of Diagnostic and Overview Studies. This was 
completed in 1997. The major findings concluded that domestic banks suffered from poor 
credit management, portfolio divestment into areas where they had no comparative advantage; 
insurance companies suffered from mismatch of assets and liabilities and banks were 
inefficient; requiring large spreads between overall lending and deposit rates; 2.) Intervention, 
this involved the negotiation of agreements with troubled institutions to close, support or 
acquire them; 3.) Rehabilitation: This involved evaluation of recovery possibilities, forensic 
audits of acquired institutions, asset management and disposal, work-out of non-performing 
loans—brought from intervened banks with FINSAC bonds, sector and institutional re-
development, and re-privatisation, and 4.) Regulatory Reform—overview studies identified 
regulatory weaknesses among the important contributory factors to the crisis. 
5.2.3.5 Lessons from the Financial Sector Crisis 
A number of lessons can be learnt from this devastating experience suffered by the 
Jamaican economy and people. Some of these can be seen as: 1.) Entry Criteria—High entry 
barriers as well as screening out the “unfit” applicants; 2.) Investments—Paying greater 
attention to the investment portfolio of institutions and ensuring greater transparency of the 
risks taken by investment managers—may need a mandatory risk management framework for 
Jamaica; 3.) Leverage—Regulators should watch whether leverage is excessive and establish 
alerts for early warning signs; 4.) Off the Balance Sheet Transactions—Particular attention 
should be paid to off the balance sheet transactions.  Regulators should require fuller and 
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timely data on such transactions; 5.) Foreign Exchange Reserve Position—Since the foreign 
exchange market has been liberalised, banks and other institutions should be required to 
present timely and complete data on their foreign exchange reserve positions and on forward 
transactions which could influence their short-term debt; and 6.) Exit of weak institutions— 
Regulations in the future must prompt weak institutions to close before a point of insolvency is 
reached. 
Sources: Ministry Paper #13, 1998 Budget Presentation, Ministry Finance and Planning; 
Bonnick, G. (1999) and Hilton, P. (1998).   
In addition to the above, the causes of the Jamaican financial crisis showed that weak 
CG structures do lead to financial and economic instability and the erosion of investor 
confidence over time.  The Jamaican experience has also shown that the financial cost of 
recovery is almost immeasurable since it is difficult to determine the real social cost to the 
economy—brain drain, hardships suffered from unemployment, closure of businesses, and the 
decline of the productive sector, among others.  The most fundamental lesson is that a severe 
financial crisis can be contained by a timely and successfully executed intervention and 
subsequent rehabilitation as demonstrated in the case of the Jamaican experience through such 
intervention measures as a financial sector adjustment mechanism such as FINSAC.     
 
5.3  PERCEPTION AND INCIDENTS OF CORRUPTION  
5.3.1 Introduction 
 The Caribbean people have been concerned about corruption in public life since the 
1990s.  This concern pre-dated the anti-corruption priorities later elaborated by the World 
Bank, IMF and other international bodies.  For example, National Public Opinion Polls carried 
out in 1995, 1996 and 2001, revealed that sixty-four per cent (64%), seventy-seven per cent 
(77%) and forty-nine per cent (49%), respectively, of the Jamaican people felt that all or most 
politicians were corrupt (Rodriquez, 1996; The Gleaner May 3, 1999; The Daily Gleaner, Sept. 
7, 2001).  In a recent survey conducted by CaPRI (2007), 81% of respondents felt the 
Jamaican police was most corrupt while Parish Councils and the Customs Department trailed 
at 62% and 61%, respectively.  See Table 5.5.  
These statistics reflecting the opinion of the Jamaican people on the question of 
corruption and governance mirror a fairly typical opinion of people in neighbouring Latin 
America, Africa, parts of Europe, Asia and North America.  In Latin America, 96% across the 
continent in 2000 regarded corruption as a serious or very serious problem (Global Corruption 
Report 2001:14).  In post-communist states, the popular perception of the majority was that the 
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level of corruption and bribe taking had increased by comparison to the former communist 
regime.  In Russia, the most important of these states, this was the view of the population. 
Across Southern Africa, opinions on corruption were somewhat varied: In Zimbabwe, 69% 
said that most government officials are involved in corruption, 50% of Zambians and South 
Africans shared similar view while only 28% in Lesotho and 20% in Namibia had a negative 
perception of government officials (Global Corruption Report, 2001:307).  
 
5.3.2 Some Causes of Corruption  
The causes purported for corruption are innumerable. Some of the most dominant of 
these are indicating that corruption stems from poverty and inequality, personal graft and 
greed, low risk of detection, over-bureaucratic structures, inadequate remuneration, cultural 
configurations, low risk of punishment, political patronage, weak enforcement mechanisms, 
absence of an ethical framework—in the individual or in the company or agency, low levels of 
transparency, low levels of public accountability, weak management systems, powerful 
network of ‘secret’ organisations, and societal pressures. It is argued that many of these causes 
are inextricably linked with prevailing conditions in certain societies (Stokes, 1997; 
Transparency, 2000; Huntington, 1968).   
Table 5.3 summarises the views of respondents who believe the three main causes of 
corruption are personal graft and greed (65%), high reward for corruption, and (61%), 
cronyism (60%).  In addition, Kaufman (2009)36 posits that corruption comes from state 
capture where powerful companies (or individuals) bend the regulatory, policy and legal 
institutions of the nation for their private benefit.  In this regard, Kaufman insists that the 
perception of the existence and actual incidents of corruption is prevalent in the private sector 
as it is in the public sector. He (Kaufman) posited that corruption is typically done through 
high-level bribery, lobbying, or influence peddling.    
It might be a firm wanting a permit, a corporation with the desire to influence the 
regulatory framework, or another wanting to shape the rules of the game so as to get 
monopolistic rights.  In elaborating his position, Kaufman further argues that: "In 
industrialised countries undue influence is often legally exercised by powerful private interests 
that in turn influence the nation's regulations, policies and laws."  In interpreting Kaufman’s 
reasoning, Buddan (2009) explains that corruption is built into and normalised by 'the 
                                               
36
 http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/27/corruption-financial-crisis-business-corruption09_0127 
[170] 
 
economy' where it can be subtle and legal. For example, a political campaign contribution 
might be made with an understanding that strings are attached. 
Table 5.3: Key Indicators of Corruption in Jamaica 
  
QUESTIONS 
 
EXTENT OF SUPPORT (%) 
 
1.  
Which of the following statements match closest your 
understanding of what ‘corruption’ is? 
Misuse of public office for private 
gain (45) 
 
2.  
What is your perspective of the prevalence of corruption in 
Jamaica among the following institutions? 
Police (81); Parish Council (62); 
Customs department (61) 
3. How easy can a public official be corrupted in Jamaica? Relatively easy (85) 
 
4. 
Do you believe the Jamaican public sector is more corrupt 
now more than it was in the past, or, is it about the same?  
Much worse (36); about the same 
(28); somewhat worse now (27) 
 
5. 
 
What do you think are the causes of corruption in the 
Jamaican public sector?  
Personal graft and greed (65); 
high reward for corruption (61); 
Cronyism (60) 
6. Do you believe that corruption has hindered Jamaica’s 
development?  
 
Yes (87) 
 
7. 
 
How likely is it for corruption to be detected in the 
Jamaican Public Sector? 
Difficult (50.1); easy (32.2); very 
diff (21); very easy (5.7) 
8. How easy is it that the corrupt individuals will be punished 
for their actions?  
Not likely (56); very likely (12.6); 
likely (31) 
 
 
9. 
 
What are the possible mechanisms preventing corruption 
from being punished in Jamaica?  
Anti-corruption rules are 
adequate, but government 
agencies are too weak to enforce 
them (44); anti-corruption rules 
are inadequate (31) 
Source: Extrapolated from CaPRI Report, A Landscape Assessment of Political Corruption in Jamaica, 2007. 
Authors: Dr. Lloyd Waller; Mr. Paul Bourne; Ms. Indiana Minto and Dr. John Rapley.  
 
 
5.3.3   The Economic Implications of Corruption 
Very little is known about the real economic cost of corruption, as so many aspects 
remain underground. Moreover, it would be difficult to accurately measure socio-political cost 
such as when it denies individuals and ruins the livelihood of entire communities thus causing 
long-term suffering.  Daniel Kaufman (2009) wrote: “corruption is not just a problem of 
developing countries, but developed ones as well, and has not declined on average”. Bribery, 
he estimates, amounts to an astonishing US$1 trillion each year.  In recent times, Switzerland 
has returned US$6 million in assets stolen by former dictator, Jean Claude 'Baby Doc' 
Duvalier to Haiti. Swiss banks stand at the centre of the Swiss economy so one has to think 
that the Swiss economy is to a great degree, a criminal economy.  However, this is not how the 
world works. United States tax authorities, who have been bled by tax avoidance, are pursuing 
a civil case against a leading Swiss bank to access thousands of names of US citizens who are 
hiding about US$14.8 billion in secret Swiss bank accounts. The bank has paid over US$780 
million to the US and has had to disclose the names of 250 Americans who the US said 
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committed tax fraud. In spite of this, TI ranks Switzerland as one of the five most honest 
countries in the world (Buddan, 2009). In Jamaica, a few of the known costs of corruption 
were estimated to be approximately US$0.5 billion in the last decade. See Table 5.4.    
 In the context of economics, corruption is argued to inhibit growth in several ways. 
First, corruption increases transaction costs for investment, for the production and distribution 
of goods and services, and offloads these costs disproportionately onto the backs of the poor 
and powerless (Munroe, T 2003: 373).  Second, Transparency International in citing Dieter 
Frisch, a former Director-General of Development at the European Commission, indicates: 
Corruption raises the cost of goods and services; it increases the debt of a 
country, and carries with it, recurring debt-servicing costs into the future; it 
leads to lowering of standards of goods provided and inappropriate and 
unnecessary technology is acquired; and it results in project choices being 
made based more on capital to be able to reward for the perpetrator of 
corruption than for manpower—the more useful element of development 
(Transparency International 2003:3).  
 
Third, corruption occurs in systems where there are instances of violations in economic 
norms, legal systems and standards which govern economic transactions, thus distorting 
private and public investment, i.e., channelling funds into highly competitive sectors such as 
construction (Olson, 1996; North, 1990; and Transparency International, 2000).  In this 
context, it subverts the merit principle by rewarding those who do not play by the rules 
(suppressing competition), weakens the authority of the rules (laws) and the mechanisms and 
processes that are at the heart of the democratic institutions. Corruption therefore contributes 
to the undermining of sustainable livelihoods in these countries, especially for the poor and 
dispossessed.  
 Fourth, socio-politically, corruption “breaks the link between collective decision-
making and people power to influence, through speaking and voting, the very link that defines 
democracy” (Warren, 2004; Johnson, 2005; della Porta, 1996). Indeed, corruption can have a 
deleterious effect on the functioning of a nation and on the ability of institutions in society to 
attain stated objectives. Critical to this point are key institutions such as political institutions, 
the judiciary, and administrative systems.  In essence, corruption undermines a culture, shrinks 
the fabric of democracy, and inhibits innovations, upward mobility, and social progress 
(CaPRI, 2007).  
 With the above economic issues in mind, corruption constrains governance and has 
wider implications for development.  Additionally, issues such as corruption and how the 
public perceive the state, tend to be wrapped up with how the citizenry views and relates to 
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key institutions of the public—departments, ministries, statutory bodies, and government 
agencies (Warren, 2004), and private sectors—inequalities and prejudice—tantamount to 
nepotism, cronyism, and unfair treatment of shareholders.  Further, Olsen (1993 and 1996) 
maintains the importance of these institutions in building the trust, stability and consensus 
needed for the development of a thriving democracy. Clearly, these institutions are crucial in 
fostering cooperation among firms as well as among citizens and their rulers. It is almost 
impossible for successful development initiatives to be realised in an environment of mistrust 
between the intended beneficiaries (the citizenry) and the provider of such development (the 
state).  
 
5.3.4 Incidents and Case Evidence of Corruption 
5.3.4.1 Cases of Political and Corporate Corruption  
In Jamaica, as well, as in many other countries, the popular perception is that corruption 
poses a major challenge to governance.  During the 1980s and 1990s, political leaders and 
security personnel were dismissed, forced to resign or convicted on corruption related charges.  
In Jamaica and the wider Caribbean,  Some of these examples include: 1.) in Jamaica in 1990, 
Minister of Labour JAG Smith, former water and housing minister, Dr. Karl Blythe, and many 
other of his colleagues in the former PNP administration, were forced out of office due to 
allegations of corruption at many public agencies; 2.) in Trinidad and Tobago in 1983, 
Commissioner of Police Rudolph Burrows; 3.) in the Bahamas as many as five members of the 
Pindling Cabinet; 4.) in Antigua, 1990, Vere Bird Jr. (Minister of Pubic Service; and 5.) a 
Deputy Prime Minister in St. Kitts & Nevis in 1994.  
In many other countries in recent years, credible accusations have been made against 
prominent persons who have been punished for corrupt use of corporate power in the banking 
and financial sectors, and for the misuse of political office in awarding contracts, the disposal 
of public assets, the acceptance of bribes in the police and customs services, and in relation to 
political campaign financing.  At least four Ministers from the former People’s National Party 
(PNP) of Jamaica (in opposition at the time of writing) have resigned over shady deals with 
which they were associated in one way or another37.  
In terms of private sector (or corporate) corruption, the egregious behaviour is not 
limited to the Caribbean as several corrupt corporate executives in the United States, United 
                                               
37
 They are Mr. Percival Patterson, M.P., resigned over the Shell Waiver Scandal while he was Minister of 
Finance, he returned to become the longest serving Prime Minister of sixteen unbroken years; Former Senator 
Colin Campbell, resigned over the Trafigura Beheer BV Scandal while he was Minister of Information and 
General Secretary of the PNP; Dr. Karl Blythe, M.P., resigned over the Operation Pride (2): NHDC Scandal 
while he was Minister of Water and Housing and Vice President of the PNP, and Mr. Ronald Thwaites, M.P., 
resigned over the Operation Pride (1)/NHDC Scandal.  
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Kingdom, Canada, and elsewhere, have been implicated for their acts. Jeffrey K. Skilling, 
former CEO, Enron, serving a 24-year and 4-month sentence for conspiracy, securities fraud, 
false statement, insider trading.  Andrew Fastow,  Enron’s former Chief Financial Offer, 
served 6 years in prison for similar corporate crimes; Bernie Ebbers, former CEO, 
WorldCom/MCI, serving 25 years in jail for securities fraud.  Dennis Koslowski, former  
CEO, Tyco, serving 25 years.  Corporate corruption in the United States and the United 
Kingdom poses grave implications beyond their respective borders. The negative economic 
implications for global stock markets specifically, and the financial integrity of the global 
economy, generally, are no secret.   
Long before the current wave of “Enronitis”, the United States’ and the United 
Kingdom’s private sector executives have been implicated in bribery and other corporate 
corruption (Munroe, T., 2003: 375).  For example, US corporations, despite operating in 
probably the most highly regulated business jurisdiction globally, have been regarded as 
amongst the most bribery-prone in foreign transactions. The 2002 Bribe Payers Index (BPI) —
a construction of Transparency International and based on cross national surveys conducted 
amongst senior executives, international accounting firms, etc., found that American 
multinationals were more likely to pay or offer bribes than those from Germany, France, the 
UK, or Canada. This tendency indicated an increase over the results of the 1999 BPI and 
moved the Chairman of Transparency International in May 2002 to conclude that: 
Large numbers of multi-national corporations from the richest nations are 
pursuing a criminal course to win contracts in the leading emerging market 
economies of the world…Politicians and public officials from the world’s 
leading industrial countries are ignoring the rot in their own backyards and the 
criminal bribe-paying activities of the multinational corporations headquartered 
in their own countries, while increasingly focusing on the high level of 
corruption in developing countries (Statement by Peter Eigen, Chairman TI, on 
the launch of the TI BPI, 2002). 
 
Further, at least two of the American multinational corporations with affiliates 
operating in Jamaica have been prosecuted and found guilty by the US Justice Department and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission for bribery (Good Year International, in 1989) and 
for violating books and records provisions of the FCPA (IBM, 2000).  Moreover, the corrupt 
use of corporate power contributing to the meltdown of the financial sector in the mid-1990s in 
Jamaica and along with this, the associated multi-billion dollar increase in the national debt 
just over one trillion Jamaican dollars or US$14 billion (at the time of writing). There can 
therefore be no doubt that enhanced measures to combat corruption and to reduce the threat to 
governance must place both the private and public sectors at the centre of attention.  
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5.3.4.2 Selected Public Sector Cases of Corruption in Jamaica   
 To demonstrate the enormity of the problem of failing CG structures and practices in 
Jamaica, such as weaknesses in institutional controls, gaps in regulations and absence of a 
mechanism to punish perpetuators of corruption, several case examples of corruption are 
summarised below. A few of these cases remain before the courts at the time of writing. These 
cases identified and briefly discussed corrupt practices (or perceived to be corruption) in 
government and the private sector and include various forms of corruption such as: the 
inappropriate award of contracts and instances of cronyism and fraud, ministerial negligence in 
the unauthorised purchasing of office furniture, overbilling of the public (customers) by a 
utility company, a salary scandal that later revealed that CEOs of State-Owned Enterprises 
were paying themselves excessive salaries, the misappropriation and use of government 
funding by a telecommunication start-up company, an incident of double billing by a 
contractor to the tune of nearly half billion Jamaican dollars, an incident of alleged bribery of a 
local politician by a foreign company in international oil trading; and criminal charges against 
a politician in the disappearances of several thousands of light bulb.   
The cases as shown in Table 5.4 and their associated costs demonstrate that corruption 
has both social and economic implications, and indeed results in underdevelopment, 
unemployment, and tangible economic implications for individuals, organisations and 
countries.  
Table 5.4:   Public Sector Scandals and Their Estimated Cost to the Jamaican Public 
 
Scandal 
 
Date 
Financial Cost to the Public (Jam$) 
– known or estimated 
US $Million) 
1. The Rollins Land Deal Scandal 1989 Unknown 
2. The Zinc Scandal 1989 5.6 
3. The Shell Waiver Scandal 1991 0.33 
4. The Furniture Scandal 1991 0.113 
5. The Operation Pride (1)/ NHDC Scandal 1997 56.0 
6. The JPSCo Overcharge Fisco 1998 1.0 
7. The Financial Sector Meltdown and business 
failures  
1990s 449.0 
8. The Fat Cats Public Sector Salary Scandal 1999 0.67 
10. The Netserv Scandal 2001 0.25 
11. The Operation Pride (2): NHDC Scandal 2003 4.49 
12. The National Solid Waste Scandal 2005 23.0 
13. The Sandals Whitehouse/UDC Scandal 2006 0.33 
14. The Trafigura Beheer BV Scandal 2007 0.34 
15. The Cuban Light Bulb Scandal 2007 3.8 
Total   US$544.92 
  Source: Jamaicaobserver.com; Jamaica-gleaner.com; Auditor-General of Jamaica: 
www.auditorgeneral.gov.jm and in-house archive.  
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 First, the Operation Pride (1)/ National Housing Development Corporation (NHDC) 
Scandal: Operation PRIDE, short for Programme for Resettlement and Integrated 
Development Enterprise, is an ongoing project managed by the NHDC.  In 1997 the Auditor 
General tabled a report which stated that J$57 million had been paid out for projects, without 
the appropriate arrangements for repayment. Further, Cabinet policies for awarding of 
contracts had not been adhered to in projects thus far. Easton Douglas, the then Minister of 
Environment and Housing, committed himself to implementing the recommendations of the 
Auditor-General.  
Second, the Furniture Scandal: In 1991 Ministers of Government in Michael Manley’s 
administration benefitted from a total of about 10 million Jamaican dollars spent on 
furnishings for their residences. For example, State Minister Ben Clare was fingered for 
having received US$6,896.60 of furnishing for his town house (jamaica-gleaner online, 2008). 
Third, JPS Overcharge Fiasco:  In 1998 consumers were overcharged by the Jamaica 
Public Service Company Limited, by over US$22.98 million. This fact was known to the 
Government but only became public when mentioned at a shareholder meeting. The company 
did not inform customers of the amount of the overcharge, but were enjoined by the 
Government to make repayments by January of the following year (jamaica-gleaner.com, 
1998).  
Fourth, the Fat Cats Public Sector Salary Scandal: In April 1999 the Opposition 
Spokesman on Finance revealed to the public that CEOs of some of Jamaica’s public entities 
had received pay hikes and perks that were beyond those of their private sector equivalents, 
and beyond even similar positions in developed countries. A Government committee was 
formed to address these excesses and recommend measures to prevent their recurrence 
(jamaica-gleaner.com, 2000).  
The Netserv Scandal:  Netserv, a telemarketing and teleservices company was one of 
several such operations receiving loans from the Jamaican government to set up businesses in 
Jamaica. Over J$90 million had been loaned before it was discovered that more than J$130 
million was lost and fund leakage had occurred. Loans were made without the proper due 
diligence, leaving the Government open to the risk of great loss (jamaicaobserver.com, 2003).
 The Operation Pride (2)/ NHDC Scandal:  Dr. Karl Blythe Minister of Water and 
Housing resigned in 2002, when massive cost overruns were revealed in the Operation PRIDE 
low income housing project. The four-member Angus Commission was created by P. J. 
Patterson, Prime Minister, to once again examine the management of the 100 plus Operation 
PRIDE construction sites (http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/pages/operationpride). 
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The National Solid Waste Scandal:  The National Solid Waste Management Authority 
(NSWMA), the government agency responsible for waste disposal, was found to have serious 
accounting weaknesses. Also the agency was found to be largely disregarding the procurement 
procedures required for hiring contractors to collect garbage in the capital. This was very 
embarrassing for then Local Government Minister Portia Simpson-Miller, with responsibility 
for this agency (jamaicaobserver.com, 2005). 
The Sandals Whitehouse/Urban Development Corporation (UDC) Scandal: The 
building of the Sandals Whitehouse property was heralded as a great opportunity for 
development on the country’s south coast. While the property was completed, this 
public/private sector partnership project was revealed to have incurred some US$43 million in 
cost overruns. The report of findings in the investigation of the overruns was condemned by 
the opposition as not being straightforward in assigning blame or responsibility.  
The Trafigura Beheer BV Scandal:  Trafigura Beheer BV is a Dutch oil trader which 
was contracted by the Jamaican government to sell Nigerian oil on its behalf. In April 2006, 
then opposition leader, Bruce Golding revealed that Trafigura had given the governing party, 
the PNP, $31 million dollars. The evidence he offered, a deposit slip, raised further 
controversy as the bank and the official responsible were slapped with a breach of 
confidentiality suit for the information leak (jamaicaobserver.com, 2008). 
The Cuban Light Bulb Scandal:  Kern Spencer, a PNP junior minister from 2007, along 
with others, was charged with fraud, corruption and money laundering, based on revelations 
from the Auditor General’s department. It was revealed that of 4 million energy-saving light 
bulbs donated by the Cuban government, for free distribution in Jamaica, over 175,000 bulbs 
valuing 92 million dollars could not be located. Irregularities were also highlighted in the 
granting of contracts to bulb distribution support services (www.jamaicaobserver.com, 2008).   
 
5.3.5 Regulatory Responses  
What anticorruption measures have been employed in Jamaica, if any? Have these 
measures worked?   In response to the forgoing failures in CG as demonstrated in the several 
examples of political and corporate private sector corruption, the Government of Jamaica 
embarked on the development and implementation of a swathe of legislation of which the 
more salient ones have been examined.  These include the Public Bodies Management and 
Accountability Act, 2001, the Access to Information Act, 2002 and the Corruption Prevention, 
Act 2003.  
[177] 
 
5.3.5.1 The Corruption Prevention Act  
The Corruption (Prevention) Act came into effect in 2003 and was intended to directly 
address the problem of reported widespread dishonesty in the public sector. The Act mandated 
the creation of the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption. This body serves as the main 
agency for the enactment of the terms of the Act. Under this edict, public sector employees 
who meet certain criteria, including those who earn over two million dollars, and other agents 
as outlined by the law, are required to submit statutory declarations of their assets and income 
to the Commission. They must do so upon entering or demitting their post, and at the 
discretion of the Commission. By recording and processing this information, the Commission 
is able to investigate those whose legitimate earnings are exceeded by their assets. The 
Commission also accepts and investigates reports of corruption. At its discretion, it looks into 
cases where it believes acts of corruption have taken place.  
The Commission may call to a hearing anyone who has not responded to its inquiries in a 
satisfactory manner. Should a person deliberately fail to file his declarations or knowingly 
include inaccurate information in his declaration/response to the Commission, he can be 
charged in the Courts. The Act also attempts to define, in detail, an act of corruption. This 
includes the offer of a bribe to a public official by a Jamaican locally and even in a foreign 
locale. Benefiting from or soliciting such a bribe is also included.  Court-issued fines for 
offences under the Act extend to as much as 10 million dollars and/or 10 years in prison. The 
Act also allows for the seizure, by the state, of property that cannot be accounted for as 
lawfully earned.   
5.3.5.2 The Proposed Whistle Blower’s Legislation 
In March of 2009, The Jamaica Cabinet of Ministers issued drafting instructions for the 
proposed Whistleblower legislation, which seeks to facilitate the disclosure of information 
about wrong-doing to the relevant authorities, and provide for the protection of persons 
making those disclosures. Private Sector Organisations are also to be included so as to capture 
all forms of wrongdoing that can be reported within an organisation. It will also speak to gross 
mismanagement or misconduct that has occurred, or is about to occur.  The green paper also 
indicates that disclosures can also be made if someone within an organisation has a legal 
obligation to act or carry out an activity and does not do so, or if there was a miscarriage of 
justice, or the likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
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According to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Jamaica38, "there is a 
culture of snitching in our society. This is really giving protection to those persons who want 
to come forward and talk."  Senator Lightbourne pointed out that the definition of employee 
under the legislation had been widened to cover independent contractors, and would also bring 
into the loop, voluntary, religious, and charitable organisations.  Furthermore, the legislation 
will mandate organisations to designate a person to whom acts deemed as corrupt or 
mismanagement can be reported, and that such persons will be obliged to investigate and deal 
with the matter. It is recognised that the person to whom a disclosure is to be made can be 
implicated, and for this reason, provisions for another route to blow the whistle if the blower is 
not comfortable with the person to whom he/she should blow the whistle. The Senator further 
states:  “the structure being put in place would enable whistle blowers to make disclosures to 
responsible persons such as a legal advisor, Minister, among several others.” 
Delicate and very sensitive information that pose threats to national security will also 
be considered.  For instance, if a person is in possession of information on matters of national 
security, provision would be made that such information be provided to the Prime Minister (as 
head of Defense) as it is critical not to endanger National Security.  Additionally, provisions 
will be made to ensure that persons, who need protection after giving information, have the 
backing of the witness protection programme (Ibid).  What does this protection mean? This 
protection means that if a whistle blower suffers any form of victimisation he/she could take 
the matter to court.  Where such persons do not have the money to go to court, it is proposed in 
the legislation that such persons be provided with legal aid.  In terms of the possibility of 
mischief, this had been taken into consideration and hence, one of the requirements is that the 
person making the disclosure must do so in good faith, and they must have a reasonable belief 
in the truth of the disclosure, that the wrong-doing has taken place, or is about to take place. 
Confidentiality of client/lawyer or doctor/patient breaches will not be protected under 
the proposed legislation and neither will it protect persons who have been proven to be guilty 
of an offence under the Official Secrets Act, or Corruption Prevention Act, by making such 
disclosures.  
Sources: http://www.jis.gov.jm; Green Paper: “Proposed Whistle Blower Legislation—In 
Search of a Model for Jamaica”. February 2008  
                                               
38
 Senator Dorothy Lightbourne in an address to a post-Cabinet Press Conference on the proposed legislation. 
http://www.mns.org.jm/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uZBA0u5aeEk%3D&tabid=36&mid=385. 
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5.3.5.3 Public Bodies Management and Accountability Act, 2001, (PBMA) 
 
This piece of legislation came about at the request of the then Opposition Spokesman 
on Finance, Mr. Audley Shaw (now Minister of Finance and the Public Service), who called 
for legislation to strengthen public sector governance and improve internal control.  It was in 
direct response to the Fat Cats’ Scandal of 1999.   
The PBMA Act, 2001, was amended in 2003 to include all statutory bodies and 
specifies the duties of public sector Boards, management and auditors. This legislation outlines 
the contents and due dates of financial reports, the corporate plan, and the annual, half-yearly 
and quarterly reports. These documents are to be submitted to the responsible Minister, and the 
Audit Commission, who review them and address any issues raised. The Minister then tables 
the relevant documents in Parliament. The Act delineates the relationship between the 
responsible Minister and the Board. It requires the public body to gain approval from the 
Minister with respect to borrowing, the corporate plan, dismissal of auditors, and formation of 
new companies by the entity in question. It also calls on the Board to advise the Minister on 
any policy related to that particular entity.   
The Act speaks to the creation of Audit Committees within Boards, outlining the duties 
of these bodies, and stipulating the conditions for the enactment of special (external) audits. 
The duties, guidelines for appointment, and right to information of the company auditor are 
also outlined. The Act gives conditions and expectations for the Directors as they carry out 
their duties, such as the process of determining remuneration for Directors, and their right to 
voice dissent to a Board decision taken in their absence. The Act has a special feature, in that it 
outlines the conditions under which the Courts may charge that a breach has taken place and 
allows for sanctions against the offending party (within certain bounds).  
  
5.3.5.4 Access to Information Act 2002 
 
The difficulty experienced by journalists and the general Jamaican citizenry in 
accessing Government information, has been a problem for many decades. In June 2002, 
Jamaica passed into law, The Access to Information Act, 2002, which came into full effect on 
July 5, 2005 after more than 10 years before Parliament. It aims at reinforcing fundamental 
democratic principles vital to achieving a more transparent and accountable Government, and 
increased public influence on, and participation in national decision making.  This Act 
provides for free access to information contained in official government documents for the 
public in general. Individuals seeking such information are not obligated in any way to reveal 
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the motivations for their request. Rather, it is the Government which must present this 
information or else give a valid reason for not being able to supply it. One major reason for the 
unavailability of material is that it may be exempt from the requirements of the Act.  
Exemption is conferred when the responsible Minister, or the Prime Minister, issues a 
certificate to that effect. This can be granted on the basis that public viewing of the material 
may be potentially detrimental to national security, public safety, and investigations being 
carried out by law enforcement agencies. Access to Cabinet documents is also restricted to 
information which is factual, scientific or technical. If there is the real risk of harm to the 
national economy or national historic sites, then such documents will be exempted from the 
force of the Act. This freedom of information Act simplifies the process and lowers the cost of 
gaining information from Government documents. By doing so, the process of democracy is 
enhanced and individual liberties strengthened.  
While this new relationship between citizens and government may be signalling a 
groundbreaking departure from an age-old culture of secrecy, many questions remain to be 
answered. Why are some entities and documents excluded, or included? Is accessibility too 
cumbersome and expensive? Is the right of citizens to access information being met?  These 
questions are beyond the scope of this discussion but remain relevant to the importance and 
rationale of this new piece of legislation.  
Source: Access to Information Act 2002;   
Cabinet Officer, Office of the Prime Minister  
 
 
5.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
This chapter analyses regulation and corruption in the context of public policy in Jamaica.  
It draws heavily on local empirical research and case evidence combined with results from 
fieldwork using interviews and case studies. Jamaica has had a number of incidents of 
corruption and corporate misdeeds and at least one major financial collapse which brought the 
economy to a virtual halt in the 1990s.  In response to these, public policy realities, several 
new laws were enacted to regulate mainly the financial sectors, with others addressing issues 
of public service, governance and behavior of professionals, both in the public and private 
sectors. Key regulations studied included the BOJ Act, FSC Act, PBMAA, the role of the JSE 
and the JDIC. These laws were analysed based on their relevance (actual outcome versus 
intended purpose)to this chapter and against the background of a more detailed gap analysis in 
chapter 8.  
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A most profound finding of this analysis was that in spite of the very complex web of 
legislations,  or as many would argue, over-regulation, significant gaps exist which must be 
corrected to ensure soundness, security, and greater confidence in the existing regulatory 
framework.  Findings on the relationship of regulation and public policy also indicate that it is 
critical that sound empirical evidence drive public policy, and in term, policies should be 
aimed at plugging holes in economic regulatory weaknesses.   
On the issue of corruption, the analysis addresses its perception, causes, implications, 
incidence and case evidence from the Jamaica perspective.  The issue is unquestionably, one 
of Jamaica’s most pressing challenges to public policy and country reputation. In fact, from 
analysis of empirical evidence which point to the Jamaican public’s negative views on this 
issue—corruption is most prevalent among the police, Parish Councils and Customs 
department, and corruption is increasing with the passing of time.  It is difficult to detect, and 
perpetuators are not being caught and punished, and though anti-corruption laws are adequate 
in many regards, but government agencies are either too weak to enforce them, the anti-
corruption rules are inadequate and are not effective. With these perceptions in mind, Jamaica 
needs to reconsider its anti-corruption strategy to ensure that the issues of and fight against 
corruption is dealt with once and for all.  Strategies to curb corruption are key components of 
this study and are discussed in chapter 8.    
The analysis of this chapter shows that CG often involves market failures, even amidst 
the presence of complex and functional regulatory frameworks, which can result in a less than 
optimal outcome for business and Government, principals and agents. It also shows that 
market failures can serve as a basis for regulatory innovation and strengthening.  It is hardly 
possible to predict exact outcomes of business deals and uncertainties. Therefore, public policy 
responses must be such that the mitigating efforts are in place to prevent the likeliness of 
potential market disequilibrium and failures by ensuring that appropriate regulatory reform is 
achieved.  
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CHAPTER 6.0:  FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS: OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL, 
STAKEHOLDER RELATIONS AND PERCEPTION AND ROLE 
OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTEROS  
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter integrates fieldwork findings obtained from the Interviewer’s 
Administered Questionnaire Survey (IAQS) with case study and focus groups in analysing CG 
issues to determine what boards actually do versus perceptions of goes on behind closed 
boardroom doors.  
 The areas of focus of this chapter include: 6.2, ownership and control patterns; 6.3, role 
and nature of stakeholder relations (representation); and 6.4, perceptions and role of 
institutional investors. These areas are in response to research problems and questions of 
chapters 1 and 4, respectively. Theoretical and empirical comparisons of the research literature 
of chapter 3 are drawn. The more specific areas have been detailed under each major heading.  
Section 6.5 is the summary and conclusions.  
 
6.2      OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL PATTERNS  
6.2.1 Introduction   
The nature of ownership and control of Jamaican firms is critical to successful CG 
reform. From the analysis of chapter three, reforms are more prevalent and accelerated at a 
greater pace in jurisdictions such as the USA and the UK where more disperse ownership of 
stock markets prevail. Governance reforms tend to progress at much slower rates in 
jurisdictions where ownership is more concentrated or closely held, such as Japan and 
Germany.  The analysis of ownership and control in chapter three also points to two factors of 
critical importance in the ownership and control debate on CG. These are the identity of 
shareholders and the concentration of shareholdings.  In this section, several questions are 
posed for which answers are sought in advancing the debate around ownership and control, or 
the separation of both.   
 
6.2.2 Findings of this Research 
  
  In conducting this survey, great care was taken to sample a wide cross-section of 
industries through random stratified means, to provide the truest reality of the Jamaican 
context based on prevailing business sectors.  In addressing the question of: What is the  
dominant ownership structure of your Company? (See Question #1, IAQS) 
 the results in Table 6.1 reflect at least nine different ownership patterns which bear 
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similarities in the identity of their ownership, while others are quite distinct.  However, no 
further care was taken to segment shareholders and so the results shown in Table 6.1 emerged 
naturally, and provide an eclectic perspective of the pattern of firm ownership in the Jamaican 
context. Additionally, listed corporations (publicly-listed, family-dominated management and 
foreign-owned subsidiaries) account for 27 of 49, or 55.2%, of the firms sampled. 
  
Table 6.1: Dominant Ownership Structure  
Ownership Structure Frequency Valid % 
Publicly-listed   19 38.9 
Family dominated management-
listed  
 
5 
 
10.2 
Foreign-owned subsidiary-Listed 3 6.1 
Foreign-owned subsidiary-Not 
listed 
 
1 
 
2.0 
Private-Multi-partners 6 12.2 
Private – Family-dominated 
management  
 
3 
 
6.1 
Locally-owned subsidiary 5 10.2 
Mutual  2 4.1 
Other  5 10.2 
Total  49 100.00 
Source: Interviews (n=49; missing value=1) 
 
However, this figure under-represents the number of respondent companies that are 
actually listed on the Jamaica Stock Market as the respondents have chosen to select the more 
dominant ownership position of the companies at the time of the interview.   
Therefore, a closer analysis of the results in Table 6.1 showed that family-dominated 
management, private-multi-partners and private-family-dominated management account for 
10.2%, 12.2%, and 6.1%, respectively. The aggregate effect of this is a 28.5% control of 
Jamaican businesses by family-owned and operated firms. These figures represent what was 
revealed during interviews and not necessarily the existing realities as even among some of the 
firms classified as publicly-listed (Table 6.1), they are significantly controlled and influenced 
on a day-to-day basis by founding families, their close relatives, and cronies (personal 
knowledge).  Table 6.1, therefore, reflects the realities of the largest Jamaica firms, and to a 
partial extent, their true ownership and control patterns—with consideration to the author’s 
explanation about realities beneath the surface of actual practices versus what is reported in 
interviews.   
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The following examples further demonstrate the influence and significance of the 
pattern of concentrated ownership in Jamaica.  Six of the largest groups of publicly-listed 
companies are owned and managed by the original families.  Jamaica Broilers Group is owned 
and managed by the Levy family with a 80% controlling interest.  The Johnston and Hall 
families are significant share owners in Jamaica Producers Group and dominate both Board 
membership and senior executive management.  The Lascelles, de Mercardo and Carreras 
Groups are majority owned and managed (Lascelles) by the McConnell and Ashenheim 
families).  The Jamaica Money Market Brokers is majority owned and controlled by the 
Duncan and Lyon Families.  The NCB Group of Companies is 75% owned by Michael Lee-
Chin who is Chairman, while key family members control the boards of other subsidiaries. 
These six companies accounted for twenty-six per cent (26%) of the value of domestic market 
capitalisation and just over one-third (33 1/3%) of the profits earned in 2008 among Jamaican 
stock market listed companies (JSE Annual Report, 2008).  
It is noteworthy that of the sampled companies, 27, or 55.2%, are listed on the Jamaica 
Stock Market and actually represented 64.29% of all stock market listed firms at December 31, 
2008.  Of this number, 17 (or 34.6% of sampled companies) are closely held vis-à-vis (being) 
owned and managed by prominent Jamaican families. Therefore, from observing this data at 
surface levels, just over a third of Jamaican stock market companies are owned and controlled 
by family groupings.   
 In performing cross tabulation analyses of these results, data in Tables 6.2a and 6.2.b 
show that there is no relationship between the number of Directors on the Board and whether 
there is a highly dispersed or a closely held ownership structure of Jamaican companies. 
Where ownership is highly dispersed, the number of Directors on the board is 75% likely to be 
10 members or less, while for boards where ownership is closely held, they  have a 62.5% 
likelihood to be less than 11 compared to 37.5% likelihood of having more than 11 members. 
Based on this data, dispersed ownership appears to be more likely to have fewer board 
members than closely held. 
 Table 6.2c shows similar cross tabulation performed to determine whether or not there 
exists any relationship between highly dispersed dominant ownership and closely held 
dominant ownership structures among independent NEDs. While there was no statistical 
significance pointing to any relationship the highly-dispersed firms were twice as likely to 
have more than five members who were independent NEDs, 47% compared to 25% for 
closely-held firms.  
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Table 6.2b: Number of Non-Executive Directors (NED) Cross Tabulated with 
Dominant ownership dispersed versus closely held  
Number of NEDs 
on Board 
Dominant ownership dispersed versus close ownership 
Highly Dispersed Closely Held 
N % N % 
less than 8 2 10.53 1 12 
8 - 10 6 31.59 3 37 
11 - 12 8 42.10 3 37 
13 and over 3 15.78 1 12 
Total 19 100 8 100 
Chi Square χ² Asymp Sig.= 0.985 
 
It is not surprising that highly dispersed firms are more likely to have a higher number 
of NEDs who are independent. These highly dispersed firms are largely stock market listed 
based on the data of this study and personal experience. They are more subjected to the 
requirements of the Jamaica Stock Exchange which prescribe that all members of the audit 
committee should be independent outsiders. In addition, about one-third of the dispersed firms 
were also financial institutions, both banking and credit unions. In fact, the BOJ Act requires 
that the Directors of their regulated entities, especially Chairmen, members of risk 
management and audit committees, all be independent NEDs. In the case of credit unions, 
approximately 100% of their NEDs (and they usually have almost 100% NEDs, except one 
employee representative based on their Constitution) are required to be independent. Thus, the 
preceding explains why these findings and interpretations required knowledge of the 
environment beyond just mere raw data.  In spite all that has been said, when one probes even 
further, it would not be surprising if many of the purported NEDs turn out to be not 
Table 6.2a: Number of Directors on Board cross tabulated with Dominant 
Ownership Dispersed versus closely held Ownership Structure 
Board Size  
Dominant Ownership 
Highly Dispersed Closely Held 
N % N % 
less than 8 4 21 1 12.5 
8 - 10 10 53 4 50 
11 - 12 2 10 2 25 
13 and over 3 16 1 12.5 
Total 19 100 8 100 
Chi Square χ² Asymp Sig.= 0.785 
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independent, given the propensity in Jamaica for cronyism, especially at the level of corporate 
boardrooms. 
  
Table 6.2c: Independent Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) Cross Tabulated with 
Dominant ownership dispersed versus close held ownership 
Independent 
NEDs 
Dominant ownership dispersed versus close ownership 
Highly Dispersed Closely Held 
N % N % 
2 and less  4 21 3 37.5 
3 – 5 6 32 3 37.5 
More than 5 9 47 2 25 
Total 19 100 8 100 
Chi Square χ² Asymp Sig.= 0.512 
 
 
6.2.3 An Integration of Findings across Methodological Approaches   
In fulfilling the need to grasp a closer view of what really happens in the boardroom, as 
well as to improve the weaknesses of the IASQ with the counter-balancing strengths of other 
methodological approaches, and vice versa,  three in-depth case studies were conducted. As 
shown in Table 6.3a, case companies ownership characteristics (except the mutual), display 
close similarity to earlier results obtained in the survey in that ownership and control is 
characterised by dominant groups of shareholding individuals, institutional investors, Directors 
and officers, investment companies, and unit trusts, among others.  
Table 6.3a: Level of Shareholding of different Category of Shareholders  
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Conglomerate  
 
51.96 
 
29.76 
 
4.05 
 
5.28 
 
9.48 
100 = 329.30m 
units 
Merchant 
Bank  
 
64.9 
 
19.04  
 
14.1 
 
1.46  
 
0.5 
100 
927.59m 
Mutual  Nil Nil  Nil  Nil  Nil  Nil  
Source: Data were extrapolated from GraceKennedy Limited Annual Report, 2007; Capital & Credit Merchant 
Bank Ltd. Annual Report, 2008; Jamaica National Director’s Report & Financial Statements, 2008; 
www.gracekennedy.com; www.capital-credit.com; www.jnbs.com.  
 
Based on the investment companies and unit trusts as identified in Table 6.3a, these are 
companies that buy stocks and shares on behalf of their clients and, therefore, do not own 
these units.  The investors or owners of these shares could be individuals, corporations or 
trusts, and others. Also, an attempt was made to demonstrate to what extent, if any, a case may 
be managed (and controlled) by major shareholders. In the case of the mutual society, not 
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being a shareholding company, it will offer much less scope for a comparative analysis in 
instances where the discussion is specific to shareholding companies.  
The conglomerate is governed by a 13-member Board of Directors comprising 8 NEDs 
and 5 Executive Directors or insiders. Two members of the Board are women and of the 8 
NEDs, 4 can be considered independent in that they have no known or obvious contracts or 
significant material relationship with the company. This case company has enjoyed an 
illustrious history of successful corporate leaders over the last eighty (80) years.  Its 
shareholding distribution is shown in Table 6.3a and represents 329.3 million of 
ordinary outstanding stock units.  The ten (10) largest shareholders possess an aggregate 
of 119.76m shares or 36% of all outstanding shares as shown in Table 6.3b.   This by all 
means is a significant block for the 10 largest shareholders and may be indicative of the 
influence and power these shareholders may have on this company.  
An analysis of the Annual Report (2008) showed that the Chairman and CEO owns 
5.77 million stock units or 1.75% compared to the Chairman and CEO of the merchant 
bank whose shareholdings are dispersed across several interconnected companies and 
cannot be easily determined without knowing his exact holding in each of the associated 
companies. These connected companies are mostly privately-held and therefore, unlike 
the financials of the flagship merchant bank, there is no obligation for their books to be 
made available for public scrutiny.   
Table 6.3b: Level of Shareholding of Top Ten Shareholders 
 
Case Companies  
 
Stake of Top Ten shareholders 
 
Conglomerate  
 
36.0% (119.76/$329.30 million Units) 
 
Merchant Bank  
 
83.8% (772.2/927.59 million units) 
Mutual Society  Nil  
Source: Data were extrapolated from GraceKennedy Limited Annual Report, 2007; Capital & Credit Merchant 
Bank Ltd. Annual Report, 2008; Jamaica National Director’s Report & Financial Statements, 2008; 
www.gracekennedy.com; www.capital-credit.com; www.jnbs.com 
 
In the case of the merchant bank, it is led by a Board of Directors drawn primarily from 
the financial sector and each in his/her own right is a distinguished leader with an average of 
30 years professional experience.  It re-invented itself in 2008 by successfully transitioning 
from being a privately-held entity to a publicly-owned company. On May 14 of that year, it 
listed approximately one billion ordinary shares on the Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago 
Exchanges following a re-structuring exercise. Simultaneously, Capital and Credit Merchant 
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Bank (CCMB), the group flagship entity, de-listed its ordinary shares, which are now listed as 
preference shares on the two Stock Exchanges. 
 Also, in Table 6.3a, institutional investors (pension funds, insurance companies, trust 
companies, private companies, listed companies, and others) are the dominant group of 
shareholders of the bank company, accounting for more than twice (64.9%) the shareholdings 
of private individuals (19.04%), while investment companies and unit trusts own a mere 
1.96% (1.46% + 0.5%).  Unlike in the conglomerate company where Directors and officers 
own a meagre 4.05% of ordinary shares, the figure is a whopping 14.1% in the merchant 
company.  Furthermore, a closer dissecting of the data shows that two employees (Group 
President & CEO and Group Deputy President & CEO) jointly own 35.7% of issues shares (or 
21.9% and 13.8%, respectively). Their shareholdings represent 99.88% of the lot of all 
Directors and officers combined.  
This closely held ownership arrangement typifies the trend and nature of ownership 
and control patterns in Jamaica where the dominant shareholder groups are either institutional 
investors representing corporations, family networks, or significant block holders of stocks and 
shares.  Also, it is instructive to note that in the case of the merchant bank only 27% of the 
registered shares have been issued and fully listed.  The trend, based on JSE information, is 
that an average of 25 % of the registered shares of companies are usually issued and with even 
fewer allocated to regular trading (JSE 2008 data).   
 The Board of Directors of the mutual society, eleven men and two women, brings 
a diversity of knowledge, skills and experience (consistent with the requirements of the 
Companies Act of Jamaica, 2004 and the Combined Code, 2006), indicative of their varied 
backgrounds spanning law, finance, accounting, medicine, engineering, commerce, and 
entrepreneurship. The mean age and tenure of service were 55 and 30 years, 
respectively.  
In spite the contrasting position of not being a shareholding company, as in the 
cases of the conglomerate and merchant companies, ownership is vested in its 
depositors.  A depositor is a member and a member is seen as an owner. The mutual offers 
services very similar (if not the same) to those of commercial banks and other international 
mutual financial institutions.  In some markets, mutual societies offer very competitive interest 
rates and fee tariffs on savings and deposit accounts, mortgages, and loans. The members who 
save and borrow with the mutual ultimately own the business.   
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Focus Group Results Integrated:  In an attempt to obtain more details on the merits or 
demerits of ownership and concentration, particularly high ownership concentration in 
Jamaica, focus group respondents were asked the question:  Is High Ownership Concentration 
a threat to CG development in Jamaica? All participants agreed that high ownership 
concentration is a threat to accountability and good governance. In support of this position, it 
was noted that the traditional approach in Jamaica has tended to be that of limited 
accountability by owner/Directors.  One General Manager/CEO noted, “While this pattern has 
been easily identifiable in small companies it has also become evident in medium and large 
size companies as some of the smaller companies, have grown….” Directors who are closely 
tied with the ownership, or who are owners themselves have limited incentives to improve 
their knowledge of emerging corporate CG issues.  They may be inclined to sacrifice good 
governance for strategic value.  Also, there is less need to maintain good relations with a larger 
group of shareholders.  
How then, if at all, does ownership and control impact board composition and 
leadership? The pattern of ownership and control of Jamaican firms observed in this study 
(through interviews, case studies, and focus groups) finds concurrence with the work of the 
late Professor Carl Stone (1988), who opined that the corporate power of the ethnic minority 
extends their strategic location in sectors and dominates the Boards of Directors. This 
ownership pattern also influences who gets big loans and how enterprises are treated when 
they run into financial problems. Additionally, the minority ethnic class who already owns the 
majority of Jamaican big businesses controls the big distribution channels and determines 
which goods reach the mass market through their private networks. They operate as 
gatekeepers of the private sector and exercise enormous power over the fate of small business 
enterprises.  
In response to yet another question: To what extent, if at all, does ownership structure 
influence the adoption of modern CG Best Practices? The findings relating to Jamaican 
ownership and control realities can explain the many challenges to CG in Jamaica.  First, is the 
limited takeover market—non-existence of a market for corporate control as only a fraction of 
the issued shares are usually traded regularly (JSE information, 2008), and where large blocks 
of shares are traded, these are usually pre-arranged between family members and/or members 
of the “network”. Second, is a highly under-developed new issue market—for example, 
between 1994 and 2004, no company was listed on the JSE and since 2004 to the time of 
writing (2009), there were only four new listings of ordinary shares and four listings (NCB 
Capital Markets, Mayberry Investments, Pan-Caribbean Investments, and Capital & Credit 
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Merchant Bank) of preference shares. This lull has been one of the lowest rates of new listings 
among regional and international stock markets.  Third is a high degree of insider board–
comprised mainly of family members and persons close to the family network. Fourth, is poor 
quality and inadequate information disclosure.  Fifth, is that incentives are usually aligned to 
dominant shareholders—with very low dividend payout ratios (less than 15% on average) on 
common shares, while preference shareholders (usually dominant family groupings) enjoy 
much higher returns.  These five challenges, identified as associated with Jamaica’s ownership 
and control patterns, bear similarity to the features that have characterised jurisdictions (stock 
markets) with high concentrations of shareholdings and whose shares are held by a small 
minority of individuals or institutions, e.g., Germany and France.  Most importantly, these 
jurisdictions are among the slowest to adapt emerging and modern CG reforms, e.g., Japan, 
France, and Germany.  
In advancing the findings of Stone (1988), the problem of the high ownership and 
control of Jamaican firms continues to have influence on the political aspects of the economy. 
The ethnic minorities have for a long time been the main financiers of Jamaica’s political 
parties. They influence which personalities move from one political party to another, if and 
when they return, and under what conditions.  They were the first, and often the only ones to 
be bailed-out when their businesses run into financial problems, and they are the first to find 
comfort in a quickly carved position in some other institution—usually financial, whether or 
not they are ideally suited for it (Stone 1988; supported by more recent political and business 
experience).  
  
6.2.4 Pros and Cons of High Ownership Concentration  
As one focus group respondent in an attempt to bring balance to the debate puts it: 
“there was the real possibility of good CG existing in closely held companies, given the checks 
and balances created by relations with such entities as banks, regulators, and customers.” He 
noted that there is a trend currently for improved training and accountability in the leadership 
of closely held companies. The case companies’ research has also demonstrated that owner-
managed firms (or those in which owners retain a significant percent of capital base and 
maintain a presence) display excellent leadership and company performance.  For example, the 
case companies under review represent three of Jamaica’s best managed and governed 
companies which have been publishing statements on their corporate governance activities for 
the past many years in their respective Annual Reports and web sites, and have gone through 
different stages of CG self-regulation including the establishment of board committees, 
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reduction of board size (conglomerate only), and the publication of Codes of Ethics and 
Business Conduct. Also, the Chairman of the holding company of the merchant bank (since its 
establishment), has been known for his conservative, but astute, results-oriented and successful 
business acumen.  Since its inception, the merchant bank has been recognised with several 
outstanding awards including the Ernst and Young Caribbean Entrepreneur of the Year Award 
in 2000 and in 2004, the Jamaica Employers’ Federation (JEF) Employer of Choice Award for 
medium-sized companies, and the Private Sector Organization of Jamaica’s Job Creation 
Award in recognition of its contribution to creating job opportunities for the local economy. 
The bank was also honoured in 2004 by the former Bear Stearns for “10 years of excellence in 
the world of global banking and for setting a high standard within the Jamaican community.”  
Additionally, the firm has weathered Jamaica’s economic turmoil of the 1990s, natural 
disasters, and even civil unrest, to become, over 15 years, Jamaica’s most successful merchant 
bank with shareholders’ equity of US$60 million (Dec. 31 2007) and just over US$600 million 
(2007) of assets under management.  In April 2006, the Chairman of the Group was named 
Business Leader of the Year 2005 by the Jamaica Observer, for his steadfastness in guiding the 
Capital & Credit Financial Group along a consistently profitable path, despite difficulties faced 
by the Jamaican financial sector (CCMB Annual Report, 2008).  
 Finally, a Credit Suisse study has shown that firms which retain a family stake of 10% 
or more of the capital base enjoy superior performance over their respective social peers. Since 
1996, this superior performance amounts to 8% per year (www.credit-suisse.com/research/en).  
Another study by Business Week declared, “Look Beyond Six Sigma and the latest technology 
fad. One of the biggest strategic advantages a company can have is blood line.”  In this study, 
Business Week identifies five key ingredients that contribute to superior performance. While 
not all the qualities can be considered unique to firms with retained family interests, they go a 
far way in explaining why ownership and control, rather than separation, i.e., having someone 
from within at the helm, works, with beneficiaries gaining more than a pay check and the 
prospect of a hefty retirement package (www.businessweek.com/magazine/content).  
  
6.3   THE ROLE OF STAKEHOLDER RELATIONS (REPRESENTATION)  
6.3.1 Introduction  
Many arguments have been postulated in the literature of Stakeholder Theory, though a 
key contrast has been drawn between the tenets of Stakeholder Theory and the conventional 
input-output model of the firm. The latter sees the firm as converting investor, supplier, and 
employee inputs into customer outputs (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). In contrast, 
Stakeholder Theory argues that every legitimate person or group taking part in the activities of 
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an organisation does so to obtain benefits and that the priority of the interests of all legitimate 
stakeholders is not self-evident. 
The traditional view sees shareholders (owners of shares) as the only legitimate 
owners.  This has been the accepted norm in most countries’ business laws and therefore 
suggests that the firm has a fiduciary duty to see to shareholders first, in increasing value to 
them. In the conventional input-output models of a corporation, the inputs of financiers, 
employees, and suppliers are converted to marketable outputs that are purchased by customers 
and hence return capital (some benefit) to the firm.  In this latter model, unfortunately, the firm 
tended only to the needs and other interests of the identifiable stakeholders above.  
However, this thesis on stakeholders, adapts a more instrumental approach to the 
corporation by integrating both the resource-based view and the market-based view. Hence, 
these views are used to guide the analysis of the case companies under review and to define 
the specific stakeholders—the normative theory by Donaldson—stakeholder identification (or 
identity) as well as examining the conditions under which these parties should be treated as 
stakeholders (the descriptive theory of stakeholder salience or salient stakeholders).   In the 
context of this study, the stakeholders involved are innumerable: governmental bodies, 
political groups, trade associations, trade unions, communities, associated corporations, 
prospective and current employees, prospective customers and current customers, and the 
public at large.  This study also found competitors to be legitimate stakeholders and whose 
relationships with case companies are not always antagonistic as this thesis will later prove. 
See Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Mitchell, Agle and Wood, 1997; Freeman and Miles, 2002; 
and Phillips, 2003.  
 The remainder of this section on stakeholder relations (representation) is subdivided into 
6.3.2, findings—this is further segmented into stakeholders’ identity, and identity and 
legitimacy, and proposes a prototype model for better understanding the interaction, identity 
and behaviour of several stakeholders among the three case companies. The next subsection, 
6.3.3, addresses trade union and employee representation and draws on interview surveys; 
6.3.4 integrates methodological approaches and serves as the basis for section conclusions. 
The findings and discussion of this section are also based on Figure 6.1, dubbed: Case 
Companies Stakeholder Relationship Cause and Effect Model.  
 
6.3.2 Findings of this Study 
6.3.2.1 Stakeholder Identity  
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What are the identities of an organisation's stakeholders and what legitimises their 
claims?  The question of what is stakeholder relations, who are stakeholders, and what 
attributes or relationship they should posses to claim legitimacy, have all been points of 
contention over many decades. Why are stakeholders important to CG and should rebel 
groups, environmentalists, media and competitors, be considered legitimate?  According to 
Phillips (2004), at the very minimum, they should include groups and individuals from whom 
the organisation has voluntarily accepted benefits, and to whom the organisation has therefore 
incurred obligations of fairness. In other words, stakeholders should be contributing in as 
much as they are benefitting from the organisation—a kind of symbiotic relationship—and 
could include bankers, financiers, employees, customers, suppliers, and local communities at-
large.  
This study has identified three distinct groups of stakeholders as having the most 
significant influence on the affairs of the case companies under review. Above all else, 
respondent interviews, extensive review of their activities formally—Annual Reports, Filings 
with the JSE, JSE Best Practice Competition data, media reports, financial analysts’ reports, 
web sites, attendance and participation in at least four investor briefings, five AGMs—and 
informally through casual discussions with company officials, concluded that the salient 
stakeholders include: 1.) bank and employee stakeholders 2.), regulators, and 3.) watchdog 
groups. These have been categorised into groups based on their influences in providing legal 
and regulatory framework for compliance reporting and CG best practice monitoring, the 
services and products they provide, and their lobbying power. Bank and employee 
stakeholders are further divided into debt holders and creditors, institutional investors, 
minority shareholders and employees.   In this next section, shareholders’ identities and 
legitimacy are discussed, as well as, how organisations and stakeholders benefit each other in 
the symbiotic manner expressed earlier. See Figure 6.1. 
 
6.3.2.2  Identity and Legitimacy  
  Regulators:  In the context of the case companies, regulators provide supervision, 
monitoring for compliance with regulations, sanctions for non-compliance, set standards of 
practice under the respective industry subsectors—Bank of Jamaica regulates the banking 
sector, the Financial Services Commission regulates the securities industry while the JSE 
establishes guidelines for listed companies through its “JSE Rules and Requirements for 
listing”. At the corporate level, the employees of regulatory bodies and their families are 
themselves consumers of the services and products offered by these case companies, and as 
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such, are clients and customers, and hence a collective source of revenue providers—a 
resource-based model relationship.  
 The case companies in return react to regulatory requirements through a compliance 
regime involving several actions: they ensure that skilled and knowledgeable human capital is 
in place, establishing appropriate guidelines in writing and communicating these through staff 
training, filing different reports periodically and as needs be, reporting violations and other 
actions (disclosure regime, change in shareholding and directorships, and so on.).  Also, the 
case companies pay licensing fees to regulators and filing fees to the Companies Office of 
Jamaica (promulgator of the Companies Act of Jamaica, 2004) and membership fees to the 
JSE.  Case companies services and products are demanded and consumed by the regulators 
and thus they are suppliers of goods and services to these regulators.  
Additionally, these regulators themselves (the regulatory institutions and their 
employees) are regulated by such entities as the Companies Office of Jamaica, Island 
Revenue, Financial Services Commission—also regulates the Stock Exchange as an entity 
dealing in securities. Therefore, there is a web of overlapping interactions within the 
regulatory sector and between individuals and this is extended to relationships between the 
regulators collectively (and individually) and case companies. See Figure 6.1 which depicts 
this theoretical relationship in a ‘Cause and Effect” Prototype Model’.  
Banks are quite a diversified group whose individual constituents require their own 
unique analysis given their importance to the stakeholder-relation analysis being ensued. Bank 
stakeholders include both debt-holders and creditors and some are themselves large 
institutional shareholders.  Banks as a collective of salient stakeholders have been chosen for 
review in this section given their relationship with case companies as debt holders (deposit 
taking) and creditors (providing all forms of credit).  Debt holders, creditors and employees 
have been written about in the international stakeholder literature more than any other groups. 
Ironically, there is the mutual society (case company) which is not a bank but possesses 
similar features of those associated with a modern bank—deposit taking, investment products, 
FX trading and many others, and the third case, the conglomerate itself has a wholly-owned 
subsidiary which is the fifth largest commercial bank in Jamaica.   
Debt holders play a pivotal role in CG and in shaping business strategy and 
performance (Hart 1995, Chap. 6; Jensen, 1986; Myers, 2001).  Debt may take the form of 
long or short-term loans from a variety of financial intermediaries who are more or less likely 
to intervene directly in the firm.  It takes the form of loan contracts arranged ‘privately’ with 
banks or ‘publicly’ via bond issues in financial markets. Debt is a contractual obligation 
[195] 
 
against future cash flow and thus impinges on managerial decisions.  For this reason, debt 
holders may force liquidation and restructuring when firms are in distress. In this way, debt is 
therefore seen as a critical control on managerial behavior in the literature of financial 
economics (Modigliani and Miller, 1958, Hart, 1995).  
Credit ratings signal financial health of firms to investors and affect the cost of capital 
and thus serve as important mechanisms of control.  It is not common in Jamaica and among 
the case companies for debt to be intertwined with equity ownership and where loan 
provisions often have board representation (Jackson 2003).  However, these practices are more 
prevalent in non-Anglo-Saxon Germany, France, and Japan.  
In the present arrangement where the case companies are both debt holders and 
creditors, some of the advantages and disadvantages have been observed.  First, the bank 
stakeholders provide firms with needed capital for start-up, expansion, and working capital 
arrangements. For example, the mutual society is the largest provider of residential mortgages 
in Jamaica with a market share of forty-five per cent (45%).  Of 1,767 loans approved with a 
value of J$7.7 billion (US$87 million), residential mortgages accounted for J$5.3 billion 
(US$60 million) or two-thirds of total loans disbursed at the end of financial year 2008 
(Director’s Report and Financial Statements, 2008).  Second, these Mutual organisations also 
provide economics of scope (cross-selling opportunities) by the many other services they 
provide (deposit, currency exchange, advisory, and investment).  Third, these banks have 
access to a wide spectrum of private information, have professionals capable of engaging in 
public scrutiny and therefore can obtain detailed insight into the firms’ operational and 
financial standings, which in turn helps with monitoring, and can be reliable signals to those 
outside the firm, like investors looking on for investment possibilities.    
Fourth, bank lending is said to have positively influenced markets where it sends 
positive messages and reduces the cost of capital. Theoretically, there is reported evidence that 
bank lending reduces the under-pricing of IPOs and has positive effect on share price of the 
firm (Filatochev et al, 2007 c.f. James 1987, Slovin and Young, 1990; Hishey et al, 1990).  
Finally, through insider information and monitoring, lenders can prevent borrowers from 
overextending themselves and making unwise investments (Boot and Thakor, 1997).  
Disadvantages associated with bank stakeholders: There are many disadvantages 
associated with banks—debt holders and creditors as a whole.  First, banks interest rates are 
never usually fixed and as such, fundamental changes in micro-economics (interest rates, 
inflation, and exchange rates) often result in clients paying back way above the initial agreed 
rate and even above market rate. For example, Jamaica experienced “hyperinflation” in 1991 
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whereby the currency was devalued sharply from J$5.50 to J$32.0, to the US$1 dollar during 
which time market interest rate went to as high as 95%.  These events have had severe ripple 
effects on the Jamaican economy including all three case companies under review.  The 
mutual society saw a decline in loan demand and increased default on loans while it benefitted 
from increased margin spreads on loans on books.  The Merchant Co. only came onto the 
scene in 1994—the tail end of the high interest rate regime of the 1990s, but at the beginning 
of what would have come to be known as the Jamaican Financial Sector Meltdown of the 
1990s.  The Financial meltdown has been discussed in chapters 1 and 5 in support of the 
Problem Statements and consistent with research questions of Chapter 4.  The enormity of the 
Financial Meltdown was evidenced in the 150 institutions that had to be bailed out by the 
Government’s FINSAC. These companies included 15 banks (5 of which are commercial, 
others—merchant banks and building societies); 21 insurance companies (including all the 
major life companies with over 95% of premium income), 34 securities firms, and 15 hotels. 
See Appendix 1.  
Second, banks may collude with managers to retain profits rather than distribute 
dividends.  The practice of bankers sitting on boards and benefitting from large cash deposits 
from companies is not uncommon in Jamaica.  In this study, in attempting to respond to the 
question as to: the nature of stakeholder relations in Jamaica, i.e., “Cause and Effect” 
outcomes,  the relationship of the CEOs and members of the executive management of all 
three case companies have been traced to the boards of Enterprises on which they serve as 
members or Chairmen. It was found that in the case of the merchant bank, the Chairman and 
CEO was up-to the time of writing, the Chairman of the National Health Fund (NHF).  In this 
situation, the merchant bank was the largest beneficiary of deposits from the NHF—a US$45 
million Fund.  Also, its Deputy President is Chairman of the Board of Directors of the 
Students’ Loan’s Bureau (SLB), and the merchant bank receives a significant amount of 
investment funds from the SLB. As to the mutual society, its Managing Director is Deputy 
Chairman of the Tourist Board and since then, the mutual have established a strategic alliance 
with the Tourism Enhancement Fund and the Tourist Board, whereby the TEF provides tens of 
millions of dollars to the mutual society which is then un-lend to the small and cottage-type 
hoteliers.   
Third and final, the Jamaican society is relatively small, consequently, large creditors 
have been alleged to have colluded with large shareholders to the disadvantage of minority 
shareholders. Banks also play similar roles in being large institutional investors themselves, in 
the US and UK, they take significant equity positions with the objective of influencing 
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investment and CG decisions in these investee companies.  In Jamaica, these case companies, 
other banks and their pension funds, are among the largest block holders of listed equities. 
Hence, in many ways, sometimes informally, they tend to have significant influences on the 
governance and direction of companies—partially justifying the existence of significant levels 
of crossholdings and interlocking directorships.     
Employees: Employees include persons directly employed to the case companies on a 
permanent basis whether through fixed term, renewable contracts, or tenured track. In some 
cases, these employees are usually shareholders themselves.  While no data was solicited on 
employee shareholding among these case companies, Employee Share Ownership Plans 
(ESOP) were present in thirty-seven per cent (37%) of companies surveyed in an Interviewer’s 
Administered Questionnaire conducted as a major component of this study.  See Table 6.4.  
There is no legal requirement for board representation of employees in Jamaica and the other 
English-speaking Caribbean countries, unlike the situation in Germany. However, while the 
legislature does not make such provisions, the constitutions and by-laws for many 
organisations (including mutual societies and educational institutions), do ensure that their 
employees have a voice at the level of the Board of Directors, and hence in the governance of 
these institutions. In addition, employees can also influence governance decision as an 
individual and/or a collective voice. The literature on individual voice is limited while there is 
a larger body of literature on collective voice. Filatochev et al (2007) wrote that employee 
representation through trade unions seems to attract the largest following, in spite of a 
declining trend in union representation, membership, and coverage in recent years.  
In two of the cases (conglomerate and mutual) in particular, there is the presence of 
trade union representation but unions play an insignificant role in monitoring management and 
influencing board decision-making. Instead, this study found that employees play a more 
important role through the collective voice of staff associations (based on feedback from two 
Presidents of the staff associations). In two of the three case companies, employees were 
represented at the level of Board of Directors (mutual) and on several subsidiaries and pension 
funds (conglomerate). In these roles, employees become more attentive to social 
responsibilities and play a more activist role in the organisation. In the case of trustees to the 
pension funds, they are required by law to act in the best interest of the schemes’ members in a 
manner consistent with overall liabilities and returns. Consistent with these findings, 
Filatochev et al (2007), argue that trustees may lack appropriate knowledge for robust and 
beneficial involvement, thus these factors then place significant restrictions on the 
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management and investment activities of trustees. In concurring with the latter, trustees have 
reported in this study, that they are by far, more regulated than ordinary board members.  
It was the collective view of informants of the conglomerate case, “that where there is 
trade union involvement in Jamaica, and where trustees have the information and motivation, 
they can have more effect on CG and in companies in which they invest”.  There is restricted 
knowledge of the influence of institutional investors on the activities of case companies. 
Institutional shareholders are insignificant to the mutual society—it not being a shareholding 
company, and whose directorship has been carefully selected to reflect representation 
geographically and socio-economically, thus reinforcing its posture as a national institution 
serving all of Jamaica and Jamaicans, locally and in the Diaspora of the UK, USA, Canada and 
elsewhere.  
All case companies play a significant role in the PSOJ. Also, the PSOJ has very 
important influences which it has honed through years of lobbying, and sometimes activist 
movements, supported by its integrity, prominence and social and economic standing in 
society—akin to that of its members.  For example, the PSOJ membership represents 
Jamaica’s 350 largest businesses and draws on both private sector and state-owned companies, 
especially tertiary educational institutions. The ICAJ membership is approximately 800 and 
these are representatives of the largest and most prominent accounting and management 
consulting firms in Jamaica with thousands of clients among them.   
Although direct views were not sought from the media fraternity and trade unions, 
these two groups have consistently influenced CG development in Jamaica in their unique 
ways over the past several decades.  The media, by exposing misfeasance in government and 
the private sector (corruption, fraud, abuse of power, misuse and abuse of government 
resources) through investigative journalism, has informed and kept the public aware.  The 
public in turn has demanded and obtained reform in government policies.  For the part of the 
trade unions, they have been at the forefront of championing the rights of employees while 
holding corporations accountable for their actions. In fact, trade unions have perhaps been the 
most vocal form of employee group in Jamaica, particularly through, influence exerted on the 
governance arrangement of the case companies, according to respondent feedback.   
The four groups of stakeholders identified earlier (PSOJ, ICAJ, JMA, and Institutional 
Investors) provide membership services to the case companies in  participation and voice by 
influencing public policy and creating a framework for constructive dialogue and engagement 
in private-public sector relationships. Additionally, through one or more of these watchdog 
groups, members obtain continual education (ICAJ) to remain relevant in their particular 
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professions, exposure to emerging local and international trends through dissemination of 
information via media; knowledge generation seminars; public announcement and press 
releases, field trips, face-to-face communications with government representatives; just to 
name a few.  
Watchdog groups as shown in Figure 6.1 above, also serve as a substitute for formal 
mechanisms of monitoring corporate behaviour and performance through lobbying and the 
other pressures they bring to bear from time to time.  Furthermore, they have been proactive in 
promulgating CG standards in board practices, international accounting standards, and internal 
control among their membership. Given that these watchdog groups are representatives of the 
public, they serve as a collective source of revenue for the case companies by accessing and 
consuming their services and products.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These watchdog groups although not having any legal authority, have earned   
 
 
In return, the case companies provide dividend payments (listed companies), membership fees 
(See Figure 6.1), advertising dollars, participation in major corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) activities through collaboration with one of more of the watchdog groups (e.g., school 
feeding programmes), supporting community reading programmes, sponsoring scholarships, 
Figure 6.1: Case Companies’ Stakeholder Relationship “Cause and Effect Model” 
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corporate mentorship programmes for high schools and university students, services to 
indigent and various groups of terminally ill persons (Cancer Care, HIV AIDS), and many 
outreach activities. These mutually binding relationships go deeper than just the provision of 
cash–they involve intense formal and informal participation of case companies’ management 
and staff personnel. The staff associations of all three case companies are actively involved in 
community reading (homework) programmes and service many projects on an on-going basis 
at various children’s Homes (See Annual Reports, 2008, for all three companies or visit their 
web sites for more details).   
In summary, the case companies depend on a wide range of stakeholders in as much as 
these stakeholders depend on them.  Regulators provide monitoring and checks and balances 
to ensure that companies operate within the law, banks provide loanable funds, a wide range of 
investment options, a broad spectrum of financial services and working capital and services. 
Listed case companies in return, provide dividends, interest income to depositors (creditors), 
goods and services, salaries and benefits to employees and participation in various CSR 
initiatives with significant deployment of staff resources and financial support. Employees of 
both case companies and all major stakeholder groups keep these complex, highly interwoven 
networks or relationships alive. See Figure 6.1. 
In the next section, the results of an Interviewer’s Administrative Survey are examined.  
Questions specifically addressing the presence of trade unions among companies sampled, the 
level of union representatives on boards, presence of non-union representatives on boards, and 
Employee Share Ownership Plans (ESOP).   
 
6.3.3 Trade Union and Employee Representation  
The literature on co-determination—a structure of decision-making within an 
organisation in which employees and their representatives exert influence on top level 
decisions—shows that in Germany, employees occupy half the seats on supervisory boards in 
large firms. In Denmark and Norway, they represent one-third and in Sweden they have three 
members in large firms. In the Netherlands, employees have a worker council that must be 
consulted when important decisions are to be taken by the Board of Directors. In this study, an 
attempt is made to link, if and where possible, employee influence on board decision through 
trade union and non-trade union representation.  
In addressing the question of the extent, if any, of trade union representation on 
corporate boards, results of Table 6.4 show that 42% (or 21/50) of companies are unionised. In 
terms of the question: Is there a trade union representative on your Board? (Question # 9 of 
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the IAQS), only two (or 13.33) of the fifteen (15) informants who actually responded to the 
question, had a trade union representative. This extremely low response rate would have 
severely affected the reliability, representativeness and interpretation of these results.   
Follow up probes were made in the case of ten of the thirty-five those who did not 
chose to respond to the question, and a majority reported that the issue was too sensitive for 
their further comment. From this latter response, it can be concluded that trade union 
representation or presence in Jamaican companies can be an issue which evokes emotions of in 
some form or another.  The representation of private sector employees who are members of 
trade unions is far contrasting to the realities in Britain, which has 20% of private sector 
workers who are members of trade unions (Filatotchev et al, 2007).  This is also of interest 
considering that Britain is a former occupier and one whose planters were strongly opposed to 
the trade union development in Jamaica (Stone, 1986).  
Table 6.4: Trade Union and Employee Representation Issues  
Source: Interviews (n1=50; n2=15; n3=50 and n4=48) 
 
To understand this high number of companies which are unionised versus the low union 
representation on boards, one has to understand the historical, sociological, industrial and 
political contexts of Jamaica. There were the 1938 labour disturbances, among other things, 
that marked the birth of the modern trade union movement as members of the working classes 
organised formally to improve their economic and social positions (Panton, 2000 cf. Eaton, 
1990). The development and growth of unions in Jamaica unlike other nations represented “a 
political response against repression” (Manley, M., 1975) and manifested itself in trade union 
terms. The rise of trade unions and increasing political agitation paved the way for the island’s 
first election under universal adult suffrage in 1944 in which newly-formed local political 
parties competed for leadership. These parties were either offshoots or affiliates of unions—
Bustamante Industrial Trade Union established 1933 gave birth to the Jamaica Labour Party 
 Yes No  Abstention  
Is your company unionised?  
Freq. Val. %  Freq. Val. %  
21 42 29 58 0 
Is there a Trade Union Representative on 
your Board?  2 13.33 13 86.67 
 
35 
Is there a non-unionised employee 
representative on your board? 6 12 44 88 
 
0 
Is there an Employee Share Ownership 
Plan in your Company? 11 22.92 37 77.08 
 
2 
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and National Workers Union, established in 1952 as an affiliate organisation of the Peoples 
National Party. By 1962, Britain peacefully gave way to Independence for Jamaica.  
In another question: Is there non-unionised employee representation on Jamaican 
boards? The responses to this question is shown in Table 6.4, that 12% (6) of firms had non-
unionized employee representation at the board level.  In spite this, 22.92% (or 11) of firms 
had some form of an Employee Share Ownership Plan. There are at least three reasons to 
explain the Jamaican realities.  Firstly, unlike in Germany and some other European countries, 
there is no legal right to board representation in Jamaica for any particular group of 
stakeholders, except among some Public Bodies and non-profit organisations. Secondly, while 
there are, legal rights to voice via various joint consultation arrangements such as works 
councils in continental European countries, there are no such arrangements in Jamaica. 
Thirdly, the literature on employee voice through trade unions is extensive, particularly on 
unions as an effective bargaining tool for securing resources and opportunities for workers 
(Freeman and Medoff, 1984).   
Following on the preceding explanation for the low trade union representation as shown 
in Table 6.4 on corporate boards, the Jamaican employee (approximately 90% come from the 
working class) is still under-represented (only 12%) on corporate boards. Furthermore, any 
move to provide trade unions and employees the right to board seats would be to provide them 
(as separate groups) with a ‘collective voice’ which would strengthen their power of 
negotiation with management.  From all indications, legislation is the only feasible means of 
providing workers, through trade unions, and employees, through staff associations, a greater 
voice in the Jamaican corporate boardrooms, in the years ahead. 
This study is limited to the extent that it seeks answers on the presence of trade unions 
in companies and trade union and non-trade union board representation.  However, further 
research is needed to determine the percentage of employee in unionised firms that are 
members of trade unions, as well as the percentage shares owned by unionised and non-
unionized employees.  Indeed, these studies could make even more interesting findings.  
 
6.3.4 An Integration of Methodological Findings on Stakeholder Representation   
The extremely low representation of trade unions in the majority of Jamaican 
boardrooms can be linked to the nature of ownership and control of these corporations by the 
minority elite classes who are the descendants of former plantation owners, against whom the 
majority class fought for their independence using trade unionism as a critical ‘weapon’. 
Hence, with trade unions being historically seen as ‘anti-corporate’ and a vehicle for 
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suppression of controls by the owner class over the working class, it should not be surprising 
that the doors to Jamaican corporate boardrooms still remain closed to trade union 
representation. 
Notwithstanding the low trade union representation (12% of corporate boards), steps 
towards legislating trade unions and employee’ rights to corporate board seats would provide 
them (as separate groups) with a ‘collective voice’ which could strengthen their power of 
negotiation with management.  However, with the nature of the high ownership concentration 
(family groupings and institutional investors), it is doubtful whether or not trade union and 
employee representation on boards will be achieved without political/legal intervention—
creation of the necessary laws.  
Among the three case companies, the mutual society was the only one having a staff 
representative amongst its Directors.  Employee representation on boards is entrenched in non-
Anglo-Saxon countries, particularly Germany with a two-tier board structure.  In the Anglo-
Saxon countries, there is increased interest in this regard. So far, only unionised organisations 
(some) and those with Employee Share Ownership Plan (ESOP) (sometimes) have moved to 
ensure that employees are represented on one-tier boards. As with the conglomerate, many of 
the Directors and officers of the mutual society, have served and are serving in many 
important roles in the public and private spheres of the Jamaican society.  
The theoretical model of Figure 6.1, is by no means complete, but it articulates a 
theoretical and empirical framework of the realities of the Jamaican stakeholder 
representation, participation and voice from which many inferences can be drawn and serve as 
a spring-board for further academic studies into stakeholder representation in Jamaica. A 
major weakness to the discussion is that it lacks more in-depth probe into and understanding of 
the role of the media and trade unions in influencing corporate behaviour and governance in 
the case companies and the wider Jamaican society.  In this regard, such investigation offers 
the potential for future academic study.   
 
6.4 PERCEPTION AND ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (IIs) IN  
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEVELOPMENT 
6.4.1.  Introduction  
Institutional Investors can be seen as collective investment schemes, which have 
gained  increased power in influencing CG in companies, particularly stock market listed 
(Clark, 2000 citing Theurillat, 2007).  They have gained significant prominence in recent years 
through their ability to organise themselves and to take significant positions in the 
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shareholdings of corporations which provide them with lobbying voice, and sometimes rights 
to board representation.  
In this study, the role of IIs have been examined through face-to-face interviews with 
eight of Jamaica’s largest (based on size funds under management) institutional investors.  The 
informant companies invested in a rather narrow range of instruments which they reported to 
be mainly stocks and shares and Government of Jamaica securities.  In one case, for example, 
the Chairman suggested: 
We invest in a range of companies. The portfolio is roughly 65% bonds, debt 
instruments (G-papers, T-bills, LRSs, and so on), another 10% in equities, 
and about 20% in real estate and hospitality. We also have ownership in one 
of the largest local merchant banks and in two very important hospitality 
properties and are involved with large real estate developments. So we get 
involved with a variety of organisations across the spectrum of the economy 
and our investments, by virtue of size of funds, is the largest pension fund in 
the island, which is about US$0.5 billion (at time of interview).  (Professor 
Gordon Shirley, Chairman of the National Insurance Fund at time of 
interview).  
 
6.4.2 Findings of this Research    
6.4.2.1 Respondent Companies’ Investment Criteria 
 
While eighty per cent (80%) of the respondents report that they were guided by a set of 
investment criteria, they have reported that these include: the security of their funds, the 
highest likelihood for short-term profits, risk-free nature of the instrument (government 
papers), a zero tolerance for any other instrument but stocks, capital base ratio to investment, 
gapping, tenor of instrument, cash flow and interest rate, asset mix, dividend payment policy, 
specified yield expected, customer-orientation, analyst reports, and the client profile 
established.   
 
6.4.2.2  Corporate Governance Guidelines used by Informant and Investee Companies 
 
In answer to this question of whether or not there existed a set of CG guidelines that 
was used to determine potential investee companies, Table 6.5 indicated that 62.5% of 
respondents said yes, 12.5% answered no, and 25% abstained.  Those who responded in the 
affirmative provided such criteria as: profit and loss and balance sheet statements, a 
company’s capital structure, management and profitability, and history of client profile.  Those 
who did not have a set of established guidelines believed the market had already been too thin, 
and hence such guidelines could only serve to bring on undue competitive pressures, thus 
making clients less attractive.  
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In terms of requesting investee companies to provide their corporate governance 
guidelines, Table 6.5 indicates that 50.0% of informants reported yes while the numbers that 
reported no, and those who abstained were equal at twenty-five per cent  (25%) each. The 
respondents, claiming to have requested corporate governance guidelines of their investee 
companies, stated that they needed to know what business investees were in, details of 
performance over several years, the composition of their boards and how organisations were 
managed, before making their investments.  For those answering no, they were only interested 
in the investee companies’ bottom lines—perceived returns on investment. Twelve and one-
half per cent (121/2%) of the institutional investors interviewed asked their investee 
companies for annual reports as the sole request (information) from which they expect to learn 
about investees past performance and future prospects.   
Table 6.5: CG Guidelines used by IIs and Provided by Investee Companies 
 Yes  No Abstention  
Guidelines for Investee Companies 62.5% 12.5% 25% 
Provision of CG Guidelines by Investees 50% 25% 25% 
Source: Interviews (n=8) 
 
In a probing question to the Chairman of the NIF, I asked, why is it important to know 
who comprises their boards? He responded: 
Well, because we think it provides information on the quality of management 
and oversight that exists. As a public entity, we are careful about our own 
participation on boards, because it could be misconstrued as a Government- 
controlled Fund. However, it is not unusual for us to have 5 to 10 per cent 
ownership of a company. If the Government then sits on the Board it could be 
viewed as the government interfering in the management of the company.  So 
what we need to have then is, and I am not saying that we won’t do that in 
certain cases, but we are careful in how we decide on when we participate at 
the board level. In the absence of that, we need information on a very timely 
basis, on an ongoing basis, on the firm’s performance, the sets of decisions 
that are being made about the company moving forward...because again 
noting the size of our holdings in these companies and the nature of the Stock 
Exchange, it would be impossible for us to trade many of these blocks across 
the floor in any normal day-to-day operation. 
 
The 25% of respondents who stated emphatically that they did not wish to ask investee 
companies for guidelines, said they would rather give investee firms the autonomy and 
independence to manage their own affairs. These informants stated that their investments 
would have already represented enough risk in any one company and they believed the nature 
of ownership and control among Jamaican firms would render any effort to reform or 
influence CG in investee companies, fruitless.  
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6.4.2.3 Perception of Institutional Investors about Jamaica’s Corporate  
Governance  
 
As to this question of whether or not the level of CG practiced by Jamaica’s 
institutional investors, is satisfactory, this was met with mixed views among informants. Fifty 
per cent (50%) said they believed CG as currently practiced by institutional investors, was 
unsatisfactory and suggested that there was a lack of good governance, improvement was 
needed (unspecified, even among those whom were satisfied) and they did not know enough to 
provide recommendations. The twenty per cent (20%) who were happy with the state of CG 
indicated that there was a greater level of understanding and awareness being generated on the 
subject, by the release of International Accounting Standards (IAS) and an obvious thrust 
towards a greater level of transparency in the society. In a more in-depth interview with a 
leading informant, he was asked to give his perception on effective CG in Jamaica.  According 
to this informant:  
I would say a couple of things in relation to that...one, is that many 
companies in Jamaica had a shareholder structure, which to a large extent 
was dominated by individuals or family groupings for quite a while. As 
pension funds have grown, a pension legislation has been implemented and 
the institutional investors have begun to become more important in the 
ownership of the shareholder base of these companies. For the listed 
companies, I think they are predisposed to the importance of providing 
information to those investors. For those companies not listed, there is still a 
tendency to exclude persons who are external to the company or family 
grouping. Also, very often reporting practices are very loose and poor and 
there is strong reliance on secrecy in decision-making in order to implement 
strategies for the company.   I think to the extent that some want to become 
listed, this will have to be changed. I also think the country is going through 
a process of change (Personal interview with Professor Gordon Shirley, 
Former Chairman of the National Insurance Fund). 
 
Institutional investors have an important role in strengthening CG due to the influence 
of their voting rights which is derived from their large share ownership in many listed 
companies. Due to their size, influence, and organisation, institutional investors can challenge 
managerial excesses, demand corporate disclosure and implement corporate guidelines. As 
seen in the case of Jamaica in comparison to the US, the influence of Jamaican institutional 
investors is far from as pragmatic and evident as in the US. Therefore, if critical changes in 
reforming CG in Jamaica are to be realised, institutional investors will need to carry their share 
of responsibilities commensurate with their ownership in these corporations.  
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6.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
This chapter builds on the analysis of chapter 5 and examines ownership and control patterns 
in Jamaica, the role of stakeholder relations (representation), and the perception and role of 
institutional investors in Jamaica. It draws its sources of primary data and information from 
interviews, case studies, and focus groups.   
 The concept of ownership and control has its early roots in the work of Adolphus Berle 
and Gardiner Means seminal thesis, Private Property and Modern Corporation (1932). Berle 
and Means found that as a corporation’s shares become more dispersed it led to a new group of 
managerial elites called the princes of corporations. With original owners no longer in control, 
this has given rise to the ‘separation of ownership from control’ in American corporations but 
as this study has shown, not so in the Jamaican context.  
 The findings in this study revealed that Jamaican firms are largely owner managed.  In 
other words, ownership and control are vested in closely connected family groupings.  Closer 
analysis of the findings also revealed that this pattern of managerial arrangement impacts 
negatively on employee and stakeholder relations. For example, employees and trade unions 
are grossly under-represented on Jamaican corporate boards. In spite of the fact that there is a 
historical context that resides in decades of adversarial relationship between owner and wage 
labour,  trade union and non-union employee representation have had a substantial impact in 
the Jamaican workplace, and unions, in particular, represented a threat to exclusive ownership 
prerogative (Stone, 1986). Many employers reacted negatively to trade union growth after 
1938, opposed unions bitterly, withheld recognition, and victimised union leaders and 
supporters. Such confrontational work culture and unwillingness to compromise of the part of 
owners, on collective bargaining issues, has given way to worker militancy,  which has proven 
to be an effective weapon in bringing management to the bargaining table (Ibid).   The 
compromise for board seats for employee and trade union representatives may never be an 
issue for bargaining in years to come.  
 The next issue relates to the perception and role of institutional investors given their 
international prominence in CG over the last decade, particularly in the USA where they have 
been very vociferous.  In Jamaica, there is much to be desired regarding the role of IIs in CG.  
While IIs admit that CG is an important element in business and they are aware of its growing 
relevance, they say they are not interested in imposing any CG requirements on their investees 
as this may backfire, making them (investors) less competitive.  IIs are seemingly more 
interested in the investment premium their investees have to offer. With these views in mind, 
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there is an even more urgent need for a fundamental rethink in the way CG reform is 
considered for Jamaica. Clearly, much work is needed to bring to the forefront such important 
stakeholders as these large Jamaican fund managers who have significant influence, through 
their money, on market dynamics.  
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CHAPTER 7.0:  FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS: BOARD CHARACTERISTICS & 
PROCESSES, BOARD’S ROLE IN STRATEGIC DECISION-
MAKING AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE     
 
7.1  INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter uses the results from the fieldwork obtained across methodological 
approaches (interviews, case studies, and focus groups) to analyse 7.2 ) CG practices (board 
characteristics and processes: board sizes, Chairman/CEO duality or separation, Non-
Executives and Executive Directors and selection of Directors, board committees and their 
composition; Director tenure, gender and inequality issues, frequency of board meetings, 
timing of distribution of board papers and proxy forms, and board performance evaluation and 
director training); 7.3) board’s role in strategic decision-making; and 7.4) corporate disclosure.  
These areas are consistent with the research problems under review (chapter 1) and research 
questions of chapter 4, and builds on the findings of chapters 5 and 6.  The specific areas have 
been detailed under the respective headings. 
 
7.2 FINDINGS ON BOARD CHARACTERISTICS & PROCESSES (CG   
PRACTICES)   
7.2.1 Board Sizes   
 
Table 7.1a indicates the sizes of Jamaican boards.  As can be seen, the mean size of 
these boards is 9.1 Directors and median board size 8-10 members.  While the mean board size 
of 9.1 falls within the median range of 8-10, approximately 54% of the boards sampled had 
less than ten members; 16% had ten members and 30% of the sample had average membership 
of eleven and greater, with the largest board having 15 members and 6 boards having 13 
members each.  When compared to mean board sizes from Anglo-Saxon (10.8), Non-Anglo-
Saxon (14.43) countries, and Japan (13.0), this figure for Jamaica, can be considered small. 
Board size is important from both practical and theoretical perspectives. The Higgs Review 
(2003) suggested that an effective board should not be so large as to become unwieldy.  It 
should be of sufficient size that the balance of skills and experience is appropriate for the 
requirement of the business and that changes in the board’s composition can be managed 
without undue disruption.   
The Chairman and CEO of Jamaica’s largest conglomerate reported that they reduced 
board size from 24 to 12 for various reasons, but particularly, his board believed that a smaller 
board would be more nimble in their ability to make decisions and more and more boards were 
relying on external Directors for checks and balances. He commented that the old board 
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structure had a majority of insiders. In addition, the conglomerate Chairman noted that the new 
board structure would provide greater access to detailed information on subsidiaries, with a 
new policy of inviting younger managers to present their cases to the main board as part of the 
new thrust in succession planning (Interview with a Chairman/CEO).  Empirical work on 
board size, which is still limited, could benefit from a longitudinal study of this company over 
many years, looking at the impact of board size on Directors’ performance, behaviour, and 
organisation. This could probably shed light on the importance of small boards in comparison 
to large boards.  
 Table 7.1a Board Sizes 
Directors Frequency Valid % 
7 and less 14         28.0 
8-10 21         42.0 
11-12 7             14.0 
13 and over 8            16.0 
Total  50 100.0 
Mean  9.1  
Median Between 8-10 members  
Source: Interviews (n=50) 
Table 7.1b below shows the result of cross tabulation performed on board size in listed 
versus unlisted companies. There was no statistically significant relationship between the 
number of Directors on a board and whether the firm is listed or unlisted.  However, 82% of 
listed firms had more than 8 Directors compared to 50% of unlisted.  This slighter tendency of 
listed firms to have larger boards could be indicative of the fact that listed companies must 
meet certain minimum requirements of the Jamaica Stock Exchange rules for specific 
committees (e.g., audit and risk management) and the appointment of a minimum number of 
independent external Directors. Hence, usually, most IPOs in Jamaica tend to look for 
qualified outsiders to increase board size to meet both the external independent Director 
criteria and to facilitate sufficient members available for new and required committees (JSE 
Rule Book, 2008; personal experience).  In spite of these realities, the more substantial 
conclusion is that there is no significant relationship between the number of Directors on the 
board of a listed versus unlisted Jamaican firm.  
From a practical standpoint, in Jamaica, minimum and maximum board sizes are 
prescribed by Statutes of Public Bodies (State-owned Enterprises), and to a lesser extent, 
Companies Law. For example, since the release of the Companies Act of Jamaica 2004, 
limited liability companies may appoint a single Director. However, publicly-listed companies 
may not have less than three Directors (JSE Rule), at least two of whom should not be 
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employees of the company or its affiliates.  Where there is one Director appointed to a limited 
liability entity, such a Director may not serve as its corporate secretary. Therefore, a Corporate 
Secretary other than the Director must be nominated and registered with the Companies Office 
of Jamaica.  
Table 7.1b: Board Size Cross Tabulated with Listed versus Unlisted Companies 
Board Size  
Listed versus Unlisted Companies 
Listed Unlisted 
N % N % 
less than 8 5 18.5 11 50 
8 - 10 14 51.9 6 27 
11 - 12 4 14.8 2 9 
13 and over 4 14.8 3 14 
Total 27 100 22 100 
Chi Square χ² Asymp Sig.= 0.121 
 
7.2.2 Chairman/CEO Duality vis-a-vis Separation 
What is your view on one person holding the positions of Chairman and CEO?  The 
results in Table 7.2a indicate that 30% of respondents have the position of Chairman and CEO 
vested in the same person.  In other words, the positions of Chairman and CEO are separated 
in 70% of Jamaican companies.  However, this assertion could be more accurately articulated 
by emphasising that it is limited to the nearly 50 stock market companies and another 50 of 
Jamaica’s leading companies based on annual turnovers. Beyond Jamaica’s top 100 companies 
(based on annual turnover), one gets into hard core family-owned and run businesses in which 
the majority has no visible organisational structure and management is usually lateral with an 
Executive Chairman sitting atop the invisible structure (personal experience).   
Table 7.2a: Presence of Executive Chairman, Deputy Executive Chairman and 
Appointed Lead Directors  
                 Frequency                              Valid  % 
Executive Chairman 15                                                  30 
Deputy Executive Chairman 6                                                  40                                                  
Appointed  Senior Independent 
Director  
12                                                  24 
Source: Interviews (n1=50, n2=15 and n3=50, respectively). 
The 70% rate of separation of the positions of Chairman and CEO compares 
favourably with existing trends around the world. Empirical data from around the world reveal 
the following percentages: the USA (24.0), UK (96.2), Canada (79.7), Australia (97.3), 
Germany (97.7), Netherlands (95.0), Switzerland (77.0), France (52.0), Italy (88.1), Spain 
(58.3), Belgium (84.6), and Japan (50.8) (EIRIS Data, 2005).  In the case of the USA, there 
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has been marginal improvement over the last decade from 12% separation in the late 1980s to 
recent data of 24.9% (2008).  For various reasons discussed in the literature review, the 
Americans tend to prefer duality over separation. Based on German laws, the dominant two-
tier board structure makes separation automatic.  In the case of Japan, the Japanese system of 
internalism does not provide for much flexibility in recruiting a Non-Executive Chairman 
easily and as such the figures show a relatively low level of separation of the dual roles of 
Chairman and CEO.  
Table 7.2b: Executive Chairman Cross Tabulated with Dominant ownership 
dispersed versus closely held  
Executive 
Chairman 
Dominant ownership dispersed versus closely held 
Highly Dispersed Closely Held 
N % N % 
Yes 8 42 2 25 
No 11 58 6 75 
Total 19 100 8 100 
Chi Square χ² Asymp Sig.= 0.401 
 
The results of cross tabulation performed and shown in Table 7.2b indicates that there 
is no statistically significant relationship between CEO/Chairman Duality and the dominant 
ownership structure of a firm. As evident in the data, approximately 42% of Executive 
Chairmen are from firms with dominant-owned, highly dispersed arrangement compared with 
25% from firms with closely held ownership. This suggests that highly dispersed firms are 
more likely to have CEO/Chairman Duality.  While this is not the norm internationally, it is 
not surprising in the Jamaican context.  When one probes deeply into the Jamaican realities of 
how firms are owned and control, the scenario of highly dispersed firms having a slightly 
greater likelihood of Chairman/CEO duality than closely held firms could be explained firstly 
from the background of two pieces of facts: 1.) these firms (having Chair/CEO duality) are not 
financial institutions as they are barred (both listed and un-listed) from having Chairman/CEO 
duality 2.) there could be a deliberate effort on the part of original family and dominant 
shareholders to ensure that power and control reside with them and not transferred to new 
owners and especially outsiders.  Secondly, highly-dispersed firms in the Jamaican context 
really means that as much as 50% of ordinary shares are owned by individual shareholders and 
persons outside the family groupings.  Hence, with this situation, it is not surprising that 
Chairman/CEO duality is more prevalent even among the highly dispersed firms in non-
financial companies. The issue of the small sample sizes in the values used in the cross-
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tabulation may also explain the very weak link between whether or not a firm with a highly-
dispersed or closely-held ownership has the presence or of an Executive Chairman. 
Table 7.2c: Executive Chairman Cross Tabulated Listed versus Unlisted 
Companies  
Executive Chairman  
Listed versus Unlisted Companies 
Listed Unlisted 
N % N % 
Yes  10 37 5 23 
No 17 63 17 77 
Total 27 100 22 100 
Chi Square χ² Asymp Sig.= 0.280 
 
Table 7.2c also indicate that there is no statistical significant relationship between 
Chairman/CEO duality and whether the firm is listed or unlisted.  This finding is supported by 
data in Table 7.2a (third above) which shows that six respondents or twelve per cent (12%) of 
the sampled population have reported having the position of Deputy Executive Chairman. As 
to the presence of a Senior Independent Director, while the frequency response rate was a 23% 
presence among the sampled population, the position has not showed up in any literature 
regarding public bodies, and only very scantily found in the literature of international 
corporate governance codes and national laws concerning privately-held or publicly-listed 
limited liability companies.  Therefore, while the large number of “non responses” could have 
distorted the findings, in this case, the low level presence of named Deputy Executive 
Chairman or Vice Chairman, used interchangeably, represented the reality in the Jamaican 
context. The issue of the small sample sizes in the values used in the cross-tabulation may also 
explain the very weak link between listed or unlisted firms and the presence (prevalence) or of 
an Executive Chairman. 
 
Are there problems with the current duality in companies in Jamaica? What is your view on 
one person holding the positions of Chairman and CEO? 
  
Members of the response group agreed that there should be a separation between the 
positions of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer. The Members believed that 
the dual role might be a hindrance to efficient operations. Separating them would allow for the 
CEO to focus more effectively on his duties. Also, the CEO serving as chairman could all too 
easily influence the board to an excessive degree, instead of himself being guided by their 
objective authority.  The collective view of the group has suggested that balanced reasoning, 
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objectivity, and thorough discourse of issues at the Board level becomes subjected to the 
personality of the Chairman/CEO.  
At least half of the respondents believed that an individual with a dual role could in 
some cases function effectively in his role. It might be expedient in the case of say, a central 
bank or a smaller firm, for the duality to exist. In the former case a separation would be a 
‘hindrance to operational efficiency,’ and in the latter it would simply exist because limited 
funding to remunerate two such individuals. Whatever the case, such a person would need to 
be committed to fairness and democracy.  
The issue of whether or not the position of Chairman and CEO should be vested in one 
person is a most controversial one.  Based on the theoretical and empirical literature, in some 
jurisdictions, the dual role is often delegated to one person, i.e., USA and France. In other 
countries, banking laws (Jamaica), Companies Laws (Germany), or public policy regulation 
provide for the separation of positions.   Another issue relates to the very unpopular existence 
of an executive Deputy Chairman, both in the literature and in practice.  The issue was also 
examined in this study to determine its existence and role in order to fill empirical void.   A 
third concern relates to the presence of an appointed Senior Independent Director. This 
question was first influenced by a recommendation of the Cadbury Report (1991) for the 
appointment of a Lead Non-executive Director (or Senior Non-executive Director or Lead 
Director). Most recently, the Higgs Report (2003) endorses the appointment of a Senior 
Independent Director.  Sir Derek Higgs recommends that such person should meet the test of 
independence set out in his report. Unless it is anticipated that they will become chairmen, and 
provided they meet the test of independence, he suggested that the role be assumed by the 
Deputy Chairman, if there is one. According to Sir Derek, “I see the role of the Senior 
Independent Director as important in the relationship between major shareholders and the 
board.” (Higgs Report, Sections 7.5, 15.15, and 15.16).   
Sir Derek goes further by suggesting that the Senior Independent Director should be 
available to shareholders if they have reason for concern, e.g., contact through the normal 
channels of Chairman or chief executive officer has failed to resolve an issue (suggested Code 
provision A.3.6). The senior independent Director should also chair meetings between non-
executive Directors where the chairman does not attend (suggested Code provision A.1.5).  
 
7.2.3  Non-Executive vis-a-vis Executive Directors, and Director Selection 
 
Tables 7.3 shows a mean of 2.6 and median of less than 4 Executive Directors, 
compared to Table 7.4a findings of a mean of 6.8 and median of 7-10 NEDs for the companies 
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surveyed in this study.  These findings demonstrate that Jamaican boards have a ratio of 2.6 
NEDs: 1 Executive Director. This finding is remarkable in an environment of high ownership 
concentration and where the salient shareholders are highly-connected networks of family 
members and business associates. While the empirical findings are unquestionable, and it 
would be easy to conclude that Jamaica enjoys a high level of board independence based on 
the data in Tables 7.3 and 7.4a, one has to go beyond the surface, to understand the hard 
realities from a practical perspective. 
 
Table 7.3: Number of Executive Directors on Boards  
Executive Directors Frequency  Valid % 
less than 4 40 80.0 
4-5 5 10.0 
6-8 4 8.0 
9-10 1 2.0 
Total  50 100 
Mean 2.6 
Median  Less than 4 members  
Source: Interviews (n=50). 
 
The Cadbury Code states: “[T]he board should include NEDs in sufficient calibre and 
number for their views to carry significant weight in the board’s decisions.”  Critical to the 
presence of NEDs is their independence.  Independent NEDs are those who purportedly have 
no material ties or service contract with the company that may impair their exercising 
objectivity and fairness, and no connection whatsoever that may be conflicting with any 
decision to be taken on behalf of the board. In soliciting the views of a number of independent 
Directors found among the NEDs core, care and patience were exercised in explaining the 
difference between NEDs or outside Directors and those who are considered to be truly 
independent. In analysing the results of Table 7.4a, it was revealed that amongst a mean of 6.8 
NEDs and median of 7-10, there was a mean of 5.6 independent NEDs with median of more 
than 5 (See Table 7.5a).  
A more detailed examination of the data in Table 7.4b utilising cross tabulation showed 
that with a significance level of 0.552, there is no relationship between the number of NEDs 
on a board and whether or not the firm is listed. While the survey results may not reveal much 
in terms of association, a working knowledge of the Jamaican environment, would suggest that 
though these Directors may appear on the surface unconnected and unrelated, the reality is that 
their networks go wide and deep.  Usually through a distant relative, a business partner, or 
[216] 
 
supplier, or even a neighbour, whose children call each the parents “uncles” and “aunties”— 
an extension of non-biological relationships in certain communities and among the more 
affluent socio-economic groups.    
 
 Table 7.4a: Number of Non-Executive Directors on Boards 
Non- Executive Directors Frequency Valid % 
3 and less  7 14.0 
4-6 21 42.0 
7-10 16 32.0 
11 and over 6 12.0 
Total  50 100.0 
Mean 6.8 
Median  Between 7-10 members  
Source: Interviews (n=50). 
Table 7.4b: Non-Executive Directors Cross Tabulated with Listed versus Unlisted 
Companies 
Number of Non-Executive 
Directors on Board 
Listed versus Unlisted Companies 
Listed Unlisted 
N % N % 
less than 8 3 11 4 18 
8 - 10 9 33 10 45 
11 - 12 11 41 5 23 
13 and over 4 15 3 14 
Total 27 100 22 100 
Chi Square χ² Asymp Sig.= 0.552 
 
Table 7.5a Number of Independent Non-Executive Directors 
Independent Non- Executive Directors Frequency (%) 
2 and less 18  36 
3-5 16 32 
6 and over 16  32 
Total             50                         100 
Mean  5.6 
Median  More than 5 members  
Source: Interviews (n=50). 
 While the empirical findings are indisputable, knowledge of Jamaica’s contextual 
realities regarding business networks and their workings would contradict these results. Cross 
tabulation on the data was performed by looking for relationship, if any, between listed and 
unlisted companies with regards to independent NEDs. Table 7.5b shows that there is no such 
relationship based on a level of significance of 0.196. Therefore, the number of NEDs and 
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independent NEDs, on Jamaican boards bear no significance on whether the firm is a member 
of the stock market or not. This is rather  surprising in that all listed firms are required to 
appoint a minimum number of outsiders (NEDs), some of whom are expected to be 
independent to meet such conventions as Audit Committee—which requires all members to be 
NEDs and preferably independent. Yet still, there seems to be no difference in the number of 
these NEDs on listed versus unlisted. The latest finding demonstrates the level of 
contradictions in the Jamaican context surrounding board directorship and composition.  
A closer analysis of the data revealed that highly dispersed firms were almost twice as 
likely to have more than five members who were independent NEDs, 47% compared to 25% 
for closely held firms.  This tendency of the more dispersed firms having a greater level of 
independence can be explained by the earlier stated fact that these listed firms are bounded by 
a degree of independence among their directorship in fulfilling requirements of the Stock 
Exchange and Audit Committee conventions.  These audit conventions require audit 
committee members to be independent NEDs.   It is, however, rather difficult to compare these 
results with other empirical findings from elsewhere, particularly among unlisted companies, 
as hardly any research exists in this group as most of the research on NEDs and independent 
Directors, tend to focus on listed companies.  
 
Table 7.5b: Independent Non-Executive Directors Cross Tabulated with Listed 
versus Unlisted Companies 
Independent Non-
Executive Directors 
Listed versus Unlisted Companies 
Listed Unlisted 
N % N % 
less than 3 7 26 11 50 
3 - 5 9 33 6 27 
More than 5 11 41 5 23 
Total 27 100 22 100 
Chi Square χ² Asymp Sig.= 0.196 
 
As can be seen from Table 7.6, of the 46 respondents or 92% of sampled population, 
52.17% revealed that director selection was most significantly influenced by CEOs and/or 
Chairmen and 15.22% claimed that selection was done by one or more shareholders. Probing 
follow-up questions revealed that these were either majority or large holders of shares, and of 
particular interest, only 13.05% of Directors were selected by shareholders at AGMs. 
The AGM is one of the most legally binding and democratic structures of the modern 
corporation. The very tenets and essence of its invention in 1844 and written in the British 
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Companies Act of that year, was meant to provide an environment of corporate democracy to 
the smallest of shareholders—hence the “one share one vote principle” that has long been 
inherent of Anglo-Saxon corporate boardrooms.  
Table 7.6: Who most significantly influences director selection/approval 
Criteria Frequency Valid % 
CEO/Chairman/Appointed by Board 24  52.17 
Nominated by one or more Shareholders 7   15.22 
Shareholders at AGM 6   13.05 
Other 5  10.86  
Nomination Committee 4  8.70 
Total  46 100 
Source: Interviews (n=46) 
 These findings while quite revealing are not surprising as according to Sir Derek, 
Chairman of the Higgs Report (2003), almost half of NEDs surveyed for the Review were 
recruited through personal contacts of friendships; only 4% had had a formal interview and 
only 1% obtained their job through answering an advertisement. Furthermore, Pfeffer (1972), 
p. 220) writes: 
The selection procedure by which board members are chosen 
guarantees that, in most cases, board members are handpicked by 
management.  In many practical respects, management is, therefore, 
in control of the board.  
 
These findings while find contrast with the prescription in regulated guidelines for 
director selection, are consistent with the above stated findings by the Higgs Review, and also 
make mockery of the director selection process in the Jamaican corporation. This author 
therefore concurs with the recommendation of the Higgs Report (2003), that Best Practices for 
nominating and appointing Directors should be universally adopted, save and except in 
circumstances where legal, regulatory, cultural and other factors will give way to differences 
in the step-by-step approaches.   
 Since NEDs are outside Directors who are expected to protect shareholders’ interest, 
check the power of executives, and bring outside experience and objectivity to bear in 
deliberating issues at the main board and its committees, it is important that the process of 
selection should seek to identify individuals of suitable background which is essential for high 
performing boards. See Higgs Report (2003: sections 10.3 through to 10.34).  
 
7.2.4 An Integration of Research Findings 
In using focus group findings to support those of survey interview above to address the 
question of whether or not a balance between Non-Executive and Executive Directors is 
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important in board composition, participants unanimously acknowledged the importance of the 
presence of independent NEDs on the Board. These individuals would bring a more objective 
voice, providing greater checks and balances and bringing to the insiders a fresh perspective 
on the planning process. According to a lead Central Bank economist, “Non Executive 
Directors might feel less obligated to the CEO and, hence, exercise their independent 
judgement more freely.”  Other respondents agreed with the Economist and collectively 
argued that the NEDs would offer a wide array of needed skills, bringing with them creativity, 
and experience that would be a valuable addition to those already present. The executives 
would bring the company perspective, including an intimate knowledge of its inner workings, 
and an understanding of the industry in which it is a player.  An outlier position held that the 
balance of Non-Executives ought to depend on the degree to which this is mandated, along 
with the public relations expediency and the extent to which insider knowledge is needed for 
the effective functioning of the board.  
On the matter of the selection of board members, in spite of some scepticism of having 
good knowledge about the prevalence of NEDs being obligated to rubber stamp Chairman and 
executive decisions, the more important lesson for Jamaica is that firms need to be aware of 
the growing global trends towards a majority board of NEDs. Additionally, there should be an 
equally significant presence of independent NEDs to serve such committees as audit, 
nomination, compensation, and CG.  
Practitioners’ literature (Cadbury, Report 1992; Combined Code, 2003; Higgs Report, 
2003) has given an inordinate amount of time and attention to prescribing and describing the 
role of NEDs and the importance of them forming a significant majority of corporate boards 
and their key committees such as audit, risk management, compensation, and CG.  
Theoretically, the agency theory supports the idea that boards should be dominated by NEDs 
to increase board independence from management.  In a contrasting view, the Stewardship 
Theory suggests that control should accrue to the firm’s managers rather than the outsiders, 
since there is no need to monitor management who are regarded as able and trustworthy.  
In terms of Executive Directors, there is hardly any sound academic literature on the 
role of Executive Directors and where it exists, it is usually limited to mainly two 
considerations: 1.) Executive Directors should not dominate board composition in their 
numbers, but rather create an enabling environment for fostering greater objectivity and 
independence by supporting the notion of a majority board of outsiders; 2.) Executive 
Directors must be trustworthy and understand their roles quite clearly as that of providing 
NEDs with timely, accurate, and relevant information.  
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7.2.5   Board Committees and Composition 
 Given the limited academic studies on board committees, more so, their growing 
importance to policymakers and practitioners as critical elements in ensuring greater board 
effectiveness and organisational performance, respondents were asked to indicate the board 
committees found in their organizations.  Table 7.7 shows the five most prevalent committees 
and their mean sizes among Jamaican boards.  These are Audit (66.67%, size 3.7), 
Remuneration or Compensation (48%, size=3.8), Risk Management (31% size 4.25), 
Corporate Governance (25% size 4.3), and Finance (23% size 4.6).   The sizes of these 
committees are generally within the mean of similar committees based on Spencer Stuart 
Board Index, 2008 (USA), which features board sizes among America’s largest listed 
corporations. These sizes reflect only members of the Board of Directors and so at each sitting, 
committee membership is usually greater, when one takes into consideration the representation 
of management officers who attend as board invitees to provide technical information and 
inform the deliberations (personal experience).  
It is also pivotal to note that other committees were identified by respondents such as 
Nomination or Selection, Succession Planning, Research and Development, and Corporate and 
Regulatory Affairs. However, their prevalence among the companies sampled was 
insignificant.  Nomination committee is, however, ranked as one of the most written about and 
established structures of modern boards as far as good governance practices dictate. For 
example, almost all FTSE 100 companies have a nomination committee, compared to only 
thirty per cent (30%) of companies outside the FTSE 350. However, interviews conducted for 
the Higgs Report (2003) (British), suggested that where the nomination committee exists, it is 
the least developed of board committees, usually meeting irregularly and often without a clear 
understanding of the extent of its role in the appointment process. In some cases, board 
members who are not committee members are present at committee discussions, effectively 
making the committee indistinct from the board as a whole. Jamaican corporate players are yet 
to come to grips with the importance of the nomination committee, and the CG implications of 
its absence among Jamaican corporate boards.  
Similarly to the role of NEDs at the level of the board, Non-Executive independent 
Directors are also important to the committees of the board as discussed in the preceding 
section. Of no lesser worth, is the size of these committees. Even though committees are 
usually smaller in number than the main board, they must be of an appropriate size and to be 
able to assemble a quorum, usually of at least two Directors excluding management officers, 
and more so, must be able to entertain a fulsome and robust discussion. Considering that the 
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average size of committees shown in Table 7.7 reflects only Directors, and does not include 
management officers who serve as ex-officio members, these figures are in line with 
international trends. 
 
Table 7.7: Board committees and their composition 
Board Committee Frequency   (%)  Average size 
1. Audit 32 66.67 3.7 
2. Remuneration or Compensation 23 48 3.8 
3. Risk Management  15 31 4.25 
4. Corporate Governance  12 25 4.3 
5. Finance 11 23 4.6 
Source: Interviews (n=48). Multiple responses allowed and hence the corresponding sum total 
of valid percentage to frequency would exceed 100%.  
 
Critical to the findings of Table 7.7 is the growing interest in the establishment of such 
committees as Corporate Governance and risk management by Jamaican firms. Traditionally, 
banks and other financial institutions are required to report on risk management (regulated 
risks—market, credit liquidity, foreign currency, and transaction) but more and more, non-
bank companies have been establishing these committees and are now more focused on risk 
and CG across the entire organisation.  In further support to this growing practice, JSE Best 
Practice Awards data for 2008 showed a 60% increase in listed companies now reporting on 
CG and risk management activities through established committees, compared to 2005 when 
the competition began. Therefore, Jamaican firms are responding more positively to both 
structural and functional changes in CG consistent with international trends, which would 
suggest that CG awareness is growing among businesses and individuals.  
Theoretical evidence on the relationship and impact of the type of board committees 
and their composition on financial performance are still inconclusive.  The literature review of 
chapter 3 on the composition and selection of nomination committee, albeit sparse, concluded 
that CEO involvement in the nomination committee would lead to a reduction of the presence 
of independent Directors overtime.  Furthermore, it would appear that many of the critical 
processes and decisions of boards of Directors are not derived from the board-at-large, but 
rather in its committees and that greater proportions of affiliated Directors on the Audit 
committee can influence the structure and length of bankruptcy procedures.  
Probing questions posed to respondents have revealed that board committees have been 
evolving over time to reduce the workload of the main board and to allow it to deal with more 
strategic and general issues while the committees explore strategies in a more detailed and 
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probing manner. Therefore, board committees are an extension of the responsibility of the full 
board and make recommendations to the board, which retains ultimate and collective 
responsibility for decision making. Additionally, respondents assert that both the type of 
committee and its composition (not only of independent Directors), regarding depth and 
breadth of skills of its members, are critical in determining the beneficial outcome of board 
processes.  Finally, committees allow their members to utilise their knowledge of the 
organisation and generally become more actively engaged and be fully-utilised during board 
interaction and deliberations.  
 
7.2.6   Tenure of Directors   
Director tenure is another area of CG which has been at best, scantily studied and 
written about in the academic literature. Tenure may be defined as the continuing appointment 
that may be granted, and is made effective by nomination by the Chairman and board, and 
subsequently elected at the AGM.  
Why is this, if at all, an actual, or, potential problem in Jamaica? Firstly, respondents 
were asked to provide average years of service for both Executive and Non-executive 
Directors so that a closer analysis could be done. In analysing the findings of Table 7.8, the 
mean tenure was 10.6 and median of 10-14 years for Executive Directors, just slightly higher 
than the 9.5 years mean and 5-9 years median years for NEDs.  Based on the theoretical and 
empirical literature presented earlier, there are four questions to ponder:  Are Jamaican NEDs 
overspending their time? Are they being given too long tenure?  If so, what are the possible 
reasons?  Why is director tenure important, if at all, in the context of this study?  
In addressing these questions, one would need to understand many of the factors that 
determine director tenure in Jamaica, a task that is beyond the scope of this research. However, 
the literature identifies several factors which influence director tenure in one or more ways. 
Tenure is not influenced by mandatory term limits and organisational objectives but rather by 
personal goals whereby Directors tend to leave to pursue more profitable, meaningful and 
beneficial opportunities, including board appointments in other companies.  The Executive 
Director Experience and Tenure Survey (2000) also revealed that tenure was dependent on 
compensation salary, board support, belief in mission, desire to retire, a feeling of ‘burn out’, 
and whether directors felt that they were contributing meaningfully to the organisation.  
Based on the findings in Table 7.8, executives spend a longer time in the average firm 
than NEDs, which is a good indicator of loyalty, succession planning, and may be indicative 
that these executives are satisfied with their jobs (Monks and Minow, 2008).  On the other 
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hand, the question as to whether or not NEDs are overspending their time on Jamaican boards 
is clearly not easily explained given the scope of this study. A mean tenure of of 9.5 and a 
median of 5-9 years could be as a result of several factors. First, because there is hardly any 
board performance evaluation mechanism in place, Directors are automatically re-nominated 
for service renewal which may run several terms in the case of many of these companies. 
Second, the pervasive nature of cronyism that characterises the Jamaican business class and 
more so board appointments may well be reflecting itself in the long tenure enjoyed by 
Jamaican NEDs (personal experience). On the advantageous side however, and this is also in 
answer to why does director tenure matter, NEDs with longer tenure can offer more in terms of 
a knowledge continuum—in-depth knowledge of the history of projects, extensive social 
networks which can bring significant long-term value to the business. Also, these longer 
serving NEDs would know more about likely candidates in executive succession planning and 
ensure continual renewal of the organisation. 
According to New York Census (2007), women make up only 14.7% of the total Board 
of Directors and senior executive officer positions in the top 100 largest public companies in 
New York. A more recent study by Spencer Stuart Board Index (SSBI) 2008 revealed that 
women sit on nearly 89% of S&P 500 boards, representing just a slight drop from 2007 but an 
increase from 85% in 2003. At the same time, the proportion of women among all independent 
Directors remains at 15.7%, up from 13.1% in 2003. As to the distribution of women Directors 
on corporate boards, SSBI 2008 indicates that 11% of US top 500 companies have an average 
of less than 1 female Director on their boards, 33% have 1 Director, 40% have 2 or more, 10% 
have 3 or more, and 6% have 4 or more female Directors.    
 
Table 7.8: Years of Service given by Executive Directors and NEDs 
 Executive 
Directors  
Valid 
(%) 
Non-Executive 
Directors 
Valid   
(%) 
 (Frequency)  (Frequency)   
4 and less 14 32.56 7 17.5 
5-9 9 20.93 13 32.5 
10-14 9 20.93 10 25.0 
15-20 7 16.3 6 15.0 
21 and over 4 9.3 4 10.0 
Total 43  100.00 40.0 100.00 
Mean  10.6  9.5  
Median  10-14 years  5-9 years  
Source: Interviews [n=43; EDs; missing values=7]; [n= 40; NEDs; missing values= 10]. 
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According to the Executive Director and Tenure Survey (2000), the mean length of 
tenure of a Director was 6.1 years. In another source, the mean length of service was 4.2 years 
for Non-Executive Directors as well as Chairmen (Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2008).  In the 
said Spencer Stuart study, the length of terms for Directors was reduced from an average of 3 
years to 1 year in two thirds of America’s S&P 500 companies between 2003 and 2008. 
However, what constitutes an appropriate length of tenure is debatable as some academics 
argue that tenure should be limited to two terms to ensure the infusion of younger, more risk-
loving and energized knowledge and kills (Director Compensation Report, 2008). Opponents 
to term limits argue that while turnover and corporate renewal is good and inevitable, on a case 
by case basis, continuity and experience is just as important.  The literature has pointed to 
balancing acts where some companies have opted to retain Directors with valuable experience 
by permitting service beyond previously mandated age limits and beyond term limits.  
 
7.2.7 Gender and Inequality Issues  
  
Drawing on data from the European continent, The Netherlands Board Index (2006) 
indicates that women now occupy 5.1% of a total of 327 executive and 547 non-executive 
board positions (compared with 3.6 per cent in 2005 and 3.1 per cent in 2000).  The report also 
revealed that the number of women occupying executive positions remains low, with 1.8 per 
cent of all 327 executive positions among the 100 companies in the overwhelming male 
dominant executive and non-executive board positions. Female non-executives occupy 4.5 per 
cent (39 positions) of the total number of executive and non-executive board positions (874) in 
the Board Index (3% in 2005 and 3.1% in 2000).  Female Executive Directors occupy 0.7 per 
cent (6 positions) of the total number of executive and non-executive board positions in the 
Board Index (0.58% in 2005 and 0.32% in 2001). 
  
Source: Interviews (n=50). 
Turning to the results of this research, Figure 7.1 shows that 78% of 50 of Jamaica’s 
largest corporations have at least one woman on their boards and as many as 6 in only one of 
the 50 sampled companies. The average presence of female Directors on boards in this study 
Figure 7.1: Presence of Female Directors 
   22% 
 
78% No 
Yes 
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was 1.8, and an average of 1.6 who were independent.  Of the sample, 38% had 1 woman 
each, 24% had 2 women, only 10% have 3 women, and even more revealing, only 3 or 6% of 
the companies had 4 or more women Directors.  One board had as many as 6 women.  The 
organisation with six female Directors is a Cooperative Credit Union (non-bank financial or 
thrifts–generic term for them in the USA), whose Directors were nominated and voted for at 
AGMs.  In this case, both nomination and selection is held at the AGM, hence, very minimal 
scope for its Chairman or influential others to have nominated and installed their cronies. 
Tables 7.9a and 7.9b below show the results of the two sets of cross tabulation analyses.  
These tables analyse whether or not there were associations in relationship between the 
number of female Directors who sit on stock market companies, which have dominant-owned 
dispersed versus closely held ownership arrangements and the number of female Directors 
who sit on boards of listed companies versus unlisted companies. While there was no 
statistical significance in either of the results of the Tables, the data show that females were a 
bit more likely to be Directors in closely held firms, as evident by the 87% versus 79% for 
dominant-owned dispersed firms.  
Table 7.9a: Female Directors * Highly dispersed versus close held ownership 
Female Director 
Highly dispersed versus close held ownership 
Highly Dispersed Closely Held 
N % N % 
Yes 15 79% 7 87% 
No 4 21% 1 12% 
Total 19  8  
Chi Square χ² Asymp Sig.= 0.601 
 
Table 7.9b Female Directors * Listed versus Unlisted Companies 
Female Director 
Listed versus Unlisted Companies 
Listed Unlisted 
N % N % 
Yes  22 82% 15 68% 
No 5 18% 7 32.% 
Total 27  22  
Chi Square χ² Asymp Sig.= 0.282 
  
Consistent with the reality that the majority of Jamaican companies are closely held, 
and their boards are likewise composed of closely related individuals (families, friends, 
business associates), most females who are Directors on the boards are likewise a part of these 
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oligarchic groups. Hence it is most natural that women would be more likely to be represented 
on the board of closely held firms, in spite the fact that highly dispersed dominantly-owned 
firms in Jamaica are hardly any different regarding their composition as the “networks” of 
connected persons are ever present.   
Comparatively, very few women are appointed to Board of Directors and at least one 
author is attributing this to the presence of a “glass ceiling” which gives rise to women getting 
less powerful corporate titles, occupying disproportionately more staff functions, being less 
likely to be top earners of the corporation and earning considerably less than men 
(Zelechowski, 2004).    
 
7.2.8 An Integration of Findings across Methodological Approaches  
Would you advocate for a woman to be nominated among the Board of Directors of every 
company in Jamaica?  Focus group respondents (the majority males save one) felt that the 
presence of a woman Director ought not to be mandated.  It was generally acknowledged that 
women could make equally valuable contributions to the board. They possessed the requisite 
talents, skills and training. However, appointments of women, some participants thought, 
should be made based on competency, and not so much on gender. Others seemed to 
acknowledge a more unique role that women could play on the Board in terms of their 
perspective as females.  
The sole female participant was the single voice unequivocally calling for mandatory 
inclusion of females on each board. This concern came in response to the perceived 
entrenchment of an ‘old boys’ club’ that would not readily self-regulate in this regard. On the 
dissenting side, another individual was concerned that a regulation requiring female Directors 
would open a Pandora’s Box of other groups and causes that would demand mandatory 
inclusion on Boards.  As one respondent sums it up, “women should not be restricted or 
promoted just because of gender.”  
In spite the rather grim realities based on the empirical data presented, there is still a 
growing trend for greater inclusion of women into corporate boards which is argued to be 
attributed to the changing outlook of younger men, the precedence set by women forerunners, 
their proven competence in management and executive positions, and the increasing 
experienced and knowledgeable pool of women to draw from in composing a more diverse 
board. There is also a body of literature pointing to better financial performance, greater 
competitive advantage, improved strategic planning, and better understanding of customers in 
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organisations with women forming the majority of the Boards of Directors (Daily et al, 1999; 
Catalyst, 2008).   
In the final analysis, the minority representation of females in the boardrooms of Jamaica, 
like in many other countries, will continue for a long time given the nature of ownership and 
control exposed earlier. Otherwise, to improve their status in the boardroom, women will have 
to create more successful businesses and enlist these businesses on the Stock Markets. 
Furthermore, the larger companies are family-dominated and usually pass the reins of 
management and control down from one generation to another. During this process of 
management and ownership succession, males are usually the main inheritors of majority of 
the business and thus management control. Females tend to marry into similarly wealthy 
families and hence either move out to work with their husbands or remain in the business with 
a lesser role.  The males tend to recruit other males of the family, as well as close relatives and 
good friends of similar stations-business knowledge, social networks, and position power. 
  
7.2.9 Frequency of Board Meetings, Timing of Distribution of Board Papers and Proxy 
Forms   
 
The issues hereunder are critical to board processes and though timing of meetings and 
the distribution of board papers may vary from one jurisdiction to another, when board 
meetings are conducted at sufficient enough frequencies, this could significantly influence 
board effectiveness, dynamics, and organisational outcomes (personal experience—15 years 
accumulated board experience).    
Table 7.9c: Board Processes—Frequency of Meetings, Timing of Board Papers and 
Proxy Forms  
Factors of Board Effectiveness  Average Period of Reference 
Average number of board meetings in the last 
three years 
 
8.5 
 
Per Year 
Distribution of board papers Prior to meetings   
1.5  
 
Weeks  
Distribution of Proxy Forms Prior to AGMs 2.7  Weeks  
Source: Interviews (N=50) 
Table 7.9c highlights important issues for the general conduct of board and how and 
why board processes impact on empirical patterns of strategy and performance. The frequency 
of board meetings is an indicator of the regularity and seriousness of attending to the business 
of an organisation. Apart from the fact that most Companies Laws (in the Caribbean) prescribe 
a minimum number of meetings per year, usually four for limited liability companies, there is 
still no punitive burden in law to prevent or penalise companies for convening fewer than the 
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legally stipulated minimum. Academic studies on the frequency of meetings hardly exist. 
However, at least one survey conducted and published annually by Spencer Stuart Board Index 
(2008), reported that the average meeting held among S&P 500 was 8.7 times per year, up 
from 7.8 in 2003 and 7.0 in 1998.  This figure is hardly off the 8.5 meetings (three year 
average) held by Jamaican Companies (Table 7.9c).  Normally, the majority of boards meet 
monthly and may take a recess either in August or December (Caribbean) relative to where in 
the world they are located.  
On closer examination of the data, it showed that 44% of the sampled population held a 
mean of less than 8 meetings over the three year review period. Furthermore, 24% of these 
companies convened 5 or less meetings on average over the same period (Appendix 9).  In 
fact, while 40% of SSBI companies meet more than 6-8 times per year and 15% meet 12 times 
or more, 50% of the companies in this study reported convening 10 meetings or more on 
average per . On a global basis, the more popular frequency is 11 meetings per year consistent 
with the one-month recess as stated. On this basis, Jamaican boards could be meeting just 
fewer than the global practice.  
Most CG codes have shied away from prescribing a minimum or maximum number of 
meetings and instead suggest that the board should meet as often as is necessary to carry out 
the affairs of the organisation effectively, and in the best interest of shareholders and 
stakeholders at large. Clearly, the less often a board meets, is the less opportunity it will have 
to discuss critical issues of the organisation and to stay current with issues.  While there is no 
empirical data to support the claim that inactive boards (not meeting regularly) are more likely 
to be ineffectual boards, personal experience of this author, validates this sentiment. Likewise, 
there is no data to support the claim that active boards (meet regularly) add more value to the 
organisation. This author would be inclined to support this position based on his personal 
experience.  
 As it relates to the issues of timeliness of distribution of board papers and proxy forms, 
prior to board meetings and AGMs, respectively, a time (minimum or maximum) has hardly 
ever been legislated regarding board papers. Generally speaking, the normal convention is for 
it to be prescribed in company bylaws, Articles of Association or Incorporations and Board 
Charters, as well as some CG codes, but not in law (personal comm., Philip Armstrong39, July 
2009).  The suggested periods vary significantly and are not without controversy in CG terms.  
In spite of the existence of non-legal prescriptions, they are hardly specific and instead 
                                               
39
 Philip Armstrong is a globally renowned CG expert and Head of the Global Corporate Governance Forum of 
the World Bank, located in Washington D.C., USA. His views were sought on this matter, July 9, 2009.   
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recommend that Directors receive their meeting papers and board information in a timely 
manner, sufficient to allow them time to make decisions in a proper and informed way. 
According to Philip Armstrong: 
 [U]nlike the lack of legal prescription for the timely distribution of board 
papers, proxy forms are usually covered in laws, e.g. English Companies 
Act and other similar “Commonwealth” legislation such as Canada, 
South Africa and Australia.  Most European countries also deal with this 
issue, albeit in ways that are controversial in corporate governance terms 
in some cases. In the US, it is governed by SEC regulations.  However, 
this is often supplemented by additional specifications in the bylaws or 
articles, such as the content and format of the proxy statement.   
 
What is certain is that shareholders need to obtain proxy forms in a timely manner 
sufficient to review and decide on the positions to vote for or against, especially in situations 
where they have to appoint a proxy to act on their behalf.  
 
7.2.10 Board Performance Evaluation and Training and Development of  
Directors 
The practices of evaluating board performance and training and development of Directors 
are at earlier stages in the empirical literature. Hardly any in-depth study of sound empirical 
base can be found, particularly regarding the beneficial impact of training on board 
effectiveness and organisational outcomes. In practice, however, it has been a part of the 
modus operandi  in most advanced economies for decades, and only recently been seen as a 
critical element in good governance in less developed countries. The primary objective of 
evaluating the performance of Directors is not simply to improve performance, effectiveness 
and the contribution of each Director, but also to improve the effectiveness of the board in the 
fulfilment of its role.  
  Table 7.10:  Board Performance Evaluation and Training of Directors 
Source: Interviews (n1=48; missing values =2; n2=47; missing values =3) 
 Table 7.10 presents descriptive statistics on two factors influencing board conduct 
based on interview surveys of this study.   First, is the question as to whether or not there is a 
formal system in place for evaluating board performance. Informants have overwhelmingly 
(80%) indicated that there is no such programme in place while 20% say they are practising 
Factors of  
Board Conduct and Representation    
Yes 
 (Frequency %) 
No 
 (Frequency %)  
1. Is there a formal system in place for 
evaluating board performance?  
 
20 
 
80  
2. Is there a formal system in place to train 
newly appointed Directors?  
 
20  
 
80 
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this exercise.  Performance measurement improves the effectiveness of Directors and further 
reduces risks to the organisation. 
In an attempt to probe this issue more deeply and inquire into the merits (or demits) of 
evaluating boards, focus group informants were asked:  Do you see any merits in evaluating 
the performance of corporate boards?  The majority of focus group participants believe there 
are merits in corporate board evaluations. Where there were reservations, these were rooted in 
a lack of knowledge or exposure to the process—how it would be conducted and the 
outcomes. Others had a clear picture of the procedure—it would examine how decisions were 
taken, the timeliness of these decisions, and whether they proved correct or effective. Another 
participant suggested that the board itself would set goals for its performance and would 
evaluate via peer review and other means. This process, or an approximation of it, would 
benefit the shareholders and the Board itself, by giving an objective, independent perspective 
on their functioning, in the case of an outside evaluation. Feedback of any sort, internal or not, 
would be helpful to identify weaknesses, and areas needing improvement. It would also serve 
as a process to weed out incompetent Directors—those who operate as if their job is merely an 
opportunity to gain remuneration without bring much value to boardroom deliberation.   
One participant, whose comment was unanimously supported, found that assessing board 
performance would be difficult to separate from that of management when looking at 
performance indicators. Also, the performance of the board would be easily affected by the 
functioning of the market in which the business is placed, as a monopoly would always have 
good returns, while a slump in the market would not be overcome simply by a good board.  
On the question of training Directors and whether or not this should be made mandatory, 
focus groups participants unanimously agreed that there were merits in training Directors in 
good CG.  Some went as far as noting that it should be mandatory, with one person singling 
out boards that did not have a mechanism for evaluation. It was generally agreed that this 
would benefit board members by teaching the specific requirements of the role and thus aiding 
in the improvement of their performance.  This would result in improved accountability and 
transparency, along with increased internal controls.  It was suggested that Directors 
exercising good CG would benefit the company, the community, and eventually the wider 
society.  
One respondent thought some Directors might not think they need training. Another 
testified to the positive response and change in those boards which had received such training. 
Whatever the case, a board was sure to benefit, as would any individual, from further training 
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in how to effectively exercise their responsibility. As another respondent puts it, “The training 
of Directors is critical, especially when performance is not reviewed”.  
 
7.3.0 Findings on Board’s Role in Firms’ Strategic Decision-Making  
7.3.1  Introduction  
 
Research on boards is still an evolving phenomenon and as such, there was a deliberate 
attempt of not placing priority attention on gathering data and measuring empirical outcomes 
but instead, to employ a mix of semi-structured and structured questions to obtain basic 
statistics while giving the Director (and corporate executives) opportunities to explain the 
realities of their organisational contexts on a range of board activities.  The questionnaire 
schedule (Appendix 2) was drawn from an analysis of existing literature.  In addition, the 
focus group method was used to strengthen the findings of these interviews.  
This section addresses issues of company vision and mission and who is responsible 
for creating them, level of board involvement in strategic decision-making and the boards 
perceived versus actual role in firm’s strategic decision-making.  The theoretical and empirical 
background to this section has been earlier addressed in the literature review of Chapter 3.  
Therefore, the ensuing discussion is restricted to defining and explaining critical concepts and 
terminologies for a better understanding of the discussion to follow. First: strategy—this is the 
formal process of planning, an analytic process that establishes long-term objectives, and a 
process usually initiated and implemented by top management and undertaken at various 
levels by other members of the organisation (Stiles citing Anoff, 1995; Chandler, 1962).  
Second is the term Vision. From a strategic planning standpoint, vision is what an organisation 
wants to be or where the organisation (or an individual) wants to go. According to one 
respondent (a CEO): 
 “When I think vision, I think the long term, I consider a number of issues as 
to what will be the driving forces to get there. Is it going to be a greater 
devotion to our customers’ needs? Or, is it going to be sticking to our 
fundamental philosophical outlook that we should not attempt to serve 
everyone, but remain committed to serving a niche group at the very best they 
can experience service and product quality. An alternative is, do we remain 
and want to be seen as customer-centric but highly differentiated. Vision is 
the big picture of where we want to go as a company.  It is therefore all 
encompassing of what has to be done, with the mission, goals...strategies and 
so on.  
 
A vision is a broader perspective than the mission which is used to achieve the vision 
by its very definition. A mission is who the organization represents or what purpose it 
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serves—the essence for its existence. Therefore, a well-crafted mission has in it, what the 
organisation represents, who it serves, how it does business and why it exists. Third is control 
—word commonly used to imply being in charge of, or, to steer. Therefore, from being in 
control the board derives certain power or authority that allows it to determine what and how 
much rewards or sanctions are to be allocated. Particularly, this power comes in the forms of 
relations such as abilities, personal prestige or status, and quality of contracts (Finkelstein, 
1992; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995).    
Fourth is the concept of strategic direction. Though many companies lack an 
established corporate strategy process in the sense of having no formal strategic planning 
process,  no structure as a strategic planning committee or an appointed corporate planner, it 
would be rather rare for any firm to have no form of strategic direction. The activities forming 
part of any strategic decision making could therefore include: determining organisation 
architecture, performance management, information systems, monitoring the organisation’s 
health and ensure corporate renewal, development of corporate vision, guiding strategic 
planning process, and acting as ambassadors in establishing critical contacts and securing 
resources, just to name a few. These activities involve intense day-to-day planning and 
executing and can be grouped as the Service Roles of the board.  
Fama and Jensen (1983) recognise both Service and Control Roles of the Board in a 
four step model of decision-making. These four steps are: 1.) initiation—the generating of 
proposals, resource utilisation and the structuring of contracts, and 2.) ratification—the 
selected choice from among several strategic options.  After careful assessments, a choice is 
decided on for approval by the board: 3.) implementation of strategic initiatives—this is the 
execution of the approved strategy, and 4.) monitoring—his is the evaluation of performance 
agents (senior executives) against their performance objectives to determine their level of 
value added to the organisation within a specific period of strategic implementation.  Fama and 
Jensen (1993) concluded that initiation and implementation form the service role of the board 
and are mainly carried out by management, hence decision management while ratification and 
monitoring form the control role of the board, and hence decision-control.  In combining both 
decision- management and decision-control, one gets the strategic role of the board.   
 
7.3.2  Findings of this Study  
 
Critical to deciding on the vision and mission statements, developing goals and 
objectives and the eventual assessment of many strategic options, an organisation must 
embrace a common set of approaches or model supported by adequate structural mechanisms 
[233] 
 
to effectively craft and implement strategies. Therefore, as to the question: Is there a Statement 
on your Company’s Vision and Mission? Respondents reported that 96% of firms have well-
articulated Vision and Mission Statements (Table 7.11), while less than one-half (44%) had an 
established and functional strategic planning committee (7.13). The strategic planning 
committee serves as the main group of individuals in an organisation who lead strategic 
initiatives, ensures buy-ins and coach team members on various aspects of the process. Where 
a committee is not present, usually the firm appoints a team member to be the internal point-
person while they ask outside consultants to facilitate annual planning retreats and review their 
strategic planning process.  
 
7.3.2.1 Findings on Who Create Vision and Mission Statements  
  
Forty per cent (40%) of respondents reported that creating the vision and mission was 
done mostly by management while only 15% agree that it was mostly and exclusively done by 
the board (Table 7.12).  Also, 42% believe it was a process evenly performed by both board 
and management.  Key to the effectiveness of any decision-making process of the board is its 
level of involvement in strategy—the future state and success of any organisation. Though a 
very difficult concept to define, Judge and Zeithaml (1992), posit a distinction between two 
phases: 1.) a formulation phase, and 2.) an evaluation phase.  In the formulation phase, the 
board’s involvement has been described as critical to a range of activities, from working with 
management on strategy development to mainly ratifying management proposals.  As to the 
evaluation phase, boards have been ranked based on their ability to probe into management’s 
utilisation of allocated resources and on how they rate management’s achievement of agreed 
objectives.  
 
7.3.2.2 Findings on the Positioning Mode of Board Involvement in Strategic Decision  
 How would you position the board’s involvement in strategy? The mode of strategic 
involvement of the board was compared equally with management by 53.1% of respondents, 
36.7% believe the board is mostly involved in strategy initiatives, and 10.2% attributed the 
board exclusively. In other words, the board’s mode of involvement is less than satisfactory in 
the mere 10.2% attributable to its exclusive responsibility. When considering the equal 
positioning of board and management at 53.1%, this makes the picture look more favourable 
to the board but still less than satisfactory.  The researcher’s next question focuses on gleaning 
from respondents their thoughts on the level (extent) of board involvement. See Table 7.15.    
 
7.3.2.3 Findings on Ranking of the Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-Making  
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What do you think should be the level of involvement of your board in the strategic 
direction of the organisation? Seventy-one per cent (71%), or an overwhelming majority, 
believed the board should be very involved while the remainder sees the board as becoming 
marginally 27.0%) to modestly (2.0%) involved (Figure 7.2).  These latest data are indicating 
that there is a clear disconnect between what respondents believe should be the status quo of 
director involvement versus how they see current realities. Following a pattern of probing, 
cross checking, and clarifying as the researcher attempts to unravel the board’s role and 
involvement, the next concern was a ranking of the board’s mode of involvement in strategy 
after a careful application of the finger-grained analysis.   
How would you rank the mode of involvement of the board in strategic decision-
making?  Table 7.14 indicates the overwhelming ranking of fairly strong and very strong 
levels of involvement of the board on the following roles: ratifying strategy (88.5%), 
approving strategy (85.5%), assessing strategy (63.2%), decision-making (65.2%), and 
monitoring strategic planning (57.15%).  These findings are consistent with the control roles of 
the board (ratification of strategy and monitoring strategy) as well as the views that boards’ 
primary purposes are gate-keeping, rubber stamping, and legitimising CEOs proposals and 
general decision-making (Ferlie et al., 1994; Lorsch and McLver, 1989).  
In terms of guiding the strategic planning process, helping to formulate strategy and 
defining strategy parameters, management (executives and staff) was seen to be more involved 
in these strategic roles.  In fact, the board’s average rank on these latter roles was only 34.2% 
(Table 7.14).   It has always been that in one-tier boards where there is a mix of executives and 
NEDs, and where the service roles and control roles merge with each other, the board would 
be very involved in helping to craft objectives and formulate strategies. However, as the data 
in Table 7.14 shows, the strategic decision-making process in these Jamaican companies is 
executed mainly from a purely top-down manner, with executives taking the lead.  This study 
finds concurrence with the findings of Judge and Zeithaml (1992; Minzberg, 1983; Mace, 
1971).   
On the other hand, the findings on the level of involvement on such issues as 
ratification of strategy, approving strategy and discussing strategy, as well as participation in 
wider decision-making processes are consistent with the writings of various strategy authors 
(Tricker, 1984; Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Ferlie et al, 1994; Henke, 1996).  These findings 
only present what respondents believe are the primary roles of the board and are by no means 
exhaustive.  A board’s primary roles will depend on the nature of the organisation, its legal 
arrangement and strategic mandate and the quality of Directors it has.  
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For the questions that follow, answers were sought for actual time the board spent 
deliberating strategy and what respondents believed were the ‘real’ or actual roles of the board 
in strategic decision-making.   
When each respondent was asked what they perceived to be a good estimate of board 
time their company spent on strategy issues, the majority (72%) indicated that the board 
spends a range of between of between ten-fifty (10-50%) per cent of board time on a wide 
range of issues concerning the future direction of the company. According to the findings of 
this study, the median time spent discussing strategy by Jamaican boards was 28%. This was 
slightly better than result of 25% obtained from the Conference Board (1993) Survey of 495 
US Corporate Secretaries.   
 
7.3.2.4 Findings on Board’s Actual Role in Strategic Decision-Making  
What role does the board actually play in strategic decision-making, if any?  In table 
7.16, the analysis is restricted to those strategic roles (derived initially through finger-grained 
analysis of pilot surveys) that obtained at least 50% approval from respondents. The primary 
roles of boards as identified by these results include the ratification of strategy—this has been 
consistently ranked and perceived as the primary role of the board (Tables 7.15 and 7.16), and 
also throughout the literature, monitoring the organisation’s health, acting as ambassadors, 
hiring and firing the CEO, ensuring corporate renewal, the development of corporate vision, 
and reviewing and monitoring corporate social responsibility. Of particular interest in these 
findings, are such roles as ensuring corporate renewal, the board acting as ambassadors, 
responsible for ethical framework, and reviewing and monitoring corporate social 
responsibility.  
 
7.3.3 An Integration of Methodological Findings  
In an attempt to probe deeper into the actual role of the board in strategic decision-
making, the focus group session moderator made the following statement: “Traditionally, the 
Board monitors the CEO and ratifies strategic decisions, while management initiate and 
implements strategy”. Respondents were then asked the question:  How do you perceive the 
role of the Board in the strategic direction of the company? 
The majority of respondents agreed that the board should be involved in the 
development of company strategy. They went further to note that this should be a major role of 
the Board of Directors.  Rather than passively ratifying the ideas of the CEO, the board was 
seen as a major and most valuable contributor to the process of strategic development.  Indeed, 
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the board is seen as bringing an important external perspective on the development of 
company strategy.  The members bring expertise and experience from their respective settings 
and combine this to lend a broader viewpoint to the possible direction of the company.  Let 
alone, the CEO is seen as having too narrow a scope, being only one man, submerged in the 
world of the company.  
The board’s role is generally agreed upon but one participant noted that management 
often takes over the board’s functioning in strategising, and the board in turn settles into the 
role of monitor, instead of joining the process. Instead of this position, the board ought to be 
actively requiring information from management. This data should then be used to help them 
make informed decisions and come up with their own contributions to the strategic 
development process. One respondent suggests that management should be the primary 
strategy developer, but the majority of respondents stressed the importance of a board that 
carefully lends a wider perspective to the strategic plans they receive from the CEO.   
It was also acknowledged that the board’s additional function was to monitor and 
ensure the implementation of the strategy, whoever developed it. This could be done through 
periodic review of progress reports. It was of note that a positive relationship with the 
CEO/management was crucial to the process. Such a relationship would certainly help to 
promote staff buy-in for the strategy that is presented.  
These roles in the context of the maturity of the empirical landscape of studies focusing 
on strategic roles of the board could easily be deemed ‘emerging’. Corporate renewal 
addresses the involvement of the board in succession planning. While this study did not seek 
to determine the prevalence of the policy or practice of succession planning in Jamaica, 
practical experiences gained from working in various spheres in the local environment 
suggests that it is a developing phenomenon. 
 
Table 7.11: Presence of Vision and Mission Statements 
 Frequency (%) 
Yes 96 
No 4 
Source: Interviews (n=48; missing values=2) 
 
Table 7.12: Who is responsible for creating Vision and Mission Statement? 
 Frequency (%)  
Board/Management 42.2 
Management Mostly 40.0 
Board Mostly 11.1 
Board Exclusively 4.4 
Other 2.2 
Source: Interviews (n=49; missing values=2) 
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Table 7.13: Presence of Strategic Planning Committee 
 
Frequency (%) 
yes 44 
no 56 
Source: Interviews (n=46; missing values =4) 
 
7.14:  Ranking of the involvement of the board in strategy 
    Rate of Involvement (%) 
 
Strategic Involvement in:  
No 
Involvement  
 
Marginal 
 
Average 
Fairly 
Strong 
 
Very Strong 
Discussing Strategy - 10.2 26.5 36.7 26.5 
Approving Strategy  2.1 2.1 10.4 31.3 54.2 
Ratifying Strategy 2.1 2.1 8.5 29.8 57.4 
Decision-Making - 12.5 22.9 37.5 27.7 
Monitoring Strategic Planning 4.1 8.2 30.6 34.7 22.4 
Guiding Strategic Planning 
Process 
 
6.3 
 
29.2 
 
33.3 
 
20.8 
 
10.4 
Helping to Formulate Strategy 4.1 24.5 32.7 18.4 20.4 
Defining Strategic Framework  6.2 16.3 44.9 16.3 16.3 
Source: Interviews (n=48; missing values=2). Multiple responses allowed. 
 
Table  7.15:   Position of the Board’s Involvement in Strategy Development 
 Frequency (%) 
Board and Management 53.1 
Mostly Management 36.7 
Mostly Board 10.2 
Missing Values =1  
(n=49) 
 
What role does the board actually play in strategy? 
Table  7.16: Roles played by the boards in strategy 
Roles Yes% No% 
 Ratification Of Strategy 96 4 
 Ensuring Corporate Survival 94 6 
 Monitoring The Organization’s Health 92 8 
 Acting As Ambassadors  85 15 
 Hiring, Appraising And Firing The CEO 83 17 
 Responsible For Ethical Framework 81 19 
 Ensuring Corporate Renewal 76 24 
 Development Of A Corporate Vision 73 27 
 Reviewing And Monitoring Corporate Social Responsibility 68 32 
 Undertaking Corporate Communication  66 34 
 Boundary Spanning 61 39 
 Guiding The Strategic Planning Process 54 46 
 Leading Strategic Change 50 50 
 Interpreting And Advising Management Of Forthcoming Legislation 50 50 
Source: Interviews (n=50) 
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In the above sections, ownership and control patterns, chairman/CEO duality or non-
duality, NEDs vs. EDs, board committees and composition, tenure of Directors, gender and 
inequality issues, frequency of meetings, timing of distribution of board papers and proxy 
forms, board performance evaluation and training, nature of corporate disclosures, and board’ 
role in strategic decision-making, have been explored.  
In the next section, the nature and role of corporate disclosure is discussed and 
analysed.    
 
7.4 THE NATURE AND ROLE OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: A CASE STUDY 
APPROACH  
7.4.1 Introduction  
This section on corporate disclosure focuses on information disclosure with regards to 
that which is practiced by the case companies under review. The objective and purpose, 
content of and details, as well as timeliness and accuracy, all important features of any good 
disclosure regime based on the theoretical literature, vary significantly from one jurisdiction to 
another.  In the foregoing analysis, similar patterns have been observed with minor differences 
based on ones case regulatory disclosure regime versus another.  While the importance of 
information disclosure in CG is indisputable and gained support from a number of authors, 
information disclosure can reduce uncertainty and lower capital cost, and greater disclosure 
has been accredited to investors to monitor management better and more effectively to 
exercise their rights (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Core, 2001). Also, disclosure mitigates 
information asymmetry between the IPO firm and investors and has been argued to have 
Figure: 7.2: Level of Involvement of Board in Strategic Direction 
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significant negative effect on under-pricing and leads to higher levels of institutional 
ownership which is positively associated with stock market volatility (Sias, 1996). 
The review of the literature in Chapter 3 which spans economics, accounting, law, 
corporate finance and sociology, suggest that information disclosure is a significant driver of 
good CG. The literature also identifies four important features of information disclosure: 1.) 
broad and deep public information and private information, 2.) mandatory disclosure, 3.) 
voluntary disclosure and, 4.) timeliness, quality and quantity of information disclosure.  It 
focuses extensively on the flow of information to shareholders and the regulatory community 
to which companies have mandatory reporting obligations.  It argues that information can 
either be held and not made available or released at the advantage of one group and the 
disadvantage of another group, depending on the custodian of the information and those 
seeking the information—the stock and flow.    
Furthermore, it has been noted that a significant proportion of the information (albeit 
financial is always a part thereof) disclosed is done via voluntary disclosure channels, and 
which can be more voluminous, targets the wider stakeholder (investor) community, and 
focuses on informing, educating, and eventually wooing their targeted audiences.   
This section draws its empirical breadth from three case companies and focus group 
respondents.  The broad areas examined include: public and private information, the Bank of 
Jamaica disclosure regime for case companies, the JSE disclosure regime, the AGM, the 
annual report, corporate web site, and factors against information disclosure. A summary and 
conclusions forms the penultimate section.  
 
7.4.2 Findings of this Study 
7.4.2.1 Public and Private Information Disclosure   
 
What is the nature of corporate disclosure practices in Jamaica? 
 
The case companies by way of being financial institutions (merchant bank and mutual) 
and Publicly Listed Corporations (PLCs) —conglomerate and merchant bank are exposed to 
extensive mandatory public information disclosure regime from selected regulatory bodies. 
These companies must also meet critical requirements of quality (specified details) and 
timeliness (must be reported within specified time) through pre-determined formats and 
methodology. From in-depth study of company publications (annual reports, news releases, 
investor relation briefing notes, special media reports) and unpublished archival information, 
informal chats, and unstructured formal telephone, and face-to-face interviews with case study 
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respondents, 12 different Channels40 of information disclosure (both mandatory and 
voluntary) have been identified.  These channels form the broad theoretical spectrum of both 
the public and private information environments of these case companies. See Table 7.17.  
Within these channels, the breadth and depth of public and private information disclosure have 
been revealed.    
Two of the case companies are financial institutions and are, therefore, obligated to 
meeting mandatory information disclosure requirements through mainly four (4) of the twelve 
channels: 1.) Reports—annual, monthly and quarterly reports, 2.) AGM, 3.) the mass media—
printed and electronic and 4.), corporate websites. The other eight (8) channels, by and large, 
are also met by all three case companies as indicated in Table 7.17 and are construed to 
constitute voluntary corporate disclosure. These voluntary disclosure channels include investor 
briefings, newsletters, analysts’ reports, target seminars, JSE Best Practice Awards 
Competition (as participation by members is optional), Electronic Mails, mobile telephone text 
messaging, and corporate speeches.   
The conglomerate, while not being an outright financial entity, is a member of the 
Jamaica Stock Exchange and as such is required under stock exchange rules to make similar 
mandatory disclosures in the four areas listed.  Also, it operates several types of financial 
subsidiaries and, therefore, indirectly has a double burden of utilising these channels of 
disclosure.  As stated earlier, the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) is the primary regulator of all 
deposit-taking financial institutions (merchant bank, mutual society, and others).  The FSC 
regulates the securities brokerage, pension fund, mutual fund, and insurance arms of all three 
case companies. In addition to the BOJ and FSC, the conglomerate and merchant bank 
companies being JSE listed are required to meet the stock exchange requirements for 
disclosure separately.  
While the information disclosure requirements of the BOJ, FSC and JSE form the 
fulcrum around which this analysis is focused, the case companies are also obliged to meeting 
other mandatory disclosure requirements from such entities as the Companies Office of 
Jamaica (filing of annual returns), Income Tax Office, Financial Investigations Division of the 
Ministry of Finance and the Public Service—for suspicious financial transactions, just to name 
a few. 
                                               
40
 A channel of disclosure, as used in this study, is a method by which a Company (as in my case companies) 
disseminates public or private information through mandatory and voluntary means to shareholders, regulators, 
investors, customers, the media, and others, as part of its corporate communications policy rather than on a one-
off or ad hoc basis.  There is no limit to the timing, quantity, or quality of the information that may be disclosed 
via a channel—it is simply the avenue through which the information flows to the recipient.   
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Table 7.17: Case Companies Channels of Information Flow 
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Conglomerate  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ x √ 
Merchant Bank 
Company 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
x 
 
x 
 
√ 
Mutual Society √ √ x √ √ x √ √ x x x √ 
Keys: √- Either a mandatory, voluntary or both forms of information disclosure; x-not 
a customary practice by the case company.   
 
7.4.2.2 The BOJ Disclosure Requirements 
 Through an instrument called “FIA Licensees Comprehensive Financial Return 
(CFR)”—an entire package of prudential returns are required by financial institutions to be 
submitted to the BOJ pursuant to the provisions of Section 16 of The Financial Institutions 
Act, 1992. The case companies must first be guided by the numerous rigid instructions, 
amongst them: a hardcopy must be submitted whether or not an electronic version is furnished, 
and the accuracy and completeness of all Returns submitted should be signed by at least two 
signatories on the specific line provided as indicated, and name of contact persons just in case 
the Supervisor of Banks and Financial Institutions should have any queries, duplicate of the 
Cover Page to enable the BOJ to acknowledge receipt on said duplicate copy. Additionally, 
each institution is given a unique identification code. The explanatory notes of the FIA 
stipulates  that, “For the proper completion of the CFR, all reporting institutions should insert, 
at the top of the Return Sections, the name of the institution, assigned identification code, and 
the period covered by the report in the appropriate spaces provided.” 
 The preceding paragraph is just the “tip of the iceberg” as it concerns breadth and depth 
of mandatory reporting.   Timeliness and the quality of mandatory reporting form two other 
important features of information disclosure which redound to good CG. According to the 
CFR and as required by the FID, monthly reports should be submitted no later than 7 working 
days following the end of the month. Quarterly reports are due no later than 12 calendar days 
after the end of the quarter. Annual reports become due at the end of the financial year and no 
later than 60 calendar days after the end of the year.   
 The broad areas of mandatory financial disclosure as required by all BOJ regulated 
entities include (excluding instructional requirements in earlier paragraphs), but not limited to:  
Balance Sheet and Supplementary Information (FIM1), Domestic Currency Cash Reserve and 
Liquid Assets (FIM2), Foreign Currency Cash Reserves and Liquid Assets Held Against 
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Foreign Currency Accounts (FIM3), Profile of Credit and Depositors by Customer Group 
(FIM4), Advances and Discounts (FIM5), Sectoral Return of Customers’ Liabilities in Respect 
of Foreign Currency Loans,  Advances and Discounts (FIM6), Foreign Currency Assets and 
Liabilities (FIM7), Distribution of Deposits by Class and Maturity (FIM8), Interest Rate Paid 
on Deposits and Loans (FIM9), Interest Rates Paid on Foreign Currency Deposits (FIM10), 
Instalment Credit (FIM11), Analysis of Foreign Currency Deposit Flows (FIM12), Claims on 
and Deposits of  Selected and other Public Entities (FIM13), Foreign Currency Claims on 
Deposits of  Selected and other  Public Entities (FIM14), Update on  Credits Exceeding 
Section 13 Limits (FIM16), Renegotiated  Facilities (FIM17), Earnings and Expenditure 
(FIQ2), Connected Persons Exposure (FIQ3), Quarterly Financing for Fix Capital Investment 
(FIQ4), Details of Past Due Loans (FIQ5), Maturity Profile (FIQ6), Earnings and Expenditure 
(FIA1), See Notes on Return Section (FIQ2), Acquired in Course of Satisfaction of Debts 
(FIA2), Unclaimed Balances (FIA3), and Branch Information (FIA4). The details which are 
indicative of ‘broad and deep’ public information disclosure can be found in ‘FIA Licensees’ 
Comprehensive Financial Return’ (BOJ, June 1996).  
 
7.4.2.3 The Jamaica Stock Exchange Disclosure Requirements 
 
The JSE disclosure requirements are by far less onerous where they concern financial 
information but much broader in the number of areas covered. The disclosure requirements for 
JSE Best Practice Corporate Disclosure and Investors Relations Award mirror very closely 
the JSE general disclosure requirements for its members (listed companies) but exceed it in 
areas of voluntary public information. A closer examination of the information provided in 
Table 7.18 shows the JSE 9-point disclosure regime for members are mandatory in some areas 
and voluntary in others.  To encourage greater level of compliance with international best 
practices, and to promote voluntary compliance in particular, JSE competition participants are 
required to report (disclose) on their CG practices, corporate social responsibilities, and risk 
management framework via a combination of instruments (questionnaires) and disclosure 
channels (a statement in annual report).  These latter three areas have been attracting much 
attention among practitioners and academicians alike in recent years.  
  
As can be seen in Table 7.18, the case companies utilise several other channels of 
voluntary   disclosure of private and public information so as to reinforce and improve CG. 
These  voluntary disclosures also form an integral aspect of the companies’ marketing 
strategies:                                                                                                                                                           
investor briefing sessions are usually used to announce corporate performance for the period 
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under review (quarterly, bi-annual, or annual) and other significant corporate development.  At 
these briefings, the entire media fraternity would be invited, financial analysts, ratings agency 
analysts, investors, shareholders, Directors, creditors, and others.  The analyst reports would 
highlight company results and paint future direction and predict or provide forecasts. Case 
companies’ executives in turn would hope that whatever is written by these analysts would 
provide key and positive information to the investing public thus driving investor confidences 
and share price.   
Timely and accurate information requirements by the JSE and as practiced by the case 
companies41 (see items 1, 2, 3, and 6 of Table 7.18), find concurrence with the literature on 
disclosure in Chapter 3.  Both timeliness and accurate information disclosure have attracted 
attention in most disclosure regimes and hence reinforce their importance in good CG.  
Newsletters and target seminars are chiefly used to provide not only financial information, 
operational issues, and company direction, but oftentimes are for reinforcement of the benefits 
of the company’s offerings, as well as to keep both shareholders and the general public abreast 
with company affairs.  
E-mails and Mobile telephone text messaging are mainly used to relay short but very 
important announcements, like a reminder of the AGM or an extra-ordinary meeting of the 
Board of Directors. Additionally, text messaging and emails are used to announce new 
products and services or a change in the institution’s fee structures or interest rates regime.   
Another issue relates to corporate speeches.  Company executives tend to use these platforms 
to criticise or endorse government policies, indirectly introduce company products, or signal 
new Directions or re-direction such as restructuring and so on. 
The conglomerate utilises all 12 channels except text messaging via mobile telephones. 
None of the other two case companies utilise text messaging to inform stakeholders. However, 
text messaging is a growing international trend amongst many other businesses in Jamaica in 
announcing the timeliness of AGM and company developments to shareholders, investors, and 
customers. The utilization of  E-mail as a channel of disclosure was the only other method not 
utilised by the merchant  bank Co. while the mutual society did not utilise as many as five 
channels, namely: investor briefing, newsletter, emails, text messaging (mobile phone), and 
the JSE Competition—being not a member of the latter, would not be qualify them however.   
 
                                               
41
 The conglomerate case company received the JSE 1st Runner Up Awards for Corporate Disclosure Investor 
Relations (CD & IR) and Website in 2004, was a joint winner of Best Annual Report Award in 2005, and 
received Special Commendation  (SC) for CD & IR in 2006 and 2007. The Merchant Company received SC for 
both CD &IR and website in 2004.  
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Table  7.18: Criteria for Best Practice Corporate Disclosure and Investor Relations Award 
 
1. Submission of timely and accurate quarterly and audited annual reports to the JSE and the 
shareholders. – 20% 
Audited Reports received over 90 days - 0 points 
2. Timely and accurate information in respect to corporate actions as required by the JSE 
“Listing agreements” and “Policy on Timely Disclosure”. – 10% 
This criterion would be graded as follows: 
• Notice of Board Meeting to consider Dividend – 2 points 
• Notice of Dividend declaration or Non-Declaration after Board meeting – 2 points 
• Notice of board movements such as appointments and resignations – 2 points 
• Notice of Share Transactions by Senior Executives and/or Directors – 2 points 
• Timeliness in the disclosure of material information – 4 points 
The committee agreed that timeliness would play a very important role and companies that 
did not conform to this rule would not get any points. 
3. AGM timeliness and provision of opportunity to participate effectively  - 10% 
• AGM's that were held less than 90 days after the companies yearend would get - 10 points 
• AGM's held between 90 - 120 days - 7 points   
• AGM's held between 120 - 179 days - 5 points   
• AGM's held over 180 days  - no points    
4. Investor briefings and media relations – 10 % 
5. Dividend policy and payment/Non-Payment – 10% 
6. Timeliness in effecting transfers of shares – 10 % 
• Information from the JCSD - 5% 
• Information from the questionnaire – 5% 
7. Disclosure of Corporate Governance practices – 10% 
8. Disclosure of Corporate social responsibilities – 10% 
9. Disclosure of Risk Management Framework/Policy – 10% 
Source: JSE 2009 Best Practice Awards Competition Guidelines. 
 
7.4.2.4 The Annual General Meeting (AGM) 
 Another form of public mandatory disclosure includes the hosting of an Annual General 
Meeting (AGM). Annual General Meetings have been around for nearly 300 years, since the 
establishment of the Joint Stock Company and the “One share, one vote” principle, introduced 
in 1844. See Appendix 14—AGM of the mutual society and an accompanied copy of the 
Minutes of the 133rd meeting held.  This case is chosen for illustration as it is by far the most 
liberal and transparent in its disclosure practices.  The fact that the mutual society was able to 
provide a copy of its Minutes of the deliberations held behind closed doors in an environment 
where Minutes are usually private and confidential, and not to be accessed by persons other 
than Directors, is a testament to the nature of public information practices of the mutual 
society.   
 The AGM was invented to provide an opportunity for shareholder and stakeholders, 
members or depositors—in the case of the mutual society, to exercise corporate democracy by 
voting on issues such as dividends, appointment of Directors and questioning of Directors and 
corporate executives about business strategies. Company law and financial regulatory 
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requirements mandate licensees such as the case companies, to make public via printed media, 
their quarterly and annual financial results.  Recent actions by both the FSC and BOJ require 
that financial institutions post their annual financial performance on their websites.  However, 
web site posting of information has become very popular in Jamaica for many reasons. Since 
JSE Best Practice Awards Competition in 2005, for all listed companies and 
brokerage/securities firms, all 44 actively traded companies now have well established 
websites, as well as, the 22 brokerages/securities’ houses.   
7.4.2.5 The Annual Report  
All three case companies produce and publish annual reports as part of their mandatory 
public information disclosure requirements under Jamaican company law, FIA, the Banking 
Act, and the JSE requirements for its members. Over time, these annual reports serve many 
more important purposes than just meeting legal and regulatory requirements. They are 
important marketing tools to these companies as stated by most company respondents 
interviewed.  Respondents also stated that maybe once upon a time, the company would just 
provide the very basics in these reports, just enough to meet minimal requirements. However, 
with the growing need for improved CG, particularly, timely, accurate and detailed 
information, on which investors rely to make informed decisions, and for which corporate 
fiduciaries can now be brought before the courts, tried and imprisoned for false, misleading 
information or non-disclosure of material information, great care and efforts are now being 
placed on ensuring that only accurate and factual information is published.  
Notwithstanding the preceding, it is not so much what is put in an annual report, but 
more so the quality (details) of the information. In most jurisdictions, while general themes 
have been suggested as to what the outline of an Annual Report should constitute, not enough 
proposals have been put forward regarding the details of each section. So far, the Hong Kong 
Society for Accountants publication, “Corporate Governance Disclosures in Annual Reports: 
A Guide to Current Requirements and Recommendations for Enhancement (March 2001),” is 
probably most comprehensive and relevant in this regard. The publication addresses both 
mandatory and voluntary governance disclosures issues.  See www.hkicpa.org.hk/publications/ 
corporategovernanceguides/p1-54.pdf).   
The JSE in its Annual Report Criteria for its Best Practice Annual Report Competition 
includes both public and private information similar to guidelines published by the Hong Kong 
Society of Accountants.  The JSE criteria for Annual Reports include four sections which are 
further broken down into subsections: 1.) General Management Information (45 points), 
strategic directions (10 points), vision and philosophy (5 points), CG practices (10 points), 
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corporate social responsibilities (5 points), risk management practices (5 points), profile of 
Directors and executives (5 points), and industry and business segment discussion (45 points); 
2.) Financial Information (25 points)—analysis of trend (10 points), ten-year historical data or 
number of years listed (key ratios) (5 points), transparency and consistency in treatment of 
items (including recurring types) (5 points), disclosure and discussion on earnings from 
ongoing operations (5 points); 3.) Layout & Design (15 points)—aesthetic appeal (5 points), 
readability (10 points); and 4.) Timeliness and Availability of Publication (15 points)—
Timeliness: companies submitting their Annual Reports within 120 days to JSE.  The point is 
indicative of the importance the JSE places on the respective areas whereby the more 
important they perceive an area is the higher the number of pointes allotted.  
Since the advent of the JSE Best Annual Report Awards, there has been significant 
improvement in the nature and quality of information disclosed by participating companies—
including the conglomerate and merchant bank.  The JSE merely suggests a listing of content 
and encourages participants to exercise even greater level of voluntary disclosure. In this 
regard, the case companies (conglomerate, merchant bank company, and mutual society—
though not a member of JSE), have all surpassed the JSE competition requirements.  A review 
of all three case companies most recent annual reports showed that they have been reporting 
(disclosing) information on an aggregate of 95 categories (headings)—59 (mutual society), 19 
(conglomerate) and 17 (merchant bank). The mutual company is by far the most liberal and 
transparent as demonstrated by the information posted on its website (www.jnbs.com) and in 
its annual reports.    
 
7.4.2.6 Corporate Web Sites 
Websites are used as sources of CG information to investors, potential and current 
customers, journalists, researchers, and the general public about various aspects of a company.  
By providing a wide spectrum of information, a company depicts itself as more caring, 
transparent, and accountable to its stakeholders. A descriptive framework of CG content and 
web site design features is discussed, borrowing extensively from the JSE Best Practice 
Awards Competition Criteria for websites, and for which this researcher is a contributing 
inventor. Three case companies have been discussed using this framework.   
The approach taken in assessing the information disclosure content and style of 
presentation via websites by the review cases is one of comparative analysis. By this, 
similarities and differences in the broad and more narrowly defined aspects, and how these 
either satisfied, exceed or fall below the JSE Best Practice Criteria for websites, are analysed. 
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The objective of the JSE website competition is to encourage listed companies and stock 
brokerages to provide quality and timely information via their websites.  Furthermore, these 
criteria were developed based on extensive consultation with several different CG actors—
representatives of listed companies, brokerages, investors, regulators, and the carefully 
selected panel of judges of the JSE competitions who include experts from the regulatory, 
academic, private and public sector communities.  
 The criteria used to evaluate the case companies’ websites included five broad 
elements which are further divided into a total of 29 indicators (or sub-criteria). The five broad 
areas on which the evaluation is based are: 1.) Content, 2) Usability, 3.) Interactivity and 
Innovativeness, 4.) Presentation style and, 5.) Functionality.  Amongst these five criteria are a 
total of 29 sub-criteria which constitute the basis for the analysis. Account was taken in 
consideration to the fact that the mutual society is not a listed company and so there were 
issues such as shareholdings, dividend, and earnings per share which not applicable to them.   
While one cannot use the broad content themes at face value to determine the depth 
and quality (relevance) of the information disclosed by each case company, a cursory glance at 
Table 7.19 provides the general themes of disclosures posted on the websites of the case 
companies (May 29, 2009 information). 
From observing and interpreting the themes as featured at the review cases websites 
and presented in Table 7.19, there is an irregular pattern of presentation and what appears to be 
the haphazard manner in which the icons are organised. It is also obvious that these sites are 
content laden. This could be a good thing but one cannot predicate an assumption solely on the 
basis of the identity of the icons without delving into contents of each.   A closer observation 
and inference (still at face value) would also suggest that in as much as these web sites are 
intended on providing timely and quality CG information disclosure, there is some measure of 
focus on marketing the companies products and services, and more so in the cases of the 
merchant bank and mutual society. 
  With the exception of the conglomerate, where for example, of 20 icons displayed on 
its website (Table 7.19), only 2 (Grace Investments and Grace Foods) may be construed to 
provide obvious product/services information with the remaining 18 dedicated to the investor 
and general stakeholder information disclosure. Contrary to the above, 12/17 of the merchant 
bank icons feature information more appropriately related to marketing its products and 
services. These are items 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, and 16 (Table 7.19).  As is the 
situation with the mutual society, 15/35 of icons can be interpreted to be providing information 
on products and services which are not necessarily in keeping with explicit investor-
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shareholder related information disclosures.  These are items 1, 2, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 
15, 18, 22, 26, and 28).   
  All three review cases provide extensive information on corporate social responsibility 
which was used interchangeably with corporate citizenship (conglomerate), Corporate 
Outreach (merchant bank) and CSR (mutual society).  Corporate outreach is the less 
commonly used terminology and is a measure of CSR in the Jamaican context in that it goes 
beyond making monetary donation and gift giving to forging long term and sustainable 
relationships with communities, individuals, and organisations to which such 
partnerships/benefits are targeted.  The mutual also had additional icons for JN Scholarships 
and Member Care, which is suggesting that these are additional CSR initiatives. In applying 
the JSE Best Practice Criteria for website (Appendix 14), the mutual society has consistently 
outperformed the other two cases in all five broad categories as stated earlier.  The mutual 
society was excluded from being assessed with the criterion of ‘timeliness’.  This criterion is 
more specific to JSE listed and broker-related companies.    
Table 7.19: Web Site Information Disclosure- Broad Themes of the Case 
Companies 
Conglomerate Merchant Bank Co. Mutual Society  
1. Code of Ethics 
2. Directors 
3. Senior Management 
4. Investor Relations 
5. Financial Info 
6. Corporate 
Citizenship 
7. Vision 
8. History  
9. News 
10. Orane Report 
11. Feedback 
12. Financial Update 
13. Grace Stock Update 
14. GK Investments  
15. GK Foods 
16. Foundations  
17. Birthright 
Programme  
18. Foreign Exchange 
19. Daily Rate  
20. Rapid True Value  
21. Paint Calculator  
22. Video and Clips  
1. About Us 
2. Contact Us 
3. History 
4. Financials 
5. Banking Services 
6. Invest. Services &  
7. Securities  
8. International Broker  
9. Dealer Services 
10. Unit Trusts 
11.  Remittance 
Services 
12. News & 
Subsidiaries 
13. Shareholder 
relations 
14. Corp.  governance 
15. FAQs (Frequently 
Asked Questions) 
16. Financial Calendar 
17. Partners/Advisors 
18. Financial Report 
19. Corporate  
20. Outreach   
1. About us  
2. Money Transfer Agent 
locator 
3. Blog 
4. JN-News Letters 
5. Contact Us 
6. Customer Service 
7. JN Media Centre 
8. Home 
9. Savings  
10. Mortgage Benefits 
11. JN Rewards 
12. Subsidiaries 
13. Money Shops 
14. Remittance 
15. Bill Payment  
16. Branch Admin 
Councils  
17. Branch Offices 
18. Community Banking 
19. CSR 
20. Dormant Account 
21. FAQ 
22. JN Money Transfer 
Fees 
23. JN Member  Benefits  
24. JN Private Treaty 
Listing 
25. JN Scholarships 
26. JN Real Estate 
27. Member Care Centre                                                              
28. Mortgage Calculators 
29. The Source 
30. Related Links 
31. International Banking 
32. Foreign Exchange Rate 
Board  
33. Weather 
34. Newsletter 
Subscription Form 
35. Multimedia Archive 
 
 
 
Source: www.gracekennedy.com; www.jnbs.com; www.capital-credit.com (May 29, 2009). 
  In the area of content which is weighted 36% of total of 100% given its importance and 
under which there are 9/29 sub-criteria or indicators, the mutual society and conglomerate 
obtained perfect scores in the areas of CG disclosure, CSR disclosure and event scheduling—
the merchant bank  also obtained perfect scores in CSR disclosure. There was just one 
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anomaly in this category which was with the events scheduling where the merchant bank did 
not obtain a point as its website did not have an icon for or information on ‘Announcements’.     
  Another important area is Interactions/Innovativeness. This was given 14% of total 
weighting on the JSE Best Practice Awards Criteria for Web Site category. In this, the Mutual 
scored perfectly in all sub-criteria. The mutual society’s ability to receive feedback was 
accommodated by several icons such as ‘FAQ’, ‘customer service’, ‘JN News’ and ‘Member 
Care Service’. The ‘use of web cast/media’ was made easy with an icon called ‘multimedia 
archive while ‘allowance for subscription of investor updates’ was made possible through a 
‘Newsletter Subscription Form’. In the area of “Company Announcements’, browsers were 
accommodated through two icons: “JN Newsletter” and “Multimedia Archive”.  The merchant 
bank did not score on the ‘Use of Webcast Media’ but obtained higher scores in its “Ability to 
Receive Feedback’ and “Allow for Subscription of Investors Updates’ than the conglomerate, 
which has been awarded perfect score for ‘Company Announcements’. 
 In turning to the area of Presentation Style, this has been assigned 25% of total weight 
or the second level of significance under the JSE Best Practice Awards Criteria for Websites. 
The mutual society and the Conglomerate both received scores of 21.5/25 based on their show 
of equal or complementary strengths in the sub-criteria. Of interest however, the Conglomerate 
obtained perfect scores in ‘Clarity of Presentation’, ‘User friendliness’ and ‘Font Size’, while 
the mutual society received its only perfect score in the area of User Friendliness.  Turning to 
the mutual society, it scored higher than the conglomerate in three sub-areas: Aesthetic 
Appeal, Use of Colour and Layout and Spacing.  The merchant bank on the other hand 
outperformed the Conglomerate in the ‘Layout and Spacing’ and the mutual society in ‘Clarity 
of Presentation’.  What the preceding section indicates is that all three performed credibly in 
this general area of Presentation and Style. It is also very important that the Websites are 
constructed in an attractive manner and that the information disclosure is presented in a 
palatable way. To achieve these, companies must continuously monitor and learn about the 
trends, lifestyle, and preferences of users so that the content can remain relevant at all times. 
Finally, but by no means least, is Functionality. This was given 10% of total 
weightings on the JSE Best Practice Awards Criteria for websites. It features five sub-criteria 
which are ‘Loading Time’, ‘Error Message’, ‘Cross Browser Compatibility’, and ‘Use of 
Common Technology.’ All three case companies obtained perfect score for ‘Use of Common 
Technology’, while the conglomerate and the mutual society earned perfect scores for ‘Cross 
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Browser Compatibility’ and the merchant bank along with the Mutual scored perfectly on 
‘Loading Time’.  
The mutual topped the ‘Functionality’ criterion like it has done for all other areas and 
hence, has demonstrated a higher level of corporate disclosure via website than the other cases 
in higher quality content, more user friendly, most attractively presented, and exhibits the 
highest degree of functionality. 
7.4.2.7 Some Factors against Information Disclosure 
What are the downsides to corporate disclosure? 
First, extensive review of the different modes of information disclosure practices of case 
companies and supported by views from focus group participants, revealed that it is a very 
tedious, onerous and laborious process which features significant overlapping and sometimes 
threatens organisational effectiveness.  Second, many companies might find it excusable to 
explain their non-compliance given the international acceptable position of ‘comply or explain’ 
which was first originated with Cadbury Report (1992).  In essence, the concept of ‘comply or 
explain’ denotes that companies that fail to report on certain of its (Cadbury) recommendations 
in their annual reports should explain the reasons for their non-compliance. Of course, there are 
no mechanisms to punish these companies as the Cadbury still remains a voluntary Code except 
in few sections that have been adopted by the London Stock Exchange, as listing rules.  
Third, most focus group respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the level of 
disclosure currently taking place among Jamaican companies. They acknowledged, in one way 
or another, that there was a lack of motivation or knowledge about the need for such 
disclosures. This was characterised as a ‘tradition of secrecy’, hiding of ‘in-company’ items 
and a simple lack of general corporate governance principles. The ignorance would be 
remedied by training of Directors to increase their awareness. Such information would 
increase their readiness to reveal such matters (as desired by one respondent) as conflicts of 
interest and attendance at board meetings.  
Some respondents were not impressed by the existence of some of the regulations that 
prescribed no punitive position for breaches.  They argued that companies tended to avoid 
these regulations by simply not going public. This stubborn resistance to having to disclose the 
inner workings of the company leads firms to take out expensive loans which allowed for 
continued privacy. This tendency, informants claimed, hampered the development of the 
capital market, restricted Jamaican ownership of businesses, increased interest rates and 
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effectively contributed to the stagnation in the economy. One dissenter expressed general 
satisfaction with the disclosure offered at AGMs, where information about financials, plans 
and direction, customer/client, and staff matters, among others, is shared. His one reservation 
is that annual reports were not sent out in time for perusal and analysis in advance of a 
meeting. 
Fourth and final, there are real costs associated with information disclosure and many 
argue as to whether or not the benefits outweigh the costs: 1.) the fixed costs of generating, 
processing and organising the information; 2.) the proprietary cost or risks when managers, 
employees, competitors, customers, and others use the information to the firm’s disadvantage; 
and 3.) the legal and reputation costs which may be incurred when firms get their information 
practices wrong.   
 
7.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
This chapter has just examined the issues of board characteristics and composition, 
board’s role in strategic decision-making, and the nature and role of corporate disclosure, as 
critical CG practices. The chapter further integrates findings from fieldwork and builds on 
those discussed in chapters 5 and 6.   
In terms of board characteristics and composition, this includes: board size was found 
to be an average of 9.1 Directors in Jamaica, which is just less than what is obtained in Britain 
and at the lower end of the international spectrum. Chairman and CEO duality—a most 
controversial issue in the academia literature, has only a 30% presence among Jamaican 
boards.  This means that an average of 70% of Jamaican firms had the roles separated. A 
majority of NEDs on boards is one of most important issues in CG at this time given its 
treatment in the literature. The general consensus is that it fosters a culture of objectivity in 
decision-making and NEDs with no connection to the CEO will bring to bear independent 
judgement and a more balanced perspective to boardroom deliberations.  In addition, research 
findings suggest that NEDs bring a variety of market knowledge and external networking 
skills that are critical for advancing the resource dependency aspects of the organisation. 
Board committee studies are inconclusive, but there is universal acceptance that the audit 
committee strikes a critical balance between performance and accountability and serves as the 
most important structural mechanism of the board in providing checks and balances to 
organisational integrity and performance. The issues of director tenure, gender and inequality, 
board performance, training, timing of distribution of board papers, and shareholder 
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communication are emerging issues in the literature which are still highly underdeveloped and 
are in need of further research.  
On board’s role in strategy, apart from overwhelming evidence that support findings of 
the research that the primary roles of the board include ratification of strategy, approving 
strategic decisions, monitoring organisational health, and ensuring corporate renewal, another 
most interesting revelation is the ambassadorial role of the board. This role of ‘acting as 
ambassador’ is also used interchangeably with ‘boundary spanning’ in the literature. A 
significant majority of respondents across methodological approaches suggest that boards need 
to play much greater role in utilising its critical networks in bringing resources and social 
contacts to the organisation.  
In addition to a complex framework of regulated corporate disclosure regime being met 
by case companies, all three displayed a high level of awareness of the importance of timely 
and quality voluntary disclosure of both public and private information. The websites and 
annual reports were all rich in information on CG, CSR, customer and investor relations.  The 
more detailed private information disclosure concerns profile of Directors and managers, 
subsidiaries and their offerings, and detailed financial reports. It is not surprising that these 
case companies were able to twin quality information disclosure with their demonstratively 
astute web marketing strategies, in the ways they have projected their product and service 
offerings. It is without a doubt that investors, shareholders, and the general browser 
community would have been edified by and benefitted from the various methods of 
information disclosure applied by these companies.  
 The next section of this thesis, features part four (4) and includes chapters 8 and 9.  
Chapter 9 presents the conclusions of the study, its limitations and suggestions for future 
research.  
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CHAPTER 8: GAP ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY  
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
 The focus of this chapter is to proffer potential strategies for public policy reform by 
analysing gaps in social science literature on CG presented in chapter 3, gaps emerging from 
the analysis of the results of the fieldwork in chapters 5, 6, and 7 and relating to regulatory and 
other public policy initiatives in Jamaica.  Each section of this chapter addresses specific 
issues.  Section 8.2 addresses theoretical and empirical gaps of the study.  The approach to the 
analysis and discussions of this chapter also draws on the findings of focus group study 
number one (Appendix #5). Section 8.3 critically analyses key local CG regulations and 
identified and discussed critical gaps based on the key elements (research questions) of this 
study, and from these gaps, proposes and number of recommendations. Section 8.4 relied on 
and utilised fieldwork data form focus group #2.  It explores such issues as pressures for and 
against CG reform in Jamaica and key initiatives for governance improvement as suggested by 
respondents.  Section 8.5 concludes this chapter.  
 
8.2 THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL GAPS 
8.2.1 Theoretical Gaps Related to the Social Science Literature    
 
One of the most limiting factors of the theoretical and empirical aspects of this study 
concerns the preponderance and dominance of Anglo-Saxon USA and UK CG structures and 
practices that most often apply the shareholder perspective to the study of CG.  More so, these 
studies do not take a holistic approach to the study of CG, i.e., from different contextual 
perspectives: continental, regional, national; studies that treat with the same sets of variables 
under the same and different sectoral perspectives, and longitudinal studies to tract a set of 
phenomena over time.  Most studies have been conducted using quantitative methods and tend 
to speculate on what boards do rather than being focused on going inside the boardroom to see, 
hear and record what Directors actually do. 
Some of the other theoretical gaps that the review in this study, have yielded include 
the following:  
(1.) the literature is fragmented, stemming from different subject matter backgrounds, i.e., 
lawyers, sociologists, financial economists, organisational theorists, accountants, and 
strategic management scholars. These experts do not read or cite the ideas of other 
experts, and the literature is fragmented within each discipline (Maassen, 2000); 
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(2.) different terminologies and operationalisations that are used for similar constructs 
evidence this fragmentation.  Researchers have failed dismally to operationalise board 
variables in a consistent manner; 
(3.) most empirical studies focused on structural dimensions of the board, and, therefore most 
authors only speculate on actual board behavior. The nature of broad processes overtime 
has not been studied, and as such, evidences on what boards actually do are not well 
documented (Dalton et al, 1998);  
(4.) the absence of research on the effectiveness of self-regulation that aims to set forth new 
international corporate governance standards. Too much emphasis is placed on the 
Cadbury Reports (1992; 1998; 2003), and much less is known about the way Directors 
voluntarily comply with codes of best practices in non-continental European countries and 
elsewhere;   
(5.) conflicting evidences exist on the extent and effects of board involvement in strategic 
decision-making (Zahra and Pearce, 1989); 
(6.) there is conflicting evidences as to whether or not board characteristics (board 
committees, director age and tenure) positively influence company performance;  
(7.) there has been a tendency among researchers to prescribe desirable reforms without 
sufficient description of board attributes.  As Pettigrew (1992:178) observes, “The task is 
perhaps a simpler one to…redress the overwhelming prescriptive bias in this literature, 
and…begin to provide some basic descriptive findings about boards and Directors”.  
 
8.2.2 Empirical Gaps Related to the Issues and Findings of this Study 
In presenting and analysing empirical gaps, some of the most relevant CG elements 
have been highlighted based on their treatment in the wider social science literature, generally, 
and specifically, their direct relevance to the findings of this study.   
8.2.2.1 Ownership and Control 
 
The findings from this study have shown that Jamaican firms are very closely-held and 
more so, employees are highly under-represented on boards. Gaps exist in understanding the 
managerial attitudes and propensity to reward employees based on meritocracy in these owner-
managed companies.  Future research could be directed at a comparative assessment of 
managerial behavior and attitudes in these owner-managed closely-held firms with more 
highly-dispersed shareholdings, among managers. Such work could probably yield interesting 
findings.    
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8.2.2.2  Employee Representation and Participation 
 
Employee Participation in Collective Decision-making and Financial Performance: 
The review of the academic literature pointed to employee involvement being very important 
in CG internationally.  Evidence on employee representation is generally less developed, and 
much of the research on collective forms of employee voice, such as trade unions and work 
councils, have emerged from other countries (UK, Germany, and other European) with very 
different institutions, than Jamaica. Therefore, although definitive conclusions are more 
difficult to be drawn, the review in chapter 3 shows that employee involvement is critical in 
CG.  Focus group respondents also believe employee involvement is an important factor for 
good CG. While there was some ambivalence among respondents, there was a majority 
agreement that employees needed to have greater voice in the boardroom of Jamaican firms. 
To justify this for public policy action, research is needed (in jurisdictions where employees 
have strong voice—Germany, UK to a lesser extent) to determine their contribution to 
organisational outcomes, bottom-line, investor confidence, and corporate reputation building. 
 
8.2.2.3 Relationship between Shareholder and Board  
The relationship between board and shareholders needs to be examined more closely. 
The area of firm–shareholder communications has been taken for granted and has been 
reduced to the issues surrounding AGMs—the main forum for board and shareholder interface 
and has been so over many centuries. Improvement is needed in assisting firms to establish 
better communication links with institutional investors and various ‘gatekeepers’ (e.g., voting 
and rating agencies, and other watchdog groups) concerning CG arrangements that deviate 
from regulatory and voluntary prescriptions. Empirical work is needed to determine how the 
board and all types of shareholders could better understand each other in the interest of 
improved shareholders relations and confidence in their corporations.   
 Given that shareholders (including institutional investors) involvement is still under-
developed in Jamaica and while much research (other than Jamaica) has looked at how 
ownership structure (e.g. concentration or dispersion) affects CG, more research is needed on 
the processes underlying shareholder engagement. That is, in what ways can shareholders get 
involved in CG to influence organisational changes, and what are the determinants of 
shareholder involvement? For example, no previous research prior to this thesis has explored 
the perceptions and role of institutional investors in Jamaica and the Caribbean. It is still not 
clear as to what extent, engagement has been integrated into investment decision-making and 
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asset management process, as well as the resources and people committed to it and the level of 
reporting provided by fund managers to their ultimate clients (Filatotchev et al, 2007).  
Bearing in mind that shareholder activism has substantial cost implications, future research 
should identify the extent of direct and indirect costs associated with shareholder engagement 
mechanisms. 
 
8.2.2.4 Non-Executive Directors (NED) and Their Independence  
The role of independent Non-Executive Directors is at the centre of debates in 
international CG.  The quality of many other key elements depends on the independence and 
quality of NEDs. The role and composition of Audit Committees, the quality of executive 
compensation schemes, evaluating performance of the CEO, the composition the CG 
Committee, just to name a few. However, the evidence needs to be advanced as to whether 
NEDs have the necessary information, time, training, and independence to perform these roles. 
Future research is needed to better understand how boards operate and the issue of how 
independent Directors are fulfilling their roles. Thisshould also evaluate potential costs of 
implementation for different groups of companies, in particular, for smaller firms. 
 
8.3 REGULATORY AND GENERAL PUBLIC POLICY GAPS 
8.3.1 Potential Regulatory Gaps: An Analysis of Selected Regulations  
It is critical that public policy in the area of CG is well grounded in social science 
evidence spanning multiple disciplines. Too few studies have addressed CG from a holistic 
perspective by assessing contingencies and the cost of CG reform without examining the 
advantages of employing a multi-disciplinary approach.  In this study, an attempt is made to 
balance key CG elements with their importance to public policy with cognisance of those 
factors that may be beyond the control of the public policy enforcers as wells as those that 
might legitimately affect the entrepreneurial flexibility of market players. These market 
players are the intended beneficiaries of public policy initiatives.  
The remainder of this section builds on earlier analysis of seven regulations and laws: 
1.) Companies Act of Jamaica, 2004; 2.) Financial Services Commission Act, 2004; 3.) Bank 
of Jamaica swathe of regulations; 4.) Public Bodies Management and Accountability Act; 5.) 
Corruption Prevention Act; and 6.) Access to Information Act; and 7.) the proposed Whistle- 
Blower’s Act.  In addition, there is one quasi-regulatory institution (JSE) and Jamaica’s sole 
CG voluntary code (PSOJ). All these regulations have been comprehensively examined in 
chapter 5. As such, a more specific assessment of these laws and only code, have been 
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undertaken, specifically addressing potential gaps and there adequacy in addressing the 
soundness, integrity and effectiveness of public policy. The proposed Whistle-Blower’s 
legislation is still undergoing public consultation, and as such, will not be dealt with to the 
same degree of details as the others.   
Jamaica has been successful relative to other Caribbean islands in the last decade in 
implementing several new regulations, laws and at least one voluntary code (PSOJ code), or 
by strengthening others, relating to various aspects of CG issues covered in this study.  In spite 
of this success at the levels of Central Government within the private sector and among public 
bodies, there are still many gaps that remain.   There are gaps in content and implementation 
spanning a wide spectrum of key CG elements as identified in Table 8.1: selection of 
Directors, information disclosure, stakeholder representation, corruption, board composition, 
and internal control and auditing, just to list a few.  
Key CG elements have been ranked based on three criteria: high, medium, and low to 
denote the extent of coverage or effectiveness of each in Table 8.1. Where a key CG element 
does not appear in a particular regulation, law or code, it is assigned the label absent.   
In this assessment, content gap covers areas in regulation, laws and codes where key 
CG elements are not sufficiently covered. Gaps in the regulatory framework are assumed to be 
areas where government and business may wish to consider for improvement.  This study 
(analysis) also considers gaps identified by public and private bodies, vis-à-vis statements and 
research by the major actors as to areas, which they perceive to be in need of improvement. 
Content gap denotes the extent of coverage and quantity while effectiveness gap connotes 
quality of information or shortcomings between the objective and eventual outcome of 
regulatory initiatives. Effectiveness gaps may include implementation problems associated 
with a particular element of the regulation, lack of provisions for various organisational 
variables, and their associated costs.  
 The aim of the analysis of gaps is to foster simplification and provide easier 
understanding of each CG key element. Therefore, Table 8.1 should be studied along with the 
narrative provided in order to grasp a more holistic view of the issues under review.  It must 
not be assumed that a ranking of high for any of the key elements under a particular regulation 
or code means that that key element is adequately covered or effectively implemented, or there 
is a case of over-regulation. Likewise, a rank of low or the label absent should not in every 
instance be assumed to mean that a particular regulation needs to reflect a greater coverage or 
implementation of a key CG element, or grossly inadequate regulation.  
[259] 
 
Additionally, many of the key elements labeled absent, were never intended for 
inclusion in some of the regulations. Therefore, conclusions about the ranking to be assigned 
must be based on sound practical and empirical evidences relating to the particular key 
element.  This is best obtained from a closer review of the analysis presented in the ensuing 
discussion of this chapter and which is derived from taking into account several other issues 
(complementarities, costs, and contingencies) concerning the key CG elements.  To illustrate 
the latter, the Ministry of Finance and Public Service (MFPS) in promulgating the PBMA Act, 
which requires all public bodies in Jamaica to develop and made public a strategic plan every 
year. However, there are several contingencies that render a very low implementation rate 
(e.g., the lack of trained strategic planners)—the Act did not mandate training for such persons 
and the public bodies themselves can’t obtain the adequate financial resource from the MFPS 
to implement these strategic plans—they have been mandated to develop.   
In terms of content gaps, (i.e., coverage and quantity), the main areas in which content 
is less than adequately covered include information disclosure, employees, stakeholders, board 
independence, Board of Directors, and board committees.  
Information Disclosure is extensively covered (result chapters 5 and 7) in relation to 
financial disclosure in all the regulations of Table 8.1, except PBMAA. In fact, the enactment 
into law of the Access to Information Act (ATIA), made Jamaica becoming the third country 
in the Caribbean, after Trinidad & Tobago and Belize, from a list of about 50 with such 
legislation.  However, significant gaps exist in relation to emerging and more forward-looking 
and strategic issues for reporting on corporate governance issues that have not been disclosed 
by Jamaican companies and public bodies. These include executive and Directors pay—
although one of the most written about issues in the international CG literature. In the USA, 
executive and Directors full compensation package is mandated to be disclosed annually under 
Securities Exchange Commission law. Board composition and make up of committees (the 
ratio of NEDs versus executives, the types of committees and qualifications of members), 
voting and proxy issues, and personal interests and multiple directorships, are some of the 
more important strategic areas not adequately covered under the Jamaica regulatory 
framework.  
Employees are grossly under-represented in the current regulatory framework of 
Jamaica but have been addressed under the Civil Service Code for Government employees and 
the Labour Relations and Industrial Disputes Act. In the latter, collective bargaining rights of 
representation to the extent of their working conditions and wages, and in the former, rights 
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covering terms of employment and unemployment issues (sick leave, vacation leave, maternity 
leave).  There is still no paternity law and a gamut of other issues.  There are gaps as it relates 
to the representational rights of employees on corporate boards and employee management 
relations.  
Stakeholders are mentioned in the Companies Act of Jamaica, 2004 in relations to 
Directors duties, but there is still a huge void regarding establishing a framework for 
stakeholder participation. The Board of Directors has received insufficient coverage in the 
PBMA Act, the Companies Act, FSC Act, BOJ regulations and the JSE Rule Book (Listing 
rules).  However, very few of these address issues such as board size, committee types, ratio of 
NEDs versus executives, and the role of committees. 
The board is extensively covered in terms of its role and issues of conflict of interest in 
the PBMAA, Companies Act 2004, FSC Act, BOJ regulations, the JSE listing rules, and the 
PSOJ Code. However, very few or none of these regulation and voluntary codes cover issues 
such as a Code of Conduct, evaluation of directors’ performance, training and development, 
tenure, retirement age, role in strategic decision-making, and involvement in the day-to-day 
operation. In terms of the Code of Conduct for Directors, the Government of Jamaica has 
announced for the first time in the history of the Public Service, two Requests for Proposals, 
one seeks ‘To Strengthen the Governance Framework of Role of Public Bodies’ and the other 
aims at ‘Clarifying the Governance Role for Public Bodies’. The former seeks to establish a 
Code of Conduct for Directors and the latter a Code of Audit Practices. See 
http://www.cabinet.gov.jm/files/RFP2009-P008.pdf (accessed August 11, 2009).  
Strategic Planning includes board’s role in strategic decision-making although very 
broadly covered in the PBMAA. Gaps exist as it relates to codifying qualifications and 
continuous development for strategic planners in as much as it is done for auditors and 
financial officers. Strategic planning is now a core requirement of public bodies but  the 
requirement has not been backed by contingencies such as training qualifications and 
continuous development of these professionals.  
With regards to the effectiveness of implementation of key CG elements, the main 
areas where gaps exist include internal control and auditing, board independence, corruption, 
and conflict of interest.  Very detailed guidelines have been issued by the PBMA Act, FSC, 
BOJ and the JSE for implementation and operationalisation of a sound internal control and 
independent audit mechanisms, as well as audit committees of Boards. However, only 
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approximately 60% of Public Bodies (at December 2008, MFPS data), have implemented 
these requirements.  In the private sector, internal control and audit committees are, to a large 
extent, not independent of executives and significant shareholders who serve on the board. 
Even though the regulations require the internal auditor to report directly to the audit 
committee of the board, it seldom happens, and the more common practice is that such 
positions have been reporting to the CEO. More gaps exist with regard to mandatory rotation 
of auditors and appointment of external auditors, placing restrictions on the quality of “non-
audit” tasks involving, and appropriate legal liabilities for auditors.  
Table 8.1: A Mapping of Regulatory Gaps vis-à-vis Key CG Elements in Jamaica 
 
Key Elements  
  
Com.    
Act 2004 
 
PBMAA  
 
CP Act  
  
ATIA 
 
FSC 
Act  
  
BOJ  
 
 
PSOJ 
Code  
JSE 
Listing 
Rules   
Corruption  Low  Low  High  Low   Medium   Medium   Low  Medium  
Conflict of Interest 
Provisions  
 
High  
 
Medium  
 
Medium  
 
Low   
 
High  
 
High  
 
Low  
 
High  
Shareholder High  Low  Absent  Low   Medium  Medium  Medium   High  
Stakeholder Medium  Low   High   Low  Low  Low  
Board Independence  Medium   Low  Absent  Absent  High  High  Medium  Medium  
Director training & 
Performance  
 
Absent  
 
Low   
 
Absent  
 
Low   
 
Low  
 
Low  
 
Medium  
 
Low  
Board Size  Medium  Low  Absent  Absent  Low  Low  Low  Absent  
Code of Conduct for 
Directors 
 
Low  
 
Low  
 
Low  
 
Absent  
 
Low  
 
Low  
 
Low  
 
Low  
Board Committee Low  Medium  Absent  Absent  High  High  High  High  
Board Papers  Low  Low  Absent  Absent  Low  Absent  Low  Low  
Board Meetings  Low   Low  Absent  Low   Low  Low  Low  Low  
Information 
Disclosure  Medium Medium Medium High High High Medium High 
Strategic Planning Absent  High  Absent  Absent  Low  Low  Low  Low  
ERM  Absent  Low  Absent  Absent  Medium  Medium  Low  Low  
Internal Control & 
Audit  
Medium  High   Low  Low  High  High  Low  High  
Keys: C Act 2004—Companies Act of Jamaica, 2004; PBMAA –Public Bodies Management and Accountability Act, 
2001; C P Act-Corruption Prevention Act; ATIA-Access to Information Act, 2002; FSC Act—Financial Service 
Commission Act; BOJ Regulations—Bank of Jamaica Regulations; PSOJ—Private Sector Organisation of Jamaica; 
JSE—Jamaica Stock Exchange.  
 
Board independence is addressed by several regulations and the PSOJ Code, but in 
reality, the practice in Jamaica makes mockery of good CG.  An audit committee ought to be 
chaired by an independent non-executive Director and should comprise of all independent 
outsiders. Sadly, the nature of ownership and control in Jamaica makes these requirements 
almost impossible to achieve. Potential implementation gaps exist in the Government’s failure, 
including stiff penalties on companies who violate such requirements.    
Corruption and the treatment of corruption are extensively covered in the Corruption 
Prevention Act of 2003. However, the perception and incidence of corruption in Jamaica 
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continues unabatedly. Potential gap exists in the enforcement of a complementary legislation, 
the Whistle-Blower Act, which is undergoing Parliamentary review, and so, is not yet a law, 
much less enforcement.  In support of the need for more stringent enforcement, respondents in 
a recently conducted survey in Jamaica say corruption regulations are in adequate (44%) and 
institutions are too weak to enforce such laws (33%) (CaPRI, 2007).  
Conflict of interest is extensively covered in most of the regulations, laws, and the sole 
voluntary code in Table 8.1. However, there are several grey areas in the regulations as to what 
actions constitute or qualify as a conflict of interest. There is a need to define and explain the 
difference between confluence of interest versus conflict of interest in clear and unambiguous 
legal terms in current legislation where it exists, and for the benefit of users.  
In conclusion, there is no doubt that many of the regulations and laws are content-
loaded but what is more relevant to the success of any programme of policy reform must be 
the effectiveness of enforcement or implementation.  Effective implementation means that 
more persons would have been brought to books, an end game of being caught, fined and 
punished or it may signal a decrease in the number of breaches detected.   
8.3.2 Balancing Uncontrollable Demands in CG Reform   
As demonstrated earlier, in spite of significant coverage in some legislation of key CG 
elements, there are variables which are sometimes beyond the control of the enforcers that 
render ineffective and inadequate implementation. As such, CG structures and practices are 
influenced by a number of contingencies and cost factors. These may include but not limited to 
(contingencies): 1.) ‘over-regulation’ and the need for market flexibility on the one hand, and 
compliance on the other hand, and 2.) cost considerations.  
Over-regulation42: Over-regulation has been argued to weaken businesses and expose 
such sensitive sectors as the financial industry to undue constraints. Appropriate regulation and 
the rule of law can strengthen financial markets and the domestic economy by attracting 
inflows of foreign capital. However, over-regulation (or excessive) has the opposite effect 
when it imposes costs that cause capital and companies to flee a jurisdiction (Rahn, 2006).
 Like all jurisdictions, the Cayman Islands authorities are crying foul from pressures to 
over-regulate, and claims to have suffered from attempts of large and less financially attractive 
                                               
42
 Over-regulation has been used in the banking, financial, and business circles to denote (anecdotally) an 
inundation of compliance requirements enforced by the authorities (usually governments). In some respects, the 
word is used in protest against the onerous, laborious and costly nature of meeting these regulations–which are 
often seen as unnecessary as well (www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20100127/business/business5.html; 
www.regulationtaskforce.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/69734/sub001.pdf; 
www.freedomworks.org/publications/the-danger-of-over-regulation) 
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jurisdictions and international institutions to impose unjustified costs on the Cayman.  
Speaking at a board meeting at Cayman Island Monetary Authority, Legal Counsel, Langston 
Sibblies, has argued that there is an unfair imbalance between the number of financial 
regulatory reviews for offshore jurisdictions. On August 20, 2006, in a talk before the Eigth 
Annual Caribbean Commercial Workshop, he said, “The fact is that the Cayman Islands, like 
many other offshore jurisdictions, have undergone more reviews of our financial regulatory 
regime in the last eight or so years than most onshore jurisdictions.”  However, a rather 
interesting dissenting position was proffered by Tim Ridley, Chairman of Cayman Island 
Monetary Authority (CIMA), who was recently quoted as saying: “The private sector wants as 
little regulation as possible. But if there was some sort of crisis, that same private sector would 
ask what we had been doing ourselves. There is no question that regulation is needed, but we 
must strike a balance to remain competitive.” The CIMA Board of Directors is very much 
aware that too little regulation can lead to major problems, and too much, like the U.S, will 
constraint market development.   
Balancing Market Flexibility with the Need for Compliance: There are still many gaps 
that exist and are associated with regulatory trade-offs.  Many of the key CG elements in Table 
8.1 are extensively covered by voluntary codes or quasi-regulations. On the one hand, there is 
a need to achieve a greater level of effectiveness in implementation as shown above.  More so, 
the laws are more effective at ensuring minimum standards for all.  Additionally, mandatory 
regulation can help to overcome market failures and weak diffusion of governance practices, 
but may be inflexible in addressing the governance needs of different types of firms and 
different contextual situations. On the other hand, codes provide coverage of key CG elements 
and greater flexibility which could elicit more commitment from companies, but may be less 
effective in terms of the quality of coverage (minimum standards) and enforcement.     
Balancing Associated Costs:  There is no doubt that many costs are associated with any 
initiative intended to deliver benefits in public sector reform. Like most other organisational 
efforts (hiring staff, training, restructuring, implementation of new soft ware, etc), CG 
initiatives do come with associated costs of varying forms and degrees. Some might be direct 
costs for routine compliance, investment in new software to improve internal control and 
ERM, training of the Board on CG best practices and procurement practices, consultant fees 
for assessment of CG status and to produce board operating manual and code of conduct. 
There are opportunity costs associated with Directors time in providing counsel and guidance 
on an going basis whether or not they are in attendance of board meetings, and cost of 
litigation for non-compliance of neglect of duties on the part of Directors. In the final analysis, 
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the cost for CG initiatives is impossible to be accurately predicted. However, a cost benefit 
analysis will be very necessary at times, even to convince a very discerning Board of Directors 
that the initiative makes sense.   
 In spite of the fact that the above gaps would challenge any CG agenda, especially one 
which is designed to explore a contextual setting, such as Jamaica, this study was designed to 
fill several of these gaps. First, the dominance of Anglo Saxon literature by placing emphasis 
on researching one developing country and its emerging CG issues, specifically and a review 
of developments in alternative corporate governance systems generally. Second, board 
processes—going into the boardroom to observe and make deductions on Directors’ behaviour 
and the need to understand more about board structures and board processes that contribute to 
the involvement of Directors in decision-making. Third, are the nature, role, and extent of 
corporate disclosures in Jamaica.  Fourth, the role and contribution of Jamaican institutional 
investors by bringing refresh perspective from a developing country to the debate given that 
the only evidence on institutional activism (or passivism) was to be found in literature 
originated in the US (CalPERS) and the UK (Hermes). Finally, there is a dearth of knowledge 
about the impact and adoption of self-regulation (volunteered governance) other than the 
Cadbury, specifically Jamaican and the Caribbean. In the next section, several 
recommendations are suggested for a CG reform agenda for Jamaica.  
 
8.4 IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY  
REFORM  
8.4.1 Introduction    
Public policy in an area such as CG needs to be well grounded on a credible framework 
of scientific evidence. This section is therefore guided by the review of social science literature 
conducted in chapter 3, the analytical results of the fieldwork presented in chapters 5, 6, and 7 
the triangulation of research methods to reinforce and validate facts across methodologies, the 
gap analysis of this chapter, and the researcher knowledge of the Jamaican regulatory 
environment.  These form the learned basis for the recommendations proffered in this section.  
Furthermore, in fulfilling the public policy objective of this study, soliciting the views 
of key stakeholders on the way forward was critical. The objectives of these policy discussion 
groups were focused on determining pressures against and for CG reform as well as obtaining 
suggestions for the way forward. The approach was adopted from Solomon, Solomon and Park 
(2002), conceptual framework methodology.  In summary, the issues are: pressures against 
reform, pressures for reform, and suggested initiatives to reform CG in Jamaica. See 
appendices 4 and 5.   
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Figure 8.1: Pressures Against and For CG Reform 
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Figure 8.1 summarises the results of discussion groups on pressures against and for CG 
reforms.  At one extreme, is a traditional system (culture) that prefers to maintain the status 
quo and hence tend to resist initiatives geared at reforming CG.  At the other extreme, is the 
need for reform to be initiated by CG actors, both internally and externally.  Key actors on 
either or both extremes are internally based, such as the Jamaican society, CG structures, 
shareholders, the Government, and external players—international organisations and 
institutional investors.  Transparency international is a key player in efforts geared towards 
curbing corruption in Jamaica.  
The third critical issue raised during the policy discussion forums concerns the 
question of what are the specific initiatives that must be of consideration within an agenda for 
CG reform in Jamaica?  Figure 8.2 summarises the key initiatives as posited by stakeholders.  
The trend for reform will move (it is hoped) from the left of the figure, where the need is 
acknowledged (from model one) and extends through the initiatives towards an 
implementation agenda.  It is hoped that this desired outcome will represent a CG system 
compatible with global trends, yet unique to the Jamaican context.  Based on the models of 
figures 8.1 and 8.2, the suggested key initiatives are discussed in the next section below. These 
recommendations span a broad gamut of CG issues and include calls for the prevention or 
reduction in the incidents of corruption, reform to create an environment to encourage whistle 
blowing, reform to increase and improve the quality and quantity of information disclosure, 
reform to the board and its key structures and other less important but necessary issues.  
 
8.4.2 Reform to Reduce Level of Corruption  
 
A study cited earlier (CaPRI, 2007) concluded that corruption is prevalent and 
persistent in all government institutions, is negatively impacting on development, anti-
corruption rules are adequate, but Government agencies are too weak to enforce them and 
although the rules are adequate, they (Government and its agencies) are not implementing 
them.  In addition, there have been perennial concerns about the inability of the state to curb 
the incidences of corruption (Munroe, 2004). Against these empirical realities, Government 
could improve enforcement by: 1.) developing and enhancing appropriate sanctions for acts of 
corruption.  This should include increasing stiffer penalties for those caught in the acts of 
corruption, strengthening codes of conduct aimed at sanctioning groups, individuals and 
institutions involved in corrupt acts such as bribery or the leaking of sensitive government 
information, private sector fraud and insider trading; 2.) expand the existing anti-corruption 
structures—laws and institutions to include “whistle-blowing” protection laws, rules on 
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political party financing, private sector competition, as well as legal changes which enable the 
press to report more freely on instances of corruption. The latter of these should focus on the 
degree to which powerful elites influence decisions and policy-making by the state. 
Some party financing strategies to curb corruption, which have been suggested by 
respondents interviewed (CaPRI, 2007) include: 1.) ensuring that all political donations and 
other sources of political party financing are recorded and made public; 2.) limiting the amount 
of money that is spent on party politics; 3.) ensuring that public sector workers are politically 
neutral and are not allowed to make contributions to political parties and; 4.) establishing a 
body to monitor these arrangements.  These suggestions are by no means exhaustive as many 
other recommendations have been proffered by other authors (Munroe, 2000, “Corruption 
Worse Now”, May 3, 1997, Gleaner; Report of the West Indian Commission, 1992) and 
politicians, policy analysts, academics and consultants—working for both sovereign 
government and international organisations—all in the war against corruption. 
Inextricably linked to a sound anticorruption model, is an environment that promotes 
and encourages whistle-blowing. In the next section, this important element is briefly 
discussed in the context of policy reform.  
 
8.4.3 Reform to Create an Environment to Encourage Whistle-Blowing   
In spite of voluminous literature that supports the merits of whistle-blowing such as 
Brinker et al. (1985), that whistle-blowers often act because, as professionals, they feel 
compelled to adhere to certain right-action ethical behaviour (Wim and Commers 2004) and 
that there are organisational needs for both loyalty and institutionalised whistle-blowing. 
Bowie and Duska (1990), in their moral motive for whistle-blowing thesis, argue that when it 
comes down to the practical realities, there is much apprehension by employees (a main source 
of information) to come forward.  Employees may experience retaliation for doing so (Martin 
2000). There might be the threat of job loss, an unexpected department demotion or physical 
threats. It is not surprising that there has been public acknowledgement that whistle-blowing is 
relevant to all organisations, and systems to protect whistle-blowers should be an everyday 
function of corporate life (Borrie and Dehn, 2001).  The importance of whistle-blowing was 
evident when Sherron Watkins blew the whistle on Enron’s management in the U.S. and Harry 
Templeton’s challenge to Robert Maxwell’s plundering of the pension fund, better known as 
“the Maxwell Saga” in the UK. 
The literature on the level of preventative ‘checks and balances’ regarding failures in 
compliance suggests the importance of ‘bottom-up’ monitoring by employees involved in 
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business operation monitoring.  To this end, the protection of employee ‘whistle-blowers’ is 
important to ensure that employees are able to disclose wrong doing and problems can be 
identified and quickly resolved. Employees making such disclosures must be protected to 
encourage the potential for qualified disclosures without having fear of retaliation or 
punishment.   
Given the preceding, it is felt that the PSOJ proposal in tackling whistle-blowing offers 
some hope. According to the PSOJ, “perhaps the best approach is a non-prescriptive one 
which encourages and requires companies to set up channels for the purpose of blowing the 
whistle. Employees, for example, should feel free to raise their concerns with Directors, the 
audit committee, regulators, or law enforcement agencies. Non-executive Directors should also 
feel free to challenge the executive Directors and not be too concerned about ‘rocking the 
boat” (Proposed Code on Corporate Governance requirement, provision D.2.1).   
 
8.4.4 Reform to Increase and Improved Quantity and Quality of Disclosure  
 
Policy discussion participants overwhelmingly identified Director interlocking as a 
critical area in need of closer scrutiny and greater disclosure and have suggested the 
establishment of a Directory of Corporate Directors to ameliorate this problem of poor 
disclosure. Director interlocking (or interlocking directorship) is the practice of one Director 
holding multiple board seats in related and unrelated companies. Given a specific director’s 
stockholding (which normally would be included or indicated for each company s/he is a 
Director of), a published directory would allow the public to determine a particular Director’s 
connectedness and possible influences. The directory of corporate Directors has become a very 
important corporate governance tool in Britain, particularly after the debacle of Maxwell 
Communications Group in the 1980s.  For better or worse, the case surrounding late Robert 
Maxwell and his defunct Maxwell Communications, Polly Peck and others, have emphasised 
the need for and importance of adequate CG disclosure in increasing the ethics and integrity in 
both private and public sector businesses. Any move to consider the establishment of a 
directory of corporate Directors in Jamaica could be, indeed, a brilliant step towards increasing 
the standard of corporate disclosure. 
Another issue of concern to informants is the annual report. Adequacy of CG 
disclosures must take into account the quality of information and its presentation in 
annual reports. It is indeed appalling to see the shabby state of some of our annual 
reports. The information presented is not always in the font size and language which can 
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be easily read and understood by many senior (older) shareholders. Companies with 
ultra-conservative presentation of information in annual reports should give 
consideration to their wide shareholder base, ensure that the language is as simple as 
possible, legible and can be understood by the average literate shareholder (Kerr, 2005).  
While it can be accepted that it would be difficult for any company to adequately 
satisfy the taste, preference, and expectations of all its members, efforts should be made 
to ensure that annual reports are attractively presented and, generally, reader-friendly. 
Additionally, today’s shareholders require much more than high quality graphics and 
flashy presentations; they require frank explanations about extraordinary items and 
under-performance. These should be visible and in legible print, not tucked away in the 
back in fine print. Companies should recognise that shareholders are only given a 
comprehensive statement once per year by their firm. It is the responsibility of the 
managers (hired hands) to ensure that shareowners receive a statement of the highest 
standard and in a non-discriminate manner. 
 
8.4.5 Reforming the Board and its Key Structures 
 
Against the background of lessons learned from the financial crisis of the 1990s, the fat 
cats’ scandal of 1999, regulatory deficiencies, systemic weaknesses and poor corporate 
governance among public bodies in Jamaica, these issues have exposed clear evidence that 
boards lack the expertise, skills, and critical thinking to interrogate executive management, 
make critical decisions independent of politicians, and in understanding their roles as distinct 
from management. Clearly, the board must be appropriately selected, composed, trained, 
evaluated, and compensated if optimal performance is to be obtained. Furthermore, the 
practice of Chairman and CEO duality is fast becoming a practice of history in many 
jurisdictions. This section highlights several areas in need of reform in the context of the 
board.  
 
8.4.5.1 Codify Chairman and CEO Separation   
Consistent with recommendations of the Cadbury Reports and numerous other 
international CG codes, there should be a separation of Chairman and CEO. The literature is 
still in conflict with this issue but focus group respondents of this study unanimously agreed 
that there should be a separation between the positions of Chairman of the Board and Chief 
Executive Officer, and believed there is more to be gained from separation over duality.  The 
Cadbury 2006, King III Report, and many others which have focused on policy reform for the 
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public sector and stock market companies, have at least one thing in common—the separation 
of the roles of Chairman and CEO.  Respondents in this study believed that the dual role might 
be a hindrance to efficient operations. Separating them would allow for the CEO to focus more 
effectively on his duties. Also, the CEO serving as chairman could all too easily influenced the 
board to an excessive degree, instead of himself being guided by their objective authority.  
One Lecturer of Banking and Financial Regulation, who is also an Attorney-at-law, argues that  
balanced reasoning, objectivity and thorough discourse of issues at the board level becomes 
subjected to the personality of the Chairman/CEO”.  
 
8.4.5.2  On a Majority of Non-Executive Directors 
 Focus group participants unanimously acknowledged the importance of the presence 
of a majority of outside independent Directors on the Board who they believe would bring an 
objective voice, providing greater checks and balances and bringing to the insiders a fresh 
perspective on the strategic planning process. According to a lead Central Bank economist, 
“Non-Executive Directors might feel less obligated to the CEO and, hence, exercise their 
independent judgment more freely.”  The non-executive Directors would offer a wide array of 
needed skills, bringing with them creativity, and experience that would be a valuable addition 
to those already present.  
 
8.4.5.3 Director Selection  
Historically, public boards are not as meticulously selected when compared to private 
boards.  Although Statutes of most public bodies have prescribed the different stakeholder 
groups that should constitute the particular board, the ‘Responsible’ Minister normally chooses 
his Directors from among a specified few persons submitted to him/her from each stakeholder 
group.  However, there is no formal system in place (at the level of the stakeholder entity) to 
decide who is nominated and the process to govern such nominations. More importantly, there 
are no written guidelines that set out the qualifications of a Director of the State-owned 
Enterprise except for those duties specified by the Companies Act of the particular 
jurisdiction. It is recommended that clear guidelines be established and inculcated in the 
PBMA Act as a separate schedule.  
 
8.4.5.4 Training Development of Directors 
Prior to 2002, there was no known programme for Director training and development 
in Jamaica.  However, in recent years, many companies have established such programme 
[271] 
 
which often involved providing Directors with the company’s operational manual and 
Director’s guide book (where these exist) and familiarising new Directors with management 
and the business of the organisation. Policy reform is needed to codify a framework for 
Director training.  
 
8.4.5.5 Director Remuneration  
Chairmen and Directors of Public Bodies are very poorly compensated. However, the 
trend in more advanced economies is to formally recruit and compensate Directors similarly to 
the treatment of executives. In justifying compensation of Directors in those countries, 
Directors are given a service contract and there is a process for evaluating performance 
annually. In Jamaica all are absent (service contract, performance evaluation, and a 
competitive remuneration). If Directors are to become more committed to their task, and add 
greater value to the boardroom and organisation, then all three of these elements will be 
necessary. Again, this could be accommodated in the PBMA Act.  
 
8.4.5.6 Performance Accountability 
There is no system for evaluating and rewarding performance at the level of corporate 
boards, CEOs and Permanent Secretaries in the public sector of Jamaica.  However, it has been 
established that only one stock-market listed company is known to have experimented with the 
practice of evaluating its Board of Directors. In other words, performance evaluation of 
corporate boards is non-existent in the Caribbean in both the public and private sectors.  
The majority of focus group participants see merits in corporate board evaluations. 
Where there were reservations, these were rooted in a lack of knowledge or exposure to the 
process—how it would be conducted and the outcomes. Others had a clear picture of the 
procedure. They suggest that it should examine how decisions were taken, the timeliness of 
these decisions, and whether they proved correct or effectual. Another participant suggested 
that the board itself would set goals for its performance and would evaluate via peer review 
and other exiting methods.  
 
8.4.5.7 A Suggested Code of Conduct for Board of Directors 
 
Participants when prodded for answers to addressing corruption, improved boardroom 
performances, and more effective and efficient management of public affairs, have 
overwhelmingly agreed on a list of broad CG benchmark drivers. They believe that such code 
of key CG standards should constitute the very minimum for a CG framework to guide Public 
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Bodies in Jamaica. The CG framework drivers listed below are also consistent with most of 
the issues and recommendations which underpin similar CG frameworks in the UK (Combined 
Code, 2003), South Africa (King III Report), and models from Australia, New Zealand and 
Kenya:  
 Board composition  
 Criteria for nomination and selection of Board members 
 Procedures for appointing Board of Directors 
 Board Orientation, Training and Continual Development 
 Roles and responsibilities of the Board and key fiduciaries-chairman, Directors,  
committees, corporate secretary  
 Clarifying the relationship between Board vis-à-vis Management, and Management and 
Board vis-à-vis Stakeholders 
 Board processes—meeting management, Director conduct and attitude  
 Independence and Powers of Board in Decision Making 
 Public Bodies Information Management and Disclosure  
 Role and Independence of Audit and Internal Controls  
 Treatment, value and limits of co-opted members, Invitees, and Ex-officio  
 Officers  
 Board and CEO Accountability & Performance Monitoring and Evaluation 
Framework 
 Code of Ethics for Directors and Officers 
 The Role and Duties of Directors and Public Officers 
 Relationship between Permanent Secretaries and Ministers 
 Relationship between Permanent Secretaries and Chairpersons 
 Relationship between Board of Directors, CEO and Senior Officials of the  
parent Ministry 
 
Notwithstanding the above swathe of key elements as recommended by expert 
informants, it is important that those in positions of authority are informed and convinced of 
the merits of good corporate governance.  It is critical that education and edification takes 
place and that these persons buy into these ambitious recommendations. Also, it would serve 
the best interest of the Government to consider several workshops to bring major Government 
actors up-to-date on emerging issues in CG for the public sector, particularly in line with 
advancement in Britain in the last 15 years beginning with the origins and success of the 
Cadbury recommendations, the Rutteman Report 1994, on internal control, the Greenbury 
Report, 1995, in response to Diretors’ pay, Hampel Committee of 1996 which focuses on the 
extent to which objectives of the Cadbury was achieved, and hence both were combined 
resulting in what was latter known as the Combined Code 1998, which was then applied to all 
listed Companies in the UK. The UK having recognised the dynamism in the regulatory 
environment and the need to continuously respond to market demands has embarked on a 
continuous process of revision and upgrade of these codes.  
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In 1998 the Turnbull Committee was established to develop guidance for companies 
regarding internal control issues and thus the report, ‘Internal Control: Guidance for Directors 
on the Combined Code’ was first released in 1999. The Financial Reporting council (FRC) 
undertook yet another revision of the Turnbull Report and published its revised version in 
2005. Other reports that were released by the UK include, the Myners Review in 2001, 
regarding the relationship between institutional investors and shareholders; the Directors’ 
Remuneration Report Regulations in 2002 addressing further concerns over the increasing 
levels of Directors’ pay; and in 2003, the Tyson Report on the recruitment and development of 
non-executive Directors was released. In December 2004, the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) launched “Building Better Boards”, a set of guiding principles, by building on 
the Higgs and Tyson works, and was aimed at assisting firms to more diverse and effective 
boards.  
Yet still, in 2002 the DTI and HM Treasury released a review of the Combined Code, 
1999 which was to be known as the Higgs Report 2003 on “The Role of Non-Executive 
Directors’.  This was followed swiftly in 2003 by The Smith Report 2003, dubbed “Guidance 
on Audit Committees”. It was the Higgs and Smith reports’ recommendations that were 
merged to form the revised Combined Code 2003.  Consistent with need to do constant review, 
the 2003 report was again reviewed in 2005 and an updated version released in 2006.  
Alongside all these developments in voluntary codes, the UK undertook its own review of 
Company law and the Final Report was presented in 2001, which sought to deliver a simple, 
modern, efficient, and cost effective framework for conducting business activity in Britain for 
the Twenty-first century.  It is the wishes and intent of this study, that Jamaica would learn 
useful lessons from, if not, the preceding recommendations and Britain’s experience with CG 
Reform over the last almost two decades.  
 
8.4.6 Other Relevant Corporate Governance Issues 
 
These issues to be discussed below include executive pay, market for corporate control,  
audit and accounting firms and enterprise risk management.  These, while not as critical to the  
core focus of the thesis, is too important to be ignored.  
 
8.4.6.1 Executive Pay 
Although a key feature which was not a subject of this study, executive pay is very 
important in global CG at all levels (academic, public policy and practice) and must be 
considered for future research. Considerable debates are on-going regarding the effectiveness 
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of incentive schemes designed to give pay rewards based on performance.  Research has been 
retarded due to exclusive emphasis on using financial rewards to improve motivation that has 
not been sufficiently balanced by considerations from other areas of social science. In 
particular, resource-based approaches to CG provide an alternative to managers being 
motivated singularly by financial rewards (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).    
There can’t be found any evidence that such rewards as Long Term Investment Plans 
(LTIP), with purely stock options, has provided motivation for employee extended tenure, 
impetus and zealousness towards work, and their greater contribution to corporate profits. In 
Jamaica, some executives wait until they are qualified for stock option plans and service same 
even if they had to borrow to acquire the shares, and then move on to other more lucrative 
jobs.  In the views of these former employees, they would have made a contribution and had 
something to look at for having made a contribution to the company. This is in regards to their 
portfolio of shares held with a former employer.  Future research should address the notion of 
‘potential’ rewards versus the ‘actual’ ones received.  Additionally, the upside versus 
downside risks involved in pay for performance schemes. Furthermore, this would give 
valuable insight into the motivational issues surrounding the grants of share options, and 
provide more meaningful explanation for real costs, which could then be measured against an 
increase in shareholder value.  
 
8.4.6.2 Market for corporate control 
 
Research into the CG implications of mergers and acquisitions is an area where 
empirical results remain non-existent in Jamaica and ambiguous internationally. While 
takeovers are obviously important for corporate restructuring, the positive and negative effects 
on performance are often unclear. Future research should address the roles of contingency 
factors (e.g., size, age, complexity, etc.) on takeover markets, both in terms of its value-
protecting and value-creating aspects. The mix of positive or negative results regarding the 
market for corporate control reflects the fact that both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ deals exist.  Stout 
(2006) is suggesting that future research should be directed at the way investors of bidding 
firms approach the takeover process, and to what extent those investors are protected.  The 
governance functions of a market for corporate control is likewise based on a fundamental 
assumption of the capital market efficiency.  
Furthermore, a new mechanism for evaluating the efficiency of the stock market, called 
"behavioural finance," and a growing number of empirical studies pose a serious challenge to 
the efficient markets hypothesis.  Further research that brings together CG and behavioural 
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finance may help to shed light on the efficiency of market for corporate control (Gilson and 
Kraakman, 2004). Future research should also take note of the growing international 
dimension to the market for corporate control. There is currently no data available on the 
extent of non-compliance with the well heralded codes such as Combined Code 2003 (UK) 
and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (USA).   
 
8.4.6.3 Audit and Accounting Firms  
 
Another under-explored area of research concerns the role of professional accounting 
bodies. Various scandals such as Enron, Tyco, or Parmalat, have led to international debates 
about the need to re-examine the incentives inside the audit firms that would be needed to 
encourage audit professionals to exercise judgment, and walk away from clients that don’t 
deserve their certification, even when they are large and important clients (Bratton, 2002).  In 
this exploratory study, this issue was not considered.  However, from personal experience, 
there is the double standard (conflict of interest) of accounting firms conducting external 
audits and yet earning fees for consulting services rendered to the same client. This is a rather 
pervasive practice in Jamaica. Whilst, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has prevented this by American 
owned firms since Enron, there is still no law in Jamaica that prescribes against this conduct 
by the big accounting firms. Indeed, research is needed to determine its extent of prevalence 
and appropriate public policy intervention to prevent such practices and punish perpetuators. 
These inappropriate actions compromise the integrity of corporate accountability, fairness, and 
honesty.    
 
8.4.6.4 Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) for the Public Sector  
With increased demand by the public for greater transparency in decision-making, 
better educated and discerning citizens, the pressures of globalisation, technological advances, 
and numerous other factors, adopting to change and uncertainty while striving for operating 
efficiency, is a fundamental part of the Public Service. Such an environment requires a 
stronger focus on public policy within State Agencies and Central Government in order to 
strategically deal with uncertainty, capitalise upon opportunities, and inform and increase 
involvement of stakeholders (including parliamentarians). Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand, are just few of the successful economies around the world that have reaped 
tremendous benefits from adopting and implementing sound policies of ERM in their 
respective public sector and across public institutions.   
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ERM addresses organisation-wide public policy issue that, as one of several 
coordinated functions, will improve decision-making, and enable the shift to results-based 
management. Enterprise Risk Management requires looking across all aspects of the public 
agency (organisation) to better manage risk. Organisations that formally manage risk have a 
greater likelihood of achieving their objectives and desired results (Victorian Auditor-General 
Office, 2004). Effective ERM minimises losses and negative outcomes and identifies 
opportunities to improve services to stakeholders and the public at large.  ERM contributes to 
better use of time and resources, improved teamwork, and strengthened trust through sharing 
analyses and actions with partners. It also increases confidence in the organisation's process, 
and improves public and stakeholder understanding.  These are fundamental imperatives for 
sound public policy in government of any country.  
In the UK, The Walker Review of CG in the financial industry, on behalf of the UK 
government has recommended as many as 39 specific recommendations for ways in which 
banks and other financial industry entities can enhance CG. Five of these recommendations 
relate specifically to risk governance which can be adopted by both the public and private 
sectors of Jamaica are: 1.) the board of a British-Owned Financial Institution (BOFI) should 
establish a board risk committee separately from the audit committee with responsibility for 
oversight and advice to the board on the current risk exposures of the entity and future risk 
strategy; 2.) the board should be served by a Chief Risk Officer (CRO); 3.) the board risk 
committee should have access to and, in the normal course, expect to draw on external input to 
its work as a means of taking full account of relevant experience elsewhere and in challenging 
its analysis and assessment; 4.) in respect of a proposed strategic transaction involving 
acquisition or disposal, it should as a matter of good practice, be for the board risk committee 
to oversee a due diligence appraisal of the proposition, drawing on external advice where 
appropriate and available, before the board takes a decision whether to proceed; and 5.), the 
board risk committee (or board) risk report should be included as a separate report within the 
annual report and accounts. Such report should describe the strategy of the entity in a risk 
management context, including information on the key exposures inherent in the strategy and 
the associated risk tolerance of the entity (Walker Review, 2009).  
Therefore, the challenge for Jamaica must be to first adopt risk management as another 
complementary function to those now obtained in the public service at both ministry and 
agency levels.  The second challenge will be to approach risk management in a more 
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integrated (enterprise wide) and systematic way that includes greater emphasis on consultation 
and communication with stakeholders and the public at large.  In meeting these challenges, the 
public service of Jamaica could fulfill its increased responsibility to demonstrate sound 
decision-making, in line with increasing expectations of due diligence, more intense public 
and media scrutiny, and initiatives for transparency, accountability and open government and 
join-up government.  
8.5  CONCLUSIONS  
Clearly, balancing the needs of different corporate governance demands must be a 
factor in contemplating any policy driven governance reform agenda which addresses 
coverage and content of regulations. From the gap analysis presented, it has demonstrated that 
there are glaring differences between the stated aims and actual outcomes of many of the local 
regulations, given the wide array of both content and effectiveness gaps (implementation).  
Another factor against public policy in Jamaica is the limited or non-existence of a national 
self-regulatory code similar to the Combined Code of the UK, which is respected and accepted 
by both the private and public sectors internationally. The PSOJ code in Jamaica was designed 
solely for its members, and further constrained by its design for mainly listed Companies of 
which there are 44 (at the time of writing).  Comparatively, the UK Combined Code provides 
the flexibility of “Comply or Explain”, thus not locking in a box an entrepreneur who would 
regard box-ticking regulations as too constraining to his business.    
The CG recommendations proffered are inexhaustible. Lobbying government and 
member companies requires time, understanding and much work. Countries, including the UK, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Kenya, Singapore, Malaysia, and many others, 
were able to develop and establish CG guidelines and regulations within a few years as their 
governments were in support of these actions from the start of the process. The level of 
mistrust of politicians and lack of political will to do the right things, were probably less 
problematic than the reality in Jamaica.  Furthermore, these countries all had what could be 
called a “Country Strategy” on corporate governance. These governments understood their 
role as facilitators too well and were never seen as barriers to progress. 
It must also be stressed that most of the successful National Corporate Governance 
Codes were developed with private sector groups playing a key role. Conceptualisation, 
planning, and strategising were left up to the private sector groups. Where is the PSOJ? What 
are their concerns regarding CG? Why has the PSOJ not concentrating more on synergising 
with government while, at the same time, developing an agenda for the way forward? 
[278] 
 
CHAPTER 9: THESIS CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY, AND 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
The current financial crisis which has already ravished businesses and economies 
across the world, has highlighted ways in which existing CG arrangements have in many 
instances failed in providing adequate checks and balances.  This failure in CG coming 
only a half decade after the demise of the energy giant Enron, has again lowered the 
confidence of the investing public, not only in the financial sector but across all spheres 
of businesses. Jamaica has not escaped this crisis and for the second time in three 
decades is heading back to the International Monetary Fund for fiscal support (at the 
time of writing).   
 Against this background, it is time the Government and key stakeholders re-
evaluate the extent to which the present CG framework is appropriate for the way 
forward. Such re-evaluation ought to be the responsibility of individual boards in the 
public sector and private sectors as well, given their importance in the CG framework of 
any national system of governance.   Concerns about absence of or weak and inadequate 
CG systems are not limited to developing economies such as those of the Caribbean. The 
Enron experience, the sub-prime crisis and subsequent bank bail-outs by the Obama 
administration of the United States and Gordon Brown of Britain, as well as countless 
others, have shown that corporate failures are not just the results of crony capitalism, 
greed, fraud, and a lack of regulation in many instances, but can be the resultant effect of 
negligence on the part of corporate fiduciaries and sometimes incompetence and poor 
managerial judgment.  
 While the field of CG has been gaining increasing academic significance, it continues 
to suffer from a lack of solid theoretical foundation and methodological soundness, academic 
rigor, peer review and misplaced emphasis on what boards should do and not enough evidence 
documenting the actual tasks executed by boards. Also, there is a dearth of literature from 
developing countries on CG structures, practices, and boards’ role, accountability and 
behaviour.  Therefore, in an attempt to bridge these gaps and generate data of sound empirical 
base, this body of work was created. It is the first of its kind in Jamaica and the Caribbean.   
 This thesis seeks to enrich CG practitioners (corporate profit-oriented professionals 
who want to improve board effectiveness and company performance), politicians and public 
policy leaders (who want to improve accountability and transparency in government and 
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efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector), and the academic community of scholars, 
students and researchers (who want new insights into a CG from a developing country’s 
perspective), and the wider community–journalists and the media, watchdogs groups and 
independent scholars and consultants.    
 This chapter connects the problem statement of chapter 1 with research questions of 
chapter 4 and integrates findings of chapters 5, 6 and 7 with policy analysis and 
recommendations of chapter 8, into a theoretical and empirical framework.  This framework, it 
is hoped, will benefit practitioners, policymakers, the academic community, and all other 
actors in the organisational context. The chapter is organised into five sections as follows: 9.1 
introduction; 9.2 conclusions on key elements of the study such as regulation, corruption, 
ownership and control, stakeholder relations (representation), institutional investors, board 
characteristics and processes and corporate disclosures; 9.3 discusses limitations of the study; 
9.4 highlights implications and suggestions for future research, and 9.5, provides an epilogue.  
 
9.2 Conclusions on Key Elements of the Study 
9.2.1 Introduction 
 
Corporate Governance refers to any set or combination of rules, voluntary practices or 
regulations which can control and govern the relationship between the company’s 
shareowners, Board of Directors, management, and its wider constituents. In addition to 
providing checks and balances to the actions of Directors and professional managers, sound 
CG should ensure that the company fulfils its primary goal of existence, honours corporate 
obligations, including corporate social responsibility, while continually renewing itself. 
Findings of this thesis suggest that CG in Jamaica has focused on supporting, 
strengthening and improving judicial, legal and regulatory systems in order to better enforce 
contracts and protect property rights. This role of CG extends further to ensure a process of 
recourse for stakeholders in circumstances where corporate Directors are involved in unethical 
and self-interested behaviour. CG in all types of economies and companies should focus on 
ensuring disclosures through periodic reporting (monthly, quarterly, or annual reports) of 
relevant information to shareholders and creditors, including business risk analyses, building a 
system of rules and voluntary practices to govern a company’s Board of Directors, establishing 
independent audit committees made up of outside board members, and monitoring and 
controlling management. 
The question confronting Jamaica and by extension, the wider Caribbean at this time, is 
not whether–but when, businesses that want to succeed in the new global economy will begin 
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to reshape their CG. The urgency stems from a rapid pace of convergence of international 
financial standards and CG practices. Traditional ownership and control structures which were 
dominated by family members have been giving way to outside professional managers, not 
only in Jamaica as preliminary research findings have shown, but there has been a trend of this 
sort throughout other Caribbean and Latin American countries. Studies have also reported this 
trend in parts of Asia, e.g., in Singapore (Mak, Y.T. and Chng, K., 2000). Domestic and 
international investors, creditors, multilateral institutions, and international organisations are 
pressing for improved CG.  
The reward for good corporate governance is a prosperous economy with a citizenry 
that supports economic growth. It is worth some effort to get there. A year 2000 Survey Report 
by McKinsey and Company found that investors are willing to pay a premium for companies 
that demonstrate sound CG systems. The downside of this study is that it reported the 
perception of investors rather than what investors actually do. However, it serves to highlight 
the importance of CG on a global scale. 
The WTO and the IMF have pressed Governments and their domestic corporate clients, 
to develop international standards that will help companies grow across borders. Most 
encouraging is the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Jamaica (ICAJ). This recent effort has been supported by 
a series of workshops. Hopefully, this will see Jamaican and other Caribbean companies 
responding to a global compromise and a set of common accounting standards to ensure 
greater accountability and transparency. 
Before committing resources, investors and institutions all over the world want to be 
able to analyse and compare potential investments by the same standards of transparency, 
clarity and accuracy as in financial statements. They want to have risk assessments. More and 
more, Caribbean companies are seeking global reach by attracting new capital and are listing 
their shares on regional stock exchanges. GraceKennedy Limited, Jamaica Money Market 
Brokers Limited, the Capital & Credit Merchant Bank Limited, National Commercial Bank 
Group, to list just a few.  
Being credible businesses that can withstand the scrutiny of international investors is 
more than just a matter of global marketing—it has become essential for local companies to 
grow and prosper. Good CG not only stimulates healthy growth, but it is a shield against 
widespread financial crisis. The Jamaican financial crisis of the 1990s underscored the urgency 
for businesses to transform the way they govern themselves.  Re-shaping CG adequately will 
not happen overnight. Many business leaders believe that by adjusting a few procedures here, 
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adopting a few rules there, and hiring a corporate relations specialist, or even including a few 
sentences on CG in annual reports, is adequate. For example, in Jamaica recently, an IPO 
placed a statement about its CG in its Initial Offer Document, yet that company failed to report 
on its CG in its first Annual Report as a listed company. Is there a commitment to good CG 
here?  The concept of CG is still new to many corporate leaders.  In the Caribbean, it is only 
now being given increased attention by a few. Any effort towards a Jamaican or Caribbean-
wide framework will need capacity strengthening to conduct critical training as well as to 
build awareness and promote conformance.   
In the next section, the key issues of the thesis are identified and conclusions are 
presented. These include regulation, corruption, ownership and control, stakeholder relations, 
institutional investors, board characteristics and processes (Chairman/CEO duality or 
Separation, NED vis-a-vis Executive Directors, Board Size, board committee and composition, 
director tenure, gender and equality issues (women representation), board performance 
evaluation training), board’s role in strategic decision-making, and corporate disclosure.    
 
9.2.2 Regulation  
 
For the past two decades, the UK has been a pioneer of a voluntary CG model in contrast 
to the legislative approach to be found in the United States.  The UK framework has sought to 
strike a balance between “hard laws” (e.g., Companies Acts of various countries; Stock 
Exchange Listing Rules) and “soft laws”–Best Practice Principles such as the 
recommendations of the Combined Code 2003, among others. While this study has reviewed 
and presented analyses of several pieces of Jamaican regulation (chapters 5 and 8), 
Government needs to be cognisant that reforming CG is best met with a mix of ‘hard’ and 
‘soft’ laws.  This allows board flexibility in their implementation of CG Best Practices, and 
encourages dialogue between boards and shareholders. Results in the UK have attested to 
significant improvement in CG standards and have been achieved without the imposition of 
significant regulatory costs on businesses.  It has indeed been widely praised and imitated by 
policy makers and CG practitioners around the world.  Therefore, there are lessons to be learnt 
by Jamaica regarding a balance of “hard” and “soft” laws when it contemplates rolling out a 
corporate governance framework for the public sector.  Further research specifically focusing 
on the impact, implications and contribution of ‘hard’ laws versus ‘soft’ laws in jurisdictions 
such as Britain (Cadbury and others—soft), the United States (Sarbanes Oxley—hard), France 
(Vénot Report—mixed of hard and soft) and some Anglo-Saxon examples such as Hungary, 
Germany (two-tier boards) and others, could possibly bring new perspectives to the 
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international literature in corporate governance generally and the role of regulation, 
specifically.  
 
9.2.3 Corruption  
Corruption has been a perennial problem in Jamaica and efforts to curb this scourge have 
been gaining momentum over several years. Supporting this is a recent report released by 
USAID, through its Director for Jamaica, which states that corruption has declined 
significantly since 2006. An earlier report had revealed that 36% of Jamaicans surveyed had 
been victims of corruption during the previous year. This figure has since dropped to 24% in 
2008, and a 12% drop over a year and a half, or over two years (Jamaica Information Service, 
March 14, 2009).  
On the one hand, this means that efforts by the Government and the private sector are 
producing tangible results.  On the other, in spite of these results, the vast majority of 
Jamaicans still consider the country to be highly corrupt. There is no reason, therefore, for the 
Government and the private sector to become complacent.  In fact, Transparency International 
is committed to intensifying its resolve to continue the fight against corruption in Jamaica and 
has only recently announced its intention to set up a permanent office.  With these coordinated 
efforts, it can be expected that over time, the perception and incidence of corruption in Jamaica 
will decrease. This however can only be achieved through continued efforts by Government, 
private sector, civil society, and international and local watchdog groups. 
Jamaican can learn many useful lessons in its quest to curb corruption.  First, TI's measure 
of corruption should not be the only guide post as there are many others from which Jamaica 
could learn useful lessons on how to curb corruption. Second, corruption in normal times is 
bad, but in these harsh economic times, might get worse.  
There is a recently launched initiative at the University of the West Indies, Mona dubbed 
“National Integrity Action Forum” (NIAF), which seeks to achieve transparency, effective 
disclosure, and improved auditing and accounting.  It is a network of corruption-fighting 
partner agencies and individuals. According to Professor Trevor Munroe, its founder, “these 
persons are those on the front-line combating corruption who need greater collaboration to 
produce more effective outcomes.”  
The NIAF is drawing on the rich expertise of network participants, along with foreign 
counterparts, combining these with research and coming up with a practical action plan to raise 
Jamaica's levels of national integrity.  This plan would strengthen the fight at all levels and 
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also target the 'big fish', who often get away with illicit wealth thereby discrediting the rule of 
law and all constituted authority.  
To achieve its objectives, the NIAF will need to maximise its resource network over the 
two-year life of the initiative.  Its strengths lie in the support of Professor Munroe, the 
Department of Government's Centre for Leadership and Governance (CLG), as well as current 
principal, Professor Gordon Shirley.  The initiative has the support of the Contractor General, 
Director of Public Prosecution, Commissioners of Customs and Inland Revenue, Auditor 
General, Commissioner of Police and Assistant Commissioner in charge of anti-corruption. It 
is supported by the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition. It has the backing of 
USAID. With the collaborative approach being taken by the NIAF and its many important 
stakeholders, this could be another opportunity for the government to demonstrate its 
seriousness to fighting corruption by its own endorsement and support.  The official 
Opposition People’s National Party, has only recently established an anti-corruption and 
Integrity Commission in an effort to signal their intention to fight this scourge within their 
party which has been plagued with corruption for nearly two decades of at the helm of 
government.   
In addition to the efforts outlined above, the Jamaican Government and people could 
benefit from studying and adopting, where applicable, anti-corruption strategies employed by 
other countries and institutions. However, the experience of Jamaica in combating corruption 
is being watched closely by other territories especially through the eyes of the international 
cooperation agencies that have been funding a number of the anti-corruption initiatives. It is 
expected that, these outcomes will have significant transferability and hence will benefit not 
only the international corruption literature but serve to improve public policy focused on 
curbing corruption in other countries.   
9.2.4 Ownership and Control 
The challenges brought about by ‘ownership and control’ of corporations in Jamaica are 
quite distinct from those of the USA and UK.  The many challenges to ownership and control 
in Jamaica have been exacerbated by the following complex of issues: (1) the prevailing high 
ownership concentration in Jamaica (a total contrast to USA and UK with highly dispersed 
stock markets); (2) no forthcoming legislation in sight to improve the plight of minority 
shareholders and no incentives for businesses to issue greater proportion of shares to the public 
and to entice the investing public, particularly individual shareholders, to increase their 
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participation in the stock market; (3) these have all compounded by weak listing rules which 
still have not been geared towards a high degree of disclosure in line with growing 
international trends.  These issues have exacerbated the many challenges and problems to 
ownership and control arrangements in Jamaica.  This author believes that it will be difficult to 
expect beneficial changes anytime soon in CG among Jamaican private sector, in particular, 
without addressing the many challenges associated with the ownership and control 
arrangement.   
 
9.2.5 Stakeholder Relations (Representation)  
There are indeed examples of innovative strategies employed by selected companies to 
engage and communicate to stakeholders over and beyond the box-ticking prescriptions of 
stock market rules and government legislations. Some of these include frequent investor 
briefings and informal information sessions. However, there are at least two imminent 
challenges that must be addressed for the way forward. First is the fact that communication 
might be becoming more difficult between board and stakeholders.  Jamaica Stock Exchange 
data (2008 Report) show that many listed companies have still not been making contact with 
their stakeholders on critical matters in a timely manner. Second, because shareholders hardly 
attend AGMs in significant numbers (personal experience), this makes it difficult for 
companies to establish meaningful dialogue and to obtain critical and representative responses 
which could aid in making more informed and beneficial decisions for those shareholders and 
stakeholders.  
In spite of these challenges, it is still possible to improve board-stakeholder relationships 
through increased disclosure, greater transparency and the enactment of legislation to 
strengthen shareholders’ rights and increased focus on participation of institutional investors. 
This has been achieved (albeit too early for a conclusive position) through the JSE Best 
Practice Awards competition which challenges and rewards contestants for meeting many 
different ‘good corporate governance standards’. In an effort to be recognised vis-a-vis  
appearance in all local media as a firm that is practicing high standards of CG, these firms put 
out all possible efforts to ensure victory (JSE Best Practice Competition data, 2005-2008). 
Incentivizing market players to adopt good CG practices is not a common phenomenon in 
the international arena and thus, the JSE model could be studied for both further improvement 
and as an approach for consideration in the international policy and practice circles of CG 
development.    
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9.2.6 Institutional Investors  
Based on the findings of this study of the perception and nature of Jamaica institutional 
investors, they (as well as ordinary shareholders) have had a poor attendance record at AGMs 
and have not been exercising any significant influence on the companies and their boards. As a 
result, underperforming boards have not been made accountable for their poor and less than 
satisfactory management of shareholders funds.  Institutional investors and ordinary 
shareholders need to play a more active role in monitoring the performance of their investee 
companies or face the risk of managerial dominance over the firms legitimate owners—the 
shareholders.  It has been highlighted that institutional investors will in due course become 
accountable to ‘the millions of ultimate owners… who may come to question the policies of 
the new powers that be.  Then the questions may extend from whether the professional money 
managers are achieving maximum private return, to whether they are fostering maximum 
public good. Their demands for downsizing and single- minded focus on shareholder 
benefits,—whatever the costs, may come to constitute a new target of ownership challenge’ 
(Mallin, 2007, p.1443).   
 
9.2.7 Board Characteristics and Processes  
In terms of board characteristics and processes, the issues of consideration here are 
those that have been identified in the thesis introduction of chapter 1, discussed in the 
literature review of chapter 3, and for which empirical findings have been obtained and 
discussed in chapter 7, and further examined as elements for public policy considerations in 
chapter 8. These include board size, Chairman/CEO duality or separation, board committees 
and their composition, director tenure, gender and inequality issues, board performance 
evaluation, and Director training. These issues, as expected, are also aimed at impacting the 
international literature on corporate governance.   
 Board Size:  The findings on board size in Jamaica revealed a mean size of 9.1 and 
median of 8-10 Directors. These figures are less than the realities in more developed Anglo-
Saxon and Non-Anglo-Saxon countries. However, this Jamaican average is large enough to 
ensure nimbleness and optimal effectiveness and to keep each Director occupied with 
organisational issues, unlike with larger boards where social loafing is the norm. With no 
significance (relationship) between board size in stock market listed and unlisted firms, and in 
                                               
43
 Mallin, Christine in Corporate Governance (2007), second edition, discusses the potential problems of the 
separation of ownership and control, and the importance of the influence of the work of Berle and Means (1932) 
which is often cited as providing one of the fundamental explanations of investor and corporate relationships. 
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dominantly-owned highly dispersed and closely-held firms, the research could perhaps benefit 
from a larger sample involving at least 150 Jamaica firms. In this way, more detailed statistical 
analysis could yield meaningful relationships from which more beneficial conclusions could 
be drawn on the way forward for board size in Jamaica.  
 Chairman/CEO Duality or Separation: With inconclusive results on whether or not 
Chairman/CEO duality or separation yields greater value to organisational performance 
(Bhagat and Black, 1999; Daily 1997), some critics (Davis et al, 1997; Pearce and Zahra, 
1991) believe the debate is not worth the importance it is accorded. Also, there is a tendency in 
the UK (and the US at a much slower pace) and other European countries to separate both 
roles. In Jamaica with a 70% separation among firms studied in this thesis, a weak association 
has been observed from cross tabulation conducted to determine existing relationship, if any, 
between the duality of Chairman/CEO in listed and unlisted firms. Similar statistical analysis 
was performed on firms with dominant ownership that are highly dispersed and closely held. 
The results have all revealed no significance in relationships. Therefore, it appears that 
Jamaican firms have neither preference for duality or separation, both in listed and unlisted 
companies.  
 In spite of the preceding facts, these findings are limited based on the small sample size 
of the groups (27 listed and 23 unlisted) and hence might not necessarily reflect the true 
realities of the Jamaica situation.  Therefore, a much larger sample which could facilitate the 
testing of more variables, their interrelationships and causalities, is recommended for future 
research.   
 Non-Executive versus Executive Directors on Boards: The need for objectivity and 
independence in boardroom deliberations has rendered the focus on NEDs far more important 
than that which is accorded to Executive Directors. As such, the theoretical and practical 
debates are really centred on achieving a majority board of NEDs. NEDs have also become 
very important constituents on such committees as audit, corporate governance, risk 
management, and compensation.  
 From the findings of this research on the presence of NEDs on Jamaican boards, of a 
mean board size of 9.1, there are 6.8 NEDs.  In this said study, an average of 5.6 of the 6.8 
NEDs have been reported to be independent Directors. While these results cannot be disputed 
on the basis of wrong or right as this is what is reliably generated methodologically and 
statistically, the practical realities are, however, much different.  Jamaican NEDs, and more so 
independent Directors, are hardly ever independent based on their relationship with owners of 
the firms, their dependent and interconnected business relationships, and family ties which 
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transcend oligarchic groups (personal experience). These Directors are also very often chosen 
to ensure that the interests of the beneficial owners are served and perpetuated.  
 It is not surprising also that although listed firms are highly regulated where the 
number of NEDs is concerned (are required to have minimum number of Directors and 
independent members), there was no statistical significance in the number of NEDs on listed 
or unlisted firms based on cross tabulation of this variable in listed and unlisted firms. 
Furthermore, the requirement for NEDs and independence by the JSE is rather meaningless as 
there has been no clear and coherent definition of independence issued and no minimum 
standards established and communicated to these firms by the Jamaica Stock Exchange or any 
source.  
 It will be difficult to achieve independence in the NEDs who are nominated to 
Jamaican boards, and if not achieved, will be an ongoing challenge to boardroom objectivity 
and independence in decision-making—hence making a mockery of accountability, 
transparency—good corporate governance in Jamaica.  
Director Tenure: Tenure is defined in this study, is the length of continuing 
appointment that may be granted and is made effective at the AGM.  There is still no such 
“appropriate” length of tenure and at least one empirical study has concluded that tenure 
should be limited to two terms to ensure the infusion of fresh minds and youthful intellectual 
vigor, knowledge and skills (Director Compensation Report, 2008).  Opponents of term limits 
argue that while turnover is good and inevitable on a case by case basis, continuity and 
experience is just as important (Michals, 2008).  In an attempt to balance the term limits and 
continuity, some Jamaican companies have opted to retain Directors with valuable experience 
by permitting service beyond previously mandated age limits and beyond term limits.  
To be open enough to assess each Director on his own merit, may be the best way 
forward for corporations in balancing  immediate needs of the board and the need of 
continuity. Given that tenure is not, an important concern of Jamaican businesses at this time, 
it will be long before any attention (academic and policy-related) will be given to this area.  
Furthermore, empirical studies on director tenure is scanty and at best weak and hence, there 
will be a slim chance convincing businesses that it is important (or unimportant), over and 
beyond the knowledge and opinion they hold over many years of practicing multi-term 
appointments.   
Gender and Equality Issues: Findings of a recent study by Women’s Resources and 
Outreach Centre (WROC, 2007) has also confirmed this low participation of women in public 
life, revealing that female representation is at an average of 29% on boards, including public 
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sector boards (33%), private sector boards (16%), and those of trade unions (30%).   These 
findings still depict a more positive representation of women on Jamaican boards than the 78% 
of boards in this thesis study that were represented by women.  Further dissecting of the data 
of the findings in this study (thesis) showed that although average board size was 9.1 
members, only 1.8 females or 19.8% of board members were women. The major weakness of 
the WROC study is that the data focused on the number of individuals sampled who were 
actually members of boards rather than the number of boards and their gender composition and 
from which (like the sample of the research of this thesis), the ratio of male versus female 
could be determined. Without the latter approach, the WROC study gives rise to multiple 
representation which could over inflate the actual female representation (on average) 
compared to men, on Jamaican boards.  
With the above findings in mind, and the important issue of gender equality which 
continues to receive serious attention, the Commonwealth Plan of Action for Gender Equality 
(2005-2015)44 calls for a focus on four critical areas for advancing gender equality. This plan 
addresses gender, democracy, peace and conflict, and it highlights the fact that the 
empowerment of women is a part of the democratic ideal that contributes to sustainable 
development. Since September 1981, the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women has entered into force and has been ratified as an 
international treaty by 185 countries including Jamaica.  Article 7 of its provisions speaks to 
Political and Public Life, specifically the right of women in relation to political participation. 
The Article notes, “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in the political and public life of the country and, in particular, 
shall ensure to women, on equal term with men, the right:  
1.) To vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible to election to all public 
elected bodies; 
2.) To participate in the formulation of government policy and the implementation thereof 
and to hold public office and perform all public functions at all levels of government;  
3.) To participate in non-governmental organisations and associations concerned with 
public and political life of the country.”  
Notwithstanding the above, and while much progress has been made in implementing the 
tenets of Article 7, there is still a far way to go in eliminating several stereotypes and negative 
cultural practices which continue to retard women’s progress in development.45 The area of 
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45
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political, economic and social decision making is of particular relevance in Jamaica where 
there is still a low level of participation in political and public life by women, and where there 
is a call for increased female representation and participation at the highest level of decision- 
making.46  This study, rather than suggesting any form of gender balance, would suggest that 
board members should be selected on the basis of a competency profile rather than any form of 
affirmative action.  
Board Performance Evaluation: Board evaluation has been receiving increased interest 
in recent years (personal knowledge) due to more intense scrutiny and the need for greater 
accountability by shareholders, regulatory and monitoring bodies, stricter enforcement of laws, 
the public in general is becoming more interested in business ethics, more law suits against 
Boards of Directors, and greater consequences for mistakes made by the board (Companies 
Act of Jamaica, 2004; Public Bodies Management & Accountability Act, 2001).  
Research findings of this study have shown that there is no system for evaluating 
corporate boards in Jamaica, even though some companies pay retainer fees in addition to an 
honorarium per meeting attended, particularly in the private sector.  Performance evaluation 
can be beneficial in giving the board a chance to reflect on its own performance and address its 
strengths and weaknesses, and may provide an invaluable yardstick by which it can prioritise 
its activities for the future (focus group respondents). A formal and well-structured board 
evaluation could assess such issues as meeting frequency, length, and agenda management. 
For example, does the agenda help NEDs to come to grips with the business? Is the board a 
constructive working group? In knowing this, the group’s behaviour is assessed. Management 
should be asked about the board’s role and involvement given their unique responsibility to the 
effective functioning of the board. In addition, the board should be assessed based on the 
insight each Director brings to the table, how they listen to each other, their contribution to 
cohesion and behaviour towards management (focus group respondents).   
Against the preceding, Jamaican boards could benefit from a structured and sustained 
approach to performance evaluation. In this way, each Director and the board as a whole, 
could understand the benefits of critical feedback from peers, become more mentally alert, ask 
more penetrating questions and participate more meaningfully in board deliberations, see the 
need for and more willingly participate in education and training activities, manage board time 
better, and become better decision makers and leaders.  
                                               
46
 United Nations (August 2006). Concluding comments of the committee on the elimination of all forms of 
discrimination against women: Jamaica, CEDAW/JAM/CO/5.  
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Director Training: Training and development of Directors in Jamaica has been a recent 
phenomenon but somehow gaining momentum among the more enlightened corporations and 
individuals. In recent years, many companies have sought and insist that their boards attended 
sessions with a view to improving their knowledge about their roles and responsibilities as 
Directors.  From personal experience, many of the facilitators of these training sessions tend to 
offer areas of training for which they are capable, and not necessarily what is most appropriate 
for individual firms.  Firms vary from private sector versus public sector, and even in different 
legal forms, thus each having unique training needs.  Policy reform is needed to codify a 
framework for Director training. To ensure that at least a minimum standard be achieved and 
Directors benefit from training that will redound to optimal value to the organisation, 
standards in quality, content and duration should be established. More so, training needs’ 
analysis should be established and implemented to determine the most appropriate content, 
taking into account differences in roles, mandate, and legal forms of these organisations.  
For boards which have already benefitted from training and those to be exposed to 
training, a tracer study could be considered to establish the relationships, if any, between 
improved Director knowledge and organisational performance. This finding could assist in 
validating and reinforcing the importance of Director training and development.  
 
9.2.8 Board’s role in Strategic Decision Making 
Findings in this study (chapter 7) on Board’s role in strategic decision making have 
been largely consistent with empirical literature cited in chapter 3. Specifically, Jamaican 
boards play critical roles such as ratifying, approving, assessing, and evaluating strategic 
projects initiated and implemented by executive management. Executive management on the 
other hand, has been more involved in initiating and implementing strategies, and their 
implementation, than the board as a whole. These differences can be explained given the 
nature of board composition in Jamaica. With an almost balanced mix of NEDs and Executive 
Directors, there seems to be a division of the role and work of the board.  It appears also that if 
the board was majority or exclusively executives, then there would be an even greater 
initiation and implementation of roles of the board.   In this regard, a reduced number of 
outsiders would see the board doing less ratification and monitoring, and increase emphasis on 
strategic issues in line with growing international trends.  
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9.2.9 Corporate Disclosure  
In any country, the critical role of accurate information and disclosure means that 
thorough, reliable and prudent business and financial reporting are essential to 
encourage good CG.  It was the failure of many Jamaican companies to disclose accurate 
information on credit lines, business risks, and highly leveraged investments that has 
was identified to be the cause of the financial meltdown of the 1990s (Hylton, 1999). This 
crisis demonstrated to Jamaica, and indeed the world, that investors and governments 
have to take CG more seriously.  Corporate disclosure is credited with mitigating the 
volatility of the market. Fox (1999) opined that “required disclosure” positively affects four of 
the economy's key mechanisms for controlling corporate management: (1) the market for 
corporate control, (2) share price based managerial compensation, (3) the cost of capital and 
(4) monitoring by external sources of finance. Through its effects on these mechanisms, 
required disclosure improves the selection of new investment projects in the economy and the 
operation of its existing productive capacity (Ibid).   
 For shareholders (and institutional investors) exercising their voting franchise, corporate 
disclosure serves as a source of corporate power. Armed with superior information, shareholders 
are better informed as to which vote is in their best interest as it relates to various amendments, 
mergers or ratification. In addition, shareholders are better equipped to evaluate the performance 
of management in the execution of its duties.  In fact, Louis Lowenstein (citing Fox, 1999) has 
argued that required disclosure can improve managerial performance simply by forcing 
managers to “become more aware of reality.”  
Notwithstanding the above, there are still significant gaps that render the corporate 
disclosure landscape of Jamaica inadequate.  Drawing on information provided in the Annual 
Reports of the case companies in this study and supported by other types of corporate disclosure 
made by these companies, several other areas have been under reported.  These  include 
information on relationships with shareholders, the nature and quality of key relationships, 
human resources, election of Directors, mergers and acquisitions, information on subsidiaries 
and associated companies, Chairman’s Report, The CEO’s Report, shareholding of Directors 
and senior executives, top-ten stock holders and their profile and change or appointment of 
auditors.   
Table 9.1 summarises details of selected issues which lack sufficient attention in Jamaica 
in the field of CG and the disclosure of private and public information. It also suggests what 
media such disclosures could be made through.  
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Table: 9.1: An Illustrative List of other Beneficial Disclosures  
 
Area 
 
Disclosure Requirement Proposed 
Media 
1. Human 
Resources 
Disclosure should be made of the company's human 
resource policies, internal management structure 
and workplace development initiatives. 
CG 
Statement 
2. Stakeholders’
Relations 
The company should explain the process by which 
it ensures effective communications with 
shareholders. 
CG 
Statement 
3. Quality of key 
Relationship 
Commentary should be given on the quality of the 
company's key relationships with employees, 
creditors, suppliers, and other significant parties. 
CG 
Statement 
4. Election of 
Directors 
The qualification and method of voting at meetings 
of members and shareholders should be in 
accordance with the company’s governance 
procedures for this matter and other issues such as 
voting by proxy, personal interest, indiscipline of 
members and counting of votes should be 
addressed. 
Voting 
Procedure 
5. Retiring, 
electing, 
paying 
Directors & 
appointing 
auditors 
In the Notice of the AGM, the items of business 
should be identified—among other things the 
director’s report, statement of accounts, auditor’s, 
election of Directors, appointment of auditors and 
any other business. 
Report of 
Directors/ 
Notice of 
AGM 
6. Chairman’s 
Report 
Regulatory compliance, Retiring Directors, 
Gratitude to employees, auditors, milestones and 
the way forward should be included 
Chair’s 
Report 
7. CEO Report Performance, operations, strategic direction, risk 
management, and outlook 
CEO Report 
 
9.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY  
This study has been challenged by a number of factors, some of which may be 
construed to be inadvertently self-imposed while others may have been beyond the control of 
the author.  First are the continuous changes in the regulatory environment of Jamaica over the 
period of fieldwork and write-up.  Several new legislations, incidents of CG governance 
failures and change of political leadership took place.  Between 2001 when the author 
commenced studies in England and 2007, when fieldwork would otherwise have been long 
completed and writing up taking shape, the following legislations came into being: Public 
Bodies Management and Accountability Act, 2001, Access to Information Act 2002, 
Corruption Prevention Act, 2003, Companies Act of Jamaica, 2004; and several amendments 
to the BOJ Act and the FSC Act. These new or amended laws have affected the operational 
dynamics, compliance regime, and CG behaviour of companies listed on the Jamaica Stock 
Exchange, members of the financial sector, and public bodies in various ways. 
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Compounding these issues are the general elections of 2002 and 2007. During this 
period, the country was led by three different Prime Ministers, with several changes of 
Ministers which led to major shifts in policy directions.  In this regard, this thesis experienced 
constant updating and changes, including changes to research instruments and the return of 
instruments to various companies for new and updated information. It was rather difficult to 
cope at times.  Secondly, a number of assumptions at the beginning of the study were 
predicated on a dearth of empirical literature and lack of awareness of CG Best Practices by 
would-respondents.  However, a few years into the study, things would have changed 
dramatically and there was to be significant awareness building stemming from various 
activities in CG such as training and development of boards, frequent publications in the local 
printed media about different aspects of CG, and in most recent times, sponsored 
developmental projects by international donor agencies directed towards improving CG and 
political governance.  This study, while challenged on the one hand to keep abreast of the new 
information, has benefitted tremendously from more knowledgeable and informed 
respondents, on the other hand.  
Third, the timing of completion of this study was severely affected initially by personal 
circumstance but more importantly, by the need for the author to make time to balance work 
and studies, due to significant international demand for his services.  Also, the author could 
not resist writing on the subject and hence published extensively over the first three years after 
completion of the taught component of the doctoral programme while working professionally 
in the field.  
 Fourth, this study was further limited by its very broad, yet not all encompassing scope. 
For example, such important emerging issues as corporate social responsibility, socially 
responsible investments, role of risk management and the financial aspects of CG, and 
company performance were either not studied or merely mentioned in the study.  However, the 
approach has been one of exploratory research from the very beginning and hence this body of 
work was never intended to address all the important issues on the international CG agenda, at 
this stage.  
Other issues and areas not studied which could perhaps enrich the findings of this study 
include but are not limited to, 1.) board’s role in stakeholder relations; 2.) board’s role in 
mergers and acquisitions; 3.) retirement age of Directors; 4.) the role of the audit committee in 
assuring sound internal control and its widening role in dealing with issues of CSR and 
environmental reporting; 5.) the study being exploratory, suffers  from an in-depth analysis 
into how corporate executives perceive the cost of making adjustments to emerging CG 
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reforms; 6.) inadequate work into the impact of training and development of Directors, 
although this has been happening for the past six years in Jamaica, pioneered by this author; 
and 7.) the dearth of empirical and theoretical literature from other parts of the Caribbean.  
However, the latter issue of a lack of empirical work in the Caribbean is a far contrast to the 
development of theoretical, empirical, and comparative literature in other parts of the world 
during said period (gleaned from extensive reading on the subject).  There is in fact an 
information overload on many aspects of CG relating to different structures, practices, and 
board composition and dynamics. Also, many new authors have emerged, and several 
academic Chairs in CG have been established in leading Universities around the world.  
Factors that may limit the effectiveness of policy reform in CG in Jamaica:  There 
are still other factors that may limit an agenda to influence policy reform in CG in Jamaica at 
this time. First, apart from this body of work, there have been no previous academic studies 
undertaken to determine basic CG features in Jamaica in spite of seven consecutive years of 
awareness building and insights that could have been gleaned from international CG failures. 
This limitation of a solid empirical understanding of board practices and structures, could 
restrain efforts geared towards the development of national and regional CG Codes. It is hoped 
that this body of work will become available to the Jamaican, Caribbean, and international 
publics, and may serve to narrow, if not fill, these existing gaps.    
Second is limited human capacity in CG from a multidisciplinary perspective.  There 
is still no course or certification programme in CG at any of the institutes of higher learning in 
Jamaica and the Caribbean, and the few such opportunities are only limited to more advanced 
countries such as the USA, the UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.  Therefore, there is a 
significant scarcity of CG professionals both locally and internationally, who have studied and 
understood CG from a multidisciplinary perspective. This will require extensive awareness 
building to include both Government and the private sector, as well as entrepreneurial 
astuteness at the institutional levels to implement these programmes.  
Third, many CG structures are either underdeveloped or have been too divergent in 
maturity and development. Standards of Best Practices will have to be unified before any one 
model can be achieved across the Caribbean.  Fourth, the emphasis on individual island states 
by their respective stakeholders, rather than a Caribbean-wide focus, continues to plague 
regional progress and will certainly affect cooperation in forging a regional governance 
framework.  Fifth, there is no existing national code and there is no Caribbean model of CG. 
Therefore, it is likely that any model that emerges will be one adopted from elsewhere. 
However, this author hopes that this will not be necessarily so but rather, one that will reflect 
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the nature and realities of CG needs within the region.  Otherwise, such effort will not be in 
the Caribbean region’s best interest.  
In addition to the above factors, more than 120 delegates representing 24 Caribbean 
countries met at the Headquarters of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, St. Kitts, where the 
first Caribbean Forum on CG was held on the September 3-5, 2003. From the deliberations, 
the following challenges were identified to have  potentially important implications on any 
future agenda of a Caribbean-wide CG framework: 1.) the judicial systems are poorly 
equipped to address healthy governance practices; 2.) the ownership structure of corporate 
sector is very complex and bureaucratic; 3.) the high level of interlocking directorships (JSE, 
2008 information) among publicly-listed and private sector companies, and Government, 
particularly occurring in the financial sector; 4.) Governments have been known to have 
intervened and interfaced with boards and this has hindered their effectiveness; 5.) there is 
minimal investor participation in companies; 6.) transparency in the management of 
companies is lacking; 7.) there is little regard for the rights of minority shareholders; 8.) there 
are limited/scarce human resource capabilities in the relevant areas; 9.) companies’ ability to 
innovate, set trends and attract talented people is limited; and 10.) there is a tendency for 
organisations to resist change. 
In spite of the above limitations, several developments have taken place during the 
period of this research that have served to advance the understanding of and appreciation for 
CG in Jamaica and the wider Caribbean, as well as partially fulfilling aspects of the aims and 
objectives of this study.  First, is a significant level of awareness by corporate leaders and the 
public at large on the merits of good CG. These have arisen through increased levels of 
awareness building seminars, training workshops and other forms of intervention such as 
donor agency funded projects addressing one of more aspects of CG.  Second, this researcher 
has published 35 articles in the Financial Gleaner between 2002 and 2007, a book in 2005 and 
presented more than 100 training workshops, short presentations, speeches and media 
interviews over the period, all addressing various aspects of CG. Other local professionals and 
academics have also contributed in similar manner and hence bombarded the local 
environment with the importance of CG.  Third, events such the JSE Competition and PSOJ 
Code published in 2006 and most recently revised in 2010 (March) have contributed to greater 
level of visibility on the subject. The involvement of international donor agencies such as 
CIDA, IDB, USAID and the World Bank in funding local activities—research, training and 
development initiatives in CG have also played important roles.   
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In order to ensure that reforms are successfully implemented and that commitment to 
improve CG is reinforced, the following are edited suggestions proposed by the Caribbean 
Forum: 1.) establish regional codes to demonstrate intent and emphasis on better CG; 2.) 
establish regional and national professional institutes to promote CG standards; 3.) encourage 
training and professional development among corporate Directors; 4.) incorporate CG in 
national development and finance policies; 5.) encourage and develop a regional strategy to 
promote better CG in the public and private sectors; 6.) establish well-defined power sharing 
and accountability regulations; 7.) develop a system that ensures board member independence 
and protection of shareholder and stakeholder interest; and 8.) establish a clearly defined code 
of values, professional conduct, and ethical standards to guide market participants. 
It is instructive to note that the 2003 Forum recognised that CG must not be viewed as 
another ‘set of rules’ imposed from outside for someone else’s benefit, but as a framework 
based on Caribbean values designed to meet Caribbean needs. 
 
9.4 IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
9.4.1  Introduction 
This section highlights several important areas identified from the literature review and 
the analytical discussions of chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8, to be in need of further research which 
could redound to contributing to the scholarship on international CG.  Also, many of the issues 
to be discussed here were either not covered or merely covered in this thesis but are important 
areas in the international CG debate from which Jamaica could benefit. These areas include:  
integration of different theoretical perspectives in the study of corporate governance. There is 
the need for CG research on non-Anglo-Saxon countries other than the USA and the UK, the 
involvement of and contribution by employees in CG, emphasis on process studies; the board 
as an instrument for influencing strategy, emphasis on the diffusion and effectiveness of so-
called self-regulation, emphasis on SMEs, public bodies and non-profit organizations, focus on 
Enterprise Risk Management, corruption and non-employee stakeholders. 
9.4.2  The Integration of different Theoretical Perspectives  
Future research could benefit from multi-disciplinary approaches to the formal 
organisation of corporate boards to provide a richer, more comprehensive theoretical 
explanation and understanding of governance structures (Davis, 1991).  This might not only 
stimulate the scholars in the various disciplines of CG to cite the ideas and/or findings of each 
other, and the exchange of concepts, theories and ideas, but also eliminate the fragmentation of 
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research and the application of different terminologies and operationalisations that are used for 
similar constructs (Maassen, 2000; Judge, 1989; Zahra and Pearce, 1989).  
9.4.3 The Need for more CG Research on Non-Anglo-Saxon Countries other than the 
USA and Britain   
A challenge for future research on boards’ role, behavior, and characteristics would also 
reveal developments over time in the composition and organisation of corporate boards, not 
only in other Non-Anglo-Saxon and continental European countries but in the Caribbean, 
Latin America, Africa, and Asia.  In Jamaica and the Caribbean, there is need to identify the 
critical features and factors to develop company, national, and regional action plans and 
influence international actions.  The absence of lessons from these smaller island states leaves 
a critical gap in the international CG debate.  
9.4.4 The Involvement and Contribution of Employees  
The famous Cadbury Committee probably failed dismally when it upheld the tripartite 
relationship of Directors, shareholders and auditors, as if these groups were the only claimants 
to the organisation.  This researcher is suggesting that research is needed, firstly, to evaluate 
the role of employees “outside the boardroom” influence on boardroom decisions, their 
contribution to organisational survival through their competencies and why their 
representation on corporate boards have for a very long time been pervasively ignored.  
9.4.5 Emphasis on Process Studies 
Numerous studies have looked beyond the doors of boardrooms to observe board 
independence, board’s roles, and board characteristics versus performance.  Also, some 
authors have managed to directly observe the behavior of Directors in their board rooms. 
However, studying boardroom processes as they happen is proving to be elusive (Pettigrew, 
1985; Thurman, 1990; Samra-Fredericks, 2000).  Future research could fill the gap in the 
literature by building up strategic alliances with Directors and practitioners who recognise the 
need to understand more about board structures and processes that contribute to the 
involvement of Directors in decision-making, and particularly through board-in-action 
observations.  
9.4.6  The Board as an “Instrument” for Influencing Strategy  
Given the importance of strategic management for organisational performance, it is 
`necessary for studies of governance, as well as boards of Directors in carrying out their role, 
to have a clear strategic focus.  This would draw attention to the fact that a Director’s role is 
not simply to a monitoring mechanism over management (as advocated by agency theory), but 
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also to offer expertise and advice (consistent with stewardship theory) and offer linkages with 
external resources (consistent with resource dependency perspective) (Dalton et al, 1999).  
Against the preceding, future methodological directions for research on corporate 
governance should include: 1.) a higher concern with validity and reliability of measurements 
2.) employment of methodological triangulation, through the use of fieldwork primary data as 
a rich resource for improving the operationalisation of concepts 3.) the explicit incorporation 
of a contingency perspective in theory building and theory testing  and 4.) a focus on factors 
related to productive group dynamics as part of a higher concern with board processes than 
simply with board structure.  It is hoped that these factors would lead scholars to a deeper 
understanding of the “environment” through mapping techniques and maps and improve the 
dialogue between the various stakeholders, through the production of robust descriptions and 
consequently sound recommendations for adoption in improving the role of the board in 
strategy (Heracleous 2001:172).  
  Another suggestion for future research relates to the strategic impact of the changing 
international context on strategic renewal processes of corporations in economies, just 
emerging from one crisis or another, e.g., Jamaica, South Africa, Argentina, just to name a 
few.  The scientific and managerial significance can be highlighted by positioning CG as a 
strategic management “instrument” for influencing strategy and strategic renewal processes of 
corporations. The analysis, both in theory and practice of different CG structures, and their 
impact on strategic renewal processes can contribute to better scientific and societal 
assessment of the importance of CG (Maassen, 2000).  
9.4.7 The Emphasis on the Diffusion and Effectiveness of Volunteered Governance  
 Future research could concentrate on the effectiveness of volunteered governance (or 
self-regulation) that aims to set new (international) CG standards. Most often, researchers have 
focused on developments in the UK where the Cadbury Code, and in the USA, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, have dominated the CG debate. Very little is known empirically, about the way 
Directors voluntarily comply with codes of Best Practices in important financial regions such 
as South Africa (King III Report), Non-Anglo-Saxon continental European countries (i.e., 
Germany, France, the Netherlands), and how Anglo-Saxon codes of Best Practices have 
influenced initiatives in other regions.  
9.4.8 Emphasis on SMEs, Public Bodies, and Not-for-Profit Organisations   
These groups have been ignored to a great extent by the literature on CG.  There are 
advantages to a research approach that concentrates on large listed corporations given the ease 
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and access to readily available data. Also, listed corporations are much more regulated than 
non-listed and are mandated to make innumerable forms of disclosures. As a result, most 
governance researchers tend to gravitate towards the larger corporations. Academic 
information and empirical studies on governance structures and practices of smaller firms and 
public bodies have been very scarce in the international literature. Future research could also 
reveal clearer understanding in the organisation and composition of Boards of Directors in 
small enterprises and non-profit organisations.   
 
9.4.9 Corruption  
In spite of hard data that can be traced back to theft and recovery or other forms of 
fraudulent actions by politicians, public servants, and corporate leaders, who by and large, 
when caught are punished, there is no precise evidence which indicates that corruption is or is 
not having a significant impact on development in Jamaica.  Research is needed with the 
objective of investigating or estimating economic losses due to corruption. Some participants 
in a CaPRI (2007) study downplayed the economic impact of corruption. Such economic and 
financial determination could serve as a basis for justifying further governmental and 
international donor agencies’ support to pursue, arrest, charge and imprison the perpetuators of 
corrupt practices.  
 
9.4.10 Non-Employee Stakeholders 
Research is needed into the contribution of shareholders activism and its impact on the 
improvement of financial performance of corporations. The few studies thus far, have only 
concentrated on institutional shareholder activism in the USA.  Research on the role of 
institutional investors in other countries is underdeveloped in the literature.  
Existing research on stakeholders has been relatively underdeveloped in Jamaica and 
many other countries.  Not surprising, since stakeholders can be regarded as a ‘non-entity’ in 
the Jamaican context. Compounding this crisis, have been recent developments in corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) and socially responsible investment (SRI) from a general 
stakeholder perspective.  While there is no literature on these areas in Jamaica, in the UK, 
much of this literature has remained rather normative (e.g., arguments for and against) and the 
empirical work in the UK has often been rather exploratory and descriptive (e.g., describing 
what individual companies are doing voluntarily). However, in the USA, some research 
suggests that broader stakeholder involvement can have an effect on governance and on 
performance. Future research is also needed that sees CSR and SRI from a governance 
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perspective, and which explores the processes whereby stakeholders such as SRI funds, NGOs, 
communities, etc., use information provided by companies to actually affect CG.  
In terms of debt holders, Chan et al. (2003) are suggesting further research to 
complement work on shareholder engagement. The goal would be a more comprehensive 
picture of the investment chain, and a mapping of the key ‘gatekeepers’ involved in various 
aspects of the investment process.   Here they (Ibid) are claiming that investment analysis and 
ratings agencies play particularly important roles, given that previous research identifies a 
number of potential problems that ‘gatekeepers’ may have when dealing with individual 
companies and their investors.   
In terms of employees, at least three areas for future research are important. First, is the 
role of pension funds and how and whether they can give employees a voice in governance. 
Second, is collective form of involvement—what makes works’ councils and information 
sharing with employees effective and what can be the positive outcomes. The third area would 
be to investigate the mechanisms and effectiveness of more individual forms of employee 
voice via employee reports, briefing meetings, and so forth (Ibid).   
 
9.4.11 Enterprise Risk Management 
 
A corporation exists in a rather complex environment of various risks with which it is 
mandated to comply.  In the financial sector, for example, ever since the invention of modern 
banking and insurance, these sectors have been riddled with risks, particularly, “regulated 
risks47”—liquidity, credit, market, operational, foreign exchange, transaction, to name a few.  
More so, the regulatory and compliance landscape has changed significantly over time, so 
have market realities. Companies must comply with other strategic risk exposures ranging 
from accounting and finance laws to health and safety. Strategic risks can affect a company in 
a number of ways, such as failure to design and implement a company-wide risk management 
framework and a have strategic plan to ensure that future uncertainties are mitigated against 
and a clear direction for strategic actions is documented and pursued.   There is ethical risk to 
the company which could involve items such as the failure to have high ethical standards 
across the business, and obtaining contracts via unethical means (Cooke, 1991). Also, there is 
now environmental risk to the company depending on the nature of its business, where it 
operates business, and how it disposes of its by-products and waste materials.  Research must, 
                                               
47
 Risks recognized by key financial laws (Financial Services Commission and Bank of Jamaica) for which the 
corporation must make certain specific disclosures periodically and usually in their Annual Reports.   
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therefore, be directed towards exploring how these emerging risks are impacting company 
bottom-line by considering the cost versus benefit implications. 
 
9.5 EPILOGUE 
   
There is no ‘one size’ CG model that fits all.  What is important at the end of the day is 
that firms’ leaders should practice what they preach. The affairs of the firm should be 
conducted and communicated, where necessary, to shareholders and the public, in a manner 
rendering absolutely no doubt about integrity and capabilities of its Directors and managers. 
Frequent and transparent financial and other information should be available and accessible to 
all stakeholders—shareholders, employees, investors, the press, community, suppliers, 
creditors, and others. All regulatory requirements and information specific to shareholders 
should be generated and disseminated in a timely manner, and so as to be understood by all. 
One lesson learned from the Jamaican financial crisis is that poor CG can create huge 
liabilities for both individual companies and society. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), part of 
the overall flow of private finance worldwide, has grown especially important in globalisation. 
Money flowing into stock markets and other short-term equity investments is significant, but 
recent experiences of the Jamaican financial crisis and elsewhere have shown that such flows 
can reverse quickly and easily, with devastating effect.  
To meet the urgent demand of convergence and capital investments, Jamaican firms 
must first embrace and conform with international financial reporting standards, specifically, 
and corporate governance Best Practices, in particular. They must be transformed, not just 
dressed up a bit. 
If a consensus on a common Framework Model of CG is to be achieved, it will most 
likely take several years, if not decades. For one, CG is still little understood throughout 
individual territories, as there is not a single Caribbean model available to be emulated or 
adopted. This means that there will be several learning curves to be established, individual 
countries will most likely be motivated to look at each individual unique situation, and to 
determine what is best.  Secondly, while there is no existing model, the problem is further 
compounded with a dearth of empirical data, which could affect the way planning for future 
development is conducted. Any sensible attempt to establish a CG framework must be 
preceded with a thorough assessment of existing CG features in each of the territories of the 
Caribbean.  This will require time, resources and the appropriately trained and skilled human 
capacity. The Caribbean presently lacks the needed human capacity which will be required to 
champion CG development. 
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Therefore, the way forward must see all stakeholder groups joining forces—private 
sector, regulators, watchdog groups, the legal framework, institutional investors, academics, 
and others. They must design strategies, establish timelines and put a realistic programme of 
activities on the road. At least there is some initiation in Jamaica through the PSOJ, and as 
recently as September 2003, with the first Caribbean CG Forum. 
Finally, for an institution to survive, compete effectively, and be profitable in the 
newly converging global financial architecture, its corporate Directors must take responsibility 
for their own CG. Information on their CG must be readily available to investors, shareholders, 
consumers, and others, even if regulatory bodies have not required such disclosures.   
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APPENDIX 1:   COMPANIES AFFECTED BY THE FINANCIAL SECTOR MELTDOWN OF THE 1990s*  
Source:  Mr. Ian Tomlinson, Managing Director of Business Recovery Services Limited (BRSL), Kingston, Jamaica 
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APPENDIX #2: 
INTERVIEWER’S ADMINISTERED QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY 
 
Section 2: Ownership and Control 
 
Q.1 
 
What is the dominant ownership structure of your 
company? 
 
(Select those applicable to your company) 
1. Publicly-held 
2. Family dominated management -listed 
3. Foreign-owned subsidiary - listed 
4. Foreign-owned subsidiary –not listed 
5. Private-Multi-partners 
6. Private-family dominated management 
7. Other________________________ 
 
Q.2 
 
What is the percentage of registered shares owned by 
common shareholders of your company? 
 
____________% 
 
Q.3 
Who are the 10 largest shareholders if your company is 
publicly-listed? 
Provide a copy of annual report if this 
information is therein.  
 
Q.4 
 
Is there an employee share-ownership plan?  
 
Yes             No      
 
Q.5 
 
What is the stake of members of the ESOP of the 
common shares of your company (exclude executive 
directors)? 
 
 
____________% 
 
Q.6  
 
 
Is there an employee representative on your board? 
 
Yes               No       
 
Q.8 
Is your company unionized? Yes               No 
 
Q.9  
Is there a union representative on your board? Yes               No     
 
 
 
Q. 10 
 
To what Industry is your company most closely 
associated? 
 
Please indicate the one representative of your 
firm. If our firm represents a multiple of the 
choices then select the relevant ones. 
1. Agriculture (A) 
2. Banking (B) 
3. Non-bank finance firms (NB) 
4. Retail (R)   
5. Distribution (D) 
6. Real Estate (RE) 
7. Consulting Services (CS) 
8. Hospitality (H) 
9. Services: (state)______________ 
10. Manufacturing: (M) 
Chemical (C) 
       Energy (E) 
      Construction materials (CM) 
11. Educational Training (ET) 
12. Other_____________________ 
 
 
Section 2:  Board Practices, Composition and Characteristics 
 
Q.11 
 
What is the total number of directors comprising your board? 
 
 
 
Q.12 
 
What is the number of executive directors comprising your board? 
 
 
Q.13 
 
What is the number of non-executive directors comprising your board? 
 
 
Q.14 
 
What is the number of non-executive directors who are independent, comprising your board? 
 
 
Q.15 
 
What is the average age of non-executive directors? 
 
 
Q.16 
 
What is the age of the oldest non-executive director?  
 
 
Q.17 
 
What is the age of the youngest non-executive director? 
 
 
Q.18 
 
What is the retirement age of non-executive directors, if applicable? 
 
 What is the average number of year service given by your current non-executive directors’  
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Q.19 core, to date? 
 
Q.20 
 
What is the average age of all executive directors? 
 
 
Q.21 
 
What is the age of the oldest executive director? 
 
 
Q.22 
 
What is the age of the youngest executive director? 
 
 
Q.23 
 
What is the average year of service given by your executive directors, to date? 
 
 
Q.24 
 
Please tick where applicable (a) 
 
Does your board comprise of any foreign non-executive director? 
Yes 
 
 
 
No 
 
Q.25 
 
If Q24 is yes, how many? ________________ 
  
 
Q.26 
 
Is there an executive chairman of the board? 
  
 
Q.27 
 
Is there a deputy executive chairman? 
  
 
Q.28 
 
Is there an appointed lead non-executive director on the board? 
  
 
Q.29 
 
Are there female directors on the board?  
  
 
Q.30 
 
If Q.29 is yes, how many? 
 
 
Q.31 
 
How many in Q. 30 are non-executives? 
 
 
Q.32 
 
Do non-executive directors provide any transferable expertise or skill to 
the board? 
Yes        No 
 
Q.33 
 
What is the average annual compensation a non-executive director receives 
for board duties in your company? 
 
 
Q.34 
 
Is there a stock/share option plan for non-executive directors of your 
board? 
Yes       No 
 
 
 
 
 
Q. 35 
Please indicate the board committees 
found in your organisation, and indicate 
beside each, the size?  
 
1. Audit (A) ____________________ 
 
2. Remuneration (R) or        
     Compensation (C)______________ 
 
3. A & R combined______________ 
 
4. Nomination (N) or  
      Selection(S)__________________ 
 
5.  Corporate  Governance (CG)_________ 
 
6.  Succession Planning (SP)___________ 
 
7.   Risk Management (RM)____________ 
 
8. Research & Development 
    (R &D)___________________________ 
  
9. Corporate, Regulatory  
      & Social_________________________ 
 
10. Others (indicate): 
 
Q. 36 
Please indicate the number of non-
executive directors on each of the 
following committees, if applicable to the 
board: 
1. Audit (A) _____________ 
2. Remuneration (R) or        
     Compensation (C)_______ 
 
3. A & R combined__________________ 
 
4. Succession Planning (SP)____________ 
 
5. Nomination (N) or Selection(S)________ 
 
Q.37 
 
Are younger managers (executives or non-executives who would not 
normally attend regular board meetings) allowed to make presentations to 
the board, regarding strategic issues or projects? 
Yes No 
 
Q. 38 
 
 
Is there a formal system in place for evaluation of director performance 
(including the Chairman and/or CEO)? 
  
 
Q.39 
 
Is formal training provided for new Directors? 
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Q.40 
What is the average time in advance of board meetings, that board papers 
are distributed to members? 
(In weeks) 
 
Q.41 
 
What is the average time prior to an AGM are proxy forms for voting 
distributed to shareholders? 
(In weeks) 
 
Q.42 
What is the average annual number of board meetings convened in the last 
three financial years? 
 
 
 
Q.43 
What are the criteria used in selecting non-executive directors? 
 
1. Elected by shareholders at AGM 
2. Nominated by CEO or Chairman or other members, appointed by the Board subject re- 
    election by shareholders at AGM.      
3. Nomination Committee 
4.  Self-appointed director 
4. Nominated by a shareholder 
5. Other 
 
 
Q.44 
Is there a limit on how many times a board member can be elected                 Yes         No       
(in terms of number of elections or number of years on board?             
                          
 
Q.45 
Are you or other members of the board aware of any corporate governance 
best practices? 
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
 
Q.46 
 
If Q.45 is yes, what are those governance best practices? 
1._______________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. _______________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. _______________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. _______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q. 47 
 
Has the board developed or presided over the development and 
implementation of any corporate governance practices voluntarily? 
Yes No 
 
 
 
 
Q.48 
 
If Q.47 is yes, what are those practices? 
1. _______________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. _______________________________________________________________________ 
 
3._______________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. ______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 SECTION THREE 
 
BOARD’S ROLE IN STRATEGY 
 
 
 
Q. 49 
 
 
What do you think should be the level of involvement of your board, in the strategic direction of the 
organization? 
 
1-Very involved; 2-Moderately involved; 3-Marginally involved; 4- Should not be involved at all 
 
Q. 50 
 
 
Is there a clear statement of the company’s overall mission and vision?  
Yes No 
 
Q. 51 
 
If the answer in Q. 50 is yes, who is actually responsible for creating this vision and mission? 
 
1.    Exclusively the board 
2. Mostly the board 
3. Evenly divided between board and management 
4. Mostly management 
5. Other: (please state): 
 
Q. 52 
 
Do you have a strategic planning committee? 
Yes 
 
No 
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Q. 53 
 
Does the board spend time debating the firm’s objectives and strategies, 
and measuring performance against them? 
 
 
 
Q. 54 
 
Does the board actually play a role in strategy?    
 
 
 
Q. 55 
How would you position the board’s involvement in strategy? 
 
1.    Exclusively the board 
2. Mostly the board 
3. Evenly divided between board and management 
4. Mostly management 
5. Other: (Please state): 
  
Q. 56 
 
What role does the board actually play in strategy? 
Please tick (a) where applicable. 
Yes No 
 
1.   Development of corporate vision  
 
 
 
2. Ratify and sign off on strategy after it is developed  
      by management  
  
3.   Direct and guide the strategic planning process   
4.   Responsibility for monitoring the health of the Firm 
 
 
 
 
5.   Hire, appraise and fire the CEO  
 
 
6.   Converse with shareholders/stakeholders (responsible for corporate 
communications or corporate governance relations). 
 
 
 
7.   Ensure corporate renewal 
 
 
 
8.   Responsible for ethical framework 
 
 
 
9.   Review and monitor corporate social responsibility policy, if applicable 
 
 
 
10. Ensure corporate survival 
  
 
11. Lead strategic change 
  
12. Act as ambassadors for the firm 
  
13. Interpret and advise management about current and forthcoming legislation 
  
14. Boundary spanning (through director interlocking) 
  
 Q.57 How would you position the non-executive directors’ involvement in strategy? 
1.   The ones mostly involved 
2. Marginally involved 
3. Never involved 
4. Executives and non-executive directors equally involved  
5. Hard to determine if non-executive directors are involved 
 Q.58 How would you rank on a scale of 1 – 5, the mode of strategic involvement of the board? 
 
1-Non-involvement; 2- Marginally involved; 3- Average involvement;  
4-Fairly strong involvement; 5- Very strong involvement. 
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(Please circle where applicable) 
  Discuss strategy 1 2 3 4 5 
  Approve strategy 1 2 3 4 5 
  Ratify  strategy 1 2 3 4 5 
  Decision-making 1 2 3 4 5 
  Monitor strategic plan 1 2 3 4 5 
  Guide strategic planning process 1 2 3 4 5 
  Help formulate strategy 1 2 3 4 5 
  Define strategic framework 1 2 3 4 5 
  Q.59  
 
 
What is a good estimate of board meeting time spent on strategy 
issues? 
1. < 10% 
2. 10-25%  
3. 26-50% 
4. 51-75% 
5. 76-100% 
GENERAL 
 
 
 As a follow up to this researcher-designed questionnaire, a more in-depth approach involving ‘boards-in-
action’ observation might be necessary. 
 
Would you or your board allow a corporate governance researcher to observe at least three consecutive 
board meetings or selected sittings on board committees, as a follow up to this preliminary survey 
instrument?  Yes ________ No ___________.  
 
 
If the answer is no, do you care to state you or your board’s objection? 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                                                          Yes                No 
Would you like a copy of the summarized findings of this study?     
 
 
Position of Interviewee:  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Could you please provide an Email address (if possible):______________________________________ 
 
Thank you very much for you time and for making this interview possible. 
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APPENDIX #3A: 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
 
Name 
 
Company  
Asset Under 
Management 
(US$) Million 
Professor Gordon Shirley  National Insurance Fund 730.0 
 
Rita Humphries Lewin  
Barita Investment 
Limited/Barita Unit Trust 
 
124.0  
 
David Wan  
Victoria Mutual Investment 
Limited 
 
112.4 
 
Donald Barrett/Anna Young 
Capital and Credit Securities 
Limited 
 
36.0 
National Capital Markets/WITCO 
Pension Fund  
 
Mureth Rhone 
 
804.0 
 
Wayne Wray  
First Global Securities 
Limited 
 
483.15 
                                                                                                                                                   
Leo Williams  
JMMB Securities Limited  79.0 
Carlene Barrett/Rema Spence 
Dunn 
Grace Pension Fund   
213.5  
 Total  US$2.6 billion.  
 
 
APPENDIX 3B:  
INTSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR QUESTIONAIRE     
 
 
1. Name of Fund (Company)_______________________________________ 
 
2. Total Asset under management __________________________________ 
 
3. Shareholders’ Equity___________________________________________ 
 
4. Approximate annual average return on investment (percentage)___________  
 
5. What are the top five industry sectors representing your fund investment portfolio? Please state beside 
each the percentage of your portfolio invested in the respective sectors: 
 
I.__________________________ 
 
II._________________________ 
 
III.________________________ 
 
IV.________________________ 
 
V_________________________ 
 
6. Are you guided by established investment criteria on which you rely to make investment decisions?   
Yes _____No  ______. 
 
7.  If yes above, what are these criteria? _____________  ____________________  __________ 
 
8. Do you have a set of established corporate governance guidelines that you use to determine in  
which company you invest?          Yes     _____No   ___________ 
 
9.  If above is no, why not?  ________________________________ 
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10.  If answer to question 8 is yes, could you please provide a set of these CG guidelines? 
 
11.  Do you request of your ‘investee’ companies that they provide you with corporate governance  
 
guidelines.  Yes _______No_________. 
 
12. If no in question 11, why not?  __________________________________________________ 
 
13.  Would a firm’s corporate governance practices influence your decision to invest in it? 
   
(1.) Not important at all             (2.)  Of little importance             (3.)  Of significant importance  
 
14. Would you be interested, at all, in influencing the corporate governance practices of the  
companies in which you invest?  Yes __________No _________. 
 
15.  If no, why?_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Do you have an internal audit committee? Yes_______No ________ 
 
17. If 16 is yes, who comprise the committee?  Total size____________Number of outside  
 
directors_______________  Number of inside directors__________________. 
 
18. In question 16, is the Chairman a non-executive director? Yes_________ No __________. 
 
19. How many members constitute your board? _______________ 
 
20. How many non-executive directors versus executive directors constitute your board?   Non- 
 
executives__________________ Executives_______________ 
 
21. Do you have an independent Compensation Committee?  Yes_______No________. 
 
22. If no, who determine the compensation of your executives, including the CEO? __________ 
 
23. Do you have an established system of communicating to stakeholders?  Yes 
_________No____________. 
 
24. If yes in 23, how? 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
25. Do you think Jamaican institutional investors, generally, see corporate governance as  
important in the way they do business? Yes_________ No__________ 
 
Please indicate yes or no as to whether you would like a copy of the analysed data and information of this 
study. 
 
Yes, I would like a copy  _______________.      No, you may not send me a copy _____________.  
 
Send to:     __________________________________(Name)_____________________________ 
 
(E-mail address)._________________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX 3C 
 
Regulation and Corruption (Chapter 5) 
1. What is the nature of the regulatory framework in Jamaica?  
2. What are some of the relevant CG legislations? 
3. How helpful or inimical have these legislation been to curbing corruption and CG 
misdeeds? 
4. Are there evidences of failing regulatory framework in Jamaica?  
5. If Q.4 is so, what are they and to what extent have they impacted good or bad CG? 
6. Are there important lessons to be learnt? 
7. Why is corruption a problem in Jamaica, if at all? 
8. What are the perceptions and causes of corruption in Jamaica? 
9. Are there cases of perception and incidences of corporate and political corruption in 
Jamaica? 
10. What anticorruption measures have been employed in Jamaica, if any? 
11. In question 10, have these measures worked? 
 
Corporate Governance Structural Issues (Chapter 6) 
a. Ownership and Control 
 
1. What is the dominant ownership structure of your Company? 
2. Does ownership and control impact, if at all, board composition and leadership?  
3. To what extent, if at all, does ownership structure influence the adaption of modern CG 
best practices? 
4. If item 3, is in the affirmative, is there a preference for or bias towards rule-based 
governance practices versus volunteered mechanisms such as Cadbury Code (comply 
compare and explain)?  
5. Is the current structure of ownership concentration (assuming this is the case), a threat to 
CG in Jamaica? 
 
b. The Nature and Role Stakeholder Relations (Representation)  
 
1. Why is stakeholder relation (or representation) an important issue in this study? 
2. What are the identities of an organization's stakeholders and what is the basis for their 
legitimacy? 
3. What is the nature of stakeholder relations in Jamaica, i.e. “Cause and Effect”.  
4. What is the prevalence of trade union presence in Jamaican companies? 
5. What is the extent of, if any, is of trade union representation on corporate boards in 
Jamaica? 
6. Is there employee representation on Jamaican boards? 
 
c. Perceptions and Role of Institutional Investors (IIs)  
 
1. Who are the key IIs in Jamaica? 
2. Are there preconditions or criteria on which these IIs rely to make investment 
decisions? 
3. Are IIs guided by CG guidelines of investee Companies?  
4. If so in Q.3, what are they? 
5. Do IIs require investee Companies to provide CG guidelines as preconditions? 
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6. Would IIs be interested in influencing CG practices of investee Companies? 
7. What is the general feeling of IIs about the level of development of CG government in 
Jamaica? 
 
a. Board Characteristics and Processes 
1. Board Size 
a. What is the average size of Jamaican boards? 
b. Why is board size and important issue in CG?  
 
2. Chairman/ CEO Duality of Separation 
a. What is your view on one person holding the positions of Chairman and CEO? 
b. Do you think the positions should be separated? If so, elaborate? 
c. Are there problems with the current duality in Companies in Jamaica?  
 
3. NEDs vs. Executive Directors, and Director Selection 
a. What is the ratio of NEDs to executive Directors on Jamaican boards? 
b. Do you think a balance between non-executive and executive directors is  
important in board composition? 
c. How are directors selected for Jamaican boards? 
d. Why should director selection matters? 
 
4. Board Committees and Composition 
a. What are the committees of your board? 
b. Why is the composition of these board committees (NED vs. Executives and 
independent) important? 
c. Does the presence and composition of committees contribute to the overall  
performance of the board? 
 
5. Director Tenure  
a. What is the average number of years served by both NEDs and executive directors on 
your board? 
b. Why is tenure an actual or potential problem in Jamaica, and elsewhere, if at  
all? 
c. Does tenure have any influence on board effectiveness?   
 
6. Gender and Inequality Issues 
a. What is the number of women present on your board? 
b. Why should there be an advocacy, if at all, for women to be nominated to 
corporate boards? 
c. Is it just a matter of equality or are there are possible other problems that can arise with 
the absence of women on these boards? 
 
7. Frequency of Board Meetings, Timing of Board Papers and Proxy Forms 
a. What is the timing of delivery of board papers before board meetings, and proxy forms 
before AGMs? 
b. How important is timeliness of delivery of these documents? 
c. How would lateness or non-delivery of these papers affect board dynamics  
and Company shareholder relations, if at all?  
 
8. Board Performance Evaluation and Training 
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a. How prevalent is the practice of evaluating board performance in Jamaica? 
b. To what extent could mandatory training benefit corporate bottom-line?  
   
b. Board’s Role in Firm’s Strategic Decision-Making 
 
1. Is there a Statement on your Companies Company’s Vision and Mission? 
2.  Who is responsible for creating Vision and Mission Statements in your  
Company? 
3. What do you think should be the level of involvement of your board in strategic 
decision-making in your organisation? 
4. What role does the board actually play in strategic decision-making, if at all? 
5. How do you perceived the role of the board in the strategic direction of the Company?  
 
c. Nature and Role of Corporate Disclosure  
 
1. What is the nature of corporate disclosure practices in Jamaica? 
2. Why is it important now more than ever? 
3. What are the downsides to corporate disclosure?  
 
APPENDIX 4A:  
       LIST OF CASE STUDY INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PARTICIPANTS 
 
Name Position  Organization 
Douglas Orane  Chairman & CEO GraceKennedy Limited  
 
Ted Alexander  
Former Director and now 
Head of IT 
GraceKennedy Limited  
Adrian Wallace (since deceased)  Former Director & 
Pension Fund Trustee 
GraceKennedy Limited  
Rafael Diaz  Former Chairman & 
CEO 
GraceKennedy Limited  
Christopher Bovell Lead Directors  GraceKennedy Limited  
 
Gordon Shirley  
NED, Chairman of 
Compensation 
Committee 
 
GraceKennedy Limited  
Byron Ward  Corporate Secretary  Jamaica National Building 
Society  
 
Janice Henlin  
 
Marketing Manager  
Jamaica National Building 
Society  
 
Maxine Laidlaw Wong  
 
Accountant  
Jamaica National Building 
Society  
 
Ryland Campbell 
 
Chairman & CEO  
 
Capital & Credit Financial 
Group  
Curtis Martin  President & CEO Capital & Credit Merchant 
Bank  
Ruth Walters  Senior Secretary  Capital & Credit Merchant 
Bank  
 
Suzette Hemmings  
Vice President, Risk 
Management & 
Compliance  
 
Capital & Credit Merchant 
Bank  
Anna Young  Company Secretary  Capital & Credit Merchant 
Bank  
Claudine Douglas  Office Clerk  Capital and Credit Merchant 
Bank  
External Participants  
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Name  Position  Organsation  
 
Greta Bogues  
 
CEO  
Private Sector Organization of 
Jamaica  
 
Garth Kiddoe  
 
President  
Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Jamaica  
Marcia Brian  CEO   Jamaica Chamber of Commerce  
 
Clifford Borough  
Independent Radical 
Minority Shareholder  
 
---------- 
Gayon  Hosin  Deputy Governor  Bank of Jamaica  
Noel Shippey  Senior Research 
Economist  
Bank of Jamaica  
Elice Douet  Compliance Officer  Bank of Jamaica  
George Roper  Deputy Executive 
Director  
Financial Services Commission 
Lawrence Crossly  Compliance Officer  Financial Services Commission  
Wayne Iton  General Manager  Jamaica Stock Exchange 
Neville Ellis Members Education 
Office  
Jamaica Stock Exchange   
Michael Johnson  Research Officer  Jamaica Stock Exchange  
Gordon Shirley  Chairman  National Insurance Fund  
Dwight Richardson  Trustee/Chief Financial 
Officer   
BNS Pension Fund  
Adrian Wallace  As Trustee of the 
Pension Fund  
GraceKennedy Pension Fund  
 
APPENDIX 4B:  
 OPEN-ENDED INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR CASE COMPANIES, 
WATCHDOG GROUPS AND REGULATORY RESPONDENTS 
 
Case Companies Directors and Executives  
 
1. How many boards all together do you currently sit on? 
2. How many times does you board meet annually? 
3. What factors influence the structure of your board membership? 
4. If you had a choice, would you have a board?  
5. If above, is yes, would its membership be the same? 
6. Is your board strong enough to say no to you and has that ever happened? 
7. Is your board well enough informed to do a good job of picking your successor if  
  you were suddenly “hit by a truck? 
8. Do you seek your board’s advice and counsel on important corporate questions  
9. before you decide on the answers? 
10. Do you keep your board informed on when there are differences of opinion on  
  significant issues within your management team? 
11. Would an outside observer of your board meeting conclude that you are an  
employee? 
12. Has the corporation performing its functions under the independent oversight of your board. 
13. How do you respond to the current debate on the duality of the role of  
14. Chairman/CEO? 
15. How differently, if at all, is your role as CEO/Chair influencing board decision  
  making process? 
16. Do you choose your directors? 
17. What is the selection process, if any, like? 
18. What board committees do you have? 
19. What formal structural mechanism, if any, do you use to justify accountability in  
  your company? 
20. How, if at all, has your board structure of accountability been influenced by  
  regulatory or industry-specific compliance measures? 
21. What regulations, if any, compel your company to be accountable to all its  
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  stakeholders? 
22. How different (if at all) would have been your business prudence and leadership  
  style were you a minority shareholder?   
23. What is your view on the issue of multiple directorships? 
24. How frequently does your Audit committee meet annually? 
25. What is your certain, or perceived, opinion of the relationship between effective  
  corporate governance and your companies performance? 
26. How has the corporate governance structure of your company helped (if at all) it to influenced 
performance? 
27. Could you identify a clear link (if there is any) between the two? 
28. How long have you been Chairman/CEO? 
29. Were you ever CEO before becoming chairman? 
30. What led you to have implemented such radical corporate governance innovations in recent years? 
31. How were you able to successfully implement such programme? 
32. You have only recently slashed your board into one-half, why was this necessary,  
if at all? 
33. How do former directors who were casualties in this restructuring view this  
move? 
34. How supportive were they? 
35. How did you decide on whom will go versus whom stay? 
36. How would you describe your relationship with other members of your board? 
37. How does the duality of your role as Chairman/CEO affect (if at all) the level of  
support you receive from your non-executive directors? 
38. Have you to do (if at all) with the selection of directors on your board? 
39. What is your certain (or perceived) opinion of the relationship between effective  
corporate governance and your companies performance? 
40. How do you think the corporate governance structure of your company has  
helped (if at all) in influencing performance? 
 
Regulators   
 
1.  What institutions do you regulate?________________________________ 
2.  Are there institutions that are regulated by both ___________and _________in    
one way or another? 
3. Why the need to regulate? 
4.  What is the role of the _____________in regulating ___________taking   
institutions? 
5. Why the need to separately regulate deposit taking from investment firms? 
6.  What are some of the most recent initiatives implemented by your agency with   
the view to improve accountability and transparency among the institutions it regulates? 
7.  More specifically, what are those regulations governing who became board  
 directors of companies? 
8.  To what extent, if at all, does the regulating arm influence the corporate structures 
of institutions under your jurisdiction? 
9.  What are some of the limitations of regulations in the context of internal  
 management of these firms; institutional reputation and economic  
10. How effective is the process of regulating? 
11. How satisfied are you as a regulator with the level of response from those you  
 regulate? 
12. Are you satisfied with the way companies are governed in Jamaica? 
13. What concerns do you have, if any, about the inclusion or exclusion of critical  
elements in the recently drafted Company Bill of Jamaica (2001)? 
14. Do you believe, if at all, that institutional investors are as influential as they ought  
to be here in Jamaica? 
15. What say you of the future of regulations to achieve greater level of transparency  
and accountability in Jamaica? 
16. How do you think institutional investors could be more influential in achieving  
good governance among firms? 
17. What are some of the Corporate Governance Codes that your agency would have  
adopted in the last five years, if any? 
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18. If so, what are the critical elements of this Code? 
19. If not, does the your agency have an alternative to the Code? 
20. What is the role of the Board of Governors of the Financial Services  
  Commission?  
 
Watchdog Groups 
 
1. What is your role as CEO of ______________? 
2. How many corporate boards do you sit on and in what organizations are they, any? 
3. For how long has been the establishment of the ____________? 
4. What is the role of the_____________? 
How influential has been the____________, if at all, in responding to public policy  
issues? 
5. How does the_____________view Jamaican boards today? 
6. What is your perception of the level of transparency and accountability as exhibited  
by Jamaican firms? 
7. What evidences, if any, are there to confirm that good governance is lacking (or  
needed) among Jamaican firms? 
8. What are the emerging corporate governance issues of which you are aware, if at all? 
9. How does your organization perceive corporate governance issues in relation to  
Jamaica? 
10. What are the corporate governance practices of your organization, if any? 
11. Are you satisfied with the way companies are governed in Jamaica? 
12. What if any, are the corporate governance intentions of the_____________ regard to  
Jamaica? 
13. How influential, if at all, has been the ____________in emerging corporate governance  
issues in Jamaica? 
14. Are you abreast with the inclusion or exclusion of critical elements in the recently  
drafted  
Company Bill of Jamaica (2001)? 
15. How do you think the persistent corruption (or perceived corruption) in government  
could be addressed from a corporate governance perspective? 
16. Do you believe institutional investors are as influential as they should in influencing  
the governance of companies in Jamaica? 
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APPENDIX 5:  
FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANTS, QUESTIONS AND THE MODERATOR’S GUIDE  
Names Participating Organisations and their Professional Engagements  
 FOCUS GROUP 2  FOCUS GROUP1  
Name  Title Company  Name  Title Company  
Dr. Brian 
Langrin  Chief Economist Bank of Jamaica 
Ann-Marie 
Rhoden  
Deputy 
Financial 
Secretary 
Ministry of 
Finance & the 
Public Service  
Robin Levy   General Manager 
Jamaica Stock 
Exchange Central 
Depository  
 
Roy Johnson  CEO Jamaica Stock Exchange 
Chris Bovell  Managing Partner  Dunn-Cox – Private Law Firm 
 
Alverly 
Casserly  Chairman 
United Way of 
Jamaica- Non-
profit 
Organization 
Ian Sangster  Executive Chairman  
Jamaica Institute 
of Management  
 
Michael 
DuQueney  CEO 
Central 
Information 
Technology 
Office --SOE 
Michael 
Ramsay  
Manager, 
Consulting Unit 
Planning Institute 
of Jamaica  
 
Sushil Jain  Company Secretary 
Seprod Limited --
Publicly-listed 
Company  
Shirley-Ann 
Eaton 
 Lecturer in 
Banking and 
Financial 
Regulations  
University of the 
West Indies  
Ms. Barbara 
Ellington  Business 
Journalist Printed Media 
Leighton 
McKnight  Partner 
International 
Accounting and 
Audit Firm  
Dr. Henley 
Morgan  Chairman 
and Lead 
Consultant  
Caribbean 
Applied 
Technology 
Centre 
 
  
Questions of Focus Group #1(Appendix 5 Contd.) 
 
Pressures for Corporate Governance Reform: 
1. What are the pressures for reform? 
2. Who are the major actors exerting these pressures? 
3. What are possible reasons for these pressures being exerted? 
4. What initiatives might you include in an agenda for reform in Jamaica?  
5. Do these initiatives represent a Corporate Governance system compatible with a global compromise/trend?   
6. Can the global compromise governance approach be applied in the Jamaican context?   
 
Pressures against Pressures against Reform:   
7. What are the pressures against reform? 
8. Who are the major actors exerting these pressures? 
9. What are possible reasons for these pressures being exerted? 
10. What are the advantages of maintaining existing systems in place? 
11. In order of your priority, what are the three most important things needed to be done in Jamaica to improve 
Corporate Governance in the Public Sector?  
12. In order of your priority, what are the three most important things needed to be done in Jamaica to improve 
Corporate Governance in the Private Sector? 
 
Questions for Focus Group # 2 (Appendix 5) 
 
Ownership and Control Patterns 
Do you think high ownership (closely held) concentration is a threat to corporate governance development in 
Jamaica? Justify your response with reasoning. 
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Chairman/CEO duality versus Separation 
What is your view on one person holding the positions of Chairman and CEO? Should they be separated?  Justify 
your answer with reasoning.   
 
Non-Executive versus Executive Directors  
Do you think a balance between non-executive and executive directors is important in board composition? Justify 
your response with reasoning. 
 
Directors’ Age and Gender   
Do you think Jamaican boards should adopt a policy to specify an age limit for retiring directors?  
Would you advocate for a woman to be nominated among the board of directors of every company in Jamaica?   
Justify your responses with reasoning.  
 
Board Evaluation and Training 
Do you see any merits in evaluating the performance of corporate boards? Justify you response with reasoning.  
 
Nature and Role of Corporate Disclosures 
Are you satisfied with the nature (content) of disclosure of information among Jamaican companies?  Justify your 
response with reasoning.  
 
Board’s Role in Strategic Decision-making 
How do you perceive the role of the Board in the strategic direction of the company? 
Background:  Traditionally, the Board monitors the CEO and ratify strategic decisions while management initiate 
and implement strategy.  
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MODERATORS GUIDE SUMMARIZED (APPENDIX 5 CONTINUED) 
 
 
1. Conceptualization of the Research Question 
• Importance of the Study,  Objectives, Impact on Public 
Policy Reform 
2. Design of the Research Approach 
• Group sizes and composition, Moderator, Duration, 
Logistics 
3. Development of the Moderator’s Guide 
• Preamble/Introduction, Icebreaker, Questions 
• The interview setting  
4. Recruitment of Participants 
• Competence, Experience, Active Corporate Involvement 
5. Group Moderation 
• Script, Control of the sessions, Capture of Content, 
assurance of the importance of confidentiality  
 
6. Debriefing of the Participants 
• Additional Insights, Impulsive Feedback, Wrap-up 
7.    Data Analysis 
• Description and Evaluation 
8.    Presentation of Findings 
• Themes, Sub-themes 
9. Follow-up 
• Feedback, Impact, Lessons Learnt 
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APPENDIX 6:  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
 
 
The structures of corporate governance, in any country, can usefully be thought of as comprising key “actors” and 
formal and informal rules, including generally accepted practices.  They include: 
 
 Legislation that gives corporations judicial personality (recognizes their existence as legal “persons” 
independent of their owners), determines corporate chartering requirements, and limits the liability of the 
owners of a corporation to the value of their equity in the corporation;  
  
 Legislation on the issuing and trading of corporate equity and debt securities (including laws on the 
responsibilities and liabilities of both securities issuers and market intermediaries and liabilities such as 
brokers and brokerage firms, accounting firms and investment advisors); 
 
 A government body (“securities commission”) empowered to regulate the issuing and trading of 
corporate securities with the means to monitor and enforce compliance with securities laws; 
 
 Stock-exchange listing requirements (conditions corporations must meet to be allowed to list and trade 
their shares on the exchange); 
 
 A judiciary system with sufficient political independence and the investigative as well as judicial powers 
and the resources required to make and enforce, without excessive delay, informed and impartial 
judgments; 
 
 Professional associations or “guilds” (such as those of accountants, stock brokers, institute of directors) 
that contribute, for example, through membership licensing, information sharing, peer pressure – to the 
definition and maintenance of professional conduct in their field; 
 
 Business associations and chambers of commerce and other private sector organizations that, in a similar 
fashion, use formal and informal means to influence members’ thinking on and behaviour with respect to 
acceptable business practices; 
 
 Other private and public monitors of corporate and securities-market participants’ (notably pension 
funds and other institutional investors, rating agencies, financial media, etc.) 
 
In addition to these corporate governance “actors” (including the body or bodies that enact 
relevant legislation), four broad categories of laws, regulations, other formal and informal rules and 
generally accepted practices are important:  those that concern corporate oversight and control 
(ownership and control issues), those that concern the role of regulations (laws and rules—enforced 
governance) and self-regulation (volunteered governance), the role of Stakeholding, the role and 
importance of institutional investors in corporate governance and the influences and impact of corruption 
on both corporate and political governance systems.  The former group notably includes rules and 
acceptable practices with respect to: 1.)  shareholder voting rights and procedures (including those that 
are especially important for the protection of minority shareholder rights vis-à-vis dominant shareholders 
as well as vis-à-vis management, such as cumulative rights and other “so-called” anti-director rights48); 
2.) the duties, powers and liabilities of corporate directors (boards and individual directors, including 
definition of what constitutes an “independent” director and requirements on board composition and on 
the constitution of board committees on audit, the nomination of directors and remuneration of directors 
and top executives); 3.), proscription of self-dealing by corporate insiders (whether self-dealing occurs 
via related-party transactions49 or tunnelling50 or takes the form of insider trading51); 4.), stock-tendering 
                                               
48
 “Anti-director rights” is the expression used by La Porta et al to refer to six key shareholders rights:  the right to mail their 
proxy vote to the firm; to participate in the General Shareholders’ Meeting without having previously deposited their shares 
with the company; to benefit from cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors; to 
benefit from the existence of an oppressed minorities mechanism; to hold an Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting if it is 
called for by a minimum of no more than 10% of share capital; and to pre-emptive rights to new issues that can only be 
waived by a shareholder’s vote (cf. Oman 1999, citing R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de Salines, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, “Law and 
Finance” in the Journal of Political Economy, 106, 1998). 
49
 Related party transactions are business dealing between a corporation and one or more other firms, or one or more 
individuals outside the corporation, with which (whom) one or more corporate insiders has a personal (often family) 
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requirements (notably to protect small shareholders in the context of a corporate merger, acquisition or 
privatization)52; 5.) and Judicial recourse for shareholders vis-à-vis managers and directors (derivative 
suits, class-action suits53).  
 
APPENDIX 7: 
OECD KEY PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2004) 
 
PRINCIPLES Explanation 
 
I.  Ensuring the Basis for an Effective 
Corporate Governance Framework 
 
The corporate governance framework should promote transparent and 
efficient markets, be consistent with the rule of law and clearly 
articulate the division of responsibilities among different supervisory, 
regulatory, and enforcement authorities.   
 
II. The Rights of Shareholders and Key 
Ownership Functions 
 
 
The corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the 
exercise of shareholders’ rights. 
III.  The Equitable Treatment of 
Shareholders  
 
The Corporate governance framework should ensure equitable 
treatment of all shareholders, including minority and foreign 
shareholders.  All shareholders should have the opportunity to obtain 
effective redress for violation of their rights. 
 
IV. The Role of Stakeholders in 
Corporate Governance 
 
The Corporate governance framework should recognize the rights of 
stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and 
encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders 
in creating wealth, jobs and the sustainability of financial sound 
enterprises.  
V. Disclosure and Transparency 
 
The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and 
accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the 
corporation, including the financial situation, performance, 
ownership, and governance of the company. 
VI. The Responsibilities of the Board  
 
The Corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic 
guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of management by 
the board, and the board’s accountability to the company and the 
shareholders. 
Source:  OECD (2004)  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
relationship.  Related party transactions are widely used as a vehicle or self-dealing, although not all related-party transactions 
involve self-dealing. 
50
 Tunnelling is self-dealing that occurs within pyramidal ownership structures when controlling shareholders transfer 
resources from companies in which they have smaller cash flow rights to companies in which they have larger cash flow 
rights; it is analogous to asset-stripping.  See S. Johnson, R. La Porta, R. Lopez de-Salines and A. Shleifer, “Tunnelling” in the 
American Economic Review, 90, 2000. 
51
 Insider trading occurs when corporate insiders or others with privileged access to information significantly likely to affect 
the market value of a company’s shares before the information is released to other market participants. 
52
 Particularly important are pre-emptive rights to new issues – sometimes referred to in Brazil as “tag along” rights – included 
among the “anti-director rights” cited here in note 1. 
53
 Derivative suits allow shareholders to sue corporate directors on behalf of the company itself; class-action suits allow 
individuals to sue on behalf of an entire class of individuals (e.g. shareholders in a given company). 
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APPENDIX 8: CADBURY REPORT (1992) 
 
The Cadbury Report recommended a Code of Best has now been utilized in a significant way internationally in 
academia, practice and in influencing corporate governance reform internationally.  The main recommendations 
were as follows. 
 
THE CODE OF BEST PRACTICE 
1. The Board of Directors: 
1.1. The board should meet regularly, retain full and effective control over the company, and monitor the 
executive management. 
1.2. There should be a clearly accepted division of responsibilities at the head of a company, which will 
ensure a balance of power and authority, such that no one individual has unfettered powers of 
decision. Where the chairman is also the chief executive, it is essential that there should be a strong 
and independent element on the board, with a recognized senior member. 
1.3. The board should include non-executive directors of sufficient calibre and number for their views to 
carry significant weight in the board’s decisions. 
1.4. The board should have a formal schedule of matters specifically reserved to it for decision to ensure 
that the direction and control of the company is firmly in its hands. 
1.5. There should be an agreed procedure for directors in the furtherance of their duties to take 
independent professional advice if necessary, at the company’s expense. 
1.6. All directors should have access to the advice and services of the company secretary, who is 
responsible to the board for ensuring that board procedures are followed and that applicable rules 
and regulations are complied with. Any question of the removal of the company secretary should be 
a matter for the board as a whole. 
 
2. Non-executive Directors: 
2.1. Non-executive directors should bring an independent judgment to bear on issues of strategy, 
performance, resources including key appointments, and standards of conduct. 
2.2. The majority should be independent of management and free from any business or other relationship 
which could materially interfere with the exercise of their independent judgment, apart from their 
fees and shareholding. Their fees should reflect the time which they commit to the company. 
2.3. Non-executive directors should be appointed for specified terms and reappointment should not be 
automatic. 
2.4. Non-executive directors should be selected through a formal process and both this process and their 
appointment should be a matter for the board as a whole. 
 
3. Executive Directors: 
3.1. Directors’ service contracts should not exceed three years without shareholders’ approval. 
3.2. There should be full and clear disclosure of directors’ total emoluments and those of the chairman 
and highest-paid UK director, including pension contributions and stock options. Separate figures 
should be given for salary and performance-related elements and the basis on which performance is 
measured should be explained. 
3.3. Executive directors’ pay should be subject to the recommendations of a remuneration committee 
made up wholly or mainly of non-executive directors. 
 
4. Reporting and Controls: 
4.1. It is the board’s duty to present a balanced and understandable assessment of the company’s 
position. 
4.2. The board should ensure that an objective and professional relationship is maintained with the 
auditors. 
4.3. The board should establish an audit committee of at least three non-executive directors with written 
terms of reference which deal clearly with its authority and duties. 
4.4. The directors should explain their responsibility for preparing the accounts next to a statement by 
the auditors about their reporting responsibilities. 
4.5. The directors should report on the effectiveness of the company’s system of internal control. 
4.6. The directors should report that the business is going concern, with supporting assumptions or 
qualifications as necessary. 
Source: Cadbury Code (1992) 
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APPENDIX 9: INTERVIEWERS’ ADMINISTERED SURVEY PARTICIPANT 
KEY CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES  
 
Company (Respondents) Board Composition and Characteristics 
 
Name of 
Company 
 
# D 
 
# 
E
D
s 
 
# 
NED
s 
 
ID 
 
CEO/ 
Chair Split 
 
Committees 
 
Board 
Evaluation/ 
Appraisal 
 
Formal 
Training 
of 
Directors 
 
Avg. Time 
Spent on 
Strategy 
(%) 
1. ALL 8 2 6 6 Yes  A, R/C, N/S, CG, SP, RM, 
CRS 
No  No  - 
2. BAR  5 2 3 - Yes  R/C, RM, R&D, CRS Yes  No  <10 
3. BCJ 7 0 7 3 Yes  A,R/C, RM, CRS, Conduct 
Review, Finance 
No  No  10-25 
4. BAN CO 9 4 5 - Yes  - No  No  51-75 
5. BNS 13 1 12 9 Yes  A, R/C, Pension, Executive No  Yes 10-25 
6. CAP 6 2 4 2 Yes  A, R/C, CG, CRS, RM, 
Credit & Investment  
Yes  No  51-75 
7. CAP 
SEC 
11 7 4 4 Yes  A, CG, RM, HR, Marketing - - 51-75 
8. CCU 13 0 13 13 Yes  A, N/C, SP, RM, Credit, 
Finance, Supervisory 
- Yes  <10 
9. CIBY  6 1 5 5 Yes  - No  No 10-25 
10. CITO 13 0 13 13 Yes  A, R/C No  No  10-25 
11. COU. JA   10 6 4 - No  A, R/C, CG, SP, RM No  Yes  26-50 
12. CW 9 6 3 3 Yes  A, Contracts  No  No  26-50 
13. CW CO-
OP 
11 0 11 - Yes  A, N/S, Credit No  Yes  <10 
14. DB&G 9 2 7 4 No  A No  No  10-25 
15. DIL 6 - 6 - Yes  - No  No  26-50 
16. DYL 9 3 6 5 Yes  A, Finance, IT Yes No  10-25 
17. FLI 10 5 5 4 No  A No  No  26-50 
18. G Ja. 10 2 8 8 No  R/C, N/S, Finance  No  No  10-25 
19. G SHIP 7 3 4 - Yes  A, R/C No  No  26-50 
20. G&B 8 3 5 5 Yes  A, R, CREDIT Yes  No  26-50 
21. GL  10 1 9 7 Yes  A, R/C, A&R, CG, Conduct 
Review 
No  No  10-25 
22. GRA 13 5 8 8 No A , R/C, CG, RM Yes  Yes  26-50 
23. GS  5 - 5 - No    A, R/C, CG, RM,  No  No  10-25 
24. GY  12 2 10 10 Yes  - No  No  10-25 
25. H & L 10 5 5 2 Yes  A, SP, RM, R&D, CRS, 
Executive 
No  No  10-25 
26. ICWI 8 1 7 7 Yes A, R/C, A&R, CG, Finance 
& Investment  
Yes  Yes  26-50 
27. JADF 11 1 10 10 Yes  A, R&D, Finance  No  Yes  10-25 
28. JB 12 3 9 4 Yes  A, R/C No  No  <10 
29. JIIC  9 3 6 4 Yes  A, CG, Conduct Review No  No  26-50 
30. JMM 10 3 7 4 Yes  A, R/C, RM Yes  - 10-25 
31. JMM 
SECS. 
8 2 6 2 Yes  A, HR No  No  26-50 
32. JAM B 14 1 13 11 Yes  A, R/C, N/S, CG, SP, RM No  No  26-50 
33. J GROW  13 4 9 6 Yes  A, CG, R/C No  No  26-50 
34. JP 15 9 6 - Yes  N/S, RM, Finance, 
Delinquency 
No  Yes  26-50 
35. KEN F 3 3 0 - No  - Yes  No  - 
36. KFP 7 1 6 1 Yes  - No  No  51-75 
37. KWL  12 1 11 7 Yes  A, CG No  No  10-25 
38. MLI 9 1 8 5 Yes  Pension  Yes  Yes  - 
39. MMJ 5 2 3 3 No  R/C, Finance, Personnel  No  No  26-50 
40. PAN C 7 3 4 - Yes  A, R/C No  No  26-50 
41. PEG  10 - 10 4 Yes  R/C, Pension, Union No  No  51-75 
42. PFS 9 2 7 4 Yes - No  No  10-25 
43. PJI 11 6 5 2 No  A, R/C, RM No  No  10-25 
44. RJ G 10 1 9 9 No  R/C, SP, CRS, Finance No  No  26-50 
45. SAL 5 0 5 2 Yes  - No  No  51-75 
46. SAM  3 2 1 1 No   RM No  No  10-25 
47. SEP 13 1 12 12 Yes  A, Executive  No  No  < 10 
48. TVJ   7 2 5 5 Yes  R/C, Finance No  No  26-50 
49. VIC I 8 5 3 3 Yes  Finance  No  - 26-50 
50. VIC S 9 1 8 7 Yes  A, N/S, Standing  No  No  10-25 
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Company (Respondents) Board Composition and Characteristics 
 
Name of 
Company 
 
# D 
 
# 
E
D
s 
 
# 
NED
s 
 
ID 
 
CEO/ 
Chair Split 
 
Committees 
 
Board 
Evaluation/ 
Appraisal 
 
Formal 
Training 
of 
Directors 
 
Avg. Time 
Spent on 
Strategy 
(%) 
Averages 9.1 2.
6 
6.8 5.6 Yes(39)- 78% 
No(11)- 22% 
3.3 per company Yes(9)- 19% 
No(39)-  81% 
NR-2 
Yes(9)-
19% 
No(38)-
81% 
NR-3 
 
 
Key:  D- Director,   ED- Executive Directors,    NED- Non Executive Directors,  N/C- Nomination or Selection,   A- Audit,   
SP-  Succession Planning,   A&R- Audit & Remuneration, RM-Risk Management,  R&D- Research & Development,  CRS- 
Corporate, Regulatory, & Social , CG-  Corporate Governance,  R/C-  Remuneration or Compensation, NR-No Response 
 
APPENDIX 9 (CONTD.): RESPONDENTS KEY CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES  
 
 
Name of 
Company 
 
Female  
Directors 
 
Female 
NEDs 
 
Foreign 
NEDs 
 
Avg. age 
NEDs 
Avg. 
Age 
EDs 
 
Retirement 
Age 
 
# of 
Meetings 
per year 
 
Compensation 
51. ALL 2 - - 45 - - 3 270000 
52. BAR  3 1 - 50 52 - na - 
53. BCJ -  2 65 - - 4 714000 
54. BAN CO -  - 60 64 - 11 
576000 
55. BNS 3 3 3 54 52 - 5 360000 
56. CAP 1 1 - 53 51 - 15 417600 
57. CAP SEC 1 1 - 53 49 - 11 - 
58. CCU 6 6 - 45 - - 12 172800 
59. CIBY  1 - - 57 58 - 5 81000 
60. CITO 2 2 - 40 - - 10 288000 
61. COU. JA   1 - 2 68 48 - 4 198000 
62. CW 1 - - - - - 3 - 
63. CW CO-OP 1 1 - - - - 13 - 
64. DBG 1 1 - 47 42 - 6 180000 
65. DIL -  3 53 - 65 4 144000 
66. DYL 1 1 - 50 45 70 11 72000 
67. FLI -  - 60 56 - 6 86400 
68. G Ja. 2 2 - 46 60 75 11 226800 
69. G SHIP -  - 52 48 65 10 - 
70. G&B 1 1 1 50 44 - 7 120000 
71. GL  -  5 60 54 70 12 - 
72. GRA 1 1 1 62 51 - 11 1135000 
73. GS  1 - - 45 - 65 8 - 
74. GY  2 1 - 60 54 - 12 360000 
75. H & L -  - 63 44 - 6 - 
76. ICWI 1 1 1 61 68 - 4 240000 
77. JADF 2 2 2 - 44 - 12 - 
78. JB 1 1 - 57 ¾ 50 ½ - 12 288000 
79. JIIC  2 1 - 50 43 - 4 - 
80. JMM 3 3 1 44 40 - 10 225600 
81. JMM SECS. 3 3 - 40 40 - 12 172800 
82. JAM B 2 2 - 64 44 - 12 244800 
83. J GROW  2 2 - 62 59 - 8 112800 
84. JP 4 1 - 50 55 - 10 - 
85. KEN F 2 - - - 43 - - - 
86. KFP 4 3 - 45 55 75 4 144000 
87. KWL  -  1 55 51 - 11 252000 
88. MLI 1 1 3 50.5 47 - 6 360000 
89. MMJ -  - 45 45 - 12 96000 
90. PAN C -  - 52 48 66 10 - 
91. PEG  2 2 - 55 - 75 5 180000 
92. PFS 1 - - 58 38 - 6 62400 
93. PJI 1 1 2 57 55 - 6 86400 
94. RJ G 2 2 - 60 62 - 12 96000 
95. SAL 1 1 1 44 - - 12 252000 
96. SAM  1 1 - 46 40 - 4 48000 
97. SEP -  - 61 63 - 11 156000 
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Name of 
Company 
 
Female  
Directors 
 
Female 
NEDs 
 
Foreign 
NEDs 
 
Avg. age 
NEDs 
Avg. 
Age 
EDs 
 
Retirement 
Age 
 
# of 
Meetings 
per year 
 
Compensation 
98. TV JAM 2 1 - 53 57 - 12 96000 
99. VIC I 3 - - 40 46 65 6 180000 
100.  
VIC S 
1 1 - 60 60 - 10 
420000 
         
Averages 1.8 1.6 2 53.1 50.6 62.8 8.5 246335.1 
Keys:  
Foreign NED- Question 24/ Female- Question 29 / Female NE- Question 30/ Compensation- Question 33/ 
Independent D- Question 14/ Avg. Age NED- Question 15/ Retirement Age- Question 18/  Avg. Age Execs- 
Question -20/ # of meetings- Q42 
 
APPENDIX 10: STATISTICAL MODEL FOR DATA ANALYSIS 
 Variable Information for SPSS Applied in Field Data Analysis 
 
 Q. # Variable Type Variable Labels Options 
 SECTION 1 
1. 1. Num Dominant Ownership Structure As is 
otheriii 
2. 2. Num % registered shares owned by common 
shareholders 
Apply range 
 3. Num Top 10 Shareholders Derive options from annual 
reports provided 
3. 4. Num Employee Share Ownership Plan As is 
4. 5. Num Common Stake of Members in ESOP Apply range 
5. 6. Num Employee Representative on Board As is 
 7. Num   
6. 8. Num Unionized Companies As is 
7. 9. Num Union Rep on Board As is 
8. 10. Num Industry As is 
otheriv 
 SECTION 2 
9. 
11.  Num Number of Directors on Board 
7 and less 
8-10 
11-12 
13 and overv 
10. 
12.  Num 
Number of Exec. Directors on 
Board 
3 and less  
4-5 
6-8 
9-10 
11. 
13.  Num 
Number of Non-Executive Directors 
on Board 
3 and less 
4-6 
7-10 
11 and above 
12. 
14.  Num 
Independent Non-Executive 
Directors 
2 and less 
3-5 
>5 
13. 
15.  Num 
Average Age of Non-Executive 
Directors 
29 and less 
30-39 
40-49 
50-65  
>65 
14. 
16.  Num 
Age of Oldest Non-Executive 
Director 
49 and less 
50-59  
>60 
15. 17.  Num 
Age of Youngest Non-Executive 
Director 
29 and less 
30-39  
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40-50 
49 and less 
16. 18.  Num 
Retirement Age of Non-Executive 
Directors 
59 and less 
>60 
17. 
19.  Num 
Average Years of Service of Current 
Non-Executive Directors 
4 and less 
5-9 
10-14 
15-20 
21 and over 
18. 
20.  Num Average age of Executive Directors 
29 and less 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
>60 
19. 
21.  Num Age of Oldest Executive Director 
49 and less 
50-60 
>60 
20. 
22.  Num Age of Youngest Executive Director 
29 and less 
30-39 
>40 
21. 
23.  Num 
Average Years of Service of 
Executive Directors 
4 and less 
5-9 
10-14 
15-20 
21 and over 
22. 24.  Num Foreign Non-Executive Directors As is 
23. 25.  Num 
Average Number of Foreign 
Executives 
2 and less 
3 and over 
24. 26.  Num Executive Chairman of the Board As is 
25. 27.  Num Deputy Executive Chairman As is 
26. 28.  Num 
Appointed Lead Non-Executive 
Chairman As is 
27. 29.  Num Female Directors As is 
28. 30.  Num Number of Female Directors 
<2vi 
2 and over 
29. 31.  Num Number of Female Non-Executives 
2 and less 
3 and over 
30. 32.  Num 
Non-Executive Transferable 
Expertise As is 
31. 33.  Num Average Salary of Non-Executives 
<.5M 
Between .5-
99M 
1-1.9M 
>2M 
32. 34.  Num 
Stock/Share Plane for Non-
Executives As is 
33. 35.  Num Audit Committee on Board As is 
34.  Num Size of Audit Committee 
<4 
4 and over 
35.  Num 
Remuneration/Compensation 
Committee on Board As is 
36.   
Size of 
Remuneration/Compensation 
Committee 
<4 
4 and over 
37.  Num A & R Committee on Board As is 
38.   Size of A & R Committee 
<4 
4 and over 
39.  Num 
Nomination/Selection Committee 
on Board As is 
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40.   
Size of Nomination/Selection 
Committee 
<4 
4 and over 
41.  Num 
Corporate Governance Committee 
on Board As is 
42.   
Size of Corporate Governance 
Committee on Board  
<4 
4 and over 
43.  Num 
Succession Planning Committee on 
Board As is 
44.   
Size of Succession Planning 
Committee 
<4 
4 and over 
45.  Num Risk Management on Board As is 
46.   Size of Risk Management 
<4 
4 and over 
47.  Num 
Research and Development of 
Board As is 
48.   
Size of Research and Development 
Committee 
<4 
4 and over 
49.  Num 
Corporate, Regulatory and Social 
Committee on Board As is 
50.   
Size of Corporate, Regulatory and 
Social Committee 
3 and less 
4 and over 
51.  Num Others  
52. 36.  Num 
Number Non-Executives on Audit 
Committee 
3 and less 
3 and over 
53.   
Number 
Remuneration/Compensation 
Committee 
3 and less 
4 and over 
54.   
Number Non-Executives on A & R 
Committee 
3 and less 
4 and over 
55.   
Number Non-Executives on 
Succession Planning Committee 
3 and less 
4 and over 
56.   
Number Non-Executives on 
Nomination/Selection Committee 
3 and less  
4 and over 
57. 37.  Num 
Involvement of Non-Board 
Members in presenting Strategic 
Recommendations to Board As is 
58. 38.  Num 
Formal System for Evaluation of 
Director Performance As is 
59. 39.  Num Formal Training for New Directors As is 
60. 40.  Num 
Average time for Distribution of 
Board Papers Prior to Meetings 
(Weeks) 
<1 week 
1-2 weeks 
>3 weeks 
61. 41.  Num 
Average Time for Distribution of 
Proxy Forms Prior to AGM (Weeks) 
<2 weeks 
2-4 weeks 
5-8 weeks 
>8 weeks 
62. 42.  Num 
Average Annual Number of Board 
Meetings in Last Three Years 
4 
5-9 
10 and over 
63. 43.  Num 
Criteria for Selecting Board 
Members As is 
64. 44.  Num 
Limit on Number of Elections or 
Years on Board As is 
65. 45.  Num 
Knowledge of Corporate 
Governance Best Practices As is 
66. 46.  Num 
Most Frequently Known Best 
Practices ----- 
67. 47.   
Voluntary Implementation of 
Corporate Governance Best As is 
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Practices 
68. 48.  Num 
Most Frequently Implemented Best 
Practices ----- 
 SECTION 3 
69. 49.  Num Involvement of the Board in 
Strategic Direction 
As is 
70. 50.  Num Company’s Mission and Vision 
Clearly Stated 
As is 
71. 51.  Num Who is Responsible for Vision and 
Mission 
As is 
72. 52.  Num Strategic Planning Committee As is 
73. 53.  Num Examination of Objectives and 
Strategies and Performance 
Measurement 
As is 
74. 54.  Num Board involvement in strategy As is 
75. 55.  Num Extent of Board involvement in 
strategy 
As is 
76. 56.  Num Develop Corporate Vision As is 
77.  Num Ratify Strategy after it is developed 
by Management 
As is 
78.  Num Guide the Strategic Planning 
Process 
As is 
79.  Num Monitor the Health of the 
Organization 
As is 
80.  Num Hire, Appraise and Fire CEO As is 
81.  Num Undertake Corporate 
Communication/Governance  
As is 
82.  Num Ensure Corporate Renewal As is 
83.  Num Responsible for Ethical Framework As is 
84.  Num Review and Monitor Corporate 
Social Responsibility Policy 
As is 
85.  Num Ensure Corporate Survival As is 
86.  Num Lead Strategic Change As is 
87.  Num Act as Ambassadors for the Firm As is 
88.  Num Interpret and Advise Management 
of Forthcoming Legislation 
As is 
89.  Num Boundary Spanning As is 
90. 57.  Num Non-Executive Directors 
Involvement in Strategy 
As is 
91. 58.  Num Mode of Strategic Involvement of 
Board in Discussing strategy 
As is 
92.  Num Mode of Strategic Involvement of 
Board in approving strategy 
As is 
93.  Num Mode of Strategic Involvement of 
Board in ratifying strategy 
As is 
94.  Num Mode of Strategic Involvement of 
Board in decision making 
As is 
95.  Num Mode of Strategic Involvement of 
Board in monitoring strategic plan 
As is 
96.  Num Mode of Strategic Involvement of 
Board in guiding strategic planning 
process 
As is 
97.  Num Mode of Strategic Involvement of 
Board in helping to formulate  
strategy 
As is 
98.  Num Mode of Strategic Involvement of 
Board in defining strategic 
framework 
As is 
99. 59.   Estimate of Board Meeting  time As is 
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spent on Strategy 
 
Please pay special attention to Variable labels as these are the axis labels in the output.   
 
 
 
                                               
i
 On-site examinations refer to supervisory review activities of actual operations of the licensee carried out at its 
place of business.  The process involves the collection of on-the-spot information that will indicate the current 
financial condition of an institution and the situation prevailing at its various operational areas/portfolios, 
verification of financial data already furnished to the Bank of Jamaica, and the review of its compliance with 
laws, regulations and standards of best practice (BOJ Pamphlet No. 7, October, 2000).  
 
ii
 Material Information is any information relating to the business and affairs of the company that results in or 
would reasonably be expected to result in a significant change in the market price or value of any of the 
company’s listed securities. Material information consists of both material facts and material changes relating to 
the business and affairs of a listed company.  In addition to material information, trading on the Exchange is 
sometimes affected by the existence of rumours and speculation. Where this is the case, the Exchange may 
require that an announcement be made by the company whether such rumours and speculation are factual or not 
(Jamaica Stock Exchange Rules, January 2007:8-1).  
 
iii
 A variable option will be added to the list if that option appears 10% of the time 
iv
 A variable option will be added to the list if that option appears 10% of the time 
v
 outliers 
vi
 With the ranges it is important to state overall % of sample.  E.g. Of the boards sampled less than 5%  
 
 
 
APPENDIX 11: 
PRIVATE SECTOR ORGANISATION OF JAMAICA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
CODE 
 
SECTION 1: COMPANIES 
A. DIRECTORS 
A.1 The Board 
Principle: 
Every company should be led by an effective Board, which is collectively responsible for promoting the success 
of the company by directing and supervising the company’s affairs. 
 
A.2 Chairman and Chief Executive 
Principle: 
The company’s constitution should include a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the company between 
the running of the Board (the Chairman) and the executive responsibility for the running of the company’s 
business (The CEO). No one individual should have unfettered powers of decision. 
 
A.3 Board Balance and independence 
Principle: 
The Board should include a balance of executive and non-executive directors, such that no individual or small 
group of individuals can dominate the Board’s decision taking. Of the non-executive directors, two thirds of these 
should be independent non-executive directors. The Chairman should also normally be an independent non-
executive director. 
 
A.4 Appointments to the Board 
Principle:  
There should be a formal, rigorous and transparent procedure for the appointment of directors to the Board. 
 
A.5 Information and Professional development 
Principle: 
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The Board should be supplied in a timely manner with information in a form and of a quality appropriate to 
enable it to discharge its duties. New directors should receive a comprehensive induction to the company affairs 
on joining the Board and all directors should continually update and refresh their skills and knowledge. 
 
A.6 Performance Evaluation 
Principle: 
The Board should undertake a formal and rigorous annual evaluation of its own performance and that of its 
committees and individual directors. 
 
A.7 Re-election 
Principle: 
All directors should be submitted for re-election at regular intervals, subject to continued satisfactory 
performance. The Board should ensure planned progressive refreshing of the Board. 
 
A.8 Liability of non-executive directors: car, skill and diligence 
Principle: 
Liability of non-executive directors and executive directors owe the same legal duty of care, diligence and skill to 
the company. 
 
REMUNERATION 
 
B.1 The Level and Make-up of Remuneration 
Principle: 
Levels of remuneration of a company’s executives and board members should be sufficient to attract and retain 
and motivate persons of the quality required to run the company successfully. A significant proportion of 
executive directors’ remuneration should be structured so as to link rewards to corporate and individual 
performance. 
 
B.2 Procedure 
Principle: 
Companies should establish a formal and transparent procedure for developing policy on executive directors’ 
remuneration and for fixing the remuneration packages of individual executive directors. No executive director 
should be involved in deciding his or her own remuneration. 
 
B.3 Disclosure 
Principle: 
The company’s annual report should contain a statement of remuneration policy and details of the remuneration 
of its executives and directors. 
 
C. RELATIONS WITH SHAREHOLDERS 
C.1 Dialogue with Institutional Shareholders 
Principle: 
There should be regular communication between the company and its shareholders based on the mutual 
understanding of objectives. Whilst recognizing that most shareholders’ contact is with the executive directors, 
the chairman and the Board as a whole should maintain sufficient contact with shareholders to understand their 
issues and concerns. 
 
C.2 Constructive Use of the AGM 
Principle: 
Boards should use the AGM as a major opportunity to inform shareholders and investors on the company’s affairs 
and encourage their participation. Boards should ensure that shareholders are provided with sufficient information 
for the AGM to make well-informed decisions on issues put for voting at the AGM. 
 
D. ACCOUNATBILITY AND AUDIT 
D.1 Financial Reporting 
Principle: 
The Board should ensure that the company provides its shareholders and investors with information that presents 
a balanced and understandable assessment of the company’s financial and business position and prospects. 
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D.2 Internal Control 
Principle:  The Board should ensure that a sound system of internal control and risk management is maintained to 
safeguard shareholders’ investment and the company’s assets. 
 
D.3 Audit Committee and Auditors 
Principle:  The Board should establish an Audit Committee.  The Board should establish formal, rigorous and 
transparent arrangements for selecting independent auditors and ensure that the independent auditors make a 
thorough checking of the company’s financial accounts, application of financial reporting standards and 
efficiency of internal control mechanisms. The Board must maintain an appropriate relationship with the 
company’s auditors. 
SECTION 2: INSTITIONAL SHAREHOLDERS’ 
E. NSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
E.1 Shareholder Voting 
Principle:  Institutional shareholders have a responsibility to make considered use of their votes. 
 
E.2 Communication with companies 
Principle:  Institutional shareholders should maintain regular communication with companies based on the mutual 
understanding of objectives. 
 
E.3 Evaluation of Governance Disclosures 
Principle:  When evaluating companies’ Governance arrangements, particularly those relating to Board structure 
and composition, transparency and disclosure, institutional investors should give due weight to all relevant factors 
drawn to their attention.   
 
Source:  PSOJ Corporate Governance Code 2006 
 
 
APPENDIX 12: GLOSSARY OF TERMS  
 
1.7.1 Agency Theory: One party, the principal, delegates work to another party, the agent. In a corporate 
scenario, the principal is the shareholder and the agent the directors/managers. Agency theory relates to the costs 
involved in this principal-agent relationship, including the costs of aligning the two sets of interests (Mallin 
2007).  
 
1.7.2 Anglo-Saxon Corporate Governance:   This refers to systems and practices of corporate governance as 
currently obtains in countries such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, etc., and known as shareholder corporate governance.    
 
1.7.3 Audit:  The process of examination of financial accounts and internal processes by an independent 
external auditor to determine whether the annual report and accounts have been appropriately prepared and give a 
true and fair view. 
 
1.7.4  Audit Committee: This committee is a committee of the board and is generally comprised of 
independent non-executive directors. It is the role of the audit committee to review the scope and outcome of the 
audit, and to ensure that the objectivity and integrity of the audit process and auditors is maintained.   
 
1.7.5 Auditor Rotation:  The audit firm is changed after a number of years in order to help ensure that the 
independence of the external auditor is preserved. There are disparate views on the effectiveness of auditor 
rotation. It is still not commonly practiced in commonwealth jurisdictions.  
 
1.7.6  Board Attitude: This is more to do with the approach of each director to his or her responsibility as a 
member of the board. It includes key elements such as preparation for board meetings, attendance, participation, 
feedback and the management of absenteeism. 
 
1.7.7  Board Committees: The board of directors may delegate various duties in specific areas to specialized 
committees such as the audit committee, remuneration committee, nomination committee, and so forth.  
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1.7.8  Board Composition: This refers to the physical size and characteristics of any given board: number of 
inside versus outside directors, female to male ratio and stakeholder group representation.  
 
1.7.9  Board Evaluation:  Boards should be evaluated annually to determine whether their performances have 
met the objectives set. The board as a whole, the board sub-committees, individual directors and the Chairman 
may form the targets for evaluation.   
 
1.7.10 Board Independence: This can be positively influenced by having a majority of outside (non-executive 
directors) who have no material interest in the company and who bring an objective and independent view.   
 
1.7.11 Board Processes:  This refers to such elements as the structure and functionality of board meetings; 
frequency and duration of meetings and board leadership. This is important to the function of an effective board 
and involves monitoring the CEO, approving strategic decision making, resource allocation and boundary 
spanning the influence of critical networks.  
 
1.7.12 Chairman/CEO Duality or Non-duality: Duality in this context refers to the practice of the Chairman 
of a board of a corporation also playing the role of Chief Executive Officer. Non-duality refers to the separation 
of both positions. 
 
1.7.13 Comply or explain:  A company should comply with the appropriate corporate governance code but if it 
cannot comply with any particular aspect of it, then it should explain why it is unable to do so based on Cadbury 
1992 recommendations.  
 
1.7.14 Controlling shareholders: Those who have control of the company, although this may be indirectly 
through their holdings in other entities, and not directly, or through connected parties such as spouses and other 
close family members.  
 
1.7.15 Corporate Governance: The voluntary and regulated actions of a corporate body in ensuring the 
highest level of transparency, accountability and probity in its operation.  It requires the Board of Directors to 
operate in a prudent manner to ensure maximum returns to shareholders and its wider stakeholders—society at 
large.   
 
1.7.16 Corporate Governance Codes: These are best practices established by corporations, international 
organizations, multination groupings and/or independent nation states. Classic examples of these best practices 
are the Cadbury Report (1992)—a British creation; OECD Principles and Guidelines; CalPERS Codes of 
Corporate Governance (public pension fund-serving employees of the State of California) and numerous National 
Codes established by different countries.   
 
1.7.17  Corporate Governance Practices:  These include issues concerning board composition, characteristics 
and attitude (board size, ratio of non-executive versus executive directors, types of board subcommittees, and 
chairmanship of committees, the separation or duality of the position of Chairman and CEO, etc.).  
 
1.7.18 Corporate Governance Structures: These are the regulatory institutions which reinforce good 
corporate governance such as Central Banks, Financial Services Commissions, Stock Exchanges; legal, judicial 
and regulatory instruments such as laws, regulations, industry-specific Codes of Best Practices, etc.  
 
1.7.19 Corporate Misdeed or (Sleaze): This refers to wrongdoing by corporate insiders (directors, 
management or staff) resulting from self-interest. Such activities include corruption, fraud, professional 
misconduct or any act that may be deemed a criminal offence or which might have criminal implications and 
resulted in the tarnishing of corporate reputation. 
 
1.7.20 Director Interlocking (or Interconnected Directorship): The concept of director interlocking refers to 
the practice in which one director holds multiple board seats across interconnected and at times competing 
companies. Its prevalence is not surprising given the methodology of choosing directors with knowledge and 
experience of a corporation’s business. However, the problem is that when an individual simultaneously serves as 
director (or officer) of two competing companies, he or she stumbles into prime opportunities for collusion.  
 
1.7.21 “Fat cats”:  Refers to executive or managerial classes in corporations who have sought to compensate 
themselves with what shareholders and the public may consider excessive salaries. These salaries are sometimes 
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authorized by boards of directors but have been known to attract severe public scrutiny only after someone, a 
shareholder, journalist or political figure places it in the public’s purview.    
 
1.7.22  Fiduciary duty:  This is an obligation to act in the best interests of another party, for example, directors 
have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the shareholders. 
 
1.7.23 Insider system:  Ownership of shares is concentrated in individuals, or a group of individuals such as 
families or holding companies. 
 
1.7.24 Institutional investors: Generally, large investors such as pension funds, insurance companies and 
mutual funds. 
 
1.7.25  Jamaican Financial Meltdown: This refers to the failure of many of Jamaica’s financial institutions in 
the 1990s which led to significant losses to depositors, investors and the government who had to implement a 
comprehensive program of intervention, rehabilitation and recovery. 
 
1.7.26 Lead Director (or Senior Director): The Cadbury Report advocates that when the two roles (Chairman 
and CEO) are combined, there should be a recognized senior, strong and independent element on the board. 
Going further than the Cadbury, the Hampel Committee added that whether or not the roles of Chairman and 
CEO were combined, there should be a clearly identified lead non-executive director. 
 
1.7.27 Outsider system:  There is dispersed ownership of shares and hence individuals, or groups of 
individuals, do not tend to have direct control. 
 
1.7.28  Poor or Ineffective Corporate Governance: Where corporate governance is poor or ineffective, the 
activities of management and directors have been known to come under severe public scrutiny, corporate 
reputational damage would have occurred and public trust in the particular institution eroded. 
 
1.7.29 Proxy Vote:  The casting of shareholders’ votes by shareholders, often by mail, fax, or electronic means. 
 
1.7.30  Qualitative Research: Qualitative research is at the other end of the spectrum in relation to quantitative 
research. The qualitative researcher seeks answers and explanations by becoming involved in the organizational 
contexts being studied through personal interaction and participation, case study analyses, ethnography and other 
non-hypothesis testing approaches. This approach requires probing, uncovering, unweaving, interpreting and 
understanding critical phenomena too complex to be assessed using quantitative analytical measures. 
 
1.7.31 Self-regulation:  Refers to the tendency of corporations to adopt existing corporate governance best 
practices for their own purposes and/or initiate and implement those of their own invention.   
 
1.7.32  Stakeholders:  Any individual or group on which the activities of the company have an impact, 
including the employees, customers, local community, the media, creditors, investors and the general public.  
 
1.7.33 Stakeholder Theory: This theory takes into account the views of a wider stakeholder group and not just 
the shareholders. 
1.7.34 Shareholder’s Recourse: Refers to restitution for shareholders who have suffered losses as a result of the 
failure of companies in which they have invested.  
 
1.7.35  Shareholder Value: The value of the firm after deducting current and future claims. 
 
1.7.36 Supervisory Board: In a dual or two-tier board system, the supervisory board oversees the direction of 
the business whilst the management board is responsible for the running of the business (see the German model 
of corporate governance).   
 
1.7.37  Transaction Cost Economics: Views the firm itself as a governance structure, which in turn can help 
align the interests of directors and shareholders. 
 
1.7.38 Unitary Board: A unitary board of directors is characterized by one single board comprising of both 
executive and non-executive directors. 
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APPENDIX 13: 
Criteria Framework for Jamaica Stock Exchange Best Practice Web Site  
(Listed Companies and Securities Brokers)-- Actual Scores for Case Companies Included  
 
  Max Conglomerate 
Merchant 
Bank 
Mutual 
Society 
Content (36%) 
  
   
Company's Information 5 4 4.5 4.5 
Macroeconomic Background 3 1.5 1.5 1 
Management Discussion and Analysis 5 4 3.5 3 
Timeliness of Information 7 5.5 4.5 n/a 
Relevance of Information 6 4 4.5 5 
List of Products and Services  2 1.5 1.5 2 
Events Schedule  2 2 0 2 
Disclosure of Corporate Social Responsibility  2 2 2 2 
Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices 4 4 2 4 
  36 28.5 24 23.5 
Usability (15%) 
  
   
Ease of Use of Navigation 3 3 3 3 
Consistent Navigation 3 3 3 3 
   Ease of Downloading and Printing Information 2 2 2 2 
   Use of Foreign Language Options 1 0 0 1 
Search Functionality 3 3 3 3 
  Help Functionality 3 0 2.5 3 
  15 11 13.5 15 
Interactive/Innovativeness (14%) 
  
   
Ability to receive feedback 3 1.5 2.5 3 
Use of Web Cast/Multimedia 2 1.5 0 2 
Allow for subscription of investors updates 3 1.5 2.5 3 
Company Announcements 6 6 4.5 6 
  14 10.5 9.5 14 
Presentation Style(25%) 
  
   
Aesthetic Appeal 6 4.5 3 5 
Use of Colour 4 3 3 3.5 
Font Size 3 3 2.5 2.5 
Layout and Spacing 4 3 3.5 3.5 
Clarity of Presentation 4 4 3.5 3 
Userfriendliness 4 4 3 4 
  25 21.5 18.5 21.5 
Functionality (10%) 
  
   
Loading Time 4 3 4 4 
Error Messages 2 1 1 1 
Cross Browser Compatibility 2 2 0 2 
Use of Common Technology 2 2 2 2 
  10 8 7 9 
Grand Total 100 79.5 72.5 83 
Source: JSE 2009. The scores are those furnished by the JSE for the Conglomerate and Merchant Bank 
while the Scores for the Mutual were generated by this researcher.  
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APPENDIX 14: 
THE JAMAICA NATIONAL BUILDING SOCIETY 
134th ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING 
AGENDA 
 
PARTICULARS 
a) Date:      Wednesday, November 19, 2008 
b) Location:     Jamaica National Building Society 
       Half-Way-Tree Branch 
       2-4 Constant Spring Road 
       Kingston 10 
c) Time:      4:00 p.m. 
 
1. CALL TO ORDER & WELCOME:  Chairman, Hon. Oliver F. Clarke O.J. 
2. PRAYER     Mrs. Rose Miller, Manager, JN Mail 
       & Courier Services 
3. NOTICE CONVENING THE MEETING 
 (Advertised in the Gleaner on the 24th day of October, 2008 in accordance with Rule 28(B) 
4. APOLOGIES FOR ABSENCE 
5. CONFIRMATION OF THE MINUTES OF ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING HELD ON TUESDAY, 
OCTOBER 30, 2007 
6. DIRECTORS’ REPORT AND PERFORMANCE HIGHLIGHTS: 
• Chairman, Hon. Oliver F. Clarke O.J. 
• General Manager, Mr. Earl Jarrett 
7. AUDITORS’ REPORT 
8. ADOPTION OF DIRECTORS’ REPORT AND STATEMENT OF ACCOUNTS FOR THE YEAR 
ENDED MARCH 31, 2008 
9. ELECTION OF DIRECTORS: 
  i) Mr. Peter Morris 
  ii) Mr. John Small 
iii) Dr. Dhiru Tanna 
10. APPOINTMENT OF AUDITORS – KPMG, Chartered Accountants 
11. ANY OTHER BUSINESS ARISING OUT OF THE FOREGOING 
12. ADJOURNMENT. 
THE JAMAICA NATIONAL BUILDING SOCIETY 
MINUTES OF THE 133rd ANNUAL GENEREL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS HELD ON 
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 2007 AT THE HALF-WAY-TREE BRANCH, 2-4 CONSTANT SPRING 
ROAD, KINGSTON 10 
PARTICULARS 
a) Date:       Tuesday, October 30, 2007 
b) Location:      Jamaica National Building Society 
        2-4 Constant Spring Road, 
        Kingston 10  
c) Time:       4:00 p.m. 
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1. CALL TO ORDER 
 The meeting was called to order at 4:00 pm by Chairman the Hon. Oliver F. Clarke, O.J. 
2. WELCOME & PRAYER 
 The Chairman welcomed the members present to the 133rd Annual General Meeting of the Society.  Mr. 
Ian Campbell, Collections Officer from the Society’s Mortgage Department commenced the meeting 
with a prayer. 
3.  NOTICE CONVENING THE MEETING 
 The Secretary confirmed that Notice of the meeting was first published in the Gleaner newspaper of 
September 6, 2006 in keeping with Rule 28(b) of the Rules of Society. 
4. APOLOGIES FOR ABSENCE 
 Apologies for absence were tendered on behalf of Director Mr. William Mahfood, former Director Noel 
Johnson and Mrs. Kathy Moss. 
5. CONFIRMATION OF MINUTES OF ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING HELD ON THURSDAY, 
SEPTEMBER 28, 2006 
6. INTRODUCTION OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
7. INTRODUCTION OF SENIOR MANAGEMENT 
 Introduction of Management Team 
8. DIRECTORS’ REPORT 
        Sections include: Introduction, Member Focus, Member Benefits, Communication  
 Channels,    
        Financial Performance, Products and Services and Subsidiaries 
9. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ARISING FROM THE PRESENTATION 
10. AUDITORS’ REPORT 
11. ADOPTION OF DIRECTORS’ REPORT AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
12. ELECTION OF DIRECTORS 
13. APPOINTMENT OF AUDITORS 
14. ANY OTHER BUSINESS 
Directors’ Fees 
15. COMMUNITY PROJECTS 
16. CHAIRMAN’S CLOSING REMARKS AND ADJOURNT.  
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APPENDIX 15: NON PARTICIPANT RESPONDENTS    
 
Mr. Ian Tomlinson -  Managing Director, Business Recovery Systems,  
Jamaica  
Mr. Anthony Johnson -  Jamaican Ambassador to Washington D.C., USA 
Mr. Andrew Holness -  Minister of Education, Jamaica  
Mr. Phillip Armstrong -  CEO, Global Corporate Governance   Forum, IFC, World Bank 
Mrs. Faith Innerarity- Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, 
Jamaica 
Mr. Donavon Stanberry - Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Jamaica  
Mr. Ian Neita   - CEO, Tourism Enhancement Fund, Jamaica  
Dr. Neville Duncan  -   Professor of Political Science and Economics, UWI,   Jamaica  
Mr. Berome Edwards  - Director of Financial Investigations Unit, Ministry of  
Finance and the Public Service, Jamaica 
Mrs. Elaine Foster-Hilton - Former Principal, Shortwood Teacher’s College  
Mr. Damian Crawford  - Former Guild President, University of the West Indies,  
  Mona     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
